Search results for 'Mental Competency' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Michael Cholbi (2005). Cruelty, Competency, and Contemporary Abolitionism. In A. Sarat (ed.), Studies in Law, Politics, and Society. 123-140.score: 44.0
    After establishing that the requirement that those criminals who stand for execution be mentally competent can be given a recognizably retributivist rationale, I suggest that not only it is difficult to show that executing the incompetent is more cruel than executing the competent, but that opposing the execution of the incompetent fits ill with the recent abolitionist efforts on procedural concerns. I then propose two avenues by which abolitionists could incorporate such opposition into their efforts.
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  2. Laura Klaming & Pim Haselager (2013). Did My Brain Implant Make Me Do It? Questions Raised by DBS Regarding Psychological Continuity, Responsibility for Action and Mental Competence. Neuroethics 6 (3):527-539.score: 42.0
    Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a well-accepted treatment for movement disorders and is currently explored as a treatment option for various neurological and psychiatric disorders. Several case studies suggest that DBS may, in some patients, influence mental states critical to personality to such an extent that it affects an individual’s personal identity, i.e. the experience of psychological continuity, of persisting through time as the same person. Without questioning the usefulness of DBS as a treatment option for various serious and (...)
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  3. Christopher Ryan (2011). One Flu Over The Cuckoo's Nest: Comparing Legislated Coercive Treatment for Mental Illness with That for Other Illness. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (1):87-93.score: 42.0
    Many of the world’s mental health acts, including all Australian legislation, allow for the coercive detention and treatment of people with mental illnesses if they are deemed likely to harm themselves or others. Numerous authors have argued that legislated powers to impose coercive treatment in psychiatric illness should pivot on the presence or absence of capacity not likely harm, but no Australian act uses this criterion. In this paper, I add a novel element to these arguments by comparing (...)
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  4. M. Strätling, V. E. Scharf & P. Schmucker (2004). Mental Competence and Surrogate Decision-Making Towards the End of Life. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 7 (2):209-215.score: 42.0
    German legislation demands that decisions about the treatment of mentally incompetent patients require an ‘informed consent’. If this was not given by the patient him-/herself before he/she became incompetent, it has to be sought by the physician from a guardian, who has to be formally legitimized before. Additionally this surrogate has to seek the permission of a Court of Guardianship (Vormundschaftsgericht), if he/she intends to consent to interventions, which pose significant risks to the health or the life of the person (...)
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  5. C. R. Blease (2013). Electroconvulsive Therapy, the Placebo Effect and Informed Consent. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (3):166-170.score: 33.0
    Major depressive disorder is not only the most widespread mental disorder in the world, it is a disorder on the rise. In cases of particularly severe forms of depression, when all other treatment options have failed, the use of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is a recommended treatment option for patients. ECT has been in use in psychiatric practice for over 70 years and is now undergoing something of a restricted renaissance following a sharp decline in its use in the 1970s. (...)
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  6. Craig Edwards (2011). Respect for Other Selves. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 21 (4):349-378.score: 31.0
    How ought we respond to advance directives that appear to fly in the face of a severely mentally impaired patient's quality of life? An advance directive is a legal instrument wherein a person records instructions regarding the medical treatment that she is to receive in the event that she becomes persistently incapable of refusing or giving informed consent to treatment. Where these instructions are legally binding, they enable a person to exercise control over her future medical treatment. This has been (...)
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  7. David Albert Jones (2011). Is There a Logical Slippery Slope From Voluntary to Nonvoluntary Euthanasia? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 21 (4):379-404.score: 30.0
    Slippery slope arguments have been important in the euthanasia debate for at least half a century. In 1957 the Cambridge legal scholar Glanville Williams wrote a controversial book, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, in which he presented the decriminalizing of euthanasia as a modern liberal proposal taking its rightful place alongside proposals to decriminalize contraception, sterilization, abortion, and attempted suicide (all of which the book also advocated).1 Opposition to these reforms was in turn presented as exclusively religious (...)
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  8. Deborah Bowman (2011). Informed Consent: A Primer for Clinical Practice. Cambridge University Press.score: 30.0
    Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction: why focus on informed consent?; 2. Deciding who decides: capacity and consent; 3. Putting the informed into 'informed consent': information and decision-making; 4. Freedom of expression: the voluntary nature of consent; 5. A patient's prerogative? The continuing nature of consent; 6. Concluding words about consent; Index.
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  9. Stephen Rowntree (1982). Ethical Issues of Life and Death. Thought 57 (4):449-464.score: 30.0
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  10. D. W. Brock (1991). What is the Moral Basis of the Authority of Family Members to Act as Surrogates for Incompetent Patients? Journal of Clinical Ethics 3 (2):121-123.score: 30.0
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  11. J. J. Delden, P. J. Maas, L. Pijnenborg & C. W. Looman (1993). Deciding Not to Resuscitate in Dutch Hospitals. Journal of Medical Ethics 19 (4):200-205.score: 30.0
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  12. Thomas Hindmarch, Matthew Hotopf & Gareth S. Owen (2013). Depression and Decision-Making Capacity for Treatment or Research: A Systematic Review. BMC Medical Ethics 14 (1):54.score: 30.0
    Psychiatric disorders can pose problems in the assessment of decision-making capacity (DMC). This is so particularly where psychopathology is seen as the extreme end of a dimension that includes normality. Depression is an example of such a psychiatric disorder. Four abilities (understanding, appreciating, reasoning and ability to express a choice) are commonly assessed when determining DMC in psychiatry and uncertainty exists about the extent to which depression impacts capacity to make treatment or research participation decisions.
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  13. T. M. Krakower, M. Montello, C. Mitchell & R. D. Truog (2012). The Ethics of Reality Medical Television. Journal of Clinical Ethics 24 (1):50-57.score: 30.0
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  14. J. Savulescu (2013). Elective Ventilation and Interests. Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (3):129-129.score: 30.0
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  15. Ajit Shah (2011). Mental Competence or Best Interests? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (2):151-152.score: 28.0
    The anthropological approach to mental competence is very interesting. I shall reason that the issue of mental competence and the determination best interests in the decision making process has been integrated together in this anthropological approach. I use the relatively recent Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) for England and Wales (Department of Constitutional Affairs 2005) to illustrate this line of reasoning. I have deliberately chosen the phrase decision-making capacity (DMC) in this commentary to separate it from the (...)
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  16. Craig Edwards (2010). Beyond Mental Competence. Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (3):273-289.score: 27.0
    Justification for psychiatric paternalism is most easily established where mental illness renders the person mentally incompetent, depriving him of the capacity for rational agency and for autonomy, hence undermining the basis for liberal rights against paternalism. But some philosophers, and no doubt some doctors, have been deeply concerned by the inadequacy of the concept of mental incompetence to encapsulate some apparently appealing cases for psychiatric paternalism. We ought to view mental incompetence as just one subset of a (...)
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  17. David Checkland & Michel Silberfeld (1996). Mental Competence and the Question of Beneficent Intervention. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 17 (2).score: 27.0
    The authors examine recent arguments purporting to show that mental incompetence (lack of decision-making capacity) is not a necessary condition for intervention in a person's best interests without consent. It is concluded that these arguments fail to show that competent wishes could justifiably be overturned. Nonetheless, it remains an open question whether accounts of decision-making capacity based solely on the notions of understanding and appreciation can adequately deal with various complexities. Different possible ways of resolving these complexities are outlined, (...)
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  18. Neelke Doorn (2011). Mental Competence or Capacity to Form a Will: An Anthropological Approach1. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (2):135-145.score: 24.0
    The use of coercive measures in mental health care is an issue of ongoing concern (Cf. Fisher 1994; Janssen et al. 2008; Paterson and Duxbury 2007; Prinsen and Van Delden 2009; Widdershoven and Berghmans 2007; Wynn 2006). On the one hand, coercive interventions seem to infringe the patient’s right to self-determination (principle of autonomy). However, professionals are also committed to providing the care they deem necessary (principle of beneficence). In other words, professionals in mental health care are often (...)
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  19. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Determination, Realization and Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):149 - 169.score: 21.0
    How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (...)
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  20. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. 75-96.score: 21.0
    My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality (...)
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  21. Justin T. Tiehen (2011). Disproportional Mental Causation. Synthese 182 (3):375-391.score: 21.0
    In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that Stephen Yablo’s influential account of mental causation is susceptible to counterexamples involving what I call disproportional mental causation. Second, I argue that similar counterexamples can be generated for any alternative account of mental causation that is like Yablo’s in that it takes mental states and their physical realizers to causally compete. Third, I show that there are alternative nonreductive approaches to mental causation which reject (...)
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  22. Kristin Andrews (2003). Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime I (...)
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  23. Robert N. Audi (1993). Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    I. the view that reasons cannot be causes. II. the view that the explanatory relevance of psychological states such as beliefs and intentions derives from their content, their explanatory role is not causal and we thus have no good reason to ascribe causal power to them. III. the idea that if the mental supervenes on the physical, then what really explains our actions is the physical properties determining our propositional attitudes, and not those attitudes themselves. IV. the thesis that (...)
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  24. Amie L. Thomasson (1998). A Nonreductivist Solution to Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 89 (2-3):181-95.score: 21.0
    Nonreductive physicalism provides an appealing solution to the nature of mental properties. But its success as a theory of mental properties has been called into doubt by claims that it cannot adequately handle the problems of mental causation, as it leads either to epiphenomenalism or to thoroughgoing overdetermination. I argue that these apparent problems for the nonreductivist are based in fundamental confusion about causation and explanation. I distinguish two different types of explanation and two different relations to (...)
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  25. Sara Worley (1997). Determination and Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 46 (3):281-304.score: 21.0
    Yablo suggests that we can understand the possibility of mental causation by supposing that mental properties determine physical properties, in the classic sense of determination according to which red determines scarlet. Determinates and their determinables do not compete for causal relevance, so if mental and physical properties are related as determinable and determinates, they should not compete for causal relevance either. I argue that this solution won''t work. I first construct a more adequate account of determination than (...)
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  26. Gary George Ford (2000). Ethical Reasoning in the Mental Health Professions. Crc Press.score: 21.0
    The ability to reason ethically is an extraordinarily important aspect of professionalism in any field. Indeed, the greatest challenge in ethical professional practice involves resolving the conflict that arises when the professional is required to choose between two competing ethical principles. Ethical Reasoning in the Mental Health Professions explores how to develop the ability to reason ethically in difficult situations. Other books merely present ethical and legal issues one at a time, along with case examples involving "right" and "wrong" (...)
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  27. Bengt Brülde (2010). On Defining “Mental Disorder”: Purposes and Conditions of Adequacy. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):19-33.score: 21.0
    All definitions of mental disorder are backed up by arguments that rely on general criteria (e.g., that a definition should be consistent with ordinary language). These desiderata are rarely explicitly stated, and there has been no systematic discussion of how different definitions should be assessed. To arrive at a well-founded list of desiderata, we need to know the purpose of a definition. I argue that this purpose must be practical; it should, for example, help us determine who is entitled (...)
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  28. Wayne Martin & Ryan Hickerson (2013). Mental Capacity and the Applied Phenomenology of Judgement. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):195-214.score: 21.0
    We undertake to bring a phenomenological perspective to bear on a challenge of contemporary law and clinical practice. In a wide variety of contexts, legal and medical professionals are called upon to assess the competence or capacity of an individual to exercise her own judgement in making a decision for herself. We focus on decisions regarding consent to or refusal of medical treatment and contrast a widely recognised clinical instrument, the MacCAT-T, with a more phenomenologically informed approach. While the MacCAT-T (...)
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  29. Lubomira Radoilska (2012). Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder. In , Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    In this Introduction, I situate the underlying project “Autonomy and Mental Disorder” with reference to current debates on autonomy in moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of action. I then offer an overview of the individual contributions. More specifically, I begin by identifying three points of convergence in the debates at issue, stating that autonomy is: 1) a fundamentally liberal concept; 2) an agency concept and; 3) incompatible with (severe) mental disorder. Next, I explore, in the context (...)
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  30. Nico Peruzzi, Andrew Canapary & Bruce Bongar (1996). Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Role of Mental Health Professionals. Ethics and Behavior 6 (4):353 – 366.score: 21.0
    A review of the literature was conducted to better understand the (potential) role of mental health professionals in physician-assisted suicide. Numerous studies indicate that depression is one of the most commonly encountered psychiatric illnesses in primary care settings. Yet, depression consistently goes undetected and undiagnosed by nonpsychiatrically trained primary care physicians. Noting the well-studied link between depression and suicide, it is necessary to question giving sole responsibility of assisting patients in making end-of-life treatment decisions to these physicians. Unfortunately, the (...)
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  31. Janna Hastings, Werner Ceusters, Mark Jensen, Kevin Mulligan & Barry Smith (2012). Representing Mental Functioning: Ontologies for Mental Health and Disease. In Towards an Ontology of Mental Functioning (ICBO Workshop), Proceeedings of the Third International Conference on Biomedical Ontology.score: 21.0
    Mental and behavioral disorders represent a significant portion of the public health burden in all countries. The human cost of these disorders is immense, yet treatment options for sufferers are currently limited, with many patients failing to respond sufficiently to available interventions and drugs. High quality ontologies facilitate data aggregation and comparison across different disciplines, and may therefore speed up the translation of primary research into novel therapeutics. Realism-based ontologies describe entities in reality and the relationships between them in (...)
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  32. Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (2009). Jerónimo Pardo on the Unity of Mental Propositions. In J. Biard (ed.), Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'Âge Classique. Peeters Publishers.score: 21.0
    Originally motivated by a sophism, Pardo's discussion about the unity of mental propositions allows him to elaborate on his ideas about the nature of propositions. His option for a non-composite character of mental propositions is grounded in an original view about syncategorems: propositions have a syncategorematic signification, which allows them to signify aliquid aliqualiter, just by virtue of the mental copula, without the need of any added categorematic element. Pardo's general claim about the simplicity of mental (...)
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  33. Ruth Macklin (1983). Philosophical Conceptions of Rationality and Psychiatric Notions of Competency. Synthese 57 (2):205 - 224.score: 21.0
    Psychiatrists are frequently called upon to make assessments of the rationality or irrationality of persons for a variety of medical-legal purposes. A key category is that of evaluations of a patient's capacity to grant informed consent for a medical procedure. A diagnosis of mental illness is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a finding of incompetence. The notion of competency to grant consent, which is a mixed psychiatric-legal concept, shares some features with philosophical conceptions of rationality, (...)
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  34. John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.) (1993). Mental Causation. Clarendon Press.score: 21.0
    I argue that the two standard models of mental causation fail to capture the crucial causal relevance of the reason-giving relations involved. Their common error is an exclusively mechanical conception of causation, on which any justification is bound to be independent of the causal process involved, based upon a general rule from which the correctness of the particular case follows only by subsumption. I establish possibility of an alternative model, by sketching an account of the causal dependence of perceptual (...)
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  35. P. J. Taylor (1983). Consent, Competency and ECT: A Psychiatrist's View. Journal of Medical Ethics 9 (3):146-151.score: 21.0
    Dr Taylor, an English psychiatrist, considers the issue of the symposium in the context of the Mental Health (Amendment) Act 1982. This, she says, gives little guidance on how judgment of a patient's competency or capability to consent to treatment should be made, although it specifies that unless compulsorily detained patients competently consent to ECT a special second medical opinion is required. Although some guidelines from the Department of Health may be offered before implementation of the Act in (...)
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  36. Giovanni Pezzulo, Francesco Rigoli & Fabian Chersi (2013). The Mixed Instrumental Controller: Using Value of Information to Combine Habitual Choice and Mental Simulation. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 21.0
    Instrumental behavior depends on both goal-directed and habitual mechanisms of choice. Normative views cast these mechanisms in terms of model-free and model-based methods of reinforcement learning, respectively. An influential proposal hypothesizes that model-free and model-based mechanisms coexist and compete in the brain according to their relative uncertainty. In this paper we propose a novel view in which a single Mixed Instrumental Controller produces both goal-directed and habitual behavior by flexibly balancing and combining model-based and model-free computations. The Mixed Instrumental Controller (...)
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  37. D. A. Greaves (1991). Can Compulsory Removal Ever Be Justified for Adults Who Are Mentally Competent? Journal of Medical Ethics 17 (4):189-194.score: 20.0
    Section 47 of the National Assistance Act is controversial in that it makes provision for the compulsory removal and care of mentally competent adults in certain limited circumstances. A case is described in which it is argued that compulsory management could be justified. This is because the diversity and potentially conflicting nature of the relevant considerations involved in this and a restricted range of other cases, defies their being captured in any wholly rational moral scheme. It follows that if the (...)
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  38. Robert Briscoe (2011). Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.score: 18.0
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay (...)
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  39. E. J. Lowe (2006). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.score: 18.0
    Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental (...)
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  40. Tim Crane (1998). Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental. In , Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. 229-251.score: 18.0
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, (...)
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  41. Mark Greenberg (2005). A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I propose a new way of understanding the space of possibilities in the field of mental content. The resulting map assigns separate locations to theories of content that have generally been lumped together on the more traditional map. Conversely, it clusters together some theories of content that have typically been regarded as occupying opposite poles. I make my points concrete by developing a taxonomy of theories of mental content, but the main points of the paper (...)
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  42. Angela Mendelovici (2013). Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.score: 18.0
    It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation (e.g. those of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan) have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.
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  43. Evan Thompson (2007). Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.score: 18.0
    This paper (1) sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery; (2) applies this analysis to the mental imagery debate in cognitive science; (3) briefly sketches a neurophenomenological approach to mental imagery; and (4) compares the results of this discussion with Dennett’s heterophenomenology.
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  44. Jennifer Nagel (2013). Knowledge as a Mental State. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.score: 18.0
    In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have not. The disagreement is (...)
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  45. Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Causally Efficacious Intentions and the Sense of Agency: In Defense of Real Mental Causation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):135-160.score: 18.0
    Empirical evidence, it has often been argued, undermines our commonsense assumptions concerning the efficacy of conscious intentions. One of the most influential advocates of this challenge has been Daniel Wegner, who has presented an impressive amount of evidence in support of a model of "apparent mental causation". According to Wegner, this model provides the best explanation of numerous curious and pathological cases of behavior. Further, it seems that Benjamin Libet's classic experiment on the initiation of action and the empirical (...)
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  46. Wayne Wu (forthcoming). Mental Action and the Threat of Automaticity. In Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillman Vierkant (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    This paper considers the connection between automaticity, control and agency. Indeed, recent philosophical and psychological works play up the incompatibility of automaticity and agency. Specifically, there is a threat of automaticity, for automaticity eliminates agency. Such conclusions stem from a tension between two thoughts: that automaticity pervades agency and yet automaticity rules out control. I provide an analysis of the notions of automaticity and control that maintains a simple connection: automaticity entails the absence of control. An appropriate analysis, however, shows (...)
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  47. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2008). The Reality and Classification of Mental Disorders. Dissertation, University of Chicagoscore: 18.0
    This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? -/- In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hacking and William Wimsatt, arguing (...)
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  48. Bence Nanay (2010). Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239 - 254.score: 18.0
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we (...)
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  49. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.score: 18.0
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  50. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Two Notions of Mental Representation. In , Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.score: 18.0
    The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
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