1. Maxwell J. Cresswell (2006). From Modal Discourse to Possible Worlds. Studia Logica 82 (3):307 - 327.
    The possible-worlds semantics for modality says that a sentence is possibly true if it is true in some possible world. Given classical prepositional logic, one can easily prove that every consistent set of propositions can be embedded in a ‘maximal consistent set’, which in a sense represents a possible world. However the construction depends on the fact that standard modal logics are finitary, and it seems false that an infinite collection of sets of sentences each finite subset of which is (...)
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  2. Maxwell J. Cresswell & Arnim Stechow (1982). De Re Belief Generalized. Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (4):503 - 535.
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  3. Maxwell J. Cresswell & Arnim Von Stechow (1982). "De Re" Belief Generalized. Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (4):503 - 535.
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