9 found
Sort by:
  1. Martin L. Jönsson & Elias Assarsson (forthcoming). A Problem for Confirmation Theoretic Accounts of the Conjunction Fallacy. Philosophical Studies:1-13.
    This paper raises a principled objection against the idea that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used to explain the conjunction fallacy. The paper demonstrates that confirmation-based explanations are limited in scope and can only be applied to cases of the fallacy of a certain restricted kind. In particular; confirmation-based explanations cannot account for the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered form of the conjunction fallacy. Once the problem has been set out, the paper explores four different ways for the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Martin L. Jönsson, Ulrike Hahn & Erik J. Olsson (2015). The Kind of Group You Want to Belong To: Effects of Group Structure on Group Accuracy. Cognition 142:191-204.
    There has been much interest in group judgment and the so-called 'wisdom of crowds'. In many real world contexts, members of groups not only share a dependence on external sources of information, but they also communicate with one another, thus introducing correlations among their responses that can diminish collective accuracy. This has long been known, but it has-to date-not been examined to what extent different kinds of communication networks may give rise to systematically different effects on accuracy. We argue that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Martin L. Jönsson (2014). Semantic Holism and Language Learning. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):725-759.
    Holistic theories of meaning have, at least since Dummett’s Frege: The Philosophy of language, been assumed to be problematic from the perspective of the incremental nature of natural language learning. In this essay I argue that the general relationship between holism and language learning is in fact the opposite of that claimed by Dummett. It is only given a particular form of language learning, and a particular form of holism, that there is a problem at all; in general, for all (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Martin L. Jönsson (2013). A Reliabilism Built on Cognitive Convergence: An Empirically Grounded Solution to the Generality Problem. Episteme 10 (3):241-268.
    Process-reliabilist analyses of justification and knowledge face the generality problem. Recent discussion of this problem turns on certain untested empirical assumptions that this paper investigates. Three experiments are reported: two are free-naming studies that support the existence of a basic level in the previously unexplored domain of names for belief-forming processes; the third demonstrates that reliability judgments for the basic-level belief-forming process types are very strongly correlated with the corresponding justification and knowledge judgments. I argue that these results lend support (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Martin L. Jönsson (2013). Linguistic Convergence in Verbs for Belief-Forming Processes. Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):114-138.
    This paper has two goals. First, it aims to investigate the empirical assumptions of a recent proposal due to Olsson (forthcoming), according to which the generality problem for process-reliabilism can be approached by recruiting patterns and models from the basic-level research in cognitive psychology. Second, the paper attempts to generalize findings in the basic-level literature pertaining to concrete nouns to the abstract verbs that denote belief-forming processes. I will demonstrate that verbs for belief-forming processes exhibit the kind of linguistic convergence (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Martin L. Jönsson & Elias Assarsson (2013). Shogenji's Measure of Justification and the Inverse Conjunction Fallacy. Synthese 190 (15):3075-3085.
    This paper takes issue with a recent proposal due to Shogenji (Synthese 184:29–48, 2012). In his paper, Shogenji introduces J, a normatively motivated formal measure of justification (and of confirmation), and then proceeds to recruit it descriptively in an explanation of the conjunction fallacy. We argue that this explanation is undermined by the fact that it cannot be extended in any natural way to the inverse conjunction fallacy, a more recently discovered, closely related fallacy. We point out that since the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Erik J. Olsson & Martin L. Jönsson (2011). Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs: Reply to Jäger on Reliabilism and the Value Problem. Theoria 77 (3):214-222.
    We reply to Christoph Jäger's criticism of the conditional probability solution (CPS) to the value problem for reliabilism due to Goldman and Olsson (2009). We argue that while Jäger raises some legitimate concerns about the compatibility of CPS with externalist epistemology, his objections do not in the end reduce the plausibility of that solution.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Martin L. Jönsson & James A. Hampton (2008). On Prototypes as Defaults (Comment on Connolly, Fodor, Gleitman and Gleitman, 2007). Cognition 106 (2):913-923.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Martin L. Jönsson & Ingar Brinck (2005). Compositionality and Other Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Language An Interview with Jerry Fodor. Theoria 71 (4):294-308.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation