Search results for 'McTaggart s Paradox' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Anne McTaggart (2012). What Women Want?: Mimesis and Gender in Chaucer's Wife of Bath's Prologue and Tale. Contagion 19 (1):41-67.score: 900.0
    But nathelees, syn I knowe youre delit, / I shal fulfille youre worldly appetit.1 Chaucer’s Wife of Bath centers on a wonderfully fruitful paradox: she claims for women and for herself the right to “maistrie” and “sovereynetee” in marriage, but she does so by articulating the discourse imparted to her by the “auctoritee” of anti-feminism.2 Indeed, this paradoxical challenge to and reiteration of anti-feminist ideas has left Chaucer’s readers debating for decades which way the irony cuts: is the Wife (...)
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  2. Cheng-Chih Tsai (2011). A Token-Based Semantic Analysis of McTaggart's Paradox. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 10:107-124.score: 720.0
    In his famous argument for the unreality of time, McTaggart claims that i) being past, being present, and being future are incompatible properties of an event, yet ii) every event admits all these three properties. In this paper, I examine two key concepts involved in the formulation of i) and ii), namely that of “validity” and that of “contradiction”, and for each concept I distinguish a static version and a dynamic version of it. I then arrive at three different (...)
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  3. Domenico Mancuso (2012). The Mathematics of McTaggart's Paradox. Manuscrito 35 (2):233-67.score: 672.0
    Mc Taggart's celebrated proof of the unreality of time is a chain of implications whose final step asserts that the A-series (i.e. the classification of events as past, present or future) is intrinsically contradictory. This is widely believed to be the heart of the argument, and it is where most attempted refutations have been addressed; yet, it is also the only part of the proof which may be generalised to other contexts, since none of the notions involved in it is (...)
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  4. L. Nathan Oaklander (2010). Mctaggart's Paradox and Crisp's Presentism. Philosophia 38 (2):229-241.score: 558.0
    In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a ) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II (...)
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  5. L. Nathan Oaklander (1996). Mctaggart's Paradox and Smith's Tensed Theory of Time. Synthese 107 (2):205 - 221.score: 537.0
    Since McTaggart first proposed his paradox asserting the unreality of time, numerous philosophers have attempted to defend the tensed theory of time against it. Certainly, one of the most highly developed and original is that put forth by Quentin Smith. Through discussing McTaggart's positive conception of time as well as his negative attack on its reality, I hope to clarify the dispute between those who believe in the existence of the transitory temporal properties of pastness, presentness and (...)
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  6. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2013). Dissolving McTaggart's Paradox. In C. Svennerlind, J. Almäng & R. Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag.score: 522.0
  7. Quentin Smith (1988). The Logical Structure of the Debate About McTaggart's Paradox. Philosophy Research Archives 14:371-379.score: 492.0
    This short article aims to illustrate the mutually question-begging arguments that are often presented in debates between opponents and defenderss of McTaggart’s “proof” that A-properties (pastness, presentness and futurity) are logically incoherent. A sample of such arguments is taken from a recent debate between L. Nathan Oaklander (a defender of McTaggart) and myself (an opponent of McTaggart) and a method of escaping the impasse that is often reached in such debates is suggested.
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  8. William Lane Craig (1998). Mctaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Analysis 58 (2):122–127.score: 450.0
  9. E. J. Lowe (1992). Mctaggart's Paradox Revisited. Mind 101 (402):323-326.score: 450.0
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  10. Ferrel Christensen (1974). Mctaggart's Paradox and the Nature of Time. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (97):289-299.score: 450.0
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  11. W. Lane Craig (2001). Mctaggart's Paradox and Temporal Solipsism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):32 – 44.score: 450.0
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  12. L. Nathan Oaklander (1999). Craig on Mctaggart's Paradox and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. Analysis 59 (264):314–318.score: 450.0
  13. L. Nathan Oaklander (1987). Mctaggart's Paradox and the Infinite Regress of Temporal Attributions: A Reply to Smith. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):425-431.score: 450.0
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  14. Ernâni Magalhães (2010). Introduction: Mctaggart's Paradox at One Hundred. Philosophia 38 (2):225-227.score: 450.0
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  15. Kenneth Rankin (1981). McTaggart's Paradox: Two Parodies. Philosophy 56 (217):333 - 348.score: 450.0
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  16. L. Nathan Oaklander (1987). McTaggart's Paradox and the Infinite Regress of Temporal Attributions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):425-431.score: 450.0
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  17. Ingthorsson Rögnvaldur (2013). Dissolving McTaggart's Paradox. In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag. 5--240.score: 450.0
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  18. L. Nathan Oaklander (1994). Introduction: McTaggart's Paradox and the Tensed Theory of Time.”. In L. Nathan Oaklander & Quentin Smith (eds.), The New Theory of Time. Yale Up. 157--162.score: 450.0
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  19. Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2013). Dissolving McTaggart's Paradox. In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Ontos Verlag. 240.score: 450.0
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  20. Rebecca Lloyd-Waller (2011). The M Event Paradox and the Specious Present: An Analysis and Refutation of Mctaggart's 2nd Argument. Analysis and Metaphysics 10:101-112.score: 435.0
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  21. Natalja Deng (2013). Fine's Mctaggart, Temporal Passage, and the a Versus B‐Debate. Ratio 26 (1):19-34.score: 270.0
    I offer an interpretation and a partial defense of Kit Fine's ‘Argument from Passage’, which is situated within his reconstruction of McTaggart's paradox. Fine argues that existing A-theoretic approaches to passage are no more dynamic, i.e. capture passage no better, than the B-theory. I argue that this comparative claim is correct. Our intuitive picture of passage, which inclines us towards A-theories, suggests more than coherent A-theories can deliver. In Finean terms, the picture requires not only Realism about tensed (...)
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  22. Clayton Littlejohn (2010). Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.score: 224.0
    We shall evaluate two strategies for motivating the view that knowledge is the norm of belief. The first draws on observations concerning belief's aim and the parallels between belief and assertion. The second appeals to observations concerning Moore's Paradox. Neither of these strategies gives us good reason to accept the knowledge account. The considerations offered in support of this account motivate only the weaker account on which truth is the fundamental norm of belief.
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  23. Andrew Bacon (2013). Curry's Paradox and Omega Inconsistency. Studia Logica 101 (1):1-9.score: 224.0
    In recent years there has been a revitalised interest in non-classical solutions to the semantic paradoxes. In this paper I show that a number of logics are susceptible to a strengthened version of Curry's paradox. This can be adapted to provide a proof theoretic analysis of the omega-inconsistency in Lukasiewicz's continuum valued logic, allowing us to better evaluate which logics are suitable for a naïve truth theory. On this basis I identify two natural subsystems of Lukasiewicz logic which individually, (...)
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  24. Timothy Chan (2010). Moore's Paradox is Not Just Another Pragmatic Paradox. Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.score: 224.0
    One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, (...)
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  25. Jack Woods (2014). Expressivism and Moore's Paradox. Philosophers' Imprint 14 (5):1-12.score: 224.0
    Expressivists explain the expression relation which obtains between sincere moral assertion and the conative or affective attitude thereby expressed by appeal to the relation which obtains between sincere assertion and belief. In fact, they often explicitly take the relation between moral assertion and their favored conative or affective attitude to be exactly the same as the relation between assertion and the belief thereby expressed. If this is correct, then we can use the identity of the expression relation in the two (...)
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  26. Timothy Chan (2008). Belief, Assertion and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395 - 414.score: 224.0
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA), the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean (...)
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  27. Samuel Alexander (2013). An Axiomatic Version of Fitch's Paradox. Synthese 190 (12):2015-2020.score: 224.0
    A variation of Fitch’s paradox is given, where no special rules of inference are assumed, only axioms. These axioms follow from the familiar assumptions which involve rules of inference. We show (by constructing a model) that by allowing that possibly the knower doesn’t know his own soundness (while still requiring he be sound), Fitch’s paradox is avoided. Provided one is willing to admit that sound knowers may be ignorant of their own soundness, this might offer a way out (...)
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  28. Gail Fine (2010). Signification, Essence, and Meno's Paradox: A Reply to David Charles's 'Types of Definition in the Meno'. Phronesis 55 (2):125-152.score: 224.0
    According to David Charles, in the Meno Socrates fleetingly distinguishes the signification from the essence question, but, in the end, he conflates them. Doing so, Charles thinks, both leads to Meno's paradox and prevents Socrates from answering it satisfactorily. I argue that Socrates doesn't conflate the two questions, and that his reply to Meno's paradox is more satisfactory than Charles allows.
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  29. Michael Cholbi (2009). Moore's Paradox and Moral Motivation. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):495-510.score: 224.0
    Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’). I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can be (...)
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  30. Daniel Hunter & Reed Richter (1978). Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Paradox. Synthese 39 (2):249 - 261.score: 224.0
    In their development of causal decision theory, Allan Gibbard and William Harper advocate a particular method for calculating the expected utility of an action, a method based upon the probabilities of certain counterfactuals. Gibbard and Harper then employ their method to support a two-box solution to Newcomb’s paradox. This paper argues against some of Gibbard and Harper’s key claims concerning the truth-values and probabilities of counterfactuals involved in expected utility calculations, thereby disputing their analysis of Newcomb’s Paradox. If (...)
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  31. Manuel Pérez Otero (2008). The Humean Problem of Induction and Carroll's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 141 (3):357 - 376.score: 224.0
    Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume’s argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll’s Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume (defended by Dauer and Van Cleve) is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is a necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not (...)
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  32. Susan Rogerson (2007). Natural Deduction and Curry's Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (2):155 - 179.score: 224.0
    Curry's paradox, sometimes described as a general version of the better known Russell's paradox, has intrigued logicians for some time. This paper examines the paradox in a natural deduction setting and critically examines some proposed restrictions to the logic by Fitch and Prawitz. We then offer a tentative counterexample to a conjecture by Tennant proposing a criterion for what is to count as a genuine paradox.
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  33. Ken Binmore & Alex Voorhoeve (2003). Defending Transitivity Against Zeno’s Paradox. Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (3):272–279.score: 224.0
    This article criticises one of Stuart Rachels' and Larry Temkin's arguments against the transitivity of 'better than'. This argument invokes our intuitions about our preferences of different bundles of pleasurable or painful experiences of varying intensity and duration, which, it is argued, will typically be intransitive. This article defends the transitivity of 'better than' by showing that Rachels and Temkin are mistaken to suppose that preferences satisfying their assumptions must be intransitive. It makes cler where the argument goes wrong by (...)
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  34. David Ebrey (2014). Meno's Paradox in Context. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):4-24.score: 224.0
    I argue that Meno’s Paradox targets the type of knowledge that Socrates has been looking for earlier in the dialogue: knowledge grounded in explanatory definitions. Socrates places strict requirements on definitions and thinks we need these definitions to acquire knowledge. Meno’s challenge uses Socrates’ constraints to argue that we can neither propose definitions nor recognize them. To understand Socrates’ response to the challenge, we need to view Meno’s challenge and Socrates’ response as part of a larger disagreement about the (...)
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  35. Ming Hsiung (2013). Equiparadoxicality of Yablo's Paradox and the Liar. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 22 (1):23-31.score: 224.0
    It is proved that Yablo’s paradox and the Liar paradox are equiparadoxical, in the sense that their paradoxicality is based upon exactly the same circularity condition—for any frame ${\mathcal{K}}$ , the following are equivalent: (1) Yablo’s sequence leads to a paradox in ${\mathcal{K}}$ ; (2) the Liar sentence leads to a paradox in ${\mathcal{K}}$ ; (3) ${\mathcal{K}}$ contains odd cycles. This result does not conflict with Yablo’s claim that his sequence is non-self-referential. Rather, it gives Yablo’s (...)
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  36. Seiki Akama (1996). Curry's Paradox in Contractionless Constructive Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (2):135 - 150.score: 224.0
    We propose contractionless constructive logic which is obtained from Nelson's constructive logic by deleting contractions. We discuss the consistency of a naive set theory based on the proposed logic in relation to Curry's paradox. The philosophical significance of contractionless constructive logic is also argued in comparison with Fitch's and Prawitz's systems.
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  37. Walter Dean (2014). Montague's Paradox, Informal Provability, and Explicit Modal Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (2):157-196.score: 224.0
    The goal of this paper is to explore the significance of Montague’s paradox—that is, any arithmetical theory $T\supseteq Q$ over a language containing a predicate $P(x)$ satisfying (T) $P(\ensuremath {\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner })\rightarrow \varphi $ and (Nec) $T\vdash \varphi \,\therefore\,T\vdash P(\ensuremath {\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner })$ is inconsistent—as a limitative result pertaining to the notions of formal, informal, and constructive provability, in their respective historical contexts. To this end, the paradox is reconstructed in a quantified extension $\mathcal {QLP}$ (the (...)
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  38. A. Romannikov (2011). Ehrenfest's Paradox and Radial Electric Field in Quasi-Neutral Tokamak Plasma. Foundations of Physics 41 (8):1331-1337.score: 224.0
    A relation between physical consequences of the so-called Ehrenfest’s Paradox and the radial electric field E r (r) in the classical quasi-neutral tokamak plasma is shown. Basic author’s approach to the relativistic nature of the tokamak E r (r) has been described in Romannikov (J. Exp. Theor. Phys. 108:340–348, 2009). The experiment which can resolve the Ehrenfest’s Paradox is presented.
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  39. Gemma Robles & José M. Méndez (2014). Curry's Paradox, Generalized Modus Ponens Axiom and Depth Relevance. Studia Logica 102 (1):185-217.score: 224.0
    “Weak relevant model structures” (wr-ms) are defined on “weak relevant matrices” by generalizing Brady’s model structure ${\mathcal{M}_{\rm CL}}$ built upon Meyer’s Crystal matrix CL. It is shown how to falsify in any wr-ms the Generalized Modus Ponens axiom and similar schemes used to derive Curry’s Paradox. In the last section of the paper we discuss how to extend this method of falsification to more general schemes that could also be used in deriving Curry’s Paradox.
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  40. John N. Williams (2014). Moore's Paradox in Belief and Desire. Acta Analytica 29 (1):1-23.score: 224.0
    Is there a Moore’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. Next I discuss putative (...)
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  41. John N. Williams (2013). Moore's Paradox and the Priority of Belief Thesis. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1117-1138.score: 224.0
    Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such asBangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailandare ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then this will (...)
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  42. Catharine Saint Croix & Richmond Thomason (2014). Chisholm's Paradox and Conditional Oughts. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8554:192-207.score: 224.0
    Since it was presented in 1963, Chisholm’s paradox has attracted constant attention in the deontic logic literature, but without the emergence of any definitive solution. We claim this is due to its having no single solution. The paradox actually presents many challenges to the formalization of deontic statements, including (1) context sensitivity of unconditional oughts, (2) formalizing conditional oughts, and (3) distinguishing generic from nongeneric oughts. Using the practical interpretation of ‘ought’ as a guideline, we propose a linguistically (...)
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  43. John N. Williams (2013). The Completeness of the Pragmatic Solution to Moore's Paradox in Belief: A Reply to Chan. Synthese 190 (12):2457-2476.score: 224.0
    Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘ p and I do not believe that p ’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy Chan calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. Chan, who also takes the absurdity (...)
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  44. David H. Wolpert & Gregory Benford (2013). The Lesson of Newcomb's Paradox. Synthese 190 (9):1637-1646.score: 224.0
    In Newcomb’s paradox you can choose to receive either the contents of a particular closed box, or the contents of both that closed box and another one. Before you choose though, an antagonist uses a prediction algorithm to accurately deduce your choice, and uses that deduction to fill the two boxes. The way they do this guarantees that you made the wrong choice. Newcomb’s paradox is that game theory’s expected utility and dominance principles appear to provide conflicting recommendations (...)
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  45. Carlo Proietti (2012). Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic, Kripke Models and Fitch's Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):877-900.score: 224.0
    The present work is motivated by two questions. (1) What should an intuitionistic epistemic logic look like? (2) How should one interpret the knowledge operator in a Kripke-model for it? In what follows we outline an answer to (2) and give a model-theoretic definition of the operator K. This will shed some light also on (1), since it turns out that K, defined as we do, fulfills the properties of a necessity operator for a normal modal logic. The interest of (...)
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  46. Taishi Kurahashi (forthcoming). Rosser-Type Undecidable Sentences Based on Yablo's Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-19.score: 224.0
    It is widely considered that Gödel’s and Rosser’s proofs of the incompleteness theorems are related to the Liar Paradox. Yablo’s paradox, a Liar-like paradox without self-reference, can also be used to prove Gödel’s first and second incompleteness theorems. We show that the situation with the formalization of Yablo’s paradox using Rosser’s provability predicate is different from that of Rosser’s proof. Namely, by using the technique of Guaspari and Solovay, we prove that the undecidability of each instance (...)
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  47. Margaret Cuonzo (2010). Intuition and Russell´s Paradox. Principia 5 (1-2):73-86.score: 224.0
    In this essay I will examine the role that intuition plays in Russell's parado; showing how different appraaches to intuition will license different treatments of the paradox. In addition, I will argue for a specific approach to the paradox, one that follows from the most plausible account of intuition. On this account, intuitions, though fallible, have episternic import. In addition, the intuitions involved in paradoxes point to something wrong with concept that leads to paradox. In the case (...)
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  48. Helge Rückert (2004). A SOLUTION TO FITCH'S PARADOX OF KNOWABILITY. In S. Rahman J. Symons (ed.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Kluwer Academic Publisher. 351--380.score: 224.0
    There is an argument (first presented by Fitch), which tries to show by formal means that the anti-realistic thesis that every truth might possibly be known, is equivalent to the unacceptable thesis that every truth is actually known (at some time in the past, present or future). First, the argument is presented and some proposals for the solution of Fitch's Paradox are briefly discussed. Then, by using Wehmeier's modal logic with subjunctive marks (S5*), it is shown how the derivation (...)
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  49. Bas C. Van Fraassen (2011). Thomason's Paradox for Belief, and Two Consequence Relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):15-32.score: 224.0
    Thomason (1979/2010)’s argument against competence psychologism in semantics envisages a representation of a subject’s competence as follows: he understands his own language in the sense that he can identify the semantic content of each of its sentences, which requires that the relation between expression and content be recursive. Then if the scientist constructs a theory that is meant to represent the body of the subject’s beliefs, construed as assent to the content of the pertinent sentences, and that theory satisfies certain (...)
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  50. John N. Williams (2013). Eliminativism, Dialetheism and Moore's Paradox. Theoria 80 (3).score: 224.0
    John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart of (...)
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