Alliances and other forms of cooperation between firms often promise great benefits, for example, by the exchange of knowledge or co-specialization of resources. At the same time, the necessary actions to realize these benefits can augment vulnerability to opportunistic behaviour of partners. In addition to formal contracts to mitigate the resulting behavioural uncertainties, often, mechanisms, such as reputation or ethical values, are suggested as important supplements. However, when it comes to assessment of a specific cooperation opportunity, it is difficult to (...) account systematically for the economic consequences of these 'softer factors'. Therefore, this paper aims to surpass mere financial analysis of chance and risk and to integrate systematically both reputation and ethical values into an economic assessment of cooperative relationships. For this purpose, we develop a theoretical framework that is based on a simple-decision model to account for reputation and ethical values of potential partners as drivers of behavioural uncertainty reduction. We also discuss how this framework can be used to assess cooperative relationships and illustrate these ideas with reference to the inter-organizational accounting practices of a large drugstore chain and its suppliers. (shrink)
Germany is considered to be a pioneer of social security systems; nonetheless, globalization and demographic changes have put enormous pressure on them. A solution is not yet in sight as the debate on the future of the German social security systems still lacks consensus. We argue that ideas matter and that the debate can benefit from a deeper reflection on the concept of social security. This objective is pursued along two lines. First, we take a historical perspective and reconstruct the (...) development of Germany’s social security systems. Second, we scrutinize from a theoretical perspective how social security is conceptualized in public and theoretical debates. Behind the various positions, we identify four basic ideal types. We then analyze how these ideal types account for the benefits of social security systems and what role they assign to corporations in providing social security. While two ultimately reinforce potential conflicts between different groups in society, the other two ideal types reveal possible benefits for all. The last ideal type actually conceptualizes social security systems as insurance that fosters risky but overall productive investments in human and other forms of capital. Therefore, it can be shown that social security systems are not necessarily threatened by globalization and that incentives exist for corporations to invest in the provision of social security. (shrink)
One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley–Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly (...) discussing a general conception of conditionality that may unify the three given conceptions. (shrink)
The Nature of Problematic Knowledge by MICHEL MEYER An interdisciplinary reader on questions and questioning, such as this one, is based on the evidence ...
The system R## of true relevant arithmetic is got by adding the -rule Infer xAx from A0, A1, A2, .... to the system R# of relevant Peano arithmetic. The rule E (or gamma) is admissible for R##. This contrasts with the counterexample to E for R# (Friedman & Meyer, Whither Relevant Arithmetic). There is a Way Up part of the proof, which selects an arbitrary non-theorem C of R## and which builds by generalizing Henkin and Belnap arguments a prime (...) theory T which still lacks C. (The key to the Way Up is a Witness Protection Program, using the -rule.) But T may be TOO BIG, whence there is a Way Down argument that produces a better theory TR, such that R## TR T. (The key to the Way Down is a Metavaluation, on which membership in T is combined with ordinary truth-functional conditions to determine TR.) The result is a theory that is Just Right, whence it never happens that A C and A are theorems of R## but C is a non-theorem. (shrink)
C I Lewis showed up Down Under in 2005, in e-mails initiated by Allen Hazen of Melbourne. Their topic was the system Hazen called FL (a Funny Logic), axiomatized in passing in Lewis 1921. I show that FL is the system MEN of material equivalence with negation. But negation plays no special role in MEN. Symbolizing equivalence with → and defining ∼A inferentially as A→f, the theorems of MEN are just those of the underlying theory ME of pure material equivalence. (...) This accords with the treatment of negation in the Abelian l-group logic A of Meyer and Slaney (Abelian logic. Abstract, Journal of Symbolic Logic 46, 425–426, 1981), which also defines ∼A inferentially with no special conditions on f. The paper then concentrates on the pure implicational part AI of A, the simple logic of Abelian groups. The integers Z were known to be characteristic for AI, with every non-theorem B refutable mod some Zn for finite n. Noted here is that AI is pre-tabular, having the Scroggs property that every proper extension SI of AI, closed under substitution and detachment, has some finite Zn as its characteristic matrix. In particular FL is the extension for which n = 2 (Lewis, The structure of logic and its relation to other systems. The Journal of Philosophy 18, 505–516, 1921; Meyer and Slaney, Abelian logic. Abstract. Journal of Symbolic Logic 46, 425–426, 1981; This is an abstract of the much longer paper finally published in 1989 in G. G. Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman, eds., Paraconsistent logic: essays on the inconsistent, Philosophica Verlag, Munich, pp. 245–288, 1989). (shrink)
The system R## of true relevant arithmetic is got by adding the Ï-rule Infer âxAx from A0, A1, A2, .... to the system R# of relevant Peano arithmetic . The rule âE (or gamma ) is admissible for R##. This contrasts with the counterexample to âE for R# (Friedman & Meyer, Whither Relevant Arithmetic ). There is a Way Up part of the proof, which selects an arbitrary non-theorem C of R## and which builds by generalizing Henkin and Belnap (...) arguments a prime theory T which still lacks C. (The key to the Way Up is a Witness Protection Program, using the Ï-rule.) But T may be TOO BIG, whence there is a Way Down argument that produces a better theory TR, such that R## â« TR â« T. (The key to the Way Down is a Metavaluation, on which membership in T is combined with ordinary truth-functional conditions to determine TR.) The result is a theory that is Just Right, whence it never happens that A â C and A are theorems of R## but C is a non-theorem. (shrink)
Loveland and Meyer have studied necessary and sufficient conditions for an infinite binary string x to be recursive in terms of the programsize complexity relative to n of its n-bit prefixes xn. Meyer has shown that x is recursive iff ∃c, ∀n, K(xn/n) ≤ c, and Loveland has shown that this is false if one merely stipulates that K(xn/n) ≤ c for infinitely..
Although AGM theory contraction (Alchourrón et al., 1985; Alchourrón and Makinson, 1985) occupies a central position in the literature on belief change, there is one aspect about it that has created a fair amount of controversy. It involves the inclusion of the postulate known as Recovery. As a result, a number of alternatives to AGM theory contraction have been proposed that do not always satisfy the Recovery postulate (Levi, 1991, 1998; Hansson and Olsson, 1995; Fermé, 1998; Fermé and Rodriguez, 1998; (...) Rott and Pagnucco, 1999). In this paper we present a new addition, systematic withdrawal, to the family of withdrawal operations, as they have become known. We define systematic withdrawal semantically, in terms of a set of preorders, and show that it can be characterised by a set of postulates. In a comparison of withdrawal operations we show that AGM contraction, systematic withdrawal and the severe withdrawal of Rott and Pagnucco (1999) are intimately connected by virtue of their definition in terms of sets of preorders. In a future paper it will be shown that this connection can be extended to include the epistemic entrenchment orderings of Gärdenfors (1988) and Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988) and the refined entrenchment orderings of Meyer et al. (2000). (shrink)
herent and rational way. Several proposals have been made for information merging in which it is possible to encode the preferences of sources (Benferhat, Dubois, Prade, & Williams, 1999; Benferhat, Dubois, Kaci, & Prade, 2000; Lafage & Lang, 2000; Meyer, 2000, 2001; Andreka, Ryan, & Schobbens, 2001). Information merging has much in common with social choice theory, which aims to define operations reflecting the preferences of a society from the individual preferences of the members of the society. Given this (...) connection, frameworks for information merging should provide satisfactory resolutions of problems raised in social choice theory. We investigate the link between the merging of epistemic states and two important results in social choice theory. We show that Arrow’s well-known impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1963) does not hold in merging frameworks when the preferences of sources are represented in terms of epistemic states. This is achieved by providing a consistent set of properties for merging from which Arrow-like properties can be derived. Similarly, by extending these to a consistent framework which includes properties corresponding to the notion of being strategy-proof, we show that results due to Gibbard and Satterthwaite (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1973, 1975) and other (Benoit, 2000; Barber´a, Dutta, & Sen, 2000) do not hold in merging frameworks. (shrink)
Generalisations of theory change involving arbitrary sets of wffs instead of belief sets have become known as base change. In one view, a base should be thought of as providing more structure to its generated belief set, and can be used to determine the theory change operation associated with a base change operation. In this paper we extend a proposal along these lines by Meyer et al. We take an infobase as a finite sequence of wffs, with each (...) element in the sequence being seen as an independently obtained bit of information, and define appropriate infobase change operations. The associated theory change operations satisfy the AGM postulates for theory change. Since an infobase change operation produces a new infobase, it allows for iterated infobase change. We measure iterated infobase change against the postulates proposed by Darwiche et al. and Lehmann. (shrink)
This is a reissue, with new introduction, of Susan Sauvé Meyer's 1993 book, in which she presents a comprehensive examination of Aristotle's accounts of voluntariness in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. She makes the case that these constitute a theory of moral responsibility--albeit one with important differences from modern theories. Highlights of the discussion include a reconstruction of the dialectical argument in the Eudemian Ethics II 6-9, and a demonstration that the definitions of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' in Nicomachean Ethics (...) III 1 are the culmination of that argument. By identifying the paradigms of voluntariness and involuntariness that Aristotle begins with and the opponents (most notably Plato) he addresses, Meyer explains notoriously puzzling features of the Nicomachean account--such as Aristotle's requirement that involuntary agents experience pain or regret. Other familiar features of Aristotle's account are cast in a new light. That we are responsible for the characters we develop turns out not to be a necessary condition of responsible agency. That voluntary action has its "origin" in the agent and that our actions are "up to us to do and not to do"--often interpreted as implying a libertarian conception of agency--turn out to be perfectly compatible with causal determinism, a point Meyer makes by locating these locutions in the context of Aristotle's general understanding of causality. While Aristotle does not himself face or address worries that determinism is incompatible with responsibility, his causal repertoire provides the resources for a powerful response to incompatibilist arguments. On this and other fronts Aristotle's is a view to be taken seriously by theorists of moral responsibility. (shrink)
Constructivism claims to be a postepistemology that replaces 'traditional' concepts of knowledge. Supporters of constructivism have argued that progress requires that pre-service teachers be weaned off traditional approaches and that they should adopt constructivist views of knowledge. Constructivism appears to be gaining ground rapidly and should no longer be viewed as an exercise in radical thinking primarily aimed at generating innovative teaching. It has become an integral part of the pedagogic mainstream. Close examination of the theoretical foundations of constructivism, however, (...) reveals that the basic assumptions of constructivism are flawed. Far from being a postepistemology, constructivism simply regresses to a pre-Renaissance mindset with theology replaced with a psychologism. Constructivists should be aware that the implications of constructivism for future generations may be both profound and non-benign. (shrink)
Much social theory takes for granted the core conceit of modern culture, that modern actors-individuals, organizations, nation states-are autochthonous and natural entities, no longer really embedded in culture. Accordingly, while there is much abstract metatheory about "actors" and their "agency," there is arguably little theory about the topic. This article offers direct arguments about how the modern (European, now global) cultural system constructs the modern actor as an authorized agent for various interests via an ongoing relocation into society of agency (...) originally located in transcendental authority or in natural forces environing the social system. We see this authorized agentic capability as an essential feature of what modern theory and culture call an "actor," and one that, when analyzed, helps greatly in explaining a number of otherwise anomalous or little analyzed features of modern individuals, organizations, and states. These features include their isomorphism and standardization, their internal decoupling, their extraordinarily complex structuration, and their capacity for prolific collective action. (shrink)
With the rigorous development of modal logic in the first half of the twentieth century, it became custom amongst philosophers to characterize different views about necessity and possibility in terms of rival axiomatic systems for the modal operators ‘ ’ (‘possibly’) and ‘ ’ (‘necessarily’). From the late 1950s onwards, Arthur Prior began to argue that temporal distinctions ought to be given a similar treatment, in terms of axiomatic systems for sentential tense operators, such as ‘P’ (‘it was the case (...) that’) and ‘F’ (‘it will be the case that’).1 My aim here is to give a brief survey of the extent to which time can be treated on the model of modality. I shall not try to address the further question of whether such ‘modal’ accounts of time are to be preferred over ‘spatial’ accounts that treat times more like places. (shrink)
There are many parallels between the role of possible worlds in modal logic and that of times in tense logic. But the similarities only go so far, and it is important to note where the two come apart. This paper argues that even though worlds and times play similar roles in the model theories of modal and tense logic, there is no tense analogue of the possible-worlds analysis of modal operators. An important corollary of this result is that presentism cannot (...) be the tense analogue of actualism. (shrink)
According to Hans Kamp and Frank Vlach, the two-dimensional tense operators "now" and "then" are ineliminable in quantified tense logic. This is often adduced as an argument against tense logic, and in favor of an extensional account that makes use of explicit quantification over times. The aim of this paper is to defend tense logic against this attack. It shows that "now" and "then" are eliminable in quantified tense logic, provided we endow it with enough quantificational structure. The operators might (...) not be redundant in some other systems of tense logic, but this merely indicates a lack of quantificational resources and does not show any deep-seated inability of tense logic to express claims about time. The paper closes with a brief discussion of the modal analogue of this issue, which concerns the role of the actuality operator in quantified modal logic. (shrink)
This paper defends three theses: (i) that presentism is either trivial or untenable; (ii) that the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time is not about the status of presentism; and (iii) that there is no temporal analogue of the modal thesis of actualism.
Analyzes the meaning expressed in music, the social and psychological sources of meaning, and the methods of musical communication This is a book meant for ...
The report of the President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity, addresses the central ethical, political, and policy issue in human embryonic stem cell research: the moral status of extracorporeal human embryos. The Council members were in sharp disagreement on this issue and essentially failed to adequately engage and respectfully acknowledge each others' deepest moral concerns, despite their stated commitment to do so. This essay provides a detailed critique of the two extreme views on the Council (i.e., embryos (...) have full moral status or they have none at all) and then gives theoretical grounding for our judgment about the intermediate moral status of embryos. It also supplies an account of how to address profound moral disagreements in the public arena, especially by way of constructing a middle ground that deliberately pays sincere respect to the views of those with whom it has deep disagreements. (shrink)
In this paper I discuss a variant of the knowledge argument which is based upon Frank Jackson's Mary thought experiment. Using this argument, Jackson tries to support the thesis that a purely physical â or, put generally: an objectively scientific â perspective upon the world excludes the important domain of `phenomenal' facts, which are only accessible introspectively. Martine Nida-Rümelinhas formulated the epistemological challenge behind the case of Mary especially clearly. I take her formulation of the problem as a starting-point and (...) present a solution which is based solely on the concepts of capability and of metalinguistic beliefs. References to epiphenomenal facts, phenomenal knowledge etc. will be avoided completely. I specify my proposal against the backdrop of Burge's critical reflections about metalinguistic reinterpretation of expressions of belief and the externalist thesis held by Burge, Putnam and others that meanings and mental states are dependent upon the environment. My solution is then compared with Lewis' and Nemirow's ability objection. Finally I argue that the much discussed ``knowing what it is like'' has in its ordinary meaning nothing much to do with `phenomenal knowledge' or knowledge of `epiphenomenal' facts. (shrink)
In a survey of newspaper staff members shows that, although implementation of public journalism projects is widespread at U.S. daily newspapers, tibe majority of jou!rnalists still adhere to traditional values in journalism practice and do not support public journalism values that depart from traditional journalism. Criticism of public journalism is that it poses a danger to traditional professional values of independence and objectivity. In the great majority of comparisons, we found thot journalists supporting certain public journalism practices were at least (...) as sensitive to traditional ethical concerns as those who did not support public journalism. (shrink)
Is it fair to leave the next generation a public debt? Is it defensible to impose legal rules on them through constitutional constraints? From combating climate change to ensuring proper funding for future pensions, concerns about ethics between generations are everywhere. In this volume sixteen philosophers explore intergenerational justice. Part One examines the ways in which various theories of justice look at the matter. These include libertarian, Rawlsian, sufficientarian, contractarian, communitarian, Marxian and reciprocity-based approaches. In Part Two, the authors look (...) more specifically at issues relevant to each of these theories, such as motivation to act fairly towards future generations, the population dimension, the formation of preferences through education and how they impact on our intergenerational obligations, and whether it is fair to rely on constitutional devices. (shrink)
The recent publication of The New Wittgenstein signals the arrival of a distinctive "therapeutic" reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein"s philosophical enterprise. As announced in its Preface, this collection presents the "nonsense" of philosophy as the subject of Wittgenstein"s therapeutic work. The simple, plain nonsense of many philosophical remarks is revealed under the scrutiny of Wittgenstein"s investigations, according to this interpretation, leading us to see that such remarks "fail to make any claim at all" (Crary 6). This view of Wittgenstein"s use of (...) "nonsense" as a term of criticism begins with the work of Stanley Cavell, on this account, and has extended more recently to work on a wide area of Wittgenstein"s concerns, elevating "nonsense" to a central position in his philosophy. This paper argues that, in at least one case of Wittgenstein"s talk of nonsense, this "therapeutic reading" (Crary 7) oversimplifies the subtlety of Wittgenstein"s writing. Indeed, one of the most prominent cases of "nonsense" in the later Wittgenstein concerns the remark "I know I am in pain". Though Wittgenstein repeatedly treats this remark as nonsense, this treatment is not final in his philosophy of psychology. Rather, though his rich discussion in the later manuscripts of the indeterminacy of psychological judgments, the relation of these judgments to knowledge, and the role of first-person psychological descriptions, Wittgenstein is able to find what sense a remark such as "I know I am in pain" might perhaps have. "I know I am in pain" may be called nonsense, but this is not the last word on the matter in Wittgenstein"s text: as Cavell says, ""it makes no sense to say these things" (in the way we think it does)" (Cavell 70). Wittgenstein is able to find what sense our remarks of first person psychological knowledge might have, contrary to what the therapeutic reading in The New Wittgenstein would have us suppose. Therefore, at least in one case, the therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein goes wrong. (shrink)
This article argues that the causal loops that occur in some time-travel scenarios and in certain solutions of the theory of relativity are no more mysterious than the infinitely descending causal chains familiar from Newtonian mechanics.
This paper examines the broad social purpose of US climate science, which has benefitted from a public investment of more than $30 billion over the last 20 years. A public values analysis identifies five core public values that underpin the interagency program. Drawing from interviews, meeting observations, and document analysis, I examine the decision processes and institutional structures that lead to the implementation of climate science policy, and identify a variety of public values failures accommodated by this system. In contrast (...) to other cases which find market values frameworks (the profit as progress assumption) at the root of public values failures, this case shows how science values ( knowledge as progress ) may serve as an inadequate or inappropriate basis for achieving broader public values. For both institutions and individual decision makers, the logic linking science to societal benefit is generally incomplete, incoherent, and tends to conflate intrinsic and instrumental values. I argue that to be successful with respect to its motivating public values, the US climate science enterprise must avoid the assumption that any advance in knowledge is inherently good, and offer a clearer account of the kinds of research and knowledge advance likely to generate desirable social outcomes. (shrink)
Causal modeling methods such as path analysis, used in the social and natural sciences, are also highly relevant to philosophical problems of probabilistic causation and statistical explanation. We show how these methods can be effectively used (1) to improve and extend Salmon's S-R basis for statistical explanation, and (2) to repair Cartwright's resolution of Simpson's paradox, clarifying the relationship between statistical and causal claims.
Is it fair to leave the next generation a public debt? Is it defensible to impose legal rules on them through constitutional constraints? From combating climate change to ensuring proper funding for future pensions, concerns about ethics between generations are everywhere. In this volume sixteen philosophers explore intergenerational justice. Part One examines the ways in which various theories of justice look at the matter. These include libertarian, Rawlsian, sufficientarian, contractarian, communitarian, Marxian and reciprocity-based approaches. In Part Two, the authors look (...) more specifically at issues relevant to each of these theories, such as motivation to act fairly towards future generations, the population dimension, the formation of preferences through education and how they impact on our intergenerational obligations, and whether it is fair to rely on constitutional devices. (shrink)
Michael Dummett claims that the classical model of time as a continuum of instants has to be rejected. In his view, “it allows as possibilities what reason rules out, and leaves it to the contingent laws of physics to rule out what a good model of physical reality would not even be able to describe.” This paper argues otherwise.
The aim of this paper is to draw attention to a conflict between two popular views about time: Arthur Prior’s proposal for treating tense on the model of modal logic, and the ‘Platonic’ thesis that some objects (God, forms, universals, or numbers) exist eternally.1 I will argue that anyone who accepts the former ought to reject the latter.
The volume brings together a collection of original papers on some of the main tenets of Joseph Raz's legal and political philosophy: Legal positivism and the nature of law, practical reason, authority, the value of equality, incommensurability, harm, group rights, and multiculturalism.
A comparison of Merge, a model of comprehension, and WEAVER, a model of production, raises five issues: (1) merging models of comprehension and production necessarily creates feedback; (2) neither model is a comprehensive account of word processing; (3) the models are incomplete in different ways; (4) the models differ in their handling of competition; (5) as opposed to WEAVER, Merge is a model of metalinguistic behavior.
In Entailment, Anderson and Belnap motivated their modification E of Ackermann’s strenge Implikation Π Π’ as a logic of relevance and necessity. The kindred system R was seen as relevant but not as modal. Our systems of Peano arithmetic R# and omega arithmetic R## were based on R to avoid fallacies of relevance. But problems arose as to which arithmetic sentences were (relevantly) true. Here we base analogous systems on E to solve those problems. Central to motivating E is the (...) rejection of fallacies of modality. Our slogan here for this is, “No diamonds entail any boxes.” Form the strenge Peano arithmetic E# like R#, adding appropriate forms of the Peano axioms to Ackermann’s E.. (shrink)
How can one conceive of the neuronal implementation of the processing model we proposed in our target article? In his commentary (Pulvermüller 1999, reprinted here in this issue), Pulvermüller makes various proposals concerning the underlying neural mechanisms and their potential localizations in the brain. These proposals demonstrate the compatibility of our processing model and current neuroscience. We add further evidence on details of localization based on a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of word production (Indefrey & Levelt 2000). We also (...) express some minor disagreements with respect to Pulvermüller's interpretation of the “lemma” notion, and concerning his neural modeling of phonological code retrieval. Branigan & Pickering discuss important aspects of syntactic encoding, which was not the topic of the target article. We discuss their well-taken proposal that multiple syntactic frames for a single verb lemma are represented as independent nodes, which can be shared with other verbs, such as accounting for syntactic priming in speech production. We also discuss how, in principle, the alternative multiple-frame-multiple-lemma account can be tested empirically. The available evidence does not seem to support that account. Footnotes1 BBS Note: The original manuscript of this Response article was received on January 14, 2000. (shrink)
Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca founded the Brussels school of argumentation in 1958, when they published their famous Traité de l'argumentation. Even if, in Brussels, Eugène Dupréel had already set out to rehabilitate the Sophists, the intellectual atmosphere in the French-speaking world was not very propitious for rhetoric. Most French intellectuals were plunged into ideological debates linked to the intellectual monopoly of the French communist party on societal issues. Free discussion was certainly not very topical. It was only after the (...) fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, five years after Perelman's death, that rhetoric began to draw increasing attention. His ideas then gained momentum in France, as .. (shrink)
The core thesis of the paper is that the constitution of biological science begins with a conceptual innovation with far-reaching consequences with effect up to the present: by conceiving the parts of living beings as organs (that is, as tools), Aristotle laid the foundation stone for a functional explanation of animate nature. Comparative anatomy is thus transformed from a merely descriptive to an explanatory theory. The point of the discussion is above all that a functional explanation must not be confused (...) with the sort of teleology according to which the function of an organ is understood as the cause of its existence. The first section outlines the theoretical motives that Aristotle adduces in arguing for biology (against contemporary contempt for biological research). The second step addresses the significance of the parts of animals in Aristotle's larger collection of zoological material, the Historia animalium . The third section demonstrates how in the major explanatory work De partibus animalium the term organon takes on the status of a key methodological concept. Finally, the fourth section discusses the significance of the Aristotelian determination of the organic with respect to current discourses in natural science. (shrink)
Traditionally, the manufacturer/operator of a machine is held (morally and legally) responsible for the consequences of its operation. Autonomous, learning machines, based on neural networks, genetic algorithms and agent architectures, create a new situation, where the manufacturer/operator of the machine is in principle not capable of predicting the future machine behaviour any more, and thus cannot be held morally responsible or liable for it. The society must decide between not using this kind of machine any more (which is not a (...) realistic option), or facing a responsibility gap, which cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility ascription. (shrink)
The paper opens with an account of moral ambition which, it argues, is both a coherent ideal and an admirable trait. It closes with a discussion of some of the ways in which this trait might differ from traditional virtues such as temperance, courage, or benevolence.
In contemporary moral philosophy, philosophers turn to biological research of primatology. Their interest in this biological discipline is based on the assumption that insights from primatology may help explaining morality. This paper goes further into the question of how an explanation of the genesis of our morality may rest on considerations about a psychological altruism among primates. For that, in addition to the recent considerations of Philip Kitcher (1), it proves to be fruitful to refer to David Hume's explication of (...) the genesis of morality (2). In the last section of this paper (3), we can then turn to the question of whether, and if so how, these considerations about the genesis of our morality might bear insights into the validity of moral judgements. German Moralphilosophen setzen sich in jüngster Zeit verstärkt mit der Biologie, und zwar mit Primatologen und deren Forschungen auseinander. Dem liegt die Annahme zugrunde, daß die in der Primatologie gewonnenen Einsichten helfen, moralische Phänomene zu erklären. Dieser Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwiefern eine Erklärung der Genese unserer Moral von einem psycholo gischen Altruismus unter Primaten ausgehen kann. Hier erweist es sich als hilfreich, zusätzlich zu den zeitgenössischen Überlegungen Philip Kitchers (1) auf David Humes Erklärung der Genese unserer Moral zurückzukommen (2). Im letzten Abschnitt dieses Beitrags (3) geht es dann um die Frage, was sich aus diesen Überlegungen zur Genese unserer Moral für deren Geltung ergibt. (shrink)
Modern ethics has been shaped by two dominant philosophical assumptions: (1) that there can be no theoretical knowledge of God, i.e., denial of metaphysics, and (2) that moral claims can be redeemed independently of theistic affirmations, i.e., morality does not require theism. These assumptions have influenced much of modern theological ethics. Yet, insofar as theological ethics accepts that morality does not require any explicit or implicit religious beliefs, it affirms that a secularistic morality is possible. But this affirmation is directly (...) at odds with the essence of theism, namely, that God is the source and end of all things, including the moral life. By accepting the dominant consensus, therefore, theological ethics undermines its fundamental theistic claim. Focusing on James Gustafson's theocentric ethics, I seek to show the price that theological ethics pays for subscribing to the dominant consensus. I argue that: (1) Gustafson embraces an inconsistent self-understanding, which undermines his theocentric claim, (2) this is due to his dismissal of metaphysics, and (3) his theocentric ethic would be more compelling if formulated in terms of Whitehead's process metaphysics. (shrink)
The paper addresses issues of scientific conduct regarding relations between science and the media, relations between scientists and journalists, and attitudes towards the public at large. In the large and increasing body of literature on scientific conduct and misconduct, these issues seem underexposed as ethical challenges. Consequently, individual scientists here tend to be left alone with problems and dilemmas, with no guidance for good conduct. Ideas are presented about how to make up for this omission. Using a practical, ethical approach, (...) the paper attempts to identify ways scientists might deal with ethical public relations issues, guided by a norm or maxim of openness. Drawing on and rethinking the CUDOS codification of the scientific ethos, as it was worked out by Robert K. Merton in 1942, we propose that this, which is echoed in current codifications of norms for good scientific conduct, contains a tacit maxim of openness which may naturally be extended to cover the public relations of science. Discussing openness as access, accountability, transparency and receptiveness, the argumentation concentrates on the possible prevention of misconduct with respect to, on the one hand, sins of omission—withholding important information from the public—and, on the other hand, abuses of the authority of science in order to gain publicity. Statements from interviews with scientists are used to illustrate how scientists might view the relevance of the issues raised. (shrink)
This paper presents a novel account of applied mathematics. It shows how we can distinguish the physical content from the mathematical form of a scientific theory even in cases where the mathematics applied is indispensable and cannot be eliminated by paraphrase.
Colonization of public education—the process by which schools are overwhelmed and penetrated by non-educational imperatives—is usually believed to be caused by capitalism and the hegemonic ideological structures it produces. In this paper I argue that in the case of the United States an additional mechanism produces strong colonizing effects: the institution of local control. In the context of contemporary institutional conditions, local control is the lynch-pin for the production of socio-economic segregation, cumulative disadvantages, and the mythology of popular control disguising (...) the growing control of public schooling through unaccountable bureaucracies and private corporations. (shrink)
This paper argues that patients' duties are derivable from the idea which typically grounds the idea of patients' rights: patient autonomy. The autonomous patient, joined in partnership with the health care professional, has self-regarding obligations and obligations to others, including health care professionals. Patients' duties include, but are not limited to: a duty to be honest about why the patient seeks care; a duty to collect information on available treatments and likely side-effects; a duty for a patient who has an (...) infectious condition to act on that information which can best prevent further transmission. Keywords: autonomy, duty, paternalism, patient, rights, self-care CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
Using practical formalism a deontological ethical analysis of peer relations in organizations is developed. This analysis is composed of two types of duties derived from Kant's Categorical Imperative: negative duties to refrain from the use of peers and positive duties to provide help and assistance. The conditions under which these duties pertain are specified through the development of examples and conceptual distinctions. A number of implications are then discussed.
Commodity chain analysis (Bair and Ramsay, 2003 Multinational Companies and Global Human Resource Strategies) is used to explore where economic pressure (from consumers) or socio-political pressure (from governments and NGOs) can be applied to reduce worker exploitation. Six paths are illustrated with examples of successful and unsuccessful application of pressure. Three conclusions are reached :Economic pressure on companies and brand owners is more likely to lead to improved workplace conditions than socio-political pressure; Brand owners are more likely to implement improved (...) workplace conditions than retailers; and Retailers who are under extreme consumer price pressure will resist improving workplace conditions. (shrink)
The aim of the work is to provide a language to reason about Closed Interactions, i.e. all those situations in which the outcomes of an interaction can be determined by the agents themselves and in which the environment cannot interfere with they are able to determine. We will see that two different interpretations can be given of this restriction, both stemming from Pauly Representation Theorem. We will identify such restrictions and axiomatize their logic. We will apply the formal tools to (...) reason about games and their regulation. (shrink)
Based on the relevant logic R, the system R# was proposed as a relevant Peano arithmetic. R# has many nice properties: the most conspicuous theorems of classical Peano arithmetic PA are readily provable therein; it is readily and effectively shown to be nontrivial; it incorporates both intuitionist and classical proof methods. But it is shown here that R# is properly weaker than PA, in the sense that there is a strictly positive theorem QRF of PA which is unprovable in R#. (...) The reason is interesting: if PA is slightly weakened to a subtheory P+, it admits the complex ring C as a model; thus QRF is chosen to be a theorem of PA but false in C. Inasmuch as all strictly positive theorems of R# are already theorems of P+, this nonconservativity result shows that QRF is also a nontheorem of R#. As a consequence, Ackermann's rule γ is inadmissible in R#. Accordingly, an extension of R# which retains its good features is desired. The system R##, got by adding an omega-rule, is such an extension. Central question: is there an effectively axiomatizable system intermediate between R# and R##, which does formalize arithmetic on relevant principles, but also admits γ in a natural way? (shrink)
This paper presents completeness and conservative extension results for the boolean extensions of the relevant logic T of Ticket Entailment, and for the contractionless relevant logics TW and RW. Some surprising results are shown for adding the sentential constant t to these boolean relevant logics; specifically, the boolean extensions with t are conservative of the boolean extensions without t, but not of the original logics with t. The special treatment required for the semantic normality of T is also shown along (...) the way. (shrink)
A serious flaw in Hartry Field’s instrumental account of applied mathematics, namely that Field must overestimate the extent to which many of the structures of our mathematical theories are reflected in the physical world, underlies much of the criticism of this account. After reviewing some of this criticism, I illustrate through an examination of the prospects for extending Field’s account to classical equilibrium statistical mechanics how this flaw will prevent any significant extension of this account beyond field theories. I note (...) in the conclusion that this diagnosis of Field’s program also points the way to modifications that may work. (shrink)
The Postlude, written for this edition, looks back at the predictions made more than twenty-five years ago and speculates about what the coming decades may hold ...
Finding suitable analysis techniques for networks generated from social processes is a difficult task when the population changes over time. Traditional social network analysis measures may not work in such circumstances. It is argued that agent-based social networks should not be constrained by a priori assumptions about the evolved network and/or the analysis techniques. In most agent-based social simulation models, the number of agents remains fixed throughout the simulation; this paper considers the case when this does not hold. Thus the (...) aim of this paper is to demonstrate how the network signatures change when the agents’ population depends upon endogenous social processes. We argue for a much wider attention from the social simulation community in addressing this open research problem. (shrink)
Some authors have recently arguedthat an objects velocity is logicallyindependent of its locations throughout time.Their aim is to deny the Russellianview that motion is merely a change oflocation, and to promote a rival account onwhich the connection between velocities andtrajectories is provided by the laws ofnature. I defend the Russellian view of motionagainst these attacks.
This paper presents an integrative, descriptive model of ethical decision making, with special attention given to issues of measurement. After building the model, hypotheses are developed from a portion of it. These hypotheses are tested in an exploratory analysis to determine if further research and testing of this model and the measurement instruments it employs are warranted.
