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Profile: Maura Tumulty (Colgate University)
  1. Maura Tumulty (2014). Managing Mismatch Between Belief and Behavior. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1).
    Our behavior doesn't always match the beliefs attributed to us, and sometimes the mismatch raises questions about what our beliefs actually are. I compare two approaches to such cases, and argue in favor of the one which allows some belief-attributions to lack a determinate truth-value. That approach avoids an inappropriate assumption about cognitive activity: namely, that whenever we fail in performing one cognitive activity, there is a distinct cognitive activity at which we succeed. The indeterminacy-allowing approach also meshes well with (...)
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  2. Maura Tumulty (2012). Delusions and Not-Quite-Beliefs. Neuroethics 5 (1):29-37.
    Bortolotti argues that the irrationality of many delusions is no different in kind from the irrationality that marks many non-pathological states typically treated as beliefs. She takes this to secure the doxastic status of those delusions. Bortolotti’s approach has many benefits. For example, it accounts for the fact that we can often make some sense of what deluded subjects are up to, and helps explain why some deluded subjects are helped by cognitive behavioral therapy. But there is an alternative approach (...)
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  3. Maura Tumulty (2011). An Introduction to Philosophical Methods. Review of Metaphysics 65 (1):152-153.
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  4. Maura Tumulty (2011). Delusions and Dispositionalism About Belief. Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.
    The imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it tempting to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie argue that adopting a dispositional account of belief can secure the doxastic status of delusions. But dispositionalism can only secure genuinely doxastic status for mental states by giving folk-psychological norms a significant role in the individuation of attitudes. When such norms individuate belief, deluded subjects will not count as believing their delusions. In general, dispositionalism won't confer genuinely doxastic status more often than do (...)
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  5. Maura Tumulty (2011). Modeling Expressing on Demonstrating. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:43-76.
    We can increase our understanding of expression by considering an analogy to demonstrative reference. The connections between a demonstrative phrase and its referent, in a case of fully successful communication with that phrase, are analogous to the connections between an expressible state and the behavior that expresses it. The connections in each case serve to maintain a certain status for the connected elements: as actions of persons; or as objects, events, or states significant to persons. The analogy to demonstrative reference (...)
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  6. Maura Tumulty (2010). Showing by Avowing. Acta Analytica 25 (1):35-46.
    Dorit Bar-On aims to account for the distinctive security of avowals by appealing to expression. She officially commits herself only to a negative characterization of expression, contending that expressive behavior is not epistemically based in self-judgments. I argue that her account of avowals, if it relies exclusively on this negative account of expression, can't achieve the explanatory depth she claims for it. Bar-On does explore the possibility that expression is a kind of perception-enabling showing. If she endorsed this positive account, (...)
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  7. Maura Tumulty, Delusions and Dispositional Beliefs.
    In some ways, someone suffering from the delusion that his or her spouse has been kidnapped and replaced with an imposter appears to believe that he or she eats dinner with an imposter every night. But the imperviousness of delusions to counter-evidence makes it hard to classify them as beliefs, and easier to classify them as imaginings. Bayne and Pacherie want to use Schwitzgebel’s dispositional account of belief to restore confidence in the doxastic character of delusion. While dispositionalism appears to (...)
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  8. Maura Tumulty (2009). How Philosophers Think About Persons, Personal Identity, and the Self. In Debra J. H. Mathews, Hilary Bok & Peter V. Rabins (eds.), Personal Identity and Fractured Selves: Perspectives From Philosophy, Ethics, and Neuroscience. Johns Hopkins University Press.
     
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  9. Maura Tumulty (2009). Pains, Imperatives, and Intentionalism. Journal of Philosophy 106 (3):161-166.
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  10. Maura Tumulty (2008). Diminished Rationality and the Space of Reasons. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 601-629.
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  11. Maura Tumulty (2006). Davidson's Fear of the Subjective. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):509-532.
    According to Donald Davidson, any philosophy of mind that appeals to propositional content is doomed to become an account of the mind as a private theater. But Davidson’s own work on thought-attribution can be used to make propositional content safe. This paper uses Davidson’s negative reaction to Gareth Evans’s works on perceptually based demonstrative thought to tease out a way of talking about propositional content that doesn’t slide into subjectivism. It also explains why Davidson saw Evans as a mentalist enemy (...)
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  12. Maura Tumulty (2004). The Problem of Perception. Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):44-53.
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