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  1. Maurice Pagnucco (2006). Isaac Levi on Abduction. In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge University Press.
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  2. James P. Delgrande, Abhaya C. Nayak & Maurice Pagnucco (2005). Gricean Belief Change. Studia Logica 79 (1):97 - 113.
    One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal (...)
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  3. Victor Jauregui, Norman Foo & Maurice Pagnucco (2001). A Trajectory Approach to Causality. Studia Logica 67 (3):385-401.
    In this paper we propose a new approach to address the ramification problem in common-sense reasoning about action and change. We contrast the methods of McCain and Turner, Thielscher and Sandewall and, based on some of the limitations they encounter, we introduce a trajectory-based approach which keeps a history of the states through which a system evolves to characterise its dynamical state. We furnish an underlying state-transition semantics and a logic that admits an expressive, dynamical account of some typical scenarios (...)
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  4. Maurice Pagnucco (2001). Victor Jauregui Maurice Pagnucco Norman Foo. Studia Logica 67:385-401.
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  5. Hans Rott & Maurice Pagnucco (1999). Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery). Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):501-547.
    The problem of how to remove information from an agent's stock of beliefs is of paramount concern in the belief change literature. An inquiring agent may remove beliefs for a variety of reasons: a belief may be called into doubt or the agent may simply wish to entertain other possibilities. In the prominent AGM framework for belief change, upon which the work here is based, one of the three central operations, contraction, addresses this concern (the other two deal with the (...)
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