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  1. Matthias Steup, Equal Doxastic Freedom.
    If our actions are mostly free, then our doxastic attitudes are mostly free. According to compatibilism, our actions are mostly free. So if the thesis of equal doxastic freedom is true, compatibilism entails that our doxastic attitudes are mostly free. Hence the thesis I will defend is: Compatibilist Doxastic Freedom Compatibilism entails that our actions and our doxastic attitudes are mostly free. My argument in defense of this claim will be that the compatibility of freedom and causal determination is not (...)
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  2. Matthias Steup, Synopsis.
    Epistemology, in the strict sense of the word, is concerned with the nature of knowledge and justified (or rational) belief. This twofold concern may be divided into five discernable questions: 1. What is knowledge? 2. What is justified belief? 3. How do we acquire knowledge? 4. What makes our beliefs justified? 5. Is the extent of justified belief and knowledge roughly what we take it to be, or are the skeptics right when they (...)
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  3. Matthias Steup, The Problem of Epistemic Circularity.
    My first car was a 1977 Plymouth Fury with a V8 engine. This car was fun in a number of ways, but on balance it disappointed because it broke down frequently. It was not a reliable car. My second car was a 1988 Honda Accord. I still have it. It never broke down. Except for regular maintenance, I never needed to bring it to a garage. Unlike my erstwhile Plymouth, it has been a reliable car. An argument in defense (...)
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  4. Matthias Steup, Knowledge and Skepticism.
    Skeptics claim that we know radically less than we think we do. For example, skeptics might claim that we have next to no knowledge of the past, the future, or other minds. Here we will consider the skeptical claim that we have next to no knowledge of the external world: the world of physical objects that we at least seem to perceive. One well-known argument in support of this claim appeals to the possibility of being a BIV: a brain in (...)
     
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  5. Matthias Steup (ed.) (forthcoming). Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 2 Ed. Blackwell.
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  6. Matthias Steup (2013). Does Phenomenal Conservatism Solve Internalism's Dilemma? In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. 135.
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  7. Matthias Steup (2013). Is Epistemic Circularity Bad? Res Philosophica 90 (2):215-235.
    Is it possible to argue that one’s memory is reliable without using one’s memory? I argue that it is not. Since it is not, it is impossible to defend the reliability ofone’s memory without employing reasoning that is epistemically circular. Hence, if epistemic circularity is vicious, it is impossible to succeed in producing a cogent argument for the reliability of one’s memory. The same applies to any other one of one’s cognitive faculties. I further argue that, if epistemic circularity is (...)
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  8. Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.) (2013). Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
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  9. Matthias Steup (2012). Belief Control and Intentionality. Synthese 188 (2):145-163.
    In this paper, I argue that the rejection of doxastic voluntarism is not as straightforward as its opponents take it to be. I begin with a critical examination of William Alston's defense of involuntarism and then focus on the question of whether belief is intentional.
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  10. Matthias Steup (2011). Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality. Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.
    In this paper, I examine Alston's arguments for doxastic involuntarism. Alston fails to distinguish (i) between volitional and executional lack of control, and (ii) between compatibilist and libertarian control. As a result, he fails to notice that, if one endorses a compatibilist notion of voluntary control, the outcome is a straightforward and compelling case for doxastic voluntarism. Advocates of involuntarism have recently argued that the compatibilist case for doxastic voluntarism can be blocked by pointing out that belief is never intentional. (...)
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  11. Matthias Steup (2011). Evidentialist Anti-Skepticism. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press.
     
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  12. Matthias Steup (2011). Empiricism, Metaphysics, and Voluntarism. Synthese 178 (1):19-26.
    This paper makes three points: First, empiricism as a stance is problematic unless criteria for evaluating the stance are provided. Second, Van Fraassen conceives of the empiricist stance as receiving its content, at least in part, from the rejection of metaphysics. But the rejection of metaphysics seems to presuppose for its justification the very empiricist doctrine Van Fraassen intends to replace with the empiricist stance. Third, while I agree with Van Fraassen’s endorsement of voluntarism, I raise doubts about the possibility (...)
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  13. Matthias Steup (2011). 6.1 The BIV Argument and How One Might Respond to It. In T. Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. 105.
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  14. Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.) (2010). A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition. Blackwell.
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  15. Matthias Steup (2009). Are Mental States Luminous? In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 217--36.
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  16. Matthias Steup (2008). Doxastic Freedom. Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
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  17. Matthias Steup, Epistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge, epistemology is concerned with the following questions: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge? What are its sources? What is its structure, and what are its limits? As the study of justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind? (...)
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  18. Matthias Steup, The Analysis of Knowledge. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  19. Matthias Steup (2008). Twentieth Century. In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge. 469.
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  20. Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.) (2005). Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
  21. Matthias Steup (2005). Contextualism and Conceptual Disambiguation. Acta Analytica 20 (1):3-15.
    I distinguish between Old Contextualism, New Contextualism, and the Multiple Concepts Theory. I argue that Old Contextualism cannot handle the following three problems: (i) the disquotational paradox, (ii) upward pressure resistance, (iii) inability to avoid the acceptance of skeptical conclusions. New Contextualism, in contrast, can avoid these problems. However, since New Contextualism appears to be a semanticized mirror image of MCT, it remains unclear whether it is in fact a genuine version of contextualism.
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  22. Matthias Steup & Ernest Sosa (eds.) (2005). Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
  23. Matthias Steup (2004). Internalist Reliabilism. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):403–425.
    When I take a sip from the coffee in my cup, I can taste that it is sweet. When I hold the cup with my hands, I can feel that it is hot. Why does the experience of feeling that the cup is hot give me justification for believing that the cup is hot?And why does the experience of tasting that the coffee is sweet give me justification for believing that the coffee is sweet?In general terms: Why is it that (...)
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  24. Matthias Steup (2003). Two Forms of Antiskepticism. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
     
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  25. Matthias Steup (2002). Real Knowing New Versions of the Coherence Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):740-743.
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  26. Matthias Steup (ed.) (2001). Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford University Press.
    This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak.
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  27. Matthias Steup (2000). Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology. Acta Analytica 15 (1):25-56.
    Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in order to assess this argument, we must distinguish between a compatibilist and a libertarian construal of the concept of voluntary control. If we (...)
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  28. Matthias Steup (2000). Unrestricted Foundationalism and the Sellarsian Dilemma. Grazer Philosophische Studien 60:75-98.
    I propose a version of foundationaUsm with the following distinctive features. First, it includes in the class of basic beliefs ordinary beliefs about physical objects. This makes it unrestricted. Second, it assigns the role of ultimate justifiers to A-states: states of being appeared to in various ways. Such states have propositional content, and are justifiers if they are presumptively reliable. The beliefs A-states justify are basic if they are non-inferential. In the last three sections of the paper, I defend this (...)
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  29. Matthias Steup (1999). A Defense of Internalism. In L. Pojman (ed.), The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd edition. Wadsworth Publishing.
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  30. Matthias Steup (1999). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of the Mind Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966, Xvi + 365 Pp., $64.95, $19.95 Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 38 (03):619-.
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  31. Matthias Steup (1999). Virtues of the Mind. Dialogue 38 (3):619-621.
     
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  32. Matthias Steup (1997). William Alston, Perceiving God. The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Noûs 31 (3):408–420.
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  33. Matthias Steup (1996). Tidman on Critical Reflection. Analysis 56 (4):277–281.
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  34. Matthias Steup (1995). Epistemology's Paradox. International Studies in Philosophy 27 (2):118-120.
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  35. Matthias Steup (1995). Review: Proper and Improper Use of Cognitive Faculties: A Counterexample to Plantiga's Proper Functioning Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):409 - 413.
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  36. Matthias Steup (1993). Proper Functioning and Warrant After Seven Vodka Martinis. Philosophical Studies 72 (1):89 - 109.
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  37. Matthias Steup (1992). Eplstemic Justification. Essays In the Theory of Knowledge, by William Alston. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):228-232.
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  38. Matthias Steup (1991). Moral Truth and Coherence: Comments on Goldman. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):185-188.
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  39. Matthias Steup (1989). The Regress of Metajustification. Philosophical Studies 55 (1):41 - 56.
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  40. Matthias Steup (1988). The Deontic Conception of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Studies 53 (1):65 - 84.
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  41. Matthias Steup, Foundationalism, Sense-Experiential Content, and Sellars's Dilemma.
    A foundationalist account of the justification of our empirical beliefs is committed to the following two claims: (1) Sense experience is a source of justification. (2) Some empirical beliefs are basic: justified without receiving their justification from any other beliefs. In this paper, I will defend each of these claims against an objection. The objection to (1) that I will discuss is due to Donald Davidson. He writes: The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations (...)
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