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Profile: Mattia Gallotti (University of London)
  1. Mattia Gallotti & John Michael (eds.) (2014). Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition. Springer.
    Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition brings together contributions discussing issues arising from theoretical and empirical research on social ontology and social cognition. It is the first comprehensive interdisciplinary collection in this rapidly expanding area. The contributors draw upon their diverse backgrounds in philosophy, cognitive science, behavioral economics, sociology of science and anthropology. -/- Based largely on contributions to the first Aarhus-Paris conference held at the University of Aarhus in June 2012, the book addresses such questions as: If the (...)
     
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  2. Mattia Gallotti & John Michael (2014). Objects in Mind. In Mattia Gallotti & John Michael (eds.), Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition. Springer.
  3. Mattia Gallotti (2013). Why Not the First-Person Plural in Social Cognition? Behavioural and Brain Sciences 36 (4):422-423.
    Through the mental alignment that sustains social interactions, the minds of individuals are shared. One interpretation of shared intentionality involves the ability of individuals to perceive features of the action scene from the perspective of the group (the ). This first-person plural approach in social cognition is distinct from and preferable to the second-person approach proposed in the target article.
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  4. Mattia Gallotti & Chris Frith (2013). Response to Di Paolo Et Al.: How, Exactly, Does It ‘Just Happen’? Interaction by Magic. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (7):304-305.
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  5. Mattia Gallotti & Chris Frith (2013). Social Cognition in the We-Mode. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
  6. Mattia Gallotti (2012). A Naturalistic Argument for the Irreducibility of Collective Intentionality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):3-30.
    According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to “share” attitudes with others. The conditions under which mental states are shared have been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of their reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related and what methodologies of investigation are appropriate in each case. In (...)
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  7. Mattia Gallotti (2012). Naturalizing Intention in Action. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):1-4.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
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  8. Mattia Gallotti (2011). Why We Cooperate. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):183-190.