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  1. Marya Schechtman (forthcoming). Misunderstandings Understood. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):47-50.
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  2. Marya Schechtman (2014). Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life. Oup Oxford.
    Marya Schechtman offers a new theory of personal identity, which captures the importance of being able to reidentify people in our daily lives. She sees persons as loci of practical interaction, and defines the unity of such a locus in terms of biological, psychological, and social functions, mediated through social and cultural infrastructure.
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  3. Marya Schechtman (2012). The Story of My (Second) Life: Virtual Worlds and Narrative Identity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Technology 25 (3):329-343.
    Abstract A small but significant number of residents of Second Life (SL) insist that SL is as real to them as Real Life (RL) and that their SL avatars are as much themselves as their offscreen selves. This paper investigates whether this claim can be literally true in any philosophically interesting way. Using a narrative account of personal identity I argue that there is a way of understanding these identity claims according to which the actions and experiences of the offscreen (...)
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  4. Marya Schechtman (2011). The Narrative Self. In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oup Oxford.
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  5. Marya Schechtman (2010). Memory and Identity. Philosophical Studies 153 (1):65-79.
    Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity. Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I (...)
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  6. Marya Schechtman (2010). Personhood and the Practical. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):271-283.
    Traditionally, it has been assumed that metaphysical and practical questions about personhood and personal identity are inherently linked. Neo-Lockean views that draw such a link have been problematic, leading to an opposing view that metaphysical and ethical questions about persons should be sharply distinguished. This paper argues that consideration of this issue suffers from an overly narrow conception of the practical concerns associated with persons that focuses on higher-order capacities and fails to appreciate basic practical concerns more directly connected to (...)
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  7. Marya Schechtman (2010). Philosophical Reflections on Narrative and Deep Brain Stimulation. Journal of Clinical Ethics 21 (2):133.
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  8. Marya Schechtman (2009). Getting Our Stories Straight : Self-Narrative and Personal Identity. In Debra J. H. Mathews, Hilary Bok & Peter V. Rabins (eds.), Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience. Johns Hopkins University Press.
  9. Marya Schechtman (2008). Diversity in Unity: Practical Unity and Personal Boundaries. Synthese 162 (3):405 - 423.
    In the spirit of the discussion in Daniel Kolak’s I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundation for Global Ethics, I consider the way in which divisions that we usually think of as borders between distinct people occur within a single life. Starting with the dispute between constructionist and non-constructionist views of persons, I argue for a view that places the unity of persons in the dynamic generated by simultaneously taking a constructionist and non-constructionist view of oneself. In order to unify ourselves (...)
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  10. Marya Schechtman (2008). Staying Alive: Personal Continuation and a Life Worth Having. In Kim Atkins & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. Routledge. 31--55.
     
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  11. Marya Schechtman (2007). Stories, Lives, and Basic Survival: A Refinement and Defense of the Narrative View. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (60):155-.
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  12. Marya Schechtman (2006). David DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics:Human Identity and Bioethics. Ethics 116 (2):406-409.
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  13. Marya Schechtman (2006). J. David Velleman, Self to Self: Selected Essays:Self to Self: Selected Essays. Ethics 117 (1):160-164.
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  14. Marya Schechtman (2005). Community, Consciousness, and Dynamic Self-Understanding. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. Special Issue 12 (1):27-29.
  15. Marya Schechtman (2005). Experience, Agency, and Personal Identity. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):1-24.
    Psychologically based accounts of personal identity over time start from a view of persons as experiencing subjects. Derek Parfit argues that if such an account is to justify the importance we attach to identity it will need to provide a deep unity of consciousness throughout the life of a person, and no such unity is possible. In response, many philosophers have switched to a view of persons as essentially agents, arguing that the importance of identity depends upon agential unity rather (...)
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  16. Marya Schechtman (2005). Personal Identity and the Past. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):9-22.
  17. Marya Schechtman (2004). Self‐Expression and Self‐Control. Ratio 17 (4):409-427.
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  18. Marya Schechtman (2004). Personality and Persistence: The Many Faces of Personal Survival. American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (2):87-106.
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  19. Marya Schechtman (2001). Book Review. Self-Concern: An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival Raymond Martin. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):504-507.
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  20. Marya Schechtman (2001). Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Identity. Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):95 – 111.
    Philosophical discussions of personal identity depend upon thought experiments which describe psychological vicissitudes and question whether the original person survives in the person resulting from the described change. These cases are meant to determine the types of psychological change compatible with personal continuation. Two main accounts of identity try to capture this distinction; psychological continuity theories and narrative theories. I argue that neither fully succeeds since both overlook the importance of a relationship I call “empathic access.” I define empathic access (...)
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  21. David Turnbull, Henry Krips, Val Dusek, Steve Fuller, Alan Sokal, Jean Bricmont, Alan Frost, Alan Chalmers, Anna Salleh, Alfred I. Tauber, Yvonne Luxford, Nicolaas Rupke, Steven French, Peter G. Brown, Hugh LaFollette, Peter Machamer, Nicolas Rasmussen, Andy J. Miller, Marya Schechtman, Ross S. West, John Forge, David Oldroyd, Nancy Demand, Darrin W. Belousek, Warren Schmaus, Sungook Hong, Rachel A. Ankeny, Peter Anstey, Jeremy Butterfield & Harshi Gunawardena (2000). Clarity, Charity and Criticism, Wit, Wisdom and Worldliness: Avoiding Intellectual Impositions. [REVIEW] Metascience 9 (3):347-498.
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  22. Marya Schechtman (1999). Carol Rovane, The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics:The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Ethics 109 (4):919-922.
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  23. Marya Schechtman (1997). The Brain/Body Problem. Philosophical Psychology 10 (2):149 – 164.
    It is a commonplace of contemporary thought that the mind is located in the brain. Although there have been some challenges to this view, it has remained mainstream outside of a few specialized discussions, and plays a prominent role in a wide variety of philosophical arguments. It is further assumed that the source of this view is empirical. I argue it is not. Empirical discoveries show conclusively that the brain is the central organ of mental life, but do not show (...)
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  24. Marya Schechtman (1996). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 105 (420):699-703.
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  25. Marya Schechtman (1996). The Constitution of Selves. Cornell University Press.
    Marya Schechtman takes issue with analytic philosophy's emphasis on the first sort of question to the exclusion of the second.
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  26. Marya Schechtman (1996). The Story of the Mind: Psychological and Biological Explanations of Human Behavior. Zygon 31 (4):597-614.
  27. Marya Schechtman (1994). 184 Philosophical Abstracts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2).
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  28. Marya Schechtman (1994). The Same and the Same: Two Views of Psychological Continuity. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (3):199-212.
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  29. Marya Schechtman (1991). Mind and Materialism. International Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):130-131.
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  30. Marya Schechtman (1991). Philip J. Regal, The Anatomy of Judgement Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 11 (1):62-64.
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  31. Marya Schechtman (1990). Personhood and Personal Identity. Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):71-92.
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