Modern science faces a series of problems that undermine confidence in its reliability. To solve these problems, we must reflect on what makes science work and what leads it astray. This book is about Science, its strengths and weaknesses. The papers that scientists write form a vast resource of evidence and theory that is doubling about every ten years, along with the number of scientists. The size of this resource makes it hard for it to be used effectively by scientists, (...) and along with this are growing concerns about its integrity and reliability. This book looks at the scientific method, as currently applied and as understood philosophically by scientists, the social structure of science, and the structure of scientific communication through journals. It includes case studies of controversies, and looks at how fields develop over time. (shrink)

In the religious controversies of the English Revolution (1640-60), one problem became particularly urgent. How far were the Scriptures to be accepted as a faithful record of history? Much ink was spilled over the theoretical and practical problems of evidence and testimony and there swiftly developed an increasing self-consciousness and sophistication about the meaning of "matter of fact." This paper describes the response to skeptics and dogmatists of such moderate divines as Henry Hammond, Seth Ward, Richard Baxter, and Brian (...) Walton, and the way in which they attempted to construct a defense of the Biblical story—incidentally helping to defend the claims of history in general. (shrink)

Some works of literature are compromised because their authors get the facts wrong. In other works deviations from the facts don’t seem to matter, and authors quite legitimately make things up. This paper gives an account of the various ways in which matters of fact can make a difference to the aesthetic value of works of literature. It concludes by showing how this account can be applied in determining when a concern with matters of fact is (...) an important part of literary criticism and when it is merely pedantic. (shrink)

At the end of Matters of Exchange , Harold Cook's major revisionist account of the early modern scientific revolution, he locates the political and economic writings of Bernard Mandeville within the practices and values of contemporaneous Dutch observational medicine. Like Mandeville, Cook describes the potency of early modern capitalism and its attendant value system in generating industry and knowledge; like Mandeville, Cook finds coercive systems of moral regulation to be mistaken in their estimation of human capacities; and like Mandeville, (...) Cook does not shy away from the violence that often made the worldwide commerce in matters of fact possible. “Every Part was full of Vice,” famously rhymed Mandeville, “Yet the whole Mass a Paradise.” The practices and values of science, this book suggests, stemmed from the vices of the merchant and the consumer, not the sprezzatura of the baroque courtier, the asceticism of the Christian gentleman, the speculation of the university philosopher, or the dour appraisal of the theologian. Interest, not claims to disinterest, made modern science and its attendant values possible. Scrupulous attention to goods from around the world and right at home created the conditions for natural knowledge. (shrink)

We discuss the justification of Bickle's “ruthless” reductionism. Bickle intends to show that we know enough about neurons to draw conclusions about the “whole” brain and about the mind. However, his reductionism does not take into account the complexity of the nervous system and the fact that new properties emerge at each significant level of integration from the coupled functioning of elementary components. From a methodological point of view, we argue that neuronal and cognitive models have to exert a (...) mutual constraint(MC) on each other. This approach would refuse to award any priority of cognitive approaches over neuroscience, and reciprocally, to refuse any priority of neuroscience over cognitive approaches. MC thus argues against radicalreductionism at the methodological level. (shrink)

My remarks in this brief commentary focus on Chris Calvert-Minor’s (2014) article on Karen Barad’s philosophical writings, and are only indirectly relevant to an assessment of Barad’s work. I have limited acquaintance with Barad’s writings, and even less with Nils Bohr’s. Barad explicitly borrows from Bohr’s theoretical writings when developing her version of feminist epistemology. Barad’s recruitment of Bohr to support her philosophy creates a dilemma for me and other readers who are not conversant with Bohr’s physics/philosophy. To my understanding, (...) the general lessons that Barad draws from Bohr about physical phenomena seem roughly in line with Husserl’s conception of phenomena or Merleau-Ponty’s account of “the intertwining,”Barad is not the first to identify a phenomenological position with a feminist standpoint (see Smith 1992). Although she refers to the tendency to feminize “nature” as the passive object of science, she distinguishes her feminist view of “nature as agent” from. (shrink)

In some part, the ideas presented here are anticipated in a paper by Frank Tillman, through I present a broader theory intended to have utility in connection with the theory of truth.

Summary Descartes' two treatises of corpuscular-mechanical natural philosophy—Le Monde (1633) and the Principia philosophiae (1644/1647)—differ in many respects. Some historians of science have studied their significantly different theories of matter and elements. Others have routinely noted that the Principia cites much evidence regarding magnetism, sunspots, novae and variable stars which is absent from Le Monde. We argue that far from being unrelated or even opposed intellectual practices inside the Principles, Descartes' moves in matter and element theory and his adoption of (...) wide swathes of novel matters of fact, were two sides of the same coin—that coin being his strategies for improving the systematic power, scope and consistency of the natural philosophy presented in the Principia. We find that Descartes' systematising strategy centred upon weaving ranges of novel matters of fact into explanatory and descriptive narratives with cosmic sweep and radical realist Copernican intent. Gambits of this type have recently been labelled as ‘cosmographical’ (the natural philosophical relating of heavens and earth in contemporary usage). Realist Copernican natural philosophers, from Copernicus himself, through Bruno, Gilbert and Galileo did this to varying degrees; but, we suggest, Descartes presented in Books III and IV of the Principia the most elaborate and strategically planned version of it, underneath the ostensible textbook style of the work. (shrink)

According to a popular objection, Hume assumes that only deductive inferences can generate knowledge and reasonable belief, and so Hume’s skepticism can be avoided by simply recognizing the role of inductive inferences in empirical matters. This paper offers an interpretation of Hume’s skepticism that avoids this objection. The resulting skeptical argument is a powerful one in the following sense: it is not at all obvious where the argument goes wrong, and responding to the argument forces us to adopt a (...) substantive and even surprising position regarding the nature of knowledge and evidence. The main strategy is to draw a three way distinction among kinds of inferential support. Thus inferences can be deductive-supportive, inductive-supportive, or non-supportive. Hume does not assume that inductive inferences cannot generate knowledge or reasonable belief. Rather, he makes the more plausible assumption that non-supportive inferences cannot. (shrink)

Agrifood scholars commonly adopt “a matter of fact way of speaking” to talk about the extent of neoliberal rollout in the food sector and the viability of “alternatives” to capitalist food initiatives. Over the past few decades this matter of fact stance has resulted in heated debate in agrifood scholarship on two distinct battlegrounds namely, the corporate food regime and the alternative food regime. In this paper I identify some of the limitations of speaking in a matter of (...) fact way and of focusing on capitalist and neoliberal economies as the yardstick by which to assess all food economy initiatives. Using stories of bananas in Australia and the Philippines I advocate for a new mode of critical inquiry in food scholarship that focuses on matters of concern. Following Bruno Latour I use the term critical inquiry to refer to research methods and thinking practices that multiply possible ways of being and acting in the world. The new mode of critical inquiry I propose centers on enacting three broad research matters of concern. These are gathering and assembling economic diversity human actancy and nonhuman actancy. I argue that through becoming critical minds in the Latourian sense researchers can play a key role in enacting economic food futures in the Anthropocene. (shrink)

The distinction tentatively drawn by Mr. Porteous at the last meeting of the Society between logical and causal necessity depends on the more general distinction between what is known or capable of being known as self-evident and what is known only as matter of fact. That there are three cows in a field is a matter of fact. That 1 + 2 = 3 is self-evident and necessarily true . So soon as the question is raised it is (...) seen that there can be no alternative to its being true—otherwise it is not self-evident. But there is no necessity that a field should have cows in it, or that if it has they should be just three in number. Similarly, it does not seem self-evident that an unsupported stone must fall to the ground. (shrink)

D.Z. Phillips’ work in the philosophy of religion continues to be criticised, often on the basis of serious misunderstandings. By engaging with criticisms of Phillips’ Wittgenstein-influenced approach, especially those recently exemplified by Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis, this article seeks to clarify what Phillips’ approach does and does not involve. Focusing on the relation between talk of God’s reality and talk of matters of fact, and on the question whether God is a ‘metaphysical reality’, the extent to which (...) Phillips himself emphasised the need for close attention to how language is used in real-life situations is highlighted, and the persistent mischaracterisation of Phillips as a ‘non-realist’ is rejected. (shrink)

The recent literature offers several models of the notion of matter of fact supposition1 revealed in the acceptance of the so-called indicative conditionals. Some of those models are qualitative [Collins 90], [Levi 96], [Stalnaker 84]. Other probabilistic models appeal either to infinitesimal probability or two place probability functions. Recent work has made possible to understand which is the exact qualitative counterpart of the latter probabilistic models. In this article we show that the qualitative notion of change that thus arises (...) is hypothetical revision, a notion previously axiomatized in [Arló-Costa 97] and [Arló-Costa & Thomason 96]. This notion is incompatible with AGM as well as with other standard methods of theory change. The way in which matter-of-fact supposition is modeled by hypothetical revision is illustrated via examples. The model is compared with other qualitative accounts of the notion of supposition encoded in two-place probability functions, with models of subjunctive supposition, as well as with some of the well know models of learning. Applications in knowledge representation and in the theory of games and decisions are summarized. (shrink)

The definitive principle of actualism is that the world is composed wholly of actual or factual entities, including concreta like a horse and abstracta like his neigh, and the sums and the sets thereof, all on the one plane of particular and definite existents. There are no substrata of potency or prime matter, no forces or virtues, no blur of indefiniteness or press of tendency; no superstructure of unexampled essences or disembodied possibilities or transcendental acts of Be-ing. Our actual entities, (...) I specify further, are all either simple qualia, or relations belonging to one of three primitive categories, or some compound of these. The relational categories which I think sufficient and necessary are the whole-part or "merological" relations, resemblances or "comparisons," and locative distances and directions, not necessarily the physical geometry of space-time, but at least some analogous modes of deployment. "Factualism" here is a rhyming synonym of "actualism" and does not connote the very dubious doctrine of the young Wittgenstein that the world is the sum of "facts" in the sense of Sachverhalten. Nor does "actualism" connote the doctrine, so popular in New York and environs, that things must be active, though quite likely most of them are. (shrink)

The traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief has collapsed under weighty objections. Some of these are well known; but others, though equally weighty and puzzling, have attracted comparatively little attention, and still demand careful study. Only through such study can we approach correct understanding of propositional knowledge.

The idea of there being “no fact of the matter” (NFM) features centrally in Quine’s indeterminacy theses. Yet there has been little discussion of how exactly Quine understands this idea. In this paper I identify, develop and then critically evaluate Quine’s conception of NFM. In Sects. 3–4 I consider a handful of intuitive semantic and ontological conceptions of NFM and argue that none is workable from within Quine’s philosophy. I conclude that the failure of each of these proposals is (...) due to the immanent status of truth and existence for Quine. In Sect. 5 I then present Quine’s official conception of NFM. Briefly, Quine’s idea is that there is NFM between two theories of translation iff those theories are physically equivalent. I develop this idea in detail. Finally, I raise two independent problems for this conception of NFM. In Sect. 6 I argue that Quine’s definition is too strong: given what he means by NFM, his arguments for indeterminacy—even granting all their premises and internal reasoning—simply cannot support his claim that there is NFM regarding translation; instead they establish a strictly weaker conclusion. In Sect. 7 I argue that Quine’s conception of NFM is in significant tension with his thesis of physicalism, and that he must give up one or the other. (shrink)

This expounds J.L. Austin's treatment of truth, and compares it with Frege's.

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 2, Page 213-232, April 2012.

This paper examines our pre-theoretic conception of non-supernaturalism; the thesis that all that exists is natural. It is argued that we intuitively take this thesis to be a substantive, non-dogmatic, empirically justified, not merely contingent truth. However, devicing an interpretation of non-supernaturalism that captures all aspects of this intuition is difficult. Indeed, it is found that this intuition conflates the strong inferential scope of a metaphysical claim with the modest justificatory requirements of an empirical matter of fact. As such, (...) non-supernaturalism, in itspre-theoreticform, contains an internal tension that must be navigated whenever the thesis features in systematic thinking. (shrink)

In the course of a project on European policy on media and alcohol, a series of structured deliberative discussion sessions with young people (aged 13–25 years) in Sweden were arranged, where young people could communicate and exchange ideas about risks and policy issues connected to alcohol consumption and drinking, as presented in fictional media. The objective was to understand how risks and knowledge about alcohol consumption is acquired by young people and ‘uploaded’ to peers. The discussion sessions applied adapted variants (...) of the Youth Jury approach developed to facilitate the communication of ideas for guidelines and policies stemming from young people’s own perceptions about alcohol and media consumption. When ordinary ‘matters of fact’ information about drinking and alcohol fail to engage young people of today (even if it is understood), using humor, horror and shock seems a justified way in Sweden to get the desired reaction. Many of the jury participants themselves thought so. Social network has become an important way of communication also for temperance nongovernmental organizations and public initiatives, in particular with regard to nudging through emotional engagement and attempting to inspire further ‘peer-to-peer’ communication of this type, as young people ‘click-to-connect’. (shrink)

Sex hormones today are seen as central to the production of biological sexual difference. This article examines the development of this scientific `fact', and asks how hormones came to be in this position. The article does not involve original historical research, however. Instead it uses existing histories of hormonal sexual difference to develop a theoretical argument about body histories. How can the history of scientific views of bodies be written and understood? What can these histories tell us about the (...) relation between scientific representations of bodies and the materiality of bodies? Combining and critiquing arguments from feminist histories of science, Bruno Latour's actor network theory, Michel Serres's theory of folded time, and Donna Haraway's notion of situated knowledges, this article argues for the centrality of embodiment and location to useful body histories. (shrink)

: In Research on Religious Funerary Documents in China, the author studies the religious funerary documents used at funerals for more than two thousand years from the Warring-States period to the present with the truth-seeking and objective attitudes. Besides some criticisms and reasonable doubts, he points out that the previous articles present a somewhat lopsided view with prejudice when the scholars interpret the existing literature. He further explores the underlying implications of the archaeological materials based on studying large numbers of (...) references. In this way, reliable conclusions are obtained with rigorous academic attitude. Resumo: Em Research on Religious Funerary Documents in China, o autor adere às atitudes objetivas e de busca da verdade e questiona as ideias dos principais estudiosos, ao analisar os documentos funerários religiosos usados em funerais por mais de dois mil anos, desde o período dos Estados Combatentes até o presente. O autor critica os pontos de vista de alguns estudiosos famosos e apresenta dúvidas razoáveis a esse respeito. Ele ressalta que seus artigos exibem uma visão um tanto desigual e preconceituosa, na interpretação da literatura existente. Ele ainda seleciona a literatura para um nível mais profundo e explora as implicações subjacentes dos materiais arqueológicos. Dessa forma, são obtidas conclusões, mostrando a abordagem acadêmica dos autores. (shrink)

According to a popular objection, Hume assumes that only deductive inferences can generate knowledge and reasonable belief, and so Hume’s skepticism can be avoided by simply recognizing the role of inductive inferences in empirical matters. This paper offers an interpretation of Hume’s skepticism that avoids this objection. The resulting skeptical argument is a powerful one in the following sense: it is not at all obvious where the argument goes wrong, and responding to the argument forces us to adopt a (...) substantive and even surprising position regarding the nature of knowledge and evidence. The main strategy is to draw a three way distinction among kinds of inferential support. Thus inferences can be deductive-supportive, inductive-supportive, or non-supportive. Hume does not assume that inductive inferences cannot generate knowledge or reasonable belief. Rather, he makes the more plausible assumption that non-supportive inferences cannot. (shrink)

The ’microcausality’ condition in quantum field theory is typically presented and justified on the basis of general principles of physical causality. I explore in detail a number of alternative causal interpretations of this condition. I conclude that none is fully satisfactory, independent of further and controversial assumptions about the object and scope of quantum field theories. In particular the stronger causalreadings require a fully reductionist and fundamentalist attitude to quantum field theory. I argue, in a deflationary spirit, for a reading (...) of the ‘microcausality’ condition as merely a boundary condition, inspired by Relativity, that different possible formulations of quantum field theory must obey. (shrink)

Did you know that insects could be tried for criminal acts in pre-industrial Europe, that the dead could be executed, that statues could be subjected to public humiliation, or that it was widely accepted that corpses could return to life? What made reasonable, educated men and women behave in ways that seem utterly nonsensical to us today? Strange Histories presents for the first time a serious account of some of the most extraordinary occurrences of European history. Throughout the ages, people (...) have held ideas and events have taken place which have baffled later societies. Religious disbelievers were thought deserving of death, insects were occasionally excommunicated, studying the biology of angels was a legitimate activity, and the pursuit of personal happiness was considered rather misguided as a life strategy. Using case studies from the Middle Ages and the early modern period with some from the more recent past, this book provides fascinating insights into the world-view through the ages, and shows how such goings-on fitted in quite naturally with the "common sense" of the time. Explanations of these phenomena, riveting and ultimately rational, encourage further reflection on what really shapes our beliefs. In the light of history, can we be sure of the validity of our own ideas? How many of our own beliefs might no longer "make sense" a few centuries from now? (shrink)

Argues that that all necessity is consequent, and that reason and God are contingent, albeit eternal, necessitiesFocusing on the central striking claim that there is something rather than nothing - that all necessity is consequent - Tritten engages with a wide range of ancient as well as contemporary philosophers including Quentin Meillassoux, Richard Kearney, Friedrich Schelling, Émile Boutroux and Markus Gabriel. He examines the ramifications of this truth arguing that even reason and God, while necessary according to essence, are utterly (...) contingent with respect to existence.Key FeaturesShows how all necessary truths are products of an epistemic framework that is itself historically contingentExplains the nature of contingency as something that stems from the facticity of being itself Explains the emergence and ontological status of reason, particularly the principle of sufficient reasonArgues for the contingency of God's existence while maintaining the necessity of his essenceProvides an alternative to Quentin Meillassoux's thesis for the necessity of contingency". (shrink)