Online research in philosophy

: This article contributes to the contemporary debate regarding the young Heidegger's method of formal indication. Theodore Kisiel argues that this method constitutes a radical break with Husserl—a rejection of phenomenological reflection that paves the way to the non-reflective approach of the Beiträge. Against this view, Steven Crowell argues that formal indication is continuous with Husserlian phenomenology—a refinement of phenomenological reflection that reveals its existential sources. I evaluate this debate and adduce further considerations in favor of Crowell's view. To do (...) so, I analyze the young Heidegger's account of phenomenological communication and argue that it further reflects the continuity that Crowell identifies: as he does with reflection, Heidegger refines Husserl's account of phenomenological communication and sheds light on its existential sources. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge the received view of the relationship between Kierkegaard and Heidegger and explore the relationship between phenomenology and theology. Against the received view—the familiar claim that Heidegger “secularizes” Kierkegaard—I argue that both philosophers attempt to uncover the existential conditions for the possibility of an authentic existence and take the passionate religious life to be one form of such an existence. Therefore, Heidegger’s concept of resoluteness does not represent a secularized break with but rather aphenomenological development of (...) Kierkegaard’s concept of inwardness; and both concepts represent a mode of existence that is the condition for the possibility of genuine Christian faith. This grounding relationship between resoluteness and faith, I argue, is representative of Heidegger’s view of the relationship between phenomenological and theological concepts in general. Thus, my argument not only sheds light onHeidegger’s development of Kierkegaard but it also clarifies some important features of the relationship between phenomenology and theology. (shrink)

This paper defends Heidegger's account of resolute self-choice against the ubiquitous Decisionism Critique [DC]. According to DC, Heidegger's discussion of resoluteness commits him to an indefensible position in which resolute Dasein is said to choose who it will be without recourse to any reasons or evaluative standards. In response, I argue that DC is based on a misunderstanding of some of the key arguments of Being and Time . I then offer an alternative portrait of Heidegger's account of resolute self-choice (...) and argue that such choice will involve both 1) the consideration of factical claims as reasons that count in favor of a particular way of life and 2) the evaluation of these reasons in light of at least three deliberative standards. Thus, I argue that DC is misguided and needs to be replaced by an interpretation rooted in a more complete understanding of Heidegger's project. (shrink)

In 1910, only four years before his death, Peirce began an adumbration of a life's worth of major results concerning nondeductive logic—results that he had reached after more than forty-five years of extremely careful and detailed investigations2—as follows: "I must premiss that we, all of us, use this word ["probability"] with a degree of laxity which corrupts and rots our reasoning to a degree that very few of us are at all awake to."3 Peirce continued the adumbration by outlining his (...) mature theory, according to which, contrary to what is generally supposed, there is not just one measure of "falling short of certainty,"4 viz. probability. Rather, there are three utterly distinct and mutually incommensurable .. (shrink)

Millions of animals are used every year in oftentimes extremely painful and distressing scientific procedures. Legislation of animal experimentation in modern societies is based on the supposition that this is ethically acceptable when certain more or less defined formal (e.g. logistical, technical) demands and ethical principles are met. The main parameters in this context correspond to the “3Rs” concept as defined by Russel and Burch in 1959, i.e. that all efforts to replace, reduce and refine experiments must be undertaken. (...) The licensing of animal experiments normally requires an ethical evaluation process, oftentimes undertaken by ethics committees. The serious problems in putting this idea into practice include inter alia unclear conditions and standards for ethical decisions, insufficient management of experiments undertaken for specific (e.g. regulatory) purposes, and conflicts of interest of ethics committees’ members. (shrink)