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  1. Martin Montminy & Andrew Russo, A Defense of Causal Invariantism.
    [Under Review] Causal contextualism holds that sentences of the form ‘c causes e’ have context-sensitive truth-conditions. Contextualists argue that how one describes the relata of a causal relation affects the truth of one’s claim. We show that this argument appeals to the wrong kind of nominals to denote events; when proper nominals are used, the data actually favor invariantism over contextualism. Second, contextualists invoke the phenomenon of contrastive focus to argue that causal statements implicitly designate salient alternatives to the cause (...)
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  2. Martin Montminy (2013). Explaining Dubious Assertions. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):825-830.
    David Sosa argues that the knowledge account of assertion is unsatisfactory, because it cannot explain the oddness of what he calls dubious assertions. One such dubious assertion is of the form ‘P but I do not know whether I know that p.’ Matthew Benton has attempted to show how proponents of the knowledge account can explain what’s wrong this assertion. I show that Benton’s explanation is inadequate, and propose my own explanation of the oddness of this dubious assertion. I also (...)
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  3. Martin Montminy (2013). The Role of Context in Contextualism. Synthese 190 (12):2341-2366.
    According to a view widely held by epistemic contextualists, the truth conditions of a knowledge claim depend on features of the context such as the presuppositions, interests and purposes of the conversational participants. Against this view, I defend an intentionalist account, according to which the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution are determined by the speaker’s intention. I show that an intentionalist version of contextualism has several advantages over its more widely accepted rival account.
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  4. Martin Montminy (2013). Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must Be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):57-68.
    I argue that assertion and practical reasoning must be governed by the same epistemic norm. This is because the epistemic rule governing assertion derives from the epistemic rule governing practical reasoning, together with a plausible rule regarding assertion, according to which assertion must manifest belief.
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  5. Martin Montminy (2012). Epistemic Modals and Indirect Weak Suggestives. Dialectica 66 (4):583-606.
    I defend a contextualist account of bare epistemic modal claims against recent objections. I argue that in uttering a sentence of the form ‘It might be that p,’ a speaker is performing two speech acts. First, she is (directly) asserting that in view of the knowledge possessed by some relevant group, it might be that p. The content of this first speech act is accounted for by the contextualist view. But the speaker's utterance also generates an indirect speech act that (...)
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  6. Martin Montminy (2011). Indeterminacy, Incompleteness, Indecision, and Other Semantic Phenomena. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):73-98.
    This paper explores the relationships between Davidson's indeterminacy of interpretation thesis and two semantic properties of sentences that have come to be recognized recently, namely semantic incompleteness and semantic indecision.1 More specifically, I will examine what the indeterminacy thesis entails for sentences of the form 'By sentence S (or word w), agent A means that m' and 'Agent A believes that p.' My primary goal is to shed light on the indeterminacy thesis and its consequences. I will distinguish two kinds (...)
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  7. Martin Montminy (2010). Analyticity and Translation. Principia 7 (1-2):147-170.
    Quine’s negative theses about meaning and analyticity are well known, but he also defends a positive account of these notions. I explain what his nega-tive and positive views are, and argue that Quine’s positive account of meaning entails that two of his most famous doctrines, namely the claim that there are no analytic statements and the indeterminacy of translation thesis, are false. But I show that the falsity of these doctrines doesn’t affect his criti-cisms of traditional conceptions of meaning. This (...)
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  8. Martin Montminy (2010). Two Contextualist Fallacies. Synthese 173 (3):317 - 333.
    I examine the radical contextualists’ two main arguments for the semantic underdeterminacy thesis, according to which all, or almost all, English sentences lack context-independent truth conditions. I show that both arguments are fallacious. The first argument, which I call the fallacy of the many understandings , mistakenly infers that a sentence S is semantically incomplete from the fact that S can be used to mean different things in different contexts. The second argument, which I call the open texture fallacy , (...)
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  9. Martin Montminy (2009). Contextualism, Invariantism and Semantic Blindness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):639-657.
    Epistemic contextualism, many critics argue, entails that ordinary speakers are blind to the fact that knowledge claims have context-sensitive truth conditions. This attribution of blindness, critics add, seriously undermines contextualism. I show that this criticism and, in general, discussions about the error theory entailed by contextualism, greatly underestimates the complexity and diversity of the data about ordinary speakers? inter-contextual judgments, as well as the range of explanatory moves that are open to both invariantists and contextualists concerning such judgments. Contextualism does (...)
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  10. Martin Montminy (2009). Contextualism, Disagreement and Communication. Manuscrito 32 (1).
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  11. Martin Montminy (2009). Contextualism, Relativism and Ordinary Speakers' Judgments. Philosophical Studies 143 (3):341 - 356.
    Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism, like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.
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  12. Martin Montminy (2008). Can Contextualists Maintain Neutrality? Philosophers' Imprint 8 (7):1-13.
    Abstract: Several critics of contextualism claim that this view cannot consistently maintain its advertised neutrality between skepticism and anti-skepticism. Some critics contend that contextualists are forced to side with the skeptic, since any defense of contextualism unavoidably puts in place the skeptic's high requirements for knowledge; others hold that the contextualists' claim to have knowledge of what their own view entails forces them to reject the skeptic's knowledge denial. I show that these arguments misconstrue the role of context in contextualism, (...)
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  13. Martin Montminy (2008). Cheap Knowledge and Easy Questions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):127-146.
    Contrastivism is the idea that knowledge is question-relative: to know is to be able to answer a contextually salient question. Constrastivism's main selling point is that it promises to respect ordinary speakers' judgments about knowledge claims made in various contexts. I show that contrastivism fails to fulfill this promise, and argue that the view I call epistemic pluralism does much better in this respect.
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  14. Martin Montminy (2008). Contextualist Resolutions of Philosophical Debates. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):571-590.
    Abstract: Despite all the critical scrutiny they have received recently, contextualist views in philosophy are still not well understood. Neither contextualists nor their opponents have been entirely clear about what contextualist theses amount to and what they are based on. In this article I show that there are actually two kinds of contextualist view that rest on two very different semantic phenomena, namely, semantic incompleteness and semantic indeterminacy . I explain how contextualist approaches can be used to dissolve certain debates (...)
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  15. Martin Montminy (2008). Supervaluationism, Validity and Necessarily Borderline Sentences. Analysis 68 (297):61–67.
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  16. Martin Montminy (2007). Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction. Synthese 155 (1):99 - 125.
    Contextualism, in its standard form, is the view that the truth conditions of sentences of the form ‘S knows that P’ vary according to the context in which they are uttered. One possible objection to contextualism appeals to what Keith DeRose calls a warranted assertability maneuver (or WAM), according to which it is not our knowledge sentences themselves that have context-sensitive truth conditions, but what is pragmatically conveyed by the use of such sentences. Thus, proponents of WAMs argue, the context (...)
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  17. Martin Montminy (2007). Moral Contextualism and the Norms for Moral Conduct. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (1):1 - 13.
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  18. Martin Montminy (2006). Review: Semantic Content, Truth Conditions and Context. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (1):1 - 26.
  19. Martin Montminy (2006). Truth and Predication. Dialogue 45 (4):774-777.
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  20. Martin Montminy (2006). Truth and Predication Donald Davidson Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, X + 180 Pp. [REVIEW] Dialogue 45 (04):774-.
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  21. Martin Montminy (2005). A Non-Compositional Inferential Role Theory. Erkenntnis 62 (2):211-233.
    I propose a version of inferential role theory which says that having a concept is having the disposition to draw most of the inferences based on the stereotypical features associated with this concept. I defend this view against Fodor and Lepore.
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  22. Martin Montminy (2005). Holisme, Référence Et Irréductibilité du Mental. Dialogue 44 (3):419-437.
    J’examine en détail l’argument vaguement suggéré par Davidson selon lequel le holisme entraînerait l’irreductibilité du mental. Je défends cet argument contre deux objections souvent faites contre des arguments visant à dériver des thèses métaphysiques à partir de prémisses portant sur nos critères ordinaires d’application de nos termes. J’invoque la sémantique bidimensionnelle pour expliquer les liensentre ces critères et les questions touchant la référence et la réduction. Je montre comment l’irréductibilité du mental dérive du caractère holiste et flexible des critères d’attribution (...)
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  23. Martin Montminy (2005). Introduction : Interprétation et interprétationnismes. Philosophiques 32 (1):3-17.
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  24. Martin Montminy (2005). L'interprétationnisme Radical. Philosophiques 32 (1):191-206.
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  25. Martin Montminy (2005). Meaning Skepticism and Normativity. Journal of Philosophical Research 30:215-235.
    Saul Kripke has raised a powerful skeptical objection to an account of meaning based on dispositions. He argues that attempts to explain meaning on the basis of dispositions, no matter how sophisticated, are bound to fail because meaning is normative, whereas dispositions are descriptive. I provide a clear account of the normativity objection, which has often been seen as obscure or been conflated with other objections Kripke raises. I offer a straight solution to the skeptical paradox based on a dispositional (...)
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  26. Martin Montminy (2005). Questions D'Interprétation. Philosophiques 32 (1).
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  27. Martin Montminy (2005). What Use is Morgan's Canon? Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):399-414.
    Morgan's canon can be construed as claiming that an intentional explanation of a behavior should be ruled out if there exists an explanation of this behavior in terms of 'lower' mechanisms. Unfortunately, Morgan's conception of higher and lower faculties is based on dubious evolutionary considerations. I examine alternative interpretations of the terms 'higher' and 'lower', and show that none can turn the canon into a principle that is both correct and useful in drawing the line between thinkers and non-thinkers. In (...)
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  28. Martin Montminy (2003). À propos d'une objection contre le naturalisme modéré. Philosophiques 30 (2):411-415.
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  29. Martin Montminy (2003). Réponse à Delpla. Dialogue 42 (01):137-.
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  30. Martin Montminy (2003). Triangulation, Objectivity and the Ambiguity Problem (Triangulación, Objetividad y El Problema de la Ambigüedad). Crítica 35 (105):25 - 48.
    Davidson claims that a creature that has spent its entire life in isolation cannot have thoughts. His two reasons for this claim are that (i) interaction with another creature (what he calls "triangulation") is required to locate the cause of the creature's responses, and that (ii) linguistic communication is necessary to acquire the concept of objective truth, which is itself required in order to have thoughts. I argue that, at best, these two reasons imply that in order to have thoughts (...)
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  31. Martin Montminy (2002). Normativité Et Irréductibilité du Mental. Dialectica 56 (4):315–333.
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  32. Martin Montminy (2001). Posséder Un Concept Selon Peacocke. Dialogue 40 (02):219-.
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  33. Éric Grillo & Martin Montminy (2000). Martin Montminy, les Fondements Empiriques de la Signification. Philosophiques 27 (1):187-206.
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  34. Martin Montminy (2000). Réponse à Éric Grillo. Philosophiques 27 (1):203-206.
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  35. Martin Montminy (2000). Sémantique Et Vérité. De Tarski à Davidson François Rivenc Collection «Philosophies» Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1998, 128 P. [REVIEW] Dialogue 39 (02):394-.
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  36. Martin Montminy (2000). Sémantique Et Vérité. De Tarski à Davidson. Dialogue 39 (2):394-396.
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  37. Martin Montminy (1999). Fodor's Very Deep Thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):595-618.
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  38. Martin Montminy (1997). Two Indeterminacies. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (3):339-362.
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  39. Martin Montminy (1996). Les Conditions de L'Interprétation. Dialogue 35 (03):505-.
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  40. Martin Montminy (1992). Indétermination de la Traduction Et Sous-Détermination des Théories Scientifiques. Dialogue 31 (04):623-.
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  41. Martin Montminy (1990). Logique et comportement verdictif. Logique Et Analyse 33 (132):295-309.
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