Search results for 'Mental Event' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Jaegwon Kim (1989). Honderich on Mental Events and Psychoneural Laws. Inquiry 32 (March):29-48.score: 160.0
    The paper discusses Ted Honderich's ?Hypothesis of Psychoneural Correlation?, one of the three fundamental ?hypotheses? of his Theory of Determinism. This doctrine holds that there is a pervasive system of psychoneural laws connecting every mental event with a neural correlate. Various questions are raised and discussed concerning the formulation of the thesis, Honderich's concepts of ?mental? and ?physical?, and the possible grounds for accepting the thesis. Finally, Honderich's response to Donald Davidson's well?known arguments for psychophysical anomalism is (...)
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  2. Robert Wyllie (1980). Causal Explanations in Mental Event Contexts. Philosophical Papers 9 (May):15-31.score: 150.0
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  3. Peter Menzies, Mental Causation for Event Dualists Peter Menzies#.score: 150.0
    The philosophical problem of mental causation concerns a clash between commonsense and scientific views about the causation of human behaviour. On the one hand, commonsense suggests that our actions are caused by our mental states—our thoughts, intentions, beliefs and so on. On the other hand, neuroscience assumes that all bodily movements are caused by neurochemical events. It is implausible to suppose that our actions are causally overdetermined in the same way that the ringing of a <span class='Hi'>bell</span> may (...)
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  4. W. R. Levick (1979). The Significance of Neural Noise for the Concept of a Mental Event. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (2):269.score: 150.0
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  5. Christopher D. Green & Grant R. Gillett (1995). Are Mental Events Preceded by Their Physical Causes? Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):333-340.score: 144.0
    Libet's experiments, supported by a strict one-to-one identity thesis between brain events and mental events, have prompted the conclusion that physical events precede the mental events to which they correspond. We examine this claim and conclude that it is suspect for several reasons. First, there is a dual assumption that an intention is the kind of thing that causes an action and that can be accurately introspected. Second, there is a real problem with the method of timing the (...)
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  6. Irwin Goldstein (1985). Communication and Mental Events. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (October):331-338.score: 130.0
    How do the young learn names for feelings? After criticizing Wittgensteinian explanations, I formulate and defend an explanation very different from Wittgensteinians embrace.
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  7. Richard E. Aquila (1979). Mental Particulars, Mental Events, and the Bundle Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (March):109-120.score: 130.0
    I argue, First, That the bundle theory is compatible with certain views of mental states as alterations in an underlying substance. Then I distinguish between momentary and enduring experiencers and argue that the bundle theory does not imply the possibility of experiences apart from experiencers, But at most apart from enduring experiencers. Finally, I reject strawson's claim that the bundle theory implies that some particular person's experience might instead have belonged to some other person. Regarding experiences as events rather (...)
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  8. Arnold B. Levison & Gary S. Rosenkrantz (1983). Mental Events: An Epistemic Analysis. Philosophia 12 (March):307-321.score: 130.0
  9. Stuart Silvers (2003). Agent Causation, Functional Explanation, and Epiphenomenal Engines: Can Conscious Mental Events Be Causally Efficacious? Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):197-228.score: 130.0
     
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  10. John G. Cox (1982). Mental Events Must Have Spatial Location. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (July):270-274.score: 130.0
     
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  11. Mark Leon (1980). Are Mental Events Outlaws? Philosophical Papers 9 (October):1-13.score: 130.0
     
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  12. Michael Lockwood (1984). Reply to David Gordon's Special Relativity and the Location of Mental Events. Analysis 44 (June):127-128.score: 130.0
     
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  13. Jordan Grafman & Frank Krueger (2009). Action and Mental Representation. The Prefrontal Cortex Stores Structured Event Complexes That Are the Representational Basis for Cognitively-Derived Actions. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press.score: 120.0
     
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  14. Jerome A. Shaffer (1963). Mental Events and the Brain. Journal of Philosophy 60 (March):160-6.score: 118.0
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  15. Robert E. Whallon (1965). Unconscious Mental Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (March):400-403.score: 118.0
  16. Charles Landesman (1964). Mental Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (March):307-317.score: 118.0
  17. Paul K. Feyerabend (1963). Mental Events and the Brain. Journal of Philosophy 40 (May):295-6.score: 118.0
  18. Stephen J. Noren (1979). Anomalous Monism, Events, and 'the Mental'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (September):64-74.score: 108.0
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  19. Paul G. Muscari (1981). The Structure of Mental Disorder. Philosophy of Science 48 (December):553-572.score: 102.0
    The present trend towards an atheoretical statistical method of psychiatric classification has prompted many psychiatrists to conceive of "mental disorder", or for that matter any other psychopathological designation, as an indexical cluster of properties and events more than a distinct psychological impairment. By employing different combinations of inclusion and exclusion criteria, the current American Psychiatric Association's scheme (called DSM-III) hopes to avoid the over-selectivity of more metaphysical systems and thereby provide the clinician with a flexible means of dealing with (...)
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  20. Giorgio Ganis Haline E. Schendan (2012). Electrophysiological Potentials Reveal Cortical Mechanisms for Mental Imagery, Mental Simulation, and Grounded (Embodied) Cognition. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 102.0
    Grounded cognition theory proposes that cognition, including meaning, is grounded in sensorimotor processing. The mechanism for grounding cognition is mental simulation, which is a type of mental imagery that re-enacts modal processing. To reveal top-down, cortical mechanisms for mental simulation of shape, event-related potentials were recorded to face and object pictures preceded by mental imagery of a picture. Mental imagery of the identical face or object (congruous condition) facilitated not only categorical perception (VPP/N170) but (...)
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  21. Arnold B. Levison (1986). Metalinguistic Dualism and the Mark of the Mental. Synthese 66 (March):339-359.score: 96.0
    In this paper I argue against the view, defended by some philosophers, that it is part of the meaning of mental that being mental is incompatible with being physical. I call this outlook metalinguistic dualism (MLD for short), and I distinguish it from metaphysical theories of the mind-body relation such as Cartesian dualism. I argue that MLD is mistaken, but I don't try to defend the contrary view that mentalistic terms can be definitionally reduced to nonmental (...)
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  22. Richard Swinburne (1993). Are Mental Events Identical with Brain Events? American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (April):173-181.score: 94.0
    EVENTS CONSIST IN THE INSTANTIATION OF PROPERTIES IN SUBSTANCES. TWO WORDS WHICH RIGIDLY DESIGNATE PROPERTIES, PICK OUT THE SAME PROPERTIES, NOT JUST BECAUSE THE TWO PROPERTIES HAVE THE SAME CAUSES OR EFFECTS, BUT IF AND ONLY IF THE WORDS MEAN THE SAME. IT FOLLOWS THAT HAVING A RED AFTER IMAGE AND HAVING C-FIBRES FIRE ARE DIFFERENT PROPERTIES. ALTHOUGH THE INSTANTIATION OF TWO DIFFERENT PROPERTIES IN A SUBSTANCE MAY CONSTITUTE THE SAME EVENT, THAT WILL BE SO ONLY IF (IN GOLDMAN’S (...)
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  23. Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (1986). Mental Causes and Explanation of Action. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):145-58.score: 90.0
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  24. Douglas E. Ehring (1984). Mental Identity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):189-194.score: 90.0
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  25. Hilary Putnam (1986). Information and the Mental. In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.score: 90.0
     
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  26. William E. Seager (1992). Externalism and Token Identity. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169):439-48.score: 86.0
    Donald Davidson espouses two fundamental theses about the individuation of mental events. The thesis of causal individuation asserts that sameness of cause and effect is sufficient and necessary for event identity. The thesis of content individuation gives only a sufficient condition for difference of mental events: if e and f have different contents then they are different mental events. I argue that given these theses, psychological externalism--the view that mental content is determined by factors external (...)
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  27. Dorothea Debus (2014). 'Mental Time Travel': Remembering the Past, Imagining the Future, and the Particularity of Events. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (3):333-350.score: 84.0
    The present paper offers a philosophical discussion of phenomena which in the empirical literature have recently been subsumed under the concept of ‘mental time travel’. More precisely, the paper considers differences and similarities between two cases of ‘mental time travel’, recollective memories (‘R-memories’) of past events on the one hand, and sensory imaginations (‘S-imaginations’) of future events on the other. It develops and defends the claim that, because a subject who R-remembers a past event is experientially aware (...)
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  28. Joseph P. Magliano & Jeffrey M. Zacks (2011). The Impact of Continuity Editing in Narrative Film on Event Segmentation. Cognitive Science 35 (8):1489-1517.score: 84.0
    Filmmakers use continuity editing to engender a sense of situational continuity or discontinuity at editing boundaries. The goal of this study was to assess the impact of continuity editing on how people perceive the structure of events in a narrative film and to identify brain networks that are associated with the processing of different types of continuity editing boundaries. Participants viewed a commercially produced film and segmented it into meaningful events, while brain activity was recorded with functional magnetic resonance imaging (...)
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  29. Douglas Odegard (1971). The Sense of Mental Events-Corporeal Events. Synthese 22 (May):360-368.score: 82.0
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  30. R. Ziedins (1971). Identification of Characteristics of Mental Events with Characteristics of Brain Events. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (January):13-23.score: 82.0
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  31. Max Kistler (2005). Lowe's Argument for Dualism From Mental Causation. Philosophia 33 (1-4):319-329.score: 78.0
  32. Andrew Russo (2013). A Defense of Nonreductive Mental Causation. Dissertation, The University of Oklahomascore: 78.0
    Mental causation is a problem and not just a problem for the nonphysicalist. One of the many lessons learned from Jaegwon Kim’s writings in the philosophy of mind is that mental causation is a problem for the nonreductive physicalist as well. A central component of the common sense picture we have of ourselves as persons is that our beliefs and desires causally explain our actions. But the completeness of the “brain sciences” threatens this picture. If all of our (...)
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  33. Thomas Nickles (1977). Davidson on Explanation. Philosophical Studies 31 (February):141-145.score: 78.0
    Davidson's defective defense of the consistency of (1) the causal interaction of mental and physical events, (2) the backing law thesis on causation, (3) the impossibility of lawfully explaining mental events is repaired by closer attention to the description-Relativity of explanation. Davidson wrongly allows that particular mental events are explainable when particular identities to physical events are known. The author argues that such identities are powerless to affect what features a given law can explain. Thus a great (...)
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  34. Brian P. Mclaughlin (2006). Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.score: 74.0
    Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility.
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  35. Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.) (2001). Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.score: 74.0
    Physicalism, a topic that has been central to philosophy of mind and metaphysics in recent years, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of new essays offers a series of 'state-of-the-art' perspectives (...)
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  36. Michael Lockwood (1984). Einstein and the Identity Theory. Analysis 44 (January):22-25.score: 74.0
    Using the special theory of relativity to show that if mental events have a temporal location, then they must have a spatial location.
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  37. Scott Campbell (2006). The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):339–358.score: 72.0
    It is argued that those who accept the psychological criterion of personal identity, such as Parfit and Shoemaker, should accept what I call the 'series' view of a person, according to which a person is a unified aggregate of mental events and states. As well as defending this view against objections, I argue that it allows the psychological theorist to avoid the two lives objection which the 'animalist' theorists have raised against it, an objection which causes great difficulties for (...)
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  38. John Gibbons (2006). Mental Causation Without Downward Causation. Philosophical Review 115 (1):79-103.score: 72.0
    to counterintuitive results. Suppose a mental event, m1, causes another mental event, m2. Unless the mental and the physical are completely independent, there will be a physical event in your brain or your body or the physical world as a whole that underlies this event. The mental event occurs at least partly in virtue of the physical event’s occurring. And the same goes for m2 [2] and p2. Let’s not worry (...)
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  39. Thomas Kroedel (2008). Mental Causation as Multiple Causation. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):125-143.score: 72.0
    The paper argues that mental causation can be explained from the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation together with relatively weak assumptions about the metaphysics of mind. If a physical event counterfactually depends on an earlier physical event, it also counterfactually depends on, and hence is caused by, a mental event that correlates with (or supervenes on) this earlier physical event, provided that this correlation (or supervenience) is sufficiently modally robust. This account of (...) causation is consistent with the overdetermination of physical events by mental events and other physical events, but does not entail it. (shrink)
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  40. Fred Dretske (1993). Mental Events as Structuring Causes of Behavior. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.score: 72.0
    1. Causal explanations depend on our interests, our purposes, and our prior knowledge. ⇒ No uniquely real causal explanation.
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  41. Paul Pietroski (2000). Mental Causation for Dualists. Mind and Language 9 (3):336-366.score: 72.0
    The philosophical problem of mental causation concerns a clash between commonsense and scientific views about the causation of human behaviour. On the one hand, commonsense suggests that our actions are caused by our mental states—our thoughts, intentions, beliefs and so on. On the other hand, neuroscience assumes that all bodily movements are caused by neurochemical events. It is implausible to suppose that our actions are causally overdetermined in the same way that the ringing of a bell may be (...)
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  42. Bernard D. Katz (1977). Davidson on the Identity Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (March):81-90.score: 72.0
    I discuss donald davidson's argument for the psycho-Physical identity theory and contend that it fails: it relies on an implausible account of mental and physical events. Davidson proposes a linguistic test for determining whether a given event is mental or physical. I argue that the assumptions that are necessary for employing such a criterion of the mental are either false or presuppose the truth of the identity theory.
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  43. Robert K. C. Korman (1986). Pure Consciousness Events and Mysticism. Sophia 25 (April):49-58.score: 70.0
  44. David Gordon (1984). Special Relativity and the Location of Mental Events. Analysis 44 (June):126-127.score: 68.0
  45. Roland Puccetti (1974). Neural Plasticity and the Location of Mental Events. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (August):154-162.score: 68.0
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  46. Brandon Taylor (1973). Mental Events: Are There Any? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (December):189-200.score: 68.0
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  47. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.score: 66.0
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  48. David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.score: 66.0
    Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is (...)
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  49. Thomas Suddendorf & Michael C. Corballis (2007). The Evolution of Foresight: What is Mental Time Travel, and is It Unique to Humans? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):299-313.score: 66.0
    In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage. We suggest that memory systems differ in the degree of flexibility they offer for anticipatory behavior and put forward a corresponding taxonomy of prospection. The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival. The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not (...)
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  50. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1998). On the Matter of Minds and Mental Causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):1-25.score: 66.0
    There is a difference between someone breaking a glass by accidentally brushing up against it and smashing a glass in a fit of anger. In the first case, the person's cognitive state has little to do with the event, but in the second, the mental state qua anger is quite relevant. How are we to understand this difference? What is the proper way to understand the relation between the mind, the brain, and the resultant behavior? This paper explores (...)
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