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Profile: Matthew (Matt) Weiner (University of Vermont)
  1. Matthew Weiner, The Assurance View of Testimony.
    This essay critically examines the Assurance View of testimony as put forth by Angus Ross (1986) and Richard Moran (1999). The Assurance View holds that someone who offers testimony gives the hearer a non-evidential justification for belief by assuming responsibility for the truth of her testimony. I agree that testimonial justification depends on the teller’s assumption of her responsibility for her testimony, but argue that it is nevertheless evidential justification. Testimonial justification is a sort of evidence that is within the (...)
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  2. Matthew Weiner, Testimony: Evidence and Responsibility.
    Chapter I: Testimony: The Problem word, pdf) Chapter I defines the framework for the discussion of the epistemology of testimony. Testimony is defined, strictly, as utterances that are meant to be believed on the teller’s say-so alone, not because of supporting arguments or any like considerations. A working analysis of this notion of testimony is given, based on Grice’s analysis of “non-natural meaning” in terms of the speaker’s intention to induce belief by means of the hearer’s recognition of that intention (...)
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  3. Matthew Weiner (2009). Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 163--182.
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  4. Matthew Weiner (2007). Norms of Assertion. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):187–195.
  5. Matthew Weiner (2006). Are All Conversational Implicatures Cancellable? Analysis 66 (290):127–130.
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  6. Matthew Weiner (2006). Martijn Blaauw, ed., Epistemological Contextualism Reviewed by. Philosophy in Review 26 (6):389-390.
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  7. Matthew Weiner & Nuel Belnap (2006). How Causal Probabilities Might Fit Into Our Objectively Indeterministic World. Synthese 149 (1):1--36.
    We suggest a rigorous theory of how objective single-case transition probabilities fit into our world. The theory combines indeterminism and relativity in the “branching space–times” pattern, and relies on the existing theory of causae causantes (originating causes). Its fundamental suggestion is that (at least in simple cases) the probabilities of all transitions can be computed from the basic probabilities attributed individually to their originating causes. The theory explains when and how one can reasonably infer from the probabilities of one “chance (...)
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  8. Matthew Weiner (2005). Must We Know What We Say? Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
    The knowledge account of assertion holds that it is improper to assert that p unless the speaker knows that p. This paper argues against the knowledge account of assertion; there is no general norm that the speaker must know what she asserts. I argue that there are cases in which it can be entirely proper to assert something that you do not know. In addition, it is possible to explain the cases that motivate the knowledge account by postulating a general (...)
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  9. Matthew Weiner (2005). Why Does Justification Matter? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):422–444.
    It has been claimed that justification, conceived traditionally in an internalist fashion, is not an epistemologically important property. I argue for the importance of a conception of justification that is completely dependent on the subject’s experience, using an analogy to advice. The epistemological importance of a property depends on two desiderata: the extent to which it guarantees the epistemic goal of attaining truth and avoiding falsehood, and the extent to which it depends only on the information available to the believer. (...)
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  10. Matthew Weiner (2003). Accepting Testimony. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):256 - 264.
    I defend the acceptance principle for testimony (APT), that hearers are justified in accepting testimony unless they have positive evidence against its reliability, against Elizabeth Fricker's local reductionist view. Local reductionism, the doctrine that hearers need evidence that a particular piece of testimony is reliable if they are to be justified in believing it, must on pain of scepticism be complemented by a principle that grants default justification to some testimony; I argue that (APT) is the principle required. I consider (...)
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