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Profile: Martijn Blaauw (Delft University of Technology)
  1. Martijn Blaauw (2013). 4 Contrastive Belief. In , Contrastivism in Philosophy. Routledge. 39--88.
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  2. Martijn Blaauw (ed.) (2013). Contrastivism in Philosophy. Routledge.
    This volume brings together state-of-the-art research on the contrastive treatment of philosophical concepts and questions, including knowledge, belief, free will, moral luck, Bayesian confirmation theory, causation, and explanation.
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  3. Martijn Blaauw (2013). Introduction: Privacy, Secrecy and Epistemology. Episteme 10 (2):99-99.
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  4. Martijn Blaauw (2013). The Epistemic Account of Privacy. Episteme 10 (2):167-177.
    Privacy is valued by many. But what it means to have privacy remains less than clear. In this paper, I argue that the notion of privacy should be understood in epistemic terms. What it means to have (some degree of) privacy is that other persons do not stand in significant epistemic relations to those truths one wishes to keep private.
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  5. Martijn Blaauw (2012). Contrastive Belief. In , Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge.
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  6. Martijn Blaauw (ed.) (2012). Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge.
    Contrastivism can be applied to a variety of problems within philosophy, and as such, it can be coherently seen as a unified movement. This volume brings together state-of-the-art research on the contrastive treatment of philosophical concepts and questions, including knowledge, belief, free will, moral luck, Bayesian confirmation theory, causation, and explanation.
     
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  7. Martijn Blaauw (2012). Defending Contrastivism. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):59-64.
  8. Martijn Blaauw (2012). Introduction : Contrastivism in Philosophy. In , Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge.
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  9. Martijn Blaauw (2012). Reinforcing the Knowledge Account of Assertion. Analysis 72 (1):105-108.
    Many philosophers are building a solid case in favour of the knowledge account of assertion (KAA). According to KAA, if one asserts that P one represents oneself as knowing that P. KAA has recently received support from linguistic data about prompting challenges, parenthetical positioning and predictions. In this article, I add another argument to this rapidly growing list: an argument from what I will call ‘reinforcing parenthesis’.
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  10. Martijn Blaauw & Jeroen de Ridder (2012). Unsafe Assertions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):1-5.
    John Turri has recently provided two problem cases for the knowledge account of assertion (KAA) to argue for the express knowledge account of assertion (EKAA). We defend KAA by explaining away the intuitions about the problem cases and by showing that our explanation is theoretically superior to EKAA.
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  11. Martijn Blaauw (2009). The Nature of Divine Revelation. Heythrop Journal 50 (1):2-12.
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  12. Martijn Blaauw (2008). Contra Contrastivism. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):20-34.
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  13. Martijn Blaauw (2008). Contrastivism in Epistemology. Social Epistemology 22 (3):227 – 234.
    In this introduction to the special issue of Social Epistemology on epistemological contrastivism, I make some remarks on the history of contrastivism, describe three main versions of contrastivism, and offer a guide through the papers that compose this issue.
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  14. Martijn Blaauw (2008). Contesting Pyrrhonian Contrastivism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):471–477.
  15. Martijn Blaauw (2008). Epistemic Value, Achievements, and Questions. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):43-57.
    A central intuition many epistemologists seem to have is that knowledge is distinctively valuable. In his paper 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value', Duncan Pritchard rejects the virtue-theoretic explanation of this intuition. This explanation says that knowledge is distinctively valuable because it is a cognitive achievement. It is maintained, in the first place, that the arguments Pritchard musters against the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive achievement are unconvincing. It is argued, in the second place, that even (...)
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  16. Martijn Blaauw (2008). Subject Sensitive Invariantism: In Memoriam. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):318–325.
    Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. I argue that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I argue, furthermore, that semantic contextualism and contrastivism can accept this plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I conclude that semantic contextualism and contrastivism are in a dialectical position better than (...)
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  17. Martijn Blaauw (2007). Divorcing Theism From Infallibilism: A Reply to Robert Oakes. Religious Studies 43 (3):349-354.
    Robert Oakes has argued that theism defeats the 'doctrine of public-world fallibilism'. That is, Oakes has argued that theism supports infallibilism about public-world beliefs such as 'There is an olive on the floor', or 'I have two hands'. Given the enormous discussion of radical scepticism in the recent epistemological literature, this argument is well worth investigating. In this short note, however, I argue that the argument Oakes presents is unconvincing. The truth of theism does not support public-world infallibilism.
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  18. Martijn Blaauw (2007). Worship Me! A Reply to Brown and Nagasawa. Ratio 20 (2):236–240.
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  19. Martijn Blaauw (2006). Belief and Pretense: A Reply to Gendler. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):204-209.
    In cases of imaginative contagion, imagining something has doxastic or doxastic-like consequences. In this reply to Tamar Szabó Gendler's article in this collection, I investigate what the philosophical consequences of these cases could be. I argue (i) that imaginative contagion has consequences for how we should understand the nature of imagination and (ii) that imaginative contagion has consequences for our understanding of what belief-forming mechanisms there are. Along the way, I make some remarks about what the consequences of the contagion (...)
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  20. José Luis Bermudez, Martijn Blaauw, Ruth M. J. Byrne, C. Casadio, P. J. Scott, R. A. G. Seely, R. G. Collingwood, Earl Conee, Theodore Sider & Ian Dearden (2005). Appearance in This List Neither Guarantees nor Precludes a Future Review of the Book. Bartsch, Renate, Memory and Understanding: Concept Formation in Proust's A la Recher-Che du Temps Perdu, Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamin's Publishing Company, 2005, Pp. Ix+ 158, $114.00,€ 95.00. Bermudez, Jose Luis, Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction, London. [REVIEW] Mind 114:456.
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  21. Martijn Blaauw (2005). Challenging Contextualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):127-146.
    In order to explain such puzzling cases as the Bank Case and the Airport Case, semantic contextualists defend two theses. First, that the truth-conditions of knowledge sentences fluctuate in accordance with features of the conversational context. Second, that this fluctuation can be explained by the fact that 'knows' is an indexical. In this paper, I challenge both theses. In particular, I argue (i) that it isn't obvious that 'knows' is an indexical at all, and (ii) that contrastivism can do the (...)
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  22. Martijn Blaauw (2003). Een verdediging van de mogelijkheid van wonderen. Bijdragen 64 (2):165-178.
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  23. Martijn Blaauw (2003). WAMming Away at Contextualism. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):88-97.
    Contextualism is a quite popular research program nowadays. In essence, the contextualist holds that the truth conditions of knowledge attributing and of knowledge denying sentences vary in accordance with the context in which the sentences are uttered. This theory is positively motivated by its (alleged) capability of best explaining certain intuitions we have about knowledge attributions and knowledge denials. In this paper, I will argue that this positive motivation isn't as compelling as the contextualists think it to be. This I (...)
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