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  1. Matthew Hanser (2013). The Wrongness of Killing and the Badness of Death. In Fred Feldman Ben Bradley (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death. 391.
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  2. Matthew Hanser (2011). Still More on the Metaphysics of Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):459-469.
  3. Matthew Hanser (2009). Harming and Procreating. In. In David Wasserman & Melinda Roberts (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer. 179--199.
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  4. Matthew Hanser (2008). Actions, Acting, and Acting Well. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 3. Oxford University Press.
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  5. Matthew Hanser (2008). Reasons Without Rationalism. Review of Metaphysics 61 (4):862-863.
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  6. Matthew Hanser (2008). The Metaphysics of Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):421-450.
  7. Matthew Hanser (2005). Permissibility and Practical Inference. Ethics 115 (3):443-470.
    I wish to examine a rather different way of thinking about permissibility, one according to which, roughly speaking, an agent acts impermissibly if and only if he acts for reasons insufficient to justify him in doing what he does. For reasons that will emerge in Section II, I call this the inferential account of permissibility. I shall not here try to prove that this account is superior to its rivals. My aims are more modest. I shall develop the inferential account, (...)
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  8. Matthew Hanser (2005). Where's the Harm in Dying? Philosophical Books 46 (1):4-10.
  9. Matthew Hanser, Eamonn Callan, John Corvino, John Sabini, Maury Silver & Simon Keller (2005). 10. Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Pp. 629-633). Ethics 115 (3).
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  10. Matthew Hanser (2000). Intention and Accident. Philosophical Studies 98 (1):15-34.
    It is widely held by philosophers of action that an agent does something intentionally only if he does it either as an end or as a means to an end. We are, however, strongly inclined to describe certain doings as intentional despite the apparent failure of this condition to be met. Can we explain the intentionalness of these doings without committing ourselves to saying that agents do all sorts of things intentionally which they manifestly do not?
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  11. Matthew Hanser (1999). Interfering with Aid. Analysis 59 (261):41–47.
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  12. Matthew Hanser (1999). Killing, Letting Die and Preventing People From Being Saved. Utilitas 11 (03):277-.
    The distinction between killing and letting die is too simple. A third category must also be recognized. Like killing, preventing a person from being saved is a species of doing harm; like killing, it infringes one of the victim's negative rights. Yet preventing a person from being saved is morally on a par with letting die, which infringes one of the victim's positive rights. It follows that we cannot explain the moral inequivalence of killing and letting die by saying, as (...)
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  13. Matthew Hanser (1998). A Puzzle About Beneficence. Analysis 58 (2):159–165.
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  14. Matthew Hanser (1998). Intention and Teleology. Mind 107 (426):381-401.
    An agent's intentional doings are often taken to be those for which a certain sort of teleological explanation is available: they are the ones that can be fitted into sequences of the form 'agent A-s in order to B, B-s in order to C, and so on'. It is natural to think that such teleological orderings are produced entirely by the agent's own (perhaps idealized) practical reasoning, and that they thus reveal the intentions with which the agent acts: he A-s (...)
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  15. Matthew Hanser (1998). Hugo Adam Bedau, Making Mortal Choices: Three Exercises in Moral Casuistry:Making Mortal Choices: Three Exercises in Moral Casuistry. Ethics 109 (1):174-176.
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  16. Matthew Hanser (1995). Why Are Killing and Letting Die Wrong? Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (3):175–201.
    This article has two main sections. In Section I, I argue against the skeptic's position. I examine an attempt to see both prima facie objections as arising from features that killing and letting die have in common, and then argue that all such attempts are doomed to failure. In Section II, I explain how even defenders of the distinction's significance have misconstrued the difference between the two objections. In so doing I attempt to develop a better account of why killing (...)
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  17. Matthew Hanser (1990). Harming Future People. Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1):47-70.