Search results for 'Mental Event' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  10
    Robert Wyllie (1980). Causal Explanations in Mental Event Contexts. Philosophical Papers 9 (May):15-31.
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  2. W. R. Levick (1979). The Significance of Neural Noise for the Concept of a Mental Event. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (2):269.
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  3. Peter Menzies, Mental Causation for Event Dualists Peter Menzies#.
    The philosophical problem of mental causation concerns a clash between commonsense and scientific views about the causation of human behaviour. On the one hand, commonsense suggests that our actions are caused by our mental states—our thoughts, intentions, beliefs and so on. On the other hand, neuroscience assumes that all bodily movements are caused by neurochemical events. It is implausible to suppose that our actions are causally overdetermined in the same way that the ringing of a bell may be (...)
     
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  4.  18
    Jaegwon Kim (1989). Honderich on Mental Events and Psychoneural Laws. Inquiry 32 (March):29-48.
    The paper discusses Ted Honderich's ?Hypothesis of Psychoneural Correlation?, one of the three fundamental ?hypotheses? of his Theory of Determinism. This doctrine holds that there is a pervasive system of psychoneural laws connecting every mental event with a neural correlate. Various questions are raised and discussed concerning the formulation of the thesis, Honderich's concepts of ?mental? and ?physical?, and the possible grounds for accepting the thesis. Finally, Honderich's response to Donald Davidson's well?known arguments for psychophysical anomalism is (...)
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  5. Jordan Grafman & Frank Krueger (2009). Action and Mental Representation. The Prefrontal Cortex Stores Structured Event Complexes That Are the Representational Basis for Cognitively-Derived Actions. In Ezequiel Morsella, John A. Bargh & Peter M. Gollwitzer (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Human Action. Oxford University Press
     
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  6.  60
    Christopher D. Green & Grant R. Gillett (1995). Are Mental Events Preceded by Their Physical Causes? Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):333-340.
    Libet's experiments, supported by a strict one-to-one identity thesis between brain events and mental events, have prompted the conclusion that physical events precede the mental events to which they correspond. We examine this claim and conclude that it is suspect for several reasons. First, there is a dual assumption that an intention is the kind of thing that causes an action and that can be accurately introspected. Second, there is a real problem with the method of timing the (...)
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  7.  19
    Arnold B. Levison (1986). Metalinguistic Dualism and the Mark of the Mental. Synthese 66 (March):339-359.
    In this paper I argue against the view, defended by some philosophers, that it is part of the meaning of mental that being mental is incompatible with being physical. I call this outlook metalinguistic dualism, and I distinguish it from metaphysical theories of the mind-body relation such as Cartesian dualism. I argue that MLD is mistaken, but I don't try to defend the contrary view that mentalistic terms can be definitionally reduced to nonmental ones. After criticizing arguments by (...)
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  8.  27
    Paul G. Muscari (1981). The Structure of Mental Disorder. Philosophy of Science 48 (December):553-572.
    The present trend towards an atheoretical statistical method of psychiatric classification has prompted many psychiatrists to conceive of "mental disorder", or for that matter any other psychopathological designation, as an indexical cluster of properties and events more than a distinct psychological impairment. By employing different combinations of inclusion and exclusion criteria, the current American Psychiatric Association's scheme (called DSM-III) hopes to avoid the over-selectivity of more metaphysical systems and thereby provide the clinician with a flexible means of dealing with (...)
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  9. Stuart Silvers (2003). Agent Causation, Functional Explanation, and Epiphenomenal Engines: Can Conscious Mental Events Be Causally Efficacious? Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):197-228.
    Agent causation presupposes that actions are behaviors under the causal control of the agent’s mental states, its beliefs and desires. Here the idea of conscious causation in causal explanations of actions is examined, specifically, actions said to be the result of conscious efforts. Causal–functionalist theories of consciousness purport to be naturalistic accounts of the causal efficacy of consciousness. Flanagan argues that his causal–functionalist theory of consciousness satisfies naturalistic constraints on causation and that his causal efficacy thesis is compatible with (...)
     
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  10. Hilary Putnam (1986). Information and the Mental. In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell
     
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  11. Irwin Goldstein (1985). Communication and Mental Events. American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (October):331-338.
    How do the young learn names for feelings? After criticizing Wittgensteinian explanations, I formulate and defend an explanation very different from Wittgensteinians embrace.
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  12.  49
    Cynthia Macdonald & Graham F. Macdonald (1986). Mental Causes and Explanation of Action. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (April):145-58.
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  13.  11
    Douglas E. Ehring (1984). Mental Identity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):189-194.
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  14.  14
    Arnold B. Levison & Gary S. Rosenkrantz (1983). Mental Events: An Epistemic Analysis. Philosophia 12 (March):307-321.
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  15. Mark Leon (1980). Are Mental Events Outlaws? Philosophical Papers 9 (October):1-13.
     
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  16. John G. Cox (1982). Mental Events Must Have Spatial Location. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (July):270-274.
     
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  17. Michael Lockwood (1984). Reply to David Gordon's Special Relativity and the Location of Mental Events. Analysis 44 (June):127-128.
     
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  18.  20
    Joseph P. Magliano & Jeffrey M. Zacks (2011). The Impact of Continuity Editing in Narrative Film on Event Segmentation. Cognitive Science 35 (8):1489-1517.
    Filmmakers use continuity editing to engender a sense of situational continuity or discontinuity at editing boundaries. The goal of this study was to assess the impact of continuity editing on how people perceive the structure of events in a narrative film and to identify brain networks that are associated with the processing of different types of continuity editing boundaries. Participants viewed a commercially produced film and segmented it into meaningful events, while brain activity was recorded with functional magnetic resonance imaging (...)
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  19.  25
    William E. Seager (1992). Externalism and Token Identity. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (169):439-48.
    Donald Davidson espouses two fundamental theses about the individuation of mental events. The thesis of causal individuation asserts that sameness of cause and effect is sufficient and necessary for event identity. The thesis of content individuation gives only a sufficient condition for difference of mental events: if e and f have different contents then they are different mental events. I argue that given these theses, psychological externalism--the view that mental content is determined by factors external (...)
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  20.  28
    Richard E. Aquila (1979). Mental Particulars, Mental Events, and the Bundle Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (March):109-120.
    I argue, First, That the bundle theory is compatible with certain views of mental states as alterations in an underlying substance. Then I distinguish between momentary and enduring experiencers and argue that the bundle theory does not imply the possibility of experiences apart from experiencers, But at most apart from enduring experiencers. Finally, I reject strawson's claim that the bundle theory implies that some particular person's experience might instead have belonged to some other person. Regarding experiences as events rather (...)
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  21. Jerome A. Shaffer (1963). Mental Events and the Brain. Journal of Philosophy 60 (March):160-6.
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  22. Stephen J. Noren (1979). Anomalous Monism, Events, and 'the Mental'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (September):64-74.
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  23. Max Kistler (2005). Lowe's Argument for Dualism From Mental Causation. Philosophia 33 (1-4):319-329.
  24. Paul K. Feyerabend (1963). Mental Events and the Brain. Journal of Philosophy 40 (May):295-6.
  25.  30
    Thomas Nickles (1977). Davidson on Explanation. Philosophical Studies 31 (February):141-145.
    Davidson's defective defense of the consistency of (1) the causal interaction of mental and physical events, (2) the backing law thesis on causation, (3) the impossibility of lawfully explaining mental events is repaired by closer attention to the description-Relativity of explanation. Davidson wrongly allows that particular mental events are explainable when particular identities to physical events are known. The author argues that such identities are powerless to affect what features a given law can explain. Thus a great (...)
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  26.  21
    Robert E. Whallon (1965). Unconscious Mental Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (March):400-403.
  27.  18
    Charles Landesman (1964). Mental Events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24 (March):307-317.
  28. Thomas Kroedel (2015). Dualist Mental Causation and the Exclusion Problem. Noûs 49 (2):357-375.
    The paper argues that dualism can explain mental causation and solve the exclusion problem. If dualism is combined with the assumption that the psychophysical laws have a special status, it follows that some physical events counterfactually depend on, and are therefore caused by, mental events. Proponents of this account of mental causation can solve the exclusion problem in either of two ways: they can deny that it follows that the physical effect of a mental event (...)
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  29. John Gibbons (2006). Mental Causation Without Downward Causation. Philosophical Review 115 (1):79-103.
    to counterintuitive results. Suppose a mental event, m1, causes another mental event, m2. Unless the mental and the physical are completely independent, there will be a physical event in your brain or your body or the physical world as a whole that underlies this event. The mental event occurs at least partly in virtue of the physical event’s occurring. And the same goes for m2 [2] and p2. Let’s not worry (...)
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  30. Thomas Kroedel (2008). Mental Causation as Multiple Causation. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):125-143.
    The paper argues that mental causation can be explained from the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation together with relatively weak assumptions about the metaphysics of mind. If a physical event counterfactually depends on an earlier physical event, it also counterfactually depends on, and hence is caused by, a mental event that correlates with (or supervenes on) this earlier physical event, provided that this correlation (or supervenience) is sufficiently modally robust. This account of (...) causation is consistent with the overdetermination of physical events by mental events and other physical events, but does not entail it. (shrink)
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  31.  83
    Sara Bernstein & Jessica Wilson (forthcoming). Free Will and Mental Quausation. Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-22.
    Free will, if such there be, involves free choosing: the ability to mentally choose an outcome, where the outcome is 'free' in being, in some substantive sense, up to the agent of the choice. As such, it is clear that the questions of how to understand free will and mental causation are connected, for events of seemingly free choosing are mental events that appear to be efficacious vis-a-vis other mental events as well as physical events. Nonetheless, the (...)
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  32. Paul Pietroski (2000). Mental Causation for Dualists. Mind and Language 9 (3):336-366.
    The philosophical problem of mental causation concerns a clash between commonsense and scientific views about the causation of human behaviour. On the one hand, commonsense suggests that our actions are caused by our mental states—our thoughts, intentions, beliefs and so on. On the other hand, neuroscience assumes that all bodily movements are caused by neurochemical events. It is implausible to suppose that our actions are causally overdetermined in the same way that the ringing of a bell may be (...)
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  33.  96
    Thomas Suddendorf & Michael C. Corballis (2007). The Evolution of Foresight: What is Mental Time Travel, and is It Unique to Humans? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):299-313.
    In a dynamic world, mechanisms allowing prediction of future situations can provide a selective advantage. We suggest that memory systems differ in the degree of flexibility they offer for anticipatory behavior and put forward a corresponding taxonomy of prospection. The adaptive advantage of any memory system can only lie in what it contributes for future survival. The most flexible is episodic memory, which we suggest is part of a more general faculty of mental time travel that allows us not (...)
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  34.  79
    Crawford L. Elder (2001). Mental Causation Versus Physical Causation: No Contest. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):110-127.
    James decides that the best price today on pork chops is at Supermarket S, then James makes driving motions for twenty minutes, then James’ car enters the parking lot at Supermarket S. Common sense supposes that the stages in this sequence may be causally connected, and that the pattern is commonplace: James’ belief (together with his desire for pork chops) causes bodily behavior, and the behavior causes a change in James’ whereabouts. Anyone committed to the idea that beliefs and desires (...)
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  35.  20
    Bernard D. Katz (1977). Davidson on the Identity Theory. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (March):81-90.
    I discuss donald davidson's argument for the psycho-Physical identity theory and contend that it fails: it relies on an implausible account of mental and physical events. Davidson proposes a linguistic test for determining whether a given event is mental or physical. I argue that the assumptions that are necessary for employing such a criterion of the mental are either false or presuppose the truth of the identity theory.
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  36. Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.) (2001). Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
    Physicalism, a topic that has been central to philosophy of mind and metaphysics in recent years, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of new essays offers a series of 'state-of-the-art' perspectives (...)
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  37. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  38. David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.
    Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is (...)
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  39. Brian P. Mclaughlin (2006). Is Role-Functionalism Committed to Epiphenomenalism? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.
    Role-functionalism for mental events attempts to avoid epiphenomenalism without psychophysical identities. The paper addresses the question of whether it can succeed. It is argued that there is considerable reason to believe it cannot avoid epiphenomenalism, and that if it cannot, then it is untenable. It is pointed out, however, that even if role- functionalism is indeed an untenable theory of mental events, a role-functionalism account of mental dispositions has some intuitive plausibility.
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  40.  52
    Douglas C. Long (1961). Second Thoughts: A Reply to Mr. Ginnane. Mind 70 (279):405-411.
    In his article "Thoughts" (MIND, July 1960) William Ginnane argues that "thought is pure intentionality," and that our thoughts are not embodied essentially in the mental imagery and other elements of phenomenology that cross our minds along with the thoughts. Such images merely illustrate out thoughts. In my discussion I resist this claim pointing out that our thoughts are often embodied in events that can be described in pheno¬menological terms, especially when our reports of our thinking are introduced by (...)
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  41. Michael Lockwood (1984). Einstein and the Identity Theory. Analysis 44 (January):22-25.
    Using the special theory of relativity to show that if mental events have a temporal location, then they must have a spatial location.
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  42. Amir Horowitz (1999). Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):421-34.
    Physicalist epiphenomenalism is the conjunction of the doctrine that tokens of mental events are tokens of physical events and the doctrine that mental events do not exert causal powers by virtue of falling under mental types. The purpose of the paper is to show that physicalist epiphenomenalism, contrary to what many have thought, is not subject to the objections that have been raised against classic epiphenomenalism. This is argued with respect to five such objections: that introspection shows (...)
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  43. George Bealer (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):23–54.
    Suppose that, for every event, whether mental or physical, there is some physical event causally sufficient for it. Suppose, moreover, that physical reductionism in its various forms fails—that mental properties cannot be reduced to physical properties and mental events cannot be reduced to physical events. In this case, how could there be mental causation? More specifically, how could mental events cause other mental events, physical events, and intentional actions? The primary goal of (...)
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  44. Philip Johnson-Laird, Paolo Legrenzi, Vittorio Girotto, Maria Sonino Legrenzi & Jean-Paul Caverni (1999). Naive Probability: A Mental Model Theory of Extensional Reasoning. Psychological Review 106 (1):62-88.
    This article outlines a theory of naive probability. According to the theory, individuals who are unfamiliar with the probability calculus can infer the probabilities of events in an extensional way: They construct mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. Each model represents an equiprobable alternative unless individuals have beliefs to the contrary, in which case some models will have higher probabilities than others. The probability of an event depends on the proportion of models in which (...)
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  45. E. J. Lowe (1999). Self, Agency, and Mental Causation. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8):225-239.
    A self or person does not appear to be identifiable with his or her organic body, nor with any part of it, such as the brain; and yet selves seem to be agents, capable of bringing about physical events as causal consequences of certain of their conscious mental states. How is this possible in a universe in which, it appears, every physical event has a sufficient cause which is wholly physical? The answer is that this is possible if (...)
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  46.  30
    Michael Tye (1989). The Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    In this provocative book, Michael Tye presents his unique account of the metaphysical foundations of psychological discourse. In place of token identity theory or eliminative materialism, he advocates a generalisation of the adverbial approach to sensory experience, the 'operator theory'. He applies this to the analysis of prepositional attitudes, arguing that mental statements cannot involve reference to mental events or objects and that therefore causal statements about the mental cannot be regarded as asserting relations between events. This (...)
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  47.  45
    Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1998). On the Matter of Minds and Mental Causation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):1-25.
    There is a difference between someone breaking a glass by accidentally brushing up against it and smashing a glass in a fit of anger. In the first case, the person's cognitive state has little to do with the event, but in the second, the mental state qua anger is quite relevant. How are we to understand this difference? What is the proper way to understand the relation between the mind, the brain, and the resultant behavior? This paper explores (...)
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  48.  29
    Grant R. Gillett (1991). The Neurophilosophy of Pain. Philosophy 66 (April):191-206.
    The ability to feel pain is a property of human beings that seems to be based entirely in our biological natures and to place us squarely within the animal kingdom. Yet the experience of pain is often used as an example of a mental attribute with qualitative properties that defeat attempts to identify mental events with physiological mechanisms. I will argue that neurophysiology and psychology help to explain the interwoven biological and subjective features of pain and recommend a (...)
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  49.  34
    Sara Worley (1993). Mental Causation and Explanatory Exclusion. Erkenntnis 39 (3):333-358.
    Kim argues that we can never have more than one complete and independent explanation for a single event. The existence of both mental and physical explanations for behavior would seem to violate this principle. We can avoid violating it only if we suppose that mental causal relationships supervene on physical causal relationships. I argue that although his solution is attractive in many respects, it will not do as it stands. I propose an alternate understanding of supervenient causation (...)
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  50.  41
    Ausonio Marras (1997). The Causal Relevance of Mental Properties. Philosophia 25 (1-4):389-400.
    I argue that (strong) psychophysical supervenience, properly understood as a metaphysical dependence or determination relation, helps to account for the causal/explanatory relevance of mental properties because (1) it blocks a standard epiphenomenalist objection to the effect that an event's mental properties are 'screened off' by their physical properties: (2) it accounts for the _causal (and not merely _normative or merely _nomological) status of commonsense psychological generalizations; (3) it accounts for the _nonredundancy and _irreducibility of psychological explanations.
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