Search results for 'Mental Object' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Order:
See also:
  1.  5
    Shelagh Crooks (2000). Hume, Images, and the Mental Object Problem. Dialogue 39 (01):3-.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  14
    Ronald Rensink, The Stability of Color, Location, and Object Presence in Mental Representations of Natural Scenes.
    Purpose. Although observers easily extract the global meaning of natural scenes, it is often the case that they do not notice or remember all of their individual properties. It appears that some scene properties are more readily coded in mental representations than others. We tested the role of three different object properties - color, location, and presence/absence - in scene representations.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3.  8
    Anna Borghi & Claudia Scorolli (2006). Object Concepts and Mental Images. Anthropology and Philosophy 7 (1/2):64-74.
    The paper focuses on mental imagery and concepts. First we discuss the possible reasons why the propositional view of representation was so successful among cognitive scientists interested in concepts. Then a novel perspective, the embodied view, is presented. Differently from the classic cognitivist view, this perspective acknowledges the importance of perceptual and motor imagery for concepts. According to the embodied perspective concepts are not given by propositional, abstract and amodal symbols but are grounded in sensorimotor processes. Neural and behavioral (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Abraham Olivier (2003). When Pains Are Mental Objects. Philosophical Studies 115 (1):33-53.
    In Why pains are not mental objects Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  40
    A. Byford (2014). The Mental Test as a Boundary Object in Early-20th-Century Russian Child Science. History of the Human Sciences 27 (4):22-58.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  6
    Olivia S. Cheung, William G. Hayward & Isabel Gauthier (2009). Dissociating the Effects of Angular Disparity and Image Similarity in Mental Rotation and Object Recognition. Cognition 113 (1):128-133.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7. Martha J. Farah & Katherine M. Hammond (1988). Mental Rotation and Orientation-Invariant Object Recognition: Dissociable Processes. Cognition 29 (1):29-46.
  8.  5
    Manami Sato, Amy J. Schafer & Benjamin K. Bergen (2013). One Word at a Time: Mental Representations of Object Shape Change Incrementally During Sentence Processing. Language and Cognition 5 (4):345-373.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Language and Cognition - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Language and Cognitive Science Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 4 Seiten: 345-373.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Bs Gibson, Lj Bernstein & La Cooper (1989). Explorations of the Mental Mapping of 3-Dimensional Object Motion. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 27 (6):523-523.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  46
    Santiago Echeverri (forthcoming). Object Files, Properties, and Perceptual Content. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    Object files are mental representations that enable perceptual systems to keep track of objects as numerically the same. How is their reference fixed? A prominent approach, championed by Zenon Pylyshyn and John Campbell, makes room for a non-satisfactional use of properties to fix reference. This maneuver has enabled them to reconcile a singularist view of reference with the intuition that properties must play a role in reference fixing. This paper examines Campbell’s influential defense of this strategy. After criticizing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  23
    Michael Murez & Joulia Smortchkova (2014). Singular Thought: Object‐Files, Person‐Files, and the Sortal PERSON. Topics in Cognitive Science 6 (4):632-646.
    In philosophy, “singular thought” refers to our capacity to represent entities as individuals, rather than as possessors of properties. Philosophers who defend singularism argue that perception allows us to mentally latch onto objects and persons directly, without conceptualizing them as being of a certain sort. Singularists assume that singular thought forms a unified psychological kind, regardless of the nature of the individuals represented. Empirical findings on the special psychological role of persons as opposed to inanimates threaten singularism. They raise the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  12.  19
    Richard E. Aquila (1976). Intentionality: A Study Of Mental Acts. Penn St University Press.
    This book is a critical and analytical survey of the major attempts, in modern philosophy, to deal with the phenomenon of intentionality—those of Descartes, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Frege, Russell, Bergmann, Chisholm, and Sellars. By coordinating the semantical approaches to the phenomenon, Dr. Aquila undertakes to provide a basis for dialogue among philosophers of different persuasions. "Intentionality" has become, since Franz Brentano revived its original medieval use, the standard term describing the mind's apparently paradoxical capacity to relate itself to objects existing (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  13.  33
    Jeanne Peijnenburg (1999). Are There Mental Entities? Some Lessons From Hans Reichenbach. Sorites 11 (11):66-81.
    The meaning of mental terms and the status of mental entities are core issues in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is argued that the old Reichenbachian distinction between abstracta and illata might shed new light on these issues. First, it suggests that beliefs, desires and other pro-attitudes that make up the higher mental life are not all equally substantial or real. Second, it conceives the elements of the lower mental life as entities that are inferred from (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  16
    Alastair Hannay (1971). Mental Images: A Defense. Allen & Unwin.
    Reissue from the classic Muirhead Library of Philosophy series (originally published between 1890s - 1970s).
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   64 citations  
  15.  5
    Alan N. Sussman (1975). Mental Entities of Theoretical Entities. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (October):277-288.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  16.  8
    J. N. Wright (1944). Mental Activity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 44:107-126.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  23
    Robert N. Audi (1978). The Ontological Status of Mental Images. Inquiry 21 (1-4):348-61.
    This paper explores the question whether an adequate account of the facts about imagination and mental imagery must construe mental images as objects. Much of the paper is a study of Alastair Hannay's defense of an affirmative answer in his wide?ranging study, Mental Images ? A Defence. The paper first sets out and evaluates Hannay's case. The second part develops an alternative account of mental images, including non?visual images, which Hannay does not treat in detail. The (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18.  16
    Lisanne Weelden, Joost Schilperoord & Alfons Maes (2014). Evidence for the Role of Shape in Mental Representations of Similes. Cognitive Science 38 (2):303-321.
    People mentally represent the shapes of objects. For instance, the mental representation of an eagle is different when one thinks about a flying or resting eagle. This study examined the role of shape in mental representations of similes (i.e., metaphoric comparisons). We tested the prediction that when people process a simile they will mentally represent the entities of the comparison as having a similar shape. We conducted two experiments in which participants read sentences that either did (experimental sentences) (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Bruce M. Hood & Laurie Santos (eds.) (2009). The Origins of Object Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Do humans start life with the capacity to detect and mentally represent the objects around them? Or is our object knowledge instead derived only as the result of prolonged experience with the external world? Are we simply able to perceive objects by watching their actions in the world, or do we have to act on objects ourselves in order to learn about their behavior? Finally, do we come to know all aspects of objects in the same way, or are (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  7
    J. R. S. Wilson (1972). Emotion and Object. Cambridge University Press.
    A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour. Dr Wilson sets his enquiry against a broad historical background on what distinguishes man from inanimate objects by describing both Cartesian view of man is matter plus mind and the neo-Wittgensteinian view that there is a dynamic behavioural (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  21.  31
    Frank Jackson (1976). The Existence of Mental Objects. American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (January):33-40.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22.  2
    Thomas Natsoulas (1994). On the Distinction Between the Object and the Content of Consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 15 (3):239-64.
    This article treats of the distinction between objects and contents of pulses of consciousness - those minimal temporal sections of James's stream that give veridical or nonveridical consciousness of, or as though of, something, which can be anything perceivable, feelable, imaginable, thinkable, or internally apprehensible. The objects of pulses of consciousness are whatever the pulses mentally apprehend , whatever it is that they, by their occurrence, give awareness of respectively. Their contents are the particular ways in which they mentally apprehend (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  60
    Eric Marcus (2006). Events, Sortals, and the Mind-Body Problem. Synthese 150 (1):99-129.
    In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about object-identity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  24.  2
    Thomas Natsoulas (1988). The Intentionality of Retrowareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 9 (4):515-547.
    An instance of retrowareness is a veridical nonperceptual occurrent awareness of something about a particular past event or state of affairs. Accordingly, this occurrence is intentional, or exemplifies the property of intentionality, in the sense that it is as though it were about something in contrast to other equally intentional mental occurrences that only seem to be about something. That a retrowareness has intentionality must be explained in terms of its own content and structure, rather than in terms of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Robert Briscoe (2011). Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  26.  43
    Josef Perner, Michael Huemer & Brian Leahy (2015). Mental Files and Belief: A Cognitive Theory of How Children Represent Belief and its Intensionality. Cognition 145:77-88.
    We provide a cognitive analysis of how children represent belief using mental files. We explain why children who pass the false belief test are not aware of the intensionality of belief. Fifty-one 3½- to 7-year old children were familiarized with a dual object, e.g., a ball that rattles and is described as a rattle. They observed how a puppet agent witnessed the ball being put into box 1. In the agent’s absence the ball was taken from box 1, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Bence Nanay (2010). Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239 - 254.
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  28. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Determination, Realization and Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):149 - 169.
    How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  29.  38
    Maria Magoula Adamos (2012). Mental Pictures, Imagination and Emotions. In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies, vol. 6. ATINER 83-91.
    Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of emotions. Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion and providing its intentional object. Mental pictures have different logical features from propositions: (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. John Heil & David Robb (2003). Mental Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3):175-196.
    It is becoming increasingly clear that the deepest problems currently exercising philosophers of mind arise from an ill-begotten ontology, in particular, a mistaken ontology of properties. After going through some preliminaries, we identify three doctrines at the heart of this mistaken ontology: (P) For each distinct predicate, “F”, there exists one, and only one, property, F, such that, if “F” is applicable to an object a, then “F” is applicable in virtue of a’s being F. (U) Properties are universals, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  31.  35
    Rachel Goodman (forthcoming). Against the Mental Files Conception of Singular Thought. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    It has become popular of late to identify the phenomenon of thinking a singular thought with that of thinking with a mental file. Proponents of the mental files conception of singular thought claim that one thinks a singular thought about an object o iff one employs a mental file to think about o. I argue that this is false by arguing that there are what I call descriptive mental files, so some file-based thought is not (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32.  27
    Michael Tye (1989). The Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    In this provocative book, Michael Tye presents his unique account of the metaphysical foundations of psychological discourse. In place of token identity theory or eliminative materialism, he advocates a generalisation of the adverbial approach to sensory experience, the 'operator theory'. He applies this to the analysis of prepositional attitudes, arguing that mental statements cannot involve reference to mental events or objects and that therefore causal statements about the mental cannot be regarded as asserting relations between events. This (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  33.  16
    Vasilis Tsompanidis (2015). Mental Files and Times. Topoi 34 (1):233-240.
    This paper argues that applying a mental files framework for singular thought to thoughts about specific times could produce an account of tensed thought with significant advantages over competing theories. After describing the framework , I argue for the conceivability of treating particular times as res of singular thoughts , and the possibility that humans open ‘object files’ for them during perception . Then I discuss the possible make-up and function of a NOW indexical mental file . (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  27
    Kazimierz Twardowski (1977). On the Content and Object of Presentations: A Psychological Investigation. Nijhoff.
    . ACT, CONTENT, AND OBJECT OF THE PRESENTATION It is one of the best known positions of psychology, hardly contested by anyone, that every mental phenomenon ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  35.  45
    Gerard O'Brien (1987). Eliminative Materialism and Our Psychological Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 52 (July):49-70.
    The project of the paper is a critical examination of the "strong thesis of eliminative materialism" in the philosophy of mind--The claim that all the mental entities that constitute the framework of commonsense psychology are, In principle at least, Eliminable from our ontology. The central conclusion reached is that the traditional formulation of this thesis is demonstrably untenable as it rests on a mistaken view of the relationship between our psychological self-Knowledge and language.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  14
    Frederick Kroon (2013). Intentional Objects, Pretence, and the Quasi-Relational Nature of Mental Phenomena: A New Look at Brentano on Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):377-393.
    Brentano famously changed his mind about intentionality between the 1874 and 1911 editions of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (PES). The 1911 edition repudiates the 1874 view that to think about something is to stand in a relation to something that is within in the mind, and holds instead that intentionality is only like a relation (it is ‘quasi-relational’). Despite this, Brentano still insists that mental activity involves ‘the reference to something as an object’, much as he did (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  17
    Frank Jackson (1977). Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    What is the nature of, and what is the relationship between, external objects and our visual perceptual experience of them? In this book, Frank Jackson defends the answers provided by the traditional Representative theory of perception. He argues, among other things that we are never immediately aware of external objects, that they are the causes of our perceptual experiences and that they have only the primary qualities. In the course of the argument, sense data and the distinction between mediate and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   97 citations  
  38. Karlyn K. Campbell (1970). Body and Mind. Doubleday.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   48 citations  
  39. David F. Pears (1961). Professor Norman Malcolm: Dreaming. Mind 70 (April):145-163.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  40. Andrew A. Brennan (1987). Discontinuity and Identity. Noûs 21 (June):241-60.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  75
    Frank Jackson (1978). Perception. Philosophical Books 19 (May):49-56.
    Two Themes to the Course: a.) How are we to understand the contrast between direct and indirect or immediate and mediate perception? b.) Is there any cogent reason to think we don’t have sense experience of the world around us?
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  41
    Han Reichgelt (1982). Mental Models and Discourse. Journal of Semantics 1 (3-4):371-386.
    In this paper I take the view that using language amounts to constructing ‘mental models’. Accordingly, semantics has to explain the structure of these mental models and the principles by which people construct them. The system proposed, which was developed jointly with Nigel Shadbolt, is called S-R Semantics. Among the fundamental features of the system is a functional distinction drawn between two sorts of mental object: epistemic objects, which are supposed to model the long-term established knowledge (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  39
    Don Locke (1964). The Privacy of Pains. Analysis 24 (March):147-152.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  19
    Robert Sokolowski (1987). Exorcising Concepts. Review of Metaphysics 40 (March):451-463.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. Hilary Putnam (1987). Computational Psychology and Interpretation Theory. In Artificial Intelligence. St Martin's Press
  46.  19
    Albert Flores (1978). On the Thesis of Intentionality. Philosophia 7 (July):501-514.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  10
    J. R. Jones (1949). The Self in Sensory Cognition. Mind 58 (January):40-61.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  3
    Martin Jüttner & Ingo Rentschler (2002). Imagery in Multi-Modal Object Learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):197-198.
    Spatial objects may not only be perceived visually but also by touch. We report recent experiments investigating to what extent prior object knowledge acquired in either the haptic or visual sensory modality transfers to a subsequent visual learning task. Results indicate that even mental object representations learnt in one sensory modality may attain a multi-modal quality. These findings seem incompatible with picture-based reasoning schemas but leave open the possibility of modality-specific reasoning mechanisms.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  4
    John W. Yolton (1961). Thinking And Perceiving: A Study In The Philosophy Of Mind. Open Court.
  50. Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
    Much of recent philosophy of perception is oriented towards accounting for the phenomenal character of perception—what it is like to perceive—in a non-mentalistic way—that is, without appealing to mental objects or mental qualities. In opposition to such views, I claim that the phenomenal character of perception of a red round object cannot be explained by or reduced to direct awareness of the object, its redness and roundness—or representation of such objects and qualities. Qualities of perception that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   25 citations  
1 — 50 / 1000