16 found
Sort by:
See also:
Profile: Matthew Talbert (West Virginia University)
  1. Matthew Talbert (forthcoming). Symmetry, Rational Abilities, and the Ought-Implies-Can Principle. Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-14.
    In Making Sense of Free Will and Moral Responsibility Dana Nelkin defends the “rational abilities view.” According to this view, agents are responsible for their behavior if and only if they act with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. It follows that agents who act well are open to praise regardless of whether they could have acted differently, but agents who act badly are open to blame only if they could have acted on the moral reasons that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Matthew Talbert (2014). Coates , D. Justin , and Tognazzini , Neal A. , Eds. Blame: Its Nature and Norms . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 318. $29.95 (Paper). [REVIEW] Ethics 124 (3):603-608.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Matthew Talbert (2013). Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame. In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 1. Oxford University Press.
    I argue against the claim that morally ignorant wrongdoers are open to blame only if they are culpable for their ignorance, and I argue against a version of skepticism about moral responsibility that depends on this claim being true. On the view I defend, the attitudes involved in blame are typically responses to the features of an action that make it objectionable or unjustifiable from the perspective of the one who issues the blame. One important way that an action can (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Mark Schroeder, Jonathan Way, Gregg Strauss, Tim Willenken, Matthew Talbert, Angela M. Smith, James A. Montmarquet, Nicole Hassoun, Virginia Held & Nicholas Wolterstorff (2012). 10. Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness (Pp. 632-637). [REVIEW] Ethics 122 (3).
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Matthew Talbert (2012). Accountability, Aliens, and Psychopaths: A Reply to Shoemaker. Ethics 122 (3):562-574.
    I respond here to an argument in David Shoemaker’s recent essay, “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility.” Shoemaker finds that “Scanlonian” approaches to moral blame err insofar as they do not include a capacity to respond to moral considerations among the conditions on blameworthiness. Shoemaker argues that wrongdoers must be able to respond to moral reasons for their behavior to express the disrespect to which blaming attitudes like resentment respond. I offer reasons for rejecting this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Matthew Talbert (2012). Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest. Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.
    I argue that wrongdoers may be open to moral blame even if they lacked the capacity to respond to the moral considerations that counted against their behavior. My initial argument turns on the suggestion that even an agent who cannot respond to specific moral considerations may still guide her behavior by her judgments about reasons. I argue that this explanation of a wrongdoer’s behavior can qualify her for blame even if her capacity for moral understanding is impaired. A second argument (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Matthew Talbert (2012). Praise and Prevention. Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):47-61.
    I argue that it is possible to prevent (and to be praiseworthy for preventing) an unwelcome outcome that had no chance of occurring. I motivate this position by constructing examples in which it makes sense to explain the non-occurrence of a certain outcome by referring to a particular agent's intentional and willing behavior, and yet the non-occurrence of the outcome in question was ensured by factors external to the agent. I conclude that even if the non-occurrence of an unwelcome outcome (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Matthew Talbert (2011). Unwitting Behavior and Responsibility. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (1):139-152.
    Unlike much work on responsibility, George Sher's new book, Who Knew?: Responsibility Without Awareness , focuses on the relationship between knowledge and responsibility. Sher argues against the view that responsibility depends on an agent's awareness of the nature and consequences of her action. According to Sher's alternative proposal, even agents who are unaware of important features of their actions may be morally or prudentially responsible for their behavior. While I agree with many of Sher's central conclusions, I explore the worry (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Matthew Talbert (2009). Compatibilism, Common Sense, and Prepunishment. Public Affairs Quarterly 23 (4):325-335.
    We “prepunish” a person if we punish her prior to the commission of her crime. This essay discusses our intuitions about the permissibility of prepunishment and the relationship between prepunishment and compatibilism about free will and determinism. It has recently been argued that compatibilism has particular trouble generating a principled objection to prepunishment. The failure to provide such an objection may be a problem for compatibilism if our moral intuitions strongly favor the prohibition of prepunishment. In defense of compatibilism, I (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Matthew Talbert (2009). Implanted Desires, Self-Formation and Blame. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3:1-18.
    Those who advocate a “historicist” outlook on moral responsibility often hold that people who unwillingly acquire corrupt dispositions are not blameworthy for the wrong actions that issue from these dispositions; this contention is frequently supported by thought experiments involving instances of forced psychological manipulation that seem to call responsibility into question. I argue against this historicist perspective and in favor of the conclusion that the process by which a person acquires values and dispositions is largely irrelevant to moral responsibility. While (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Matthew Talbert (2009). Situationism, Normative Competence, and Responsibility for Wartime Behavior. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (3):415-432.
    About a year after the start of the Iraq War, a story broke about the abuse of Iraqi detainees by American soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison. Editorialists and science writers noted affinities between what happened at Abu Ghraib and Philip Zimbardo’s famous 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment. Zimbardo’s experiment is part of the “situationist” literature in social psychology, which suggests that the contexts in which agents act have a larger influence on behavior, and that personality traits have a smaller influence, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Matthew Talbert (2008). Review of Herbert Fingarette, Mapping Responsibility: Explorations in Mind, Law, Myth, and Culture. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 117 (1):130-133.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Matthew Talbert (2008). Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):516-535.
    Abstract: Many philosophers believe that people who are not capable of grasping the significance of moral considerations are not open to moral blame when they fail to respond appropriately to these considerations. I contend, however, that some morally blind, or 'psychopathic,' agents are proper targets for moral blame, at least on some occasions. I argue that moral blame is a response to the normative commitments and attitudes of a wrongdoer and that the actions of morally blind agents can express the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Matthew Talbert (2008). Review of Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (10).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Matthew Talbert (2006). Contractualism and Our Duties to Nonhuman Animals. Environmental Ethics 28 (2):201-215.
    The influential account of contractualist moral theory offered recently by T. M. Scanlon in What We Owe to Each Other is not intended to account for all the various moral commitments that people have; it covers only a narrow—though important—range of properly moral concerns and claims. Scanlon focuses on what he calls the morality of right and wrong or, as he puts it in his title, what we owe to each other. The question arises as to whether nonhuman animals can (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Matthew Talbert (2006). Review of Carlos J. Moya, Moral Responsibility: The Ways of Scepticism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8).
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation