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  1. Meghan Griffith (2010). Why Agent-Caused Actions Are Not Lucky. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):43-56.
    Philosophers like to worry about luck. And well they should. Luck poses potential difficulties for knowledge, moral appraisal, and freedom. The primary target of this paper will be the last of these concerns . Recent arguments from luck have been levied against libertarian accounts of free will, including agent-causal ones. One general goal of this paper will be to demonstrate the truth of an often overlooked claim about responsibility-undermining luck. Part of this task will include illustrating what is genuinely worrisome (...)
     
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  2. Meghan E. Griffith (2005). Does Free Will Remain a Mystery? A Response to Van Inwagen. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):261-269.
    In this paper, I argue against Peter van Inwagen’s claim (in “Free Will Remains a Mystery”), that agent-causal views of free will could do nothing to solve the problem of free will (specifically, the problem of chanciness). After explaining van Inwagen’s argument, I argue that he does not consider all possible manifestations of the agent-causal position. More importantly, I claim that, in any case, van Inwagen appears to have mischaracterized the problem in some crucial ways. Once we are clear on (...)
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  3. Meghan Griffith (2007). Freedom and Trying: Understanding Agent-Causal Exertions. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 22 (1):16-28.
    In this paper, I argue that trying is the locus of freedom and moral responsibility. Thus, any plausible view of free and responsible action must accommodate and account for free tryings. I then consider a version of agent causation whereby the agent directly causes her tryings. On this view, the agent is afforded direct control over her efforts and there is no need to posit—as other agent-causal theorists do—an uncaused event. I discuss the potential advantages of this sort of view, (...)
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    Meghan Griffith (2011). Based on a True Story. Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):19-34.
    In several essays, John Fischer motivates his guidance control view of moral responsibility by discussing the value of acting freely. What we value, he argues, is unhindered self-expression that derives its meaning from a narrative structure. In this paper, I claim that while Fischer may be correct that self-expression (understood in its narrative sense) is the value of acting freely, it is less clear that the kind of self-expression that we value sits comfortably with determinism. The meaning of one’s narrative (...)
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    Meghan Griffith (2009). Review of E. J. Lowe, Personal Agency: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
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    Meghan Griffith (2008). Review of Pedro Alexis Tabensky, Judging and Understanding: Essays on Free Will, Narrative, Meaning and the Ethical Limits of Condemnation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (4).
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    Meghan Griffith (2013). Free Will: The Basics. Routledge.
    Introduction -- The compatibility issue -- Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities -- Some current compatibilist proposals -- Some current incompatibilist proposals -- Other positions -- Free will and science -- Where does this leave us?
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  8. Meghan Griffith (2013). Free Will: The Basics. Routledge.
    The question of whether humans are free to make their own decisions has long been debated and it continues to be a controversial topic today. In _Free Will: The Basics_ readers are provided with a clear and accessible introduction to this central but challenging philosophical problem. The questions which are discussed include: Does free will exist? Or is it illusory? Can we be free even if everything is determined by a chain of causes? If our actions are not determined, does (...)
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  9. Meghan Griffith, Kevin Timpe & Neil Levy (eds.) (forthcoming). Routledge Companion to Free Will. Routledge.
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  10. Kevin Timpe, Meghan Griffith & Neil Levy (eds.) (2016). The Routlege Companion to Free Will. Routledge.
    Questions concerning free will are intertwined with issues in almost every area of philosophy, from metaphysics to philosophy of mind to moral philosophy, and are also informed by work in different areas of science. Free will is also a perennial concern of serious thinkers in theology and in non-western traditions. Because free will can be approached from so many different perspectives and has implications for so many debates, a comprehensive survey needs to encompass an enormous range of approaches. This book (...)
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