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Matthew McGrath [56]Matthew Stephen Mcgrath [1]
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Profile: Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri, Columbia)
  1.  47
    Matthew McGrath (2016). Looks and Perceptual Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks (...)
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  2. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2002). Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification. Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
  3.  85
    Juan Comesana & Matthew McGrath (2016). Perceptual Reasons. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):991-1006.
    The two main theories of perceptual reasons in contemporary epistemology can be called Phenomenalism and Factualism. According to Phenomenalism, perceptual reasons are facts about experiences conceived of as phenomenal states, i.e., states individuated by phenomenal character, by what it’s like to be in them. According to Factualism, perceptual reasons are instead facts about the external objects perceived. The main problem with Factualism is that it struggles with bad cases: cases where perceived objects are not what they appear or where there (...)
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  4. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2007). On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558–589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic -- that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing tothe role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving (...)
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  5.  10
    Matthew McGrath, Knowing What Things Look Like.
    Walking through the supermarket, I see the avocados. I know they are avocados. Similarly, if you see a pumpkin on my office desk, you can know it’s a pumpkin from its looks. The phenomenology in such cases is that of “just seeing” that such and such. This phenomenology might suggest that the knowledge gained is immediate. This paper argues, to the contrary, that in these target cases, the knowledge is mediate, depending as it does on one’s knowledge of what the (...)
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  6.  42
    Matthew McGrath (2016). Hill on Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):841-849.
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  7.  13
    Matthew McGrath (forthcoming). Alston on the Epistemic Advantages of the Theory of Appearing in Advance. Journal of Philosophical Research.
  8.  49
    Matthew McGrath (2016). Schellenberg on the Epistemic Force of Experience. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):897-905.
    According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the “capacity view.” In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we (...)
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  9.  72
    Matthew McGrath (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: The Bad Basis Counterexamples. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification.
  10. Matthew McGrath (2013). Dogmatism, Underminers and Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):533-562.
  11. Matthew McGrath (2013). Siegel and the Impact for Epistemological Internalism. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):723-732.
  12.  94
    Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2012). Contextualism and Subject-Sensitivity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):693-702.
    Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
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  13.  4
    Matthew McGrath (2016). Looks and Perceptual Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1).
    Imagine I hold up a Granny Smith apple for all to see. You would thereby gain justified beliefs that it was green, that it was apple, and that it is a Granny Smith apple. Under classical foundationalism, such simple visual beliefs are mediately justified on the basis of reasons concerning your experience. Under dogmatism, some or all of these beliefs are justified immediately by your experience and not by reasons you possess. This paper argues for what I call the looks (...)
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  14.  18
    Matthew Mcgrath (2007). Memory and Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 157 (1):1-24.
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  15. Matthew McGrath (1997). Weak Deflationism. Mind 106 (421):69-98.
    Is truth a substantial feature of truth-bearers? Correspondence theorists answer in the affirmative, deflationists in the negative. Correspondence theorists cite in their defense the dependence of truth on meaning or representational content. Deflationists in turn cite the conceptual centrality of simple equivalences such as ''Snow is white' is true iff snow is white'' and 'It is true that snow is white iff snow is white'. The apparent facts to which these theorists appeal correspond to some of our firmest and most (...)
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  16.  17
    Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55-66.
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  17. Matthew McGrath (2007). Memory and Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese 157 (1):1 - 24.
    Much of the plausibility of epistemic conservatism derives from its prospects of explaining our rationality in holding memory beliefs. In the first two parts of this paper, I argue for the inadequacy of the two standard approaches to the epistemology of memory beliefs, preservationism and evidentialism. In the third, I point out the advantages of the conservative approach and consider how well conservatism survives three of the strongest objections against it. Conservatism does survive, I claim, but only if qualified in (...)
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  18.  15
    Matthew McGrath (1998). Proportionality and Mental Causation: A Fit? Noûs 32 (S12):167-176.
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  19.  45
    Matthew McGrath (2007). Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 3:143-76.
  20.  69
    Matthew McGrath (2010). Contextualism and Intellectualism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):383-405.
  21. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55 - 66.
    We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I (...)
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  22.  85
    Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2012). Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):473-490.
  23.  92
    Matthew McGrath (2007). Temporal Parts. Philosophy Compass 2 (5):730–748.
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  24.  62
    Matthew McGrath, Propositions. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  25. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Critical Study of John Hawthorne's Knowledge and Lotteries and Jason Stanley's Knowledge and Practical Interests. [REVIEW] Noûs 43 (1):178-192.
  26.  45
    Matthew McGrath (2005). Truth Without Objectivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):491-494.
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  27. Matthew McGrath (2008). Conciliatory Metaontology and the Vindication of Common Sense. Noûs 42 (3):482-508.
  28.  96
    Matthew McGrath (2005). No Objects, No Problem? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):457 – 486.
    One familiar form of argument for rejecting entities of a certain kind is that, by rejecting them, we avoid certain difficult problems associated with them. Such problem-avoidance arguments backfire if the problems cited survive the elimination of the rejected entities. In particular, we examine one way problems can survive: a question for the realist about which of a set of inconsistent statements is false may give way to an equally difficult question for the eliminativist about which of a set of (...)
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  29.  81
    Matthew McGrath (2003). What the Deflationist May Say About Truthmaking. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):666–688.
    The correspondence theory of truth is often thought to be supported by the intuition that if a proposition (sentence, belief) is true, then something makes it true. I argue that this appearance is illusory and is sustained only by a conflation of two distinct notions of truthmaking, existential and non-existential. Once the conflation is exposed, I maintain, deflationism is seen to be adequate for accommodating truthmaking intuitions.
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  30.  46
    Matthew McGrath & Jeremy Fantl (2013). Truth and Epistemology. In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer 127--145.
  31.  93
    Matthew McGrath (2003). Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth. Philosophical Studies 112 (1):47 - 67.
    This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has the resources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussion centers on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one is incorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesn't state a fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If it does,, it can be explained.
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  32.  71
    Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (2012). Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):441-446.
  33.  72
    Matthew McGrath (2007). On Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):558-589.
    We argue, contrary to epistemological orthodoxy, that knowledge is not purely epistemic -- that knowledge is not simply a matter of truth-related factors (evidence, reliability, etc.). We do this by arguing for a pragmatic condition on knowledge, KA: if a subject knows that p, then she is rational to act as if p. KA, together with fallibilism, entails that knowledge is not purely epistemic. We support KA by appealing tothe role of knowledge-citations in defending and criticizing actions, and by giving (...)
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  34. Matthew McGrath (1998). Van Inwagen's Critique of Universalism. Analysis 58 (2):116–121.
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  35.  57
    Matthew McGrath (2001). Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):239-242.
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  36.  48
    Matthew Mcgrath (2005). Lynch on the Value of Truth. Philosophical Books 46 (4):302-310.
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  37. Matthew McGrath (2004). Review: The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (450):379-383.
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  38.  54
    Matthew McGrath (2002). Review: Scott Soames: Understanding Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):410 - 417.
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  39.  99
    Matthew McGrath (2001). Rea on Universalism. Analysis 61 (1):69–76.
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  40. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge in an Uncertain World is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error, then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error--as seems required if (...)
     
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  41.  79
    Matthew McGrath (1998). Quasi-Realism and the Humean Defense of Normative Non-Factualism. Philosophical Studies 90 (2):113-127.
  42. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (eds.) (2008). Epistemology: An Anthology. Wiley-Blackwell.
    New and thoroughly updated, _Epistemology: An Anthology_ continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in the theory of knowledge. Concentrates on the central topics of the field, such as skepticism and the Pyrrhonian problematic, the definition of knowledge, and the structure of epistemic justification Offers coverage of more specific topics, such as foundationalism vs coherentism, and virtue epistemology Presents wholly new sections on 'Testimony, Memory, and Perception' and 'The Value of Knowledge' Features modified sections on (...)
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  43.  62
    Matthew McGrath (1998). The Concrete Modal Realist Challenge to Platonism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):587 – 610.
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  44.  45
    Matthew McGrath (1997). Reply to Kovach. Mind 106 (423):581-586.
  45.  39
    Matthew McGrath (2004). Review of John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (8).
  46.  51
    Matthew Mcgrath (2002). Scott Soames: Understanding Truth. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):410–417.
  47. Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Knowledge in an Uncertain World is an exploration of the relation between knowledge, reasons, and justification. According to the primary argument of the book, you can rely on what you know in action and belief, because what you know can be a reason you have and you can rely on the reasons you have. If knowledge doesn't allow for a chance of error, then this result is unsurprising. But if knowledge does allow for a chance of error - as seems (...)
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  48. Ernest Sosa, Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath (eds.) (2008). Epistemology. John Wiley & Sons.
    New and thoroughly updated, _Epistemology: An Anthology_ continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in the theory of knowledge. Concentrates on the central topics of the field, such as skepticism and the Pyrrhonian problematic, the definition of knowledge, and the structure of epistemic justification Offers coverage of more specific topics, such as foundationalism vs coherentism, and virtue epistemology Presents wholly new sections on 'Testimony, Memory, and Perception' and 'The Value of Knowledge' Features modified sections on (...)
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  49. Matthew McGrath (2005). Book Symposium: True to Life: Why Truth Matters by Michael P. Lynch: Lynch on the Value of Truth. Philosophical Books 46 (4):302-310.
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  50. Alvin Goldman & Matthew McGrath (2014). Epistemology: An Introduction. Oxford.
     
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