Search results for 'Mental Object' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Abraham Olivier (2003). When Pains Are Mental Objects. Philosophical Studies 115 (1):33-53.score: 66.0
    In Why pains are not mental objects (1998) Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state (...)
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  2. Ronald Rensink, The Stability of Color, Location, and Object Presence in Mental Representations of Natural Scenes.score: 48.0
    Purpose. Although observers easily extract the global meaning of natural scenes, it is often the case that they do not notice or remember all of their individual properties. It appears that some scene properties are more readily coded in mental representations than others. We tested the role of three different object properties - color, location, and presence/absence - in scene representations.
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  3. Frank Jackson (1976). The Existence of Mental Objects. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):33-40.score: 45.0
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  4. Shelagh Crooks (2000). Hume, Images, and the Mental Object Problem. Dialogue 39 (01):3-.score: 45.0
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  5. Giorgio Ganis Haline E. Schendan (2012). Electrophysiological Potentials Reveal Cortical Mechanisms for Mental Imagery, Mental Simulation, and Grounded (Embodied) Cognition. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 45.0
    Grounded cognition theory proposes that cognition, including meaning, is grounded in sensorimotor processing. The mechanism for grounding cognition is mental simulation, which is a type of mental imagery that re-enacts modal processing. To reveal top-down, cortical mechanisms for mental simulation of shape, event-related potentials were recorded to face and object pictures preceded by mental imagery of a picture. Mental imagery of the identical face or object (congruous condition) facilitated not only categorical perception (VPP/N170) (...)
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  6. Gudrun Schwarzer, Claudia Freitag & Nina Schum (2013). How Crawling and Manual Object Exploration Are Related to the Mental Rotation Abilities of 9-Month-Old Infants. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 42.0
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  7. Jeanne Peijnenburg (1999). Are There Mental Entities? Some Lessons From Hans Reichenbach. Sorites 11 (11):66-81.score: 39.0
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  8. Robert N. Audi (1978). The Ontological Status of Mental Images. Inquiry 21 (1-4):348-61.score: 39.0
    This paper explores the question whether an adequate account of the facts about imagination and mental imagery must construe mental images as objects. Much of the paper is a study of Alastair Hannay's defense of an affirmative answer in his wide?ranging study, Mental Images ? A Defence. The paper first sets out and evaluates Hannay's case. The second part develops an alternative account of mental images, including non?visual images, which Hannay does not treat in detail. The (...)
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  9. Alastair Hannay (1971). Mental Images: A Defense. Allen & Unwin.score: 39.0
    Reissue from the classic Muirhead Library of Philosophy series (originally published between 1890s - 1970s).
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  10. Lisanne Weelden, Joost Schilperoord & Alfons Maes (2014). Evidence for the Role of Shape in Mental Representations of Similes. Cognitive Science 38 (2):303-321.score: 39.0
    People mentally represent the shapes of objects. For instance, the mental representation of an eagle is different when one thinks about a flying or resting eagle. This study examined the role of shape in mental representations of similes (i.e., metaphoric comparisons). We tested the prediction that when people process a simile they will mentally represent the entities of the comparison as having a similar shape. We conducted two experiments in which participants read sentences that either did (experimental sentences) (...)
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  11. J. N. Wright (1944). Mental Activity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 44:107-126.score: 39.0
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  12. Richard E. Aquila (1976). Intentionality: A Study Of Mental Acts. Penn St University Press.score: 39.0
  13. Alan N. Sussman (1975). Mental Entities of Theoretical Entities. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (October):277-288.score: 39.0
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  14. Bruce M. Hood & Laurie Santos (eds.) (2009). The Origins of Object Knowledge. Oxford University Press.score: 39.0
    Do humans start life with the capacity to detect and mentally represent the objects around them? Or is our object knowledge instead derived only as the result of prolonged experience with the external world? Are we simply able to perceive objects by watching their actions in the world, or do we have to act on objects ourselves in order to learn about their behavior? Finally, do we come to know all aspects of objects in the same way, or are (...)
     
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  15. Tuomas E. Tahko (2013). Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. By Douglas Ehring. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):379-382.score: 36.0
    Book review of 'Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation' (2011, OUP). By DOUGLAS EHRING.
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  16. Eric Marcus (2006). Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese 150 (1):99-129.score: 36.0
    In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are (...)
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  17. A. Byford (forthcoming). The Mental Test as a Boundary Object in Early-20th-Century Russian Child Science. History of the Human Sciences.score: 36.0
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  18. Thomas Natsoulas (1988). The Intentionality of Retrowareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 9:515-547.score: 36.0
    An instance of retrowareness is a veridical nonperceptual occurrent awareness of something about a particular past event or state of affairs. Accordingly, this occurrence is intentional, or exemplifies the property of intentionality, in the sense that it is as though it were about something in contrast to other equally intentional mental occurrences that only seem to be about something. That a retrowareness has intentionality must be explained in terms of its own content and structure, rather than in terms of (...)
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  19. Manami Sato, Amy J. Schafer & Benjamin K. Bergen (2013). One Word at a Time: Mental Representations of Object Shape Change Incrementally During Sentence Processing. Language and Cognition 5 (4):345-373.score: 36.0
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  20. Anna Borghi & Claudia Scorolli (2006). Object Concepts and Mental Images. Anthropology and Philosophy 7 (1/2):64-74.score: 36.0
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  21. Olivia S. Cheung, William G. Hayward & Isabel Gauthier (2009). Dissociating the Effects of Angular Disparity and Image Similarity in Mental Rotation and Object Recognition. Cognition 113 (1):128-133.score: 36.0
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  22. Martha J. Farah & Katherine M. Hammond (1988). Mental Rotation and Orientation-Invariant Object Recognition: Dissociable Processes. Cognition 29 (1):29-46.score: 36.0
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  23. Bs Gibson, Lj Bernstein & La Cooper (1989). Explorations of the Mental Mapping of 3-Dimensional Object Motion. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 27 (6):523-523.score: 36.0
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  24. Gerard O'Brien (1987). Eliminative Materialism and Our Psychological Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):49-70.score: 33.0
    The project of the paper is a critical examination of the "strong thesis of eliminative materialism" in the philosophy of mind--The claim that all the mental entities that constitute the framework of commonsense psychology are, In principle at least, Eliminable from our ontology. The central conclusion reached is that the traditional formulation of this thesis is demonstrably untenable as it rests on a mistaken view of the relationship between our psychological self-Knowledge and language.
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  25. Arno L. Goudsmit (2000). On the Construction of Mental Objects in Third and in First Persons. Foundations of Science 5 (4):399-428.score: 33.0
    This paper deals with some formal properties of objects that are supposed to be internal to persons, that is, mental structures and mental functions. Depending on the ways of talking about these internal objects, they will appear different. Two types of discourse will be presented, to be called the realist and the nominalist discourses, and for eachdiscourse I will focus upon the construction of `self'.The realist discourse assumes an identity between the person and his construction of himself. I (...)
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  26. J. R. S. Wilson (1972). Emotion and Object. Cambridge University Press.score: 33.0
  27. Thomas Natsoulas (1994). On the Distinction Between the Object and the Content of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (3):239-64.score: 33.0
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  28. Frank Jackson (1978). Perception. Philosophical Books 19 (May):49-56.score: 30.0
    Two Themes to the Course: a.) How are we to understand the contrast between direct and indirect or immediate and mediate perception? b.) Is there any cogent reason to think we don’t have sense experience of the world around us?
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  29. David F. Pears (1961). Professor Norman Malcolm: Dreaming. Mind 70 (April):145-163.score: 30.0
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  30. Andrew A. Brennan (1987). Discontinuity and Identity. Noûs 21 (June):241-60.score: 30.0
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  31. Michael Tye (1989). The Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge University Press.score: 30.0
  32. Don Locke (1964). The Privacy of Pains. Analysis 24 (March):147-152.score: 30.0
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  33. Albert Flores (1978). On the Thesis of Intentionality. Philosophia 7 (July):501-514.score: 30.0
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  34. Robert Sokolowski (1987). Exorcising Concepts. Review of Metaphysics 40 (March):451-463.score: 30.0
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  35. Dan D. Crawford (1974). Bergmann on Perceiving, Sensing, and Appearing. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (April):103-112.score: 30.0
    In this study I am going to present and discuss some of the central themes of Gustav Bergmann's theory of perception. I shall be concerned, however, only with "later Bergmann," that is, with the perceptual theory worked out in a series of essays in which Bergmann shifts from phenomenalism to a form of intentional realism. This label ("intentional realism") indicates the two dominant themes in Bergmann's later thought about perception: perceivings are analyzed as mental acts (thoughts) which are intentionally (...)
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  36. J. R. Jones (1949). The Self in Sensory Cognition. Mind 58 (January):40-61.score: 30.0
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  37. Karlyn K. Campbell (1970). Body and Mind. Doubleday.score: 30.0
     
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  38. Frank Jackson (1977). Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge University Press.score: 30.0
  39. Hilary Putnam (1987). Computational Psychology and Interpretation Theory. In Artificial Intelligence. St Martin's Press.score: 30.0
  40. John W. Yolton (1961). Thinking And Perceiving: A Study In The Philosophy Of Mind. Open Court.score: 30.0
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  41. Robert Briscoe (2011). Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.score: 27.0
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as (...)
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  42. Bence Nanay (2010). Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239 - 254.score: 27.0
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which (...)
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  43. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Determination, Realization and Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):149 - 169.score: 27.0
    How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (...)
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  44. John Heil & David Robb (2003). Mental Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3):175-196.score: 27.0
    It is becoming increasingly clear that the deepest problems currently exercising philosophers of mind arise from an ill-begotten ontology, in particular, a mistaken ontology of properties. After going through some preliminaries, we identify three doctrines at the heart of this mistaken ontology: (P) For each distinct predicate, “F”, there exists one, and only one, property, F, such that, if “F” is applicable to an object a, then “F” is applicable in virtue of a’s being F. (U) Properties are universals, (...)
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  45. Harold Langsam (1995). Why Pains Are Mental Objects. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):303-13.score: 27.0
  46. Peter T. Geach (1957). Mental Acts: Their Content And Their Objects. Humanities Press.score: 27.0
    ACT, CONTENT, AND OBJECT THE TITLE I have chosen for this work is a mere label for a set of problems; the controversial views that have historically been ...
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  47. G. Douglas (1998). Why Pains Are Not Mental Objects. Philosophical Studies 91 (2):127-148.score: 27.0
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  48. Otis T. Kent (1984). Brentano and the Relational View of Consciousness. Man and World 17 (1):19-52.score: 27.0
    What is consciousness? brentano suggests that consciousness is a simple binary relation between a self and an object. in this paper, i offer a textual clarification and a qualified philosophical defense of brentano's suggestion. in part i, i indicate the ordinary facts of subjective experience that any adequate theory of consciousness must account for. in part ii, i argue on textual grounds that brentano's theory has been misunderstood by chisholm. in part iii, i argue that brentano's theory meets the (...)
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  49. Kazimierz Twardowski (1977). On the Content and Object of Presentations: A Psychological Investigation. Nijhoff.score: 27.0
    . ACT, CONTENT, AND OBJECT OF THE PRESENTATION It is one of the best known positions of psychology, hardly contested by anyone, that every mental phenomenon ...
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  50. Liliana Albertazzi (2003). From Kanizsa Back to Benussi: Varieties of Intentional Reference. [REVIEW] Axiomathes 13 (3-4):239-259.score: 27.0
    The essay analyses the mereological structure of an act of intentional presentation, on the basis of Benussi' and Kanizsa's works. Several aspects are discussed, among which: The existence of diverse formats of representation, their eventual continuity, the presence of subjective integrations at primary levels, and the identification of phrases in the phenomenic structure of an act of presentation. It is argued that the difference between perceptual and mental presence, as elaborated by Kanizsa, proves to be a valid instrument for (...)
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