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  1. H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin (eds.) (forthcoming). Goldman and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  2. Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.) (forthcoming). Alvin Goldman and His Critics. Blackwell.
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  3. Brian P. McLaughlin (2012). On Justifying Neurobiologicalism for Consciousness. In Hill Christopher & Gozzano Simone (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. 207.
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  4. Brian P. Mclaughlin (2012). Phenomenal Concepts and the Defense of Materialism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):206-214.
  5. Brian P. McLaughlin (2010). Consciousness, Type Physicalism, and Inference to the Best Explanation. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):266-304.
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  6. Brian P. McLaughlin (2010). The Representational Vs. The Relational View of Visual Experience. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):239-262.
    In Reference and Consciousness, John Campbell attempts to a make a case that what he calls of visual experience, a view that he champions, is superior to what he calls . I argue that his attempt fails. In section 1, I spell out the two views. In section 2, I outline Campbell's case that the Relational View is superior to the Representational View and offer a diagnosis of where Campbell goes wrong. In section 3, I examine the case in detail (...)
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  7. Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) (2009/2011). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. Oxford University Press now presents the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the philosophy of mind. An outstanding international team of contributors offer 45 specially written critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of (...)
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  8. Tim Crane & Brian P. McLaughlin (2009). Introduction. Synthese 170 (2):211-215.
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  9. Brian P. McLaughlin (2009). Review of Sydney Shoemaker, Physical Realization. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (7).
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  10. Brian P. McLaughlin (2009). Systematicity Redux. Synthese 170 (2):251 - 274.
    One of the main challenges that Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn (Cognition 28:3–71, 1988) posed for any connectionist theory of cognitive architecture is to explain the systematicity of thought without implementing a Language of Thought (LOT) architecture. The systematicity challenge presents a dilemma: if connectionism cannot explain the systematicity of thought, then it fails to offer an adequate theory of cognitive architecture; and if it explains the systematicity of thought by implementing a LOT architecture, then it fails to offer an (...)
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  11. Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.) (2009/2011). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. Oxford University Press now presents the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the philosophy of mind. An outstanding international team of contributors offer 45 specially written critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of (...)
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  12. Sven Walter, B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (2009). Epiphenomenalism and the Notion of Causation. In Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Hiebaum (eds.), Gehirne Und Personen. Ontos.
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  13. Brian McLaughlin, Supervenience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  14. Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) (2007). Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  15. Jonathan Cohen, C. L. Hardin & Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). The Truth About 'the Truth About True Blue'. Analysis 67 (294):162–166.
    It can happen that a single surface S, viewed in normal conditions, looks pure blue (“true blue”) to observer John but looks blue tinged with green to a second observer, Jane, even though both are normal in the sense that they pass the standard psychophysical tests for color vision. Tye (2006a) finds this situation prima facie puzzling, and then offers two different “solutions” to the puzzle.1 The first is that at least one observer misrepresents S’s color because, though normal in (...)
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  16. Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin (eds.) (2007). Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
     
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  17. Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). Mental Causation and Shoemaker-Realization. Erkenntnis 67 (2):149 - 172.
    Sydney Shoemaker has proposed a new definition of `realization’ and used it to try to explain how mental events can be causes within the framework of a non-reductive physicalism. I argue that it is not actually his notion of realization that is doing the work in his account of mental causation, but rather the assumption that certain physical properties entail mental properties that do not entail them. I also point out how his account relies on certain other controversial assumptions, including (...)
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  18. Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
     
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  19. Brian P. McLaughlin (2007). Type Materialism for Phenomenal Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 431--444.
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  20. Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.) (2007). Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell Pub..
    Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. Comprises 20 newly commissioned essays on hotly debated issues in the philosophy of mind Written by a cast of leading experts in their fields, essays take opposing views on 10 central contemporary debates A thorough introduction provides a comprehensive background to the issues explored Organised into three sections which explore the ontology of the mental, nature of the mental (...)
     
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  21. Jonathan Cohen, C. L. Hardin & Brian P. McLaughlin (2006). True Colours. Analysis 66 (292):335-340.
    (Tye 2006) presents us with the following scenario: John and Jane are both stan- dard human visual perceivers (according to the Ishihara test or the Farnsworth test, for example) viewing the same surface of Munsell chip 527 in standard conditions of visual observation. The surface of the chip looks “true blue” to John (i.e., it looks blue not tinged with any other colour to John), and blue tinged with green to Jane.1 Tye then in effect poses a multiple choice question.
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  22. Brian McLaughlin (2006). Mental Causation. In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Reference. 2.
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  23. Brian P. Mclaughlin (2006). Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.
    Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility.
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  24. Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.) (2006). Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  25. Karen Bennett & Brian McLaughlin, Supervenience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  26. Vann Mcgee & Brian P. Mclaughlin (2004). Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy: A Reply to Williamson. Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (1):123-136.
  27. Brian P. Mclaughlin (2004). Anti-Individualism and Minimal Self-Knowledge: A Dissolution of Ebbs's Puzzle. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter. 2--427.
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  28. Brian P. McLaughlin (2004). Of Ebbs's Puzzle. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
     
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  29. Brian P. McLaughlin & Gary Bartlett (2004). Have Noe and Thompson Cast Doubt on the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Programme? Comment. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):56-67.
  30. Brian P. McLaughlin & Gary Bartlett (2004). Peer Commentary on Are There Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Have Noe and Thompson Cast Doubt on the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Programme? Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (1):56-67.
  31. Zoltán Jakab & Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). Why Not Color Physicalism Without Color Absolutism? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35.
    We make three points. First, the concept of productance value that the authors propose in their defense of color physicalism fails to do the work for which it is intended. Second, the authors fail to offer an adequate physicalist account of what they call the hue-magnitudes. Third, their answer to the problem of individual differences faces serious difficulties.
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  32. Brian McLaughlin (2003). The Place of Color in Nature. In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press. 475--502.
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  33. Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). A Naturalist-Phenomenal Realist Response to Block's Harder Problem. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204.
    widely held commitments: to phenomenal realism and to naturalism. Phenomenal realism is the view that (a) we are phenomenally consciousness, and that (b) there is no a priori or armchair sufficient condition for phenomenal consciousness that can be stated (non- circularly) in nonphenomenal terms (p.392).1,2 Block points out that while phenomenal realists reject.
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  34. Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). Color, Consciousness, and Color Consciousness. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. 97-154.
     
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  35. Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). McKinsey's Challenge, Warrant Transmission, and Skepticism. In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press.
  36. Brian P. McLaughlin (2003). Vitalism and Emergence. In T. Balwin (ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 631--639.
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  37. Brian P. McLaughlin (2001). In Defense of New Wave Materialism: A Response to Horgan and Tienson. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  38. Brian P. McLaughlin (2001). Introspecting Thoughts. Facta Philosophica 3:77-84.
  39. Vann McGee & Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). The Lessons of the Many. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):129-151.
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  40. Brian McLaughlin (2000). Herméneutique cosmique. Philosophiques 27 (1):63-76.
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  41. Brian McLaughlin (2000). Skepticism, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74:93-118.
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  42. Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Colors and Color Spaces. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 5: Epistemology. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center. 83-89.
    Sensory qualities are objective properties; indeed, on the evidence, they are physical properties. However, what makes a physical property the sensory quality it is is its relationship to sensory experiences of perceivers. For instance, the redness of a surface is a physical property of the surface; what makes that physical property surface red is the fact that it disposes surfaces to look red to appropriate visual perceivers in appropriate viewing circumstances. What it is like for something to look red—that is, (...)
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  43. Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):93-118.
    [Brian P. McLaughlin] In recent years, some philosophers have claimed that we can know a priori that certain external world skeptical hypotheses are false on the basis of a priori knowledge that we are in certain kinds of mental states, and a priori knowledge that those mental states are individuated by contingent environmental factors. Appealing to a distinction between weak and strong a priority, I argue that weakly a priori arguments of this sort would beg the question of whether the (...)
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  44. Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism,I. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):93–118.
    [Brian P. McLaughlin] In recent years, some philosophers have claimed that we can know a priori that certain external world skeptical hypotheses are false on the basis of a priori knowledge that we are in certain kinds of mental states, and a priori knowledge that those mental states are individuated by contingent environmental factors. Appealing to a distinction between weak and strong a priority, I argue that weakly a priori arguments of this sort would beg the question of whether the (...)
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  45. Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). The Lessons of the Many. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):129-151.
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  46. Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 5: Epistemology. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center.
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  47. Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Why Intentional Systems Theory Cannot Reconcile Physicalism with Realism About Belief and Desire. Protosociology 14:145-157.
  48. David J. Owens & Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Self-Knowledge, Externalism and Scepticism: II--David Owens, Scepticisms: Descartes and Hume. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (74):119-142.
    [FIRST PARAGRAPHS]The role of Professor McLaughlin's sceptic is to introduce certain 'sceptical hypotheses', hypotheses which imply the falsity of most of what we believe about the world. Professor McLaughlin asks whether these hypotheses are coherent and thus whether they can tell us anything about what are entitled to believe, or to claim to know. He concludes that, semantic externalism notwithstanding, these hypotheses are both coherent and threatening. I shall not question this conclusion but I do wonder whether the fate of (...)
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  49. Christopher S. Hill & Brian P. Mclaughlin (1999). There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454.
  50. Vann McGee & Brian McLaughlin (1998). Timothy Williamson, Vagueness: London and New York: 1994. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (2):221-235.
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