Search results for 'Mental Competency' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Ruth Macklin & Willard Gaylin (1981). Mental Retardation and Sterilization a Problem of Competency and Paternalism. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  2. R. Prashanth & R. K. Chadda (2nd ed. 2015). Allied Mental Health Professionals: Clinical Psychologists, Psychiatric Nurses and Psychiatric Social Workers: Availability and Competency. In Adarsh Tripathi & Jitendra Kumar Trivedi (eds.), Mental Health in South Asia: Ethics, Resources, Programs and Legislation. Springer Netherlands
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  3.  35
    Christopher Ryan (2011). One Flu Over The Cuckoo's Nest: Comparing Legislated Coercive Treatment for Mental Illness with That for Other Illness. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (1):87-93.
    Many of the world’s mental health acts, including all Australian legislation, allow for the coercive detention and treatment of people with mental illnesses if they are deemed likely to harm themselves or others. Numerous authors have argued that legislated powers to impose coercive treatment in psychiatric illness should pivot on the presence or absence of capacity not likely harm, but no Australian act uses this criterion. In this paper, I add a novel element to these arguments by comparing (...)
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  4.  30
    Michael Cholbi (2005). Cruelty, Competency, and Contemporary Abolitionism. In A. Sarat (ed.), Studies in Law, Politics, and Society. 123-140.
    After establishing that the requirement that those criminals who stand for execution be mentally competent can be given a recognizably retributivist rationale, I suggest that not only it is difficult to show that executing the incompetent is more cruel than executing the competent, but that opposing the execution of the incompetent fits ill with the recent abolitionist efforts on procedural concerns. I then propose two avenues by which abolitionists could incorporate such opposition into their efforts.
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  5.  11
    C. R. Blease (2013). Electroconvulsive Therapy, the Placebo Effect and Informed Consent. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (3):166-170.
    Major depressive disorder is not only the most widespread mental disorder in the world, it is a disorder on the rise. In cases of particularly severe forms of depression, when all other treatment options have failed, the use of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is a recommended treatment option for patients. ECT has been in use in psychiatric practice for over 70 years and is now undergoing something of a restricted renaissance following a sharp decline in its use in the 1970s. (...)
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  6.  5
    Inés Morán-Sánchez, Aurelio Luna, Maria Sánchez-Muñoz, Beatriz Aguilera-Alcaraz & Maria D. Pérez-Cárceles (2016). Decision-Making Capacity for Research Participation Among Addicted People: A Cross-Sectional Study. BMC Medical Ethics 17 (1):1-10.
    BackgroundInformed consent is a key element of ethical clinical research. Addicted population may be at risk for impaired consent capacity. However, very little research has focused on their comprehension of consent forms. The aim of this study is to assess the capacity of addicted individuals to provide consent to research.Methods53 subjects with DSM-5 diagnoses of a Substance Use Disorder and 50 non psychiatric comparison subjects participated in the survey from December 2014 to March 2015. This cross-sectional study was carried out (...)
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  7.  7
    Camillia Kong (2015). The Space Between Second-Personal Respect and Rational Care in Theory and Mental Health Law. Law and Philosophy 34 (4):433-467.
    In recent human rights and legal instruments, individuals with impairments are increasingly recognised as agents who are worthy of respect for their inherent dignity and capacity to make autonomous decisions regarding treatment and care provisions. These legal developments could be understood using Stephen Darwall’s normative framework of the second person standpoint. However, this paper draws upon phenomena – both in legal developments and recent court cases – to illustrate theoretical difficulties with the contractualist underpinnings of Darwall’s account if applied to (...)
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  8.  14
    Thomas Hindmarch, Matthew Hotopf & Gareth S. Owen (2013). Depression and Decision-Making Capacity for Treatment or Research: A Systematic Review. BMC Medical Ethics 14 (1):54.
    Psychiatric disorders can pose problems in the assessment of decision-making capacity (DMC). This is so particularly where psychopathology is seen as the extreme end of a dimension that includes normality. Depression is an example of such a psychiatric disorder. Four abilities (understanding, appreciating, reasoning and ability to express a choice) are commonly assessed when determining DMC in psychiatry and uncertainty exists about the extent to which depression impacts capacity to make treatment or research participation decisions.
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  9.  4
    J. Savulescu (2013). Elective Ventilation and Interests. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (3):129-129.
    This paper examines questions concerning elective ventilation, contextualised within English law and policy. It presents the general debate with reference both to the Exeter Protocol on elective ventilation, and the considerable developments in legal principle since the time that that protocol was declared to be unlawful. I distinguish different aspects of what might be labelled elective ventilation policies under the following four headings: ‘basic elective ventilation’; ‘epistemically complex elective ventilation’; ‘practically complex elective ventilation’; and ‘epistemically and practically complex elective ventilation’. (...)
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  10.  33
    Deborah Bowman (2011). Informed Consent: A Primer for Clinical Practice. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction: why focus on informed consent?; 2. Deciding who decides: capacity and consent; 3. Putting the informed into 'informed consent': information and decision-making; 4. Freedom of expression: the voluntary nature of consent; 5. A patient's prerogative? The continuing nature of consent; 6. Concluding words about consent; Index.
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  11. David Albert Jones (2011). Is There a Logical Slippery Slope From Voluntary to Nonvoluntary Euthanasia? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 21 (4):379-404.
    Slippery slope arguments have been important in the euthanasia debate for at least half a century. In 1957 the Cambridge legal scholar Glanville Williams wrote a controversial book, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, in which he presented the decriminalizing of euthanasia as a modern liberal proposal taking its rightful place alongside proposals to decriminalize contraception, sterilization, abortion, and attempted suicide (all of which the book also advocated).1 Opposition to these reforms was in turn presented as exclusively religious (...)
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  12.  35
    Craig Edwards (2011). Respect for Other Selves. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 21 (4):349-378.
    How ought we respond to advance directives that appear to fly in the face of a severely mentally impaired patient's quality of life? An advance directive is a legal instrument wherein a person records instructions regarding the medical treatment that she is to receive in the event that she becomes persistently incapable of refusing or giving informed consent to treatment. Where these instructions are legally binding, they enable a person to exercise control over her future medical treatment. This has been (...)
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  13.  17
    Stephen Rowntree (1982). Ethical Issues of Life and Death. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):449-464.
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  14.  6
    T. M. Krakower, M. Montello, C. Mitchell & R. D. Truog (2012). The Ethics of Reality Medical Television. Journal of Clinical Ethics 24 (1):50-57.
    Reality medical television, an increasingly popular genre, depicts private medical moments between patients and healthcare providers. Journalists aim to educate and inform the public, while the participants in their documentaries—providers and patients—seek to heal and be healed. When journalists and healthcare providers work together at the bedside, moral problems precipitate. During the summer of 2010, ABC aired a documentary, Boston Med, featuring several Boston hospitals. We examine the ethical issues that arise when journalism and medicine intersect. We provide a framework (...)
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  15.  2
    D. W. Brock (1991). What is the Moral Basis of the Authority of Family Members to Act as Surrogates for Incompetent Patients? Journal of Clinical Ethics 3 (2):121-123.
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  16.  2
    J. J. Delden, P. J. Maas, L. Pijnenborg & C. W. Looman (1993). Deciding Not to Resuscitate in Dutch Hospitals. Journal of Medical Ethics 19 (4):200-205.
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  17.  29
    Nico Peruzzi, Andrew Canapary & Bruce Bongar (1996). Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Role of Mental Health Professionals. Ethics and Behavior 6 (4):353 – 366.
    A review of the literature was conducted to better understand the (potential) role of mental health professionals in physician-assisted suicide. Numerous studies indicate that depression is one of the most commonly encountered psychiatric illnesses in primary care settings. Yet, depression consistently goes undetected and undiagnosed by nonpsychiatrically trained primary care physicians. Noting the well-studied link between depression and suicide, it is necessary to question giving sole responsibility of assisting patients in making end-of-life treatment decisions to these physicians. Unfortunately, the (...)
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  18.  22
    Ruth Macklin (1983). Philosophical Conceptions of Rationality and Psychiatric Notions of Competency. Synthese 57 (2):205 - 224.
    Psychiatrists are frequently called upon to make assessments of the rationality or irrationality of persons for a variety of medical-legal purposes. A key category is that of evaluations of a patient's capacity to grant informed consent for a medical procedure. A diagnosis of mental illness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a finding of incompetence. The notion of competency to grant consent, which is a mixed psychiatric-legal concept, shares some features with philosophical conceptions of rationality, (...)
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  19.  4
    P. J. Taylor (1983). Consent, Competency and ECT: A Psychiatrist's View. Journal of Medical Ethics 9 (3):146-151.
    Dr Taylor, an English psychiatrist, considers the issue of the symposium in the context of the Mental Health (Amendment) Act 1982. This, she says, gives little guidance on how judgment of a patient's competency or capability to consent to treatment should be made, although it specifies that unless compulsorily detained patients competently consent to ECT a special second medical opinion is required. Although some guidelines from the Department of Health may be offered before implementation of the Act in (...)
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  20.  92
    Jim Hopkins (2016). Free Energy and Virtual Reality in Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience: A Complexity Theory of Dreaming and Mental Disorder. Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    This paper compares the free energy neuroscience now advocated by Karl Friston and his colleagues with that hypothesised by Freud, arguing that Freud's notions of conflict and trauma can be understood in terms of computational complexity. It relates Hobson and Friston's work on dreaming and the reduction of complexity to contemporary accounts of dreaming and the consolidation of memory, and advances the hypothesis that mental disorder can be understood in terms of computational complexity and the mechanisms, including synaptic pruning, (...)
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  21. Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (2014). Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds. In Harold Kincaid & Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (eds.), Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds. MIT 1-10.
    In this volume, leading philosophers of psychiatry examine psychiatric classification systems, including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, asking whether current systems are sufficient for effective diagnosis, treatment, and research. Doing so, they take up the question of whether mental disorders are natural kinds, grounded in something in the outside world. Psychiatric categories based on natural kinds should group phenomena in such a way that they are subject to the same type of causal explanations and respond (...)
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  22. Thomas Suddendorf & Michael C. Corballis (2007). The Evolution of Foresight: What is Mental Time Travel, and is It Unique to Humans? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):299-313.
    In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage. We suggest that memory systems differ in the degree of flexibility they offer for anticipatory behavior and put forward a corresponding taxonomy of prospection. The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival. The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not (...)
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  23. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press 75-96.
    My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality (...)
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  24. Stan Klein & Chloe Steindam (forthcoming). The Role of Subjective Temporality in Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. In Kirk Michaelian, Stan Klein & Karl Szpunar (eds.), Seeing the Future: Theoretical Perspectives on Future-Oriented Mental Time Travel. Oxford University Press
    In this chapter we examine the tendency to view future-oriented mental time travel as a unitary faculty that, despite task-driven surface variation, ultimately reduces to a common phenomenological state. We review evidence that FMTT is neither unitary nor beholden to episodic memory: Rather, it is varied both in its memorial underpinnings and experiential realization. We conclude that the phenomenological diversity characterizing FMTT is dependent not on the type of memory activated during task performance, but on the kind of subjective (...)
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  25. Fabian Dorsch (2009). Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press 38-71.
    What is the scope of our conscious mental agency, and how do we acquire self-knowledge of it? Both questions are addressed through an investigation of what best explains our inability to form judgemental thoughts in direct response to practical reasons. Contrary to what Williams and others have argued, it cannot be their subjection to a truth norm, given that our failure to adhere to such a norm need not undermine their status as judgemental. Instead, it is argued that we (...)
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  26. Tim Crane (1998). Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental. In Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 229-251.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, (...)
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  27. Galen Strawson (1994). Mental Reality. MIT Press.
    Introduction -- A default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism (...)
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  28. Lubomira Radoilska (2012). Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder. In Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press
    In this Introduction, I situate the underlying project “Autonomy and Mental Disorder” with reference to current debates on autonomy in moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of action. I then offer an overview of the individual contributions. More specifically, I begin by identifying three points of convergence in the debates at issue, stating that autonomy is: 1) a fundamentally liberal concept; 2) an agency concept and; 3) incompatible with (severe) mental disorder. Next, I explore, in the context (...)
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  29.  78
    Robert N. Audi (1993). Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
    I. the view that reasons cannot be causes. II. the view that the explanatory relevance of psychological states such as beliefs and intentions derives from their content, their explanatory role is not causal and we thus have no good reason to ascribe causal power to them. III. the idea that if the mental supervenes on the physical, then what really explains our actions is the physical properties determining our propositional attitudes, and not those attitudes themselves. IV. the thesis that (...)
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  30.  44
    Janna Hastings, Werner Ceusters, Mark Jensen, Kevin Mulligan & Barry Smith (2012). Representing Mental Functioning: Ontologies for Mental Health and Disease. In Towards an Ontology of Mental Functioning (ICBO Workshop), Proceeedings of the Third International Conference on Biomedical Ontology.
    Mental and behavioral disorders represent a significant portion of the public health burden in all countries. The human cost of these disorders is immense, yet treatment options for sufferers are currently limited, with many patients failing to respond sufficiently to available interventions and drugs. High quality ontologies facilitate data aggregation and comparison across different disciplines, and may therefore speed up the translation of primary research into novel therapeutics. Realism-based ontologies describe entities in reality and the relationships between them in (...)
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  31.  18
    Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (2009). Jerónimo Pardo on the Unity of Mental Propositions. In J. Biard (ed.), Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'Âge Classique. Peeters Publishers
    Originally motivated by a sophism, Pardo's discussion about the unity of mental propositions allows him to elaborate on his ideas about the nature of propositions. His option for a non-composite character of mental propositions is grounded in an original view about syncategorems: propositions have a syncategorematic signification, which allows them to signify aliquid aliqualiter, just by virtue of the mental copula, without the need of any added categorematic element. Pardo's general claim about the simplicity of mental (...)
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  32. J. Millum (2012). Introduction: Case Studies in the Ethics of Mental Health Research. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 200:230-35.
    This collection presents six case studies on the ethics of mental health research, written by scientific researchers and ethicists from around the world. We publish them here as a resource for teachers of research ethics and as a contribution to several ongoing ethical debates. Each consists of a description of a research study that was proposed or carried out and an in-depth analysis of the ethics of the study.
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  33. Martin Smith (forthcoming). The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State. In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First, Approaches to Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press
    My concern in this paper is with the claim that knowledge is a mental state – a claim that Williamson places front and centre in Knowledge and Its Limits. While I am not by any means convinced that the claim is false, I do think it carries certain costs that have not been widely appreciated. One source of resistance to this claim derives from internalism about the mental – the view, roughly speaking, that one’s mental states are (...)
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  34.  71
    Rachel Goodman (forthcoming). Against the Mental Files Conception of Singular Thought. Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2):1-25.
    It has become popular of late to identify the phenomenon of thinking a singular thought with that of thinking with a mental file. Proponents of the mental files conception of singular thought claim that one thinks a singular thought about an object o iff one employs a mental file to think about o. I argue that this is false by arguing that there are what I call descriptive mental files, so some file-based thought is not singular (...)
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  35. Chiwook Won (2014). Overdetermination, Counterfactuals, and Mental Causation. Philosophical Review 123 (2):205-229.
    The overdetermination problem has long been raised as a challenge to nonreductive physicalism. Nonreductive physicalists have, in various ways, tried to resolve the problem through appeal to counterfactuals. This essay does two things. First, it takes up the question whether counterfactuals can yield an appropriate notion of causal redundancy and argues for a negative answer. Second, it examines how this issue bears on the mental causation debate. In particular, it considers the argument that the overdetermination problem simply does not (...)
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  36.  25
    Zdenka Brzović (forthcoming). Duševne bolesti i rasprava o biološkim funkcijama (eng. Mental ilness and the debate on biological functions). In Snjezana Prijic-Samarzija, Luca Malatesti & Elvio Baccarini (eds.), Moralni, Politički I Društveni Odgovori Na Društvene Devijacije (Eng. Moral, Political, and Social Responses to Antisocial Deviation). FAculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka 183-199.
    In this paper, I discuss the question whether objective criteria could be provided for judging something to be a mental illness. I consider the two most prominent objectivist or naturalistic accounts of mental illness, evolutionary and bio-statistical account, which offer such a criterion by relying on the notion of biological function. According to such suggestions, illness is a condition in which there is dysfunciton in some feature of an organism. In this context, I consider different accounts for ascribing (...)
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  37. Jennifer Nagel (2013). Knowledge as a Mental State. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.
    In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have not. The disagreement is (...)
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  38.  24
    Zdenka Brzović (forthcoming). Duševne bolesti i rasprava o biološkim funkcijama (eng. Mental ilness and the debate on biological functions). In Snjezana Prijic-Samarzija, Luca Malatesti & Elvio Baccarini (eds.), Moralni, Politički I Društveni Odgovori Na Društvene Devijacije (Eng. Moral, Political, and Social Responses to Antisocial Deviation). FAculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Rijeka 183-199.
    In this paper, I discuss the question whether objective criteria could be provided for judging something to be a mental illness. I consider the two most prominent objectivist or naturalistic accounts of mental illness, evolutionary and bio-statistical account, which offer such a criterion by relying on the notion of biological function. According to such suggestions, illness is a condition in which there is dysfunciton in some feature of an organism. In this context, I consider different accounts for ascribing (...)
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  39. Eric Hochstein (forthcoming). Categorizing the Mental. Philosophical Quarterly.
    A common view in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology is that there is an ideally correct way of categorizing the structures and operations of the mind, and that the goal of neuroscience and psychology is to find this correct categorizational scheme. Categories which cannot find a place within this correct framework ought to be eliminated from scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this general idea runs counter to productive scientific practices. Such a view ignores the (...)
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  40. Stan Klein (2015). The Feeling of Personal Ownership of One’s Mental States: A Conceptual Argument and Empirical Evidence for an Essential, but Underappreciated, Mechanism of Mind. Psychology of Consciousness: Research, Practice, and Theory 2 (4):355-376.
    I argue that the feeling that one is the owner of his or her mental states is not an intrinsic property of those states. Rather, it consists in a contingent relation between consciousness and its intentional objects. As such, there are (a variety of) circumstances, varying in their interpretive clarity, in which this relation can come undone. When this happens, the content of consciousness still is apprehended, but the feeling that the content “belongs to me” no longer is secured. (...)
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  41.  90
    Sara Bernstein & Jessica Wilson (2016). Free Will and Mental Quausation. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2:310-331.
    Free will, if such there be, involves free choosing: the ability to mentally choose an outcome, where the outcome is 'free' in being, in some substantive sense, up to the agent of the choice. As such, it is clear that the questions of how to understand free will and mental causation are connected, for events of seemingly free choosing are mental events that appear to be efficacious vis-a-vis other mental events as well as physical events. Nonetheless, the (...)
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  42.  28
    Jacob Beck & Keith Schneider (forthcoming). Attention and Mental Primer. Mind and Language.
    Drawing on the empirical premise that attention makes objects look more intense (bigger, faster, higher in contrast), Ned Block has argued for mental paint, a phenomenal residue that cannot be reduced to what is perceived or represented. If sound, Block’s argument would undermine direct realism and representationism, two widely held views about the nature of conscious perception. We argue that Block’s argument fails because the empirical premise it is based upon is false. Attending to an object alters its salience, (...)
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  43. Robert Briscoe (2011). Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay (...)
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  44.  17
    Stephen M. Kosslyn, Steven Pinker, Sophie Schwartz & G. Smith (1979). On the Demystification of Mental Imagery. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):535-81.
    What might a theory of mental imagery look like, and how might one begin formulating such a theory? These are the central questions addressed in the present paper. The first section outlines the general research direction taken here and provides an overview of the empirical foundations of our theory of image representation and processing. Four issues are considered in succession, and the relevant results of experiments are presented and discussed. The second section begins with a discussion of the proper (...)
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  45. Andrea Schimmenti (2013). Monismo anômalo, fisicalismo, causalidade mental. Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 17 (2):43-75.
    This paper focuses some aspects of a debate which took place between Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim, about the problem of causal efficacy of mental properties in the physical world. The most famous expression of davidsoniannon reductive physicalism, the argument of Anomalous Monism, was criticized by Kim, because it tries to harmonize two allegations that can´t coexist in a physicalist thesis, and have to be considered as incompatible from a physicalistpoint of view. The first of these allegations is theAnomaly (...)
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  46.  95
    Ken Levy & Alex Cohen (2016). Commentary on Szmukler: Mental Illness, Dangerousness, and Involuntary Civil Commitment. In Daniel D. Moseley Gary J. Gala (ed.), Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections, and New Perspectives. Routledge 147-160.
    Prof. Cohen and I answer six questions: (1) Why do we lock people up? (2) How can involuntary civil commitment be reconciled with people's constitutional right to liberty? (3) Why don't we treat homicide as a public health threat? (4) What is the difference between legal and medical approaches to mental illness? (5) Why is mental illness required for involuntary commitment? (6) Where are we in our efforts to understand the causes of mental illness?
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  47. Angela Mendelovici (2013). Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.
    It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.
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  48. Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
  49.  30
    Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Hallucination as Mental Imagery. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    Hallucination is a big deal in contemporary philosophy of perception. The main reason for this is that the way hallucination is treated marks an important stance in one of the most vicious debates in this subdiscipline: the debate between ‘relationalists’ and ‘representationalists’. I argue that if we take hallucinations to be a form of mental imagery (as the literature in neuroscience and psychiatry routinely does), then we have a very straightforward way of arguing against disjunctivism: if hallucination is a (...)
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  50.  50
    Robert C. Cummins (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. MIT Press.
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