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  1. Fiona Macpherson, Martine Nida-Rümelin & Fabian Dorsch (eds.) (forthcoming). Phenomenal Presence.
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  2. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2013). La nozione di soggetto cosciente e la sua base fenomenologica nell'autocoscienza preriflessiva. Rivista di Filosofia 104 (3):485-504.
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  3. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2013). The Argument for Subject Body Dualism From Transtemporal Identity Defended. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):702-714.
    In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannot be used for the argument either. The discussion of this (...)
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  4. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2013). The Notion of a Conscious Subject and its Phenomenological Basis in Prereflexive Self-Awareness. Rivista di Filosofia 104 (3):485-504.
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  5. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2011). Phenomenal Presence and Perceptual Awareness: A Subjectivist Account of Perceptual Openness to the World1. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):352-383.
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  6. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2010). Buchkritik Subjektivität. Wissen von innen. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (6):1001-1005.
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  7. Martine Nida-Rumelin (2010). Thinking Without Language. A Phenomenological Argument for Its Possibility and Existence. Grazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1):55-75.
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  8. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2010). What About the Emergence of Consciousness Deserves Puzzlement? In Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge. 6--149.
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  9. Martine Nida-Rumelin (2009). An Argument From Transtemporal Identity for Subject-Body Dualism. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
     
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  10. Martine Nida-rümelin & Juan Suarez (2009). Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims About Phenomenal Structure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):346-391.
    We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We (...)
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  11. Juan Suarez & Martine Nida-Rümelin (2009). Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims About Phenomenal Structure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):346-391.
    We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We (...)
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  12. Juan Suarez & Martine Nida-Rumelin (2009). Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims About Phenomenal Structure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2):346 - 391.
    We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We (...)
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  13. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2008). Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience. In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. The Mit Press. 309--324.
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  14. Martine Nida-Rümelin, Qualia: The Knowledge Argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  15. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2008). Transtemporale Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 56 (4):513-534.
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  16. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2007). Doings and Subject Causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2):255 - 272.
    In the center of this paper is a phenomenological claim: we experience ourselves in our own doings and we experience others when we perceive them in their doings as active in the sense of being a cause of the corresponding physical event. These experiences are fundamental to the way we view ourselves and others. It is therefore desirable for any philosophical theory to be compatible with the content of these experiences and thus to avoid the attribution of radical and permanent (...)
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  17. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2007). Dualist Emergentism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
     
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  18. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2007). Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):429–455.
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  19. Vivian Mizrahi & Martine Nida-Rumelin (2006). Introduction. Dialectica 60 (3):209-222.
  20. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2006). A Puzzle About Colors. Dialectica 60 (3):321–336.
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  21. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2006). Der Blick von Innen: Zur Transtemporalen Identität Bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen. Suhrkamp.
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  22. Martine Nida-Rumelin (2006). Grasping Phenomenal Properties. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property is (...)
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  23. Martine Nida-Rumelin (2006). Phenomenal Belief and Phenomenal Concepts. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Maci (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford University Press.
     
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  24. Martine Nida-Rumelin (2004). Phenomenal Essentialism: A Problem for Identity Theorists. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present. Mentis.
  25. Martine Nida-Rumelin & Achill Schnetzer, Unique Hues, Binary Hues, and Phenomenal Composition.
     
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  26. Martine Nida-Rumelin, Qualia: The Knowledge Argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  27. Martine Nida-Rumelin, The Knowledge Argument. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  28. Martine Nida-Rümelin (2001). Identité transtemporelle et attribution de propriétés futures. Studia Philosophica 60:33-52.
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  29. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1999). Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Science: A Reply to Peter Ross. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):571-574.
  30. Martine Nida-Rümelin (1999). Intrinsic Phenomenal Properties in Color Vision Science: A Reply to Peter Ross. Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):571-574.
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  31. Martine Nida-Rümelin (1999). Normal, Pseudonormal, and Color-Blind Vision: Cases of Justified Phenomenal Belief. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):965-965.
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  32. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1999). Pseudonormal Vision and Color Qualia. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III. MIT Press.
     
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  33. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1998). On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.
    The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief-about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated-as usual-using the locution of `knowing what it's like' but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why `knowing what it's like' does not serve the purposes of those who wish to defend the (...)
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  34. Martine Nida-Rümelin (1998). On Belief About Experiences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.
    The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief---about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated---as usual---using the locution of ‘knowing what it’s like’ but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why ‘knowing what it's like’ does not serve the purposes of those who wish to defend the (...)
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  35. Martine Nida-Rümelin (1998). On Belief About Experiences. An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51 - 73.
    The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief-about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated-as usual-using the locution of `knowing what it's like' but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why `knowing what it's like' does not serve the purposes of those who wish to defend the (...)
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  36. Martine Nida-Rümelin (1998). Zur Abhängigkeit transtemporaler, personaler Identität von empirischen Beziehungen. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 52 (2):171 - 194.
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  37. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1997). Chisholm on Personal Identity and the Attribution of Experiences. In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court.
     
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  38. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1997). Is the Naturalization of Qualitative Experience Possible or Sensible? In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind. Pittsburgh University Press.
     
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  39. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1997). On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):51-73.
  40. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1997). The Character of Color Predicates: A Phenomenalist View. In M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes. CSLI Press.
     
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  41. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1996). Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion? Philosophical Studies 82 (2):145-57.
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  42. Martine Nida-Rümelin (1996). Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion? Philosophical Studies 82 (2):145 - 157.
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  43. Martine Nida-Rumelin (1995). What Mary Couldn't Know: Belief About Phenomenal States. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh. 219--41.
  44. Martine Nida-Rümelin (1993). Probability and Direct Reference. Erkenntnis 39 (1):51-78.
    I discuss three puzzles of probability theory which seem connected with problems of direct reference and rigid designation. The resolution of at least one of them requires referential use of definite descriptions in probability statements. I argue that contrary to common opinion all these puzzles are in a way still unsolved: They seem to exemplify cases in which a change of probabilities is rationally required, even though any specific change presupposes unjustified assumptions.
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  45. Martine Nida-Rümelin (1993). Probability and Direct Reference: Three Puzzles of Probability Theory: The Problem of the Two Boys, Freund's Problem and the Problem of the Three Prisoners. Erkenntnis 39 (1):51 - 78.
    I discuss three puzzles of probability theory which seem connected with problems of direct reference and rigid designation. The resolution of at least one of them requires referential use of definite descriptions in probability statements. I argue that contrary to common opinion all these puzzles are in a way still unsolved: They seem to exemplify cases in which a change of probabilities is rationally required, even though any specific change presupposes unjustified assumptions.
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  46. Martine Nida-Rümelin (1990). In Defense of Mentalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 37:217-220.
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