Search results for 'Mental Property' (try it on Scholar)

1000+ found
Sort by:
  1. Douglas E. Ehring (1996). Mental Causation, Determinables, and Property Instances. Noûs 30 (4):461-80.score: 168.0
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. John Heil & David Robb (2003). Mental Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3):175-196.score: 154.0
    It is becoming increasingly clear that the deepest problems currently exercising philosophers of mind arise from an ill-begotten ontology, in particular, a mistaken ontology of properties. After going through some preliminaries, we identify three doctrines at the heart of this mistaken ontology: (P) For each distinct predicate, “F”, there exists one, and only one, property, F, such that, if “F” is applicable to an object a, then “F” is applicable in virtue of a’s being F. (U) Properties are universals, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.score: 134.0
    Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is used (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Ausonio Marras (1997). The Causal Relevance of Mental Properties. Philosophia 25 (1-4):389-400.score: 132.0
    I argue that (strong) psychophysical supervenience, properly understood as a metaphysical dependence or determination relation, helps to account for the causal/explanatory relevance of mental properties because (1) it blocks a standard epiphenomenalist objection to the effect that an event's mental properties are 'screened off' by their physical properties: (2) it accounts for the _causal (and not merely _normative or merely _nomological) status of commonsense psychological generalizations; (3) it accounts for the _nonredundancy and _irreducibility of psychological explanations.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. George Bealer (1994). Mental Properties. Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):185-208.score: 130.0
    It is argued that, because of scientific essentialism, two currently popular arguments against the mind-body identity thesis -- the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument -- are unsatisfactory as they stand and that their problems are incurable. It is then argued that a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality can be achieved by weaving together two traditional Cartesian arguments -- the modal argument and the certainty argument. This argument establishes, not just the falsity of the identity (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Frank Jackson (1995). Essentialism, Mental Properties, and Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:253-268.score: 130.0
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. S. C. Gibb (2004). The Problem of Mental Causation and the Nature of Properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):464-75.score: 120.0
    Despite the fact that the nature of the properties of causation is rarely discussed within the mental causation debate, the implicit assumption is that they are universals as opposed to tropes. However, in recent literature on the problem of mental causation, a new solution has emerged which aims to address the problem by appealing to tropes. It is argued that if the properties of causation are tropes rather than universals, then a psychophysical reductionism can be advanced which does (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Robert Francescotti (2001). Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism? Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.score: 104.0
    Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any plausible analysis, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Neil Campbell (2013). Do MacDonald and MacDonald Solve the Problem of Mental Causal Relevance? Philosophia 41 (4):1149-1158.score: 104.0
    Ever since Davidson first articulated and defended anomalous monism, nonreductive physicalists have struggled with the problem of mental causation. Considerations about the causal closure of the physical domain and related principles about exclusion make it very difficult to maintain the distinctness of mental and physical properties while securing a causal role for the former. Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the underlying metaphysics and ontology of the mental causation debate to gain traction on this issue. Cynthia (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Max Kistler (1999). Multiple Realization, Reduction and Mental Properties. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):135 – 149.score: 96.0
    This paper tries to remove some obstacles standing in the way of considering mental properties as both genuine natural kinds and causally efficacious rather than epiphenomena. As the case of temperature shows, it is not justified to conclude from a property being multiply realizable to it being irreducible. Yet Kim's argument to the effect that if a property is multiply realizable with a heterogeneous reduction base then it cannot be a natural kind and possesses only derivative “epiphenomenal” (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Douglas Keaton (2010). Two Kinds of Role Property. Philosophia 38 (4):773-788.score: 96.0
    The realization relation is commonly explicated via, or identified with, the causal role playing relation. However, the realization relation does not formally match the causal role playing relation. While realization is a relation between a base realizer property and a single higher level realized property, I argue that the causal role playing relation as typically defined is a relation between a base property and two higher-level role properties. Advocates of using causal role playing to explicate realization must (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Pierre Jacob (1991). Are Mental Properties Causal Efficacious? Grazer Philosophische Studien 39:51-73.score: 96.0
    In respect of the question whether mental properties, i.e. contents of mental states, are causally relevant the distinction between type and token physikalism and externalism and their consequences concerning the problems of property dualism and content epiphenomenalism are sketched. Fodor's theory - a functionalist version of token physikalism - is presented and criticized. Distinguishing between naming a causally relevant property and quantifying over it a solution to the threat of epihenomenalism is suggested, and finally Davidson's Anomalous (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Eric Marcus, Defending Naïve Realism About Mental Properties.score: 96.0
    _metaphysically transparent_: we do not arrive at a better understanding of the realm of facts that make such talk true or false when we abandon ordinary mental concepts in favor of naturalistic concepts—or, for that matter, in favor of supernaturalistic concepts, although _super_naturalism will not be my concern here. Rather, it is ordinary mental concepts themselves that provide the best framework for understanding the metaphysics of mind. In this essay, I will be concerned just with naïve realism about (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Michael Esfeld (2005). Mental Causation and Mental Properties. Dialectica 59 (1):5-18.score: 92.0
    The aim of this paper is to defend the causal homogeneity of functional, mental properties against Kim’s attack. It is argued that (a) token identity is sufficient for mental causation, that (b) token identity implies a sort of functional reduction, but that (c) nonetheless functional, mental properties can be causally homogeneous despite being multiply realizable: multiple composition is sufficient for multiple realizability, but multiple composition does not prevent the realizers from having their pertinent effects in common. Thus, (...)
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Karsten R. Stueber (2005). Mental Causation and the Paradoxes of Explanation. Philosophical Studies 122 (3):243-77.score: 92.0
    In this paper I will discuss Kims powerful explanatory exclusion argument against the causal efficacy of mental properties. Baker and Burge misconstrue Kims challenge if they understand it as being based on a purely metaphysical understanding of causation that has no grounding in an epistemological analysis of our successful scientific practices. As I will show, the emphasis on explanatory practices can only be effective in answering Kim if it is understood as being part of the dual-explanandum strategy. Furthermore, a (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Ralph Wedgwood (2000). The Price of Non-Reductive Physicalism. Noûs 34 (3):400-421.score: 90.0
    Nonreductive physicalism faces a serious objection: physicalism entails the existence of an enormous number of modal facts--specifically, facts about exactly which physical properties necessitate each mental property; and, it seems, if mental properties are irreducible, these modal facts cannot all be satisfactorily explained. The only answer to this objection is to claim that the explanations of these modal facts are themselves contingent. This claim requires rejecting "S5" as the appropriate logic for metaphysical modality. Finally, it is argued (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Godehard Brüntrup (1998). Is Psycho-Physical Emergentism Committed to Dualism? The Causal Efficacy of Emergent Mental Properties. Erkenntnis 3 (2):133-151.score: 82.0
  18. Tuomas E. Tahko (2013). Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. By Douglas Ehring. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (251):379-382.score: 80.0
    Book review of 'Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation' (2011, OUP). By DOUGLAS EHRING.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Simone Gozzano (2009). Levels, Orders and the Causal Status of Mental Properties. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):347-362.score: 80.0
    In recent years Jaegwon Kim has offered an argument – the ‘supervenience argument’ – to show that supervenient mental properties, construed as second- order properties distinct from their first-order realizers, do not have causal powers of their own. In response, several philosophers have argued that if Kim’s argument is sound, it generalizes in such a way as to condemn to causal impotency all properties above the level of basic physics. This paper discusses Kim’s supervenience argument in the context of (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Douglas E. Ehring (2003). Part-Whole Physicalism and Mental Causation. Synthese 136 (3):359-388.score: 80.0
    A well-known ``overdetermination''argument aims to show that the possibility of mental causes of physical events in a causally closed physical world and the possibility of causally relevant mental properties are both problematic. In the first part of this paper, I extend an identity reply that has been given to the first problem to a property-instance account of causal relata. In the second, I argue that mental types are composed of physical types and, as a consequence, both (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Richard Double (1983). Nagel's Argument That Mental Properties Are Nonphysical. Philosophy Research Archives 9:217-22.score: 80.0
    One of Thomas Nagel’s premises in his argument for panpsychism (in Mortal Questions) is criticized. The principal criticisms are: (1) Nagel has failed to provide a clear sense in which mental properties are nonphysical. (2) Even within the framework of Nagel’s argumeent, there is no strong reason to think that the psychological lies outside the explanatory web of physical properties. This is because certain reducing properties common to both the psychological and nonpsychological may well be physical.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.score: 78.0
    Despite the fact that Davidson's theory of the causal relata is crucial to his response to the problem of mental causation - that of anomalous monism - it is commonly overlooked within discussions of his position. Anomalous monism is accused of entailing property epiphenomenalism, but given Davidson's understanding of the causal relata, such accusations are wholly misguided. There are, I suggest, two different forms of property epiphenomenalism. The first understands the term 'property' in an ontological sense, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Paul Noordhof (1997). Making the Change: The Functionalist's Way. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):233-50.score: 74.0
    The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are Functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be efficacious. The first (Lewis) approach takes functional properties to be the occupants of causal roles. Block [1990] has argued that mental properties should not be characterized in this way because it would make them properties of the ?implementing science?, e. (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Eric Hiddleston (2011). Second-Order Properties and Three Varieties of Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 153 (3):397 - 415.score: 72.0
    This paper investigates whether there is an acceptable version of Functionalism that avoids commitment to second-order properties. I argue that the answer is "no". I consider two reductionist versions of Functionalism, and argue that both are compatible with multiple realization as such. There is a more specific type of multiple realization that poses difficulties for these views, however. The only apparent Functionalist solution is to accept second-order properties.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Sean Crawford (2003). Relational Properties, Causal Powers and Psychological Laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.score: 70.0
    This paper argues that Twin Earth twins belong to the same psychological natural kind, but that the reason for this is not that the causal powers of mental states supervene on local neural structure. Fodor’s argument for this latter thesis is criticized and found to rest on a confusion between it and the claim that Putnamian and Burgean type relational psychological properties do not affect the causal powers of the mental states that have them. While it is true (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Irwin Goldstein (2000). Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.score: 68.0
    By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many kinds (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. J. Barrett (1994). Rationalizing Explanation and Causally Relevant Mental Properties. Philosophical Studies 74 (1):77-102.score: 68.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Brendan O.’Sullivan (2008). Through Thick and Thin with Ned Block: How Not to Rebut the Property Dualism Argument. Philosophia 36 (4):531-544.score: 68.0
    In Max Black’s Objection to Mind–Body Identity, Ned Block seeks to offer a definitive treatment of property dualism arguments that exploit modes of presentation. I will argue that Block’s central response to property dualism is confused. The property dualist can happily grant that mental modes of presentation have a hidden physical nature. What matters for the property dualist is not the hidden physical side of the property, but the apparent mental side. Once that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Gordon Barnes (2001). Should Property-Dualists Be Substance-Hylomorphists? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:285-299.score: 68.0
    In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in property dualism—the view that some mental properties are neither identical with, nor strongly supervenient on, physical properties. One of the principal objections to this view is that, according to natural science, the physical world is a causally closed system. So if mental properties are really distinct from physical properties, then it would seem that mental properties never really cause anything that happens in the physical world. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Ausonio Marras (1994). Nonreductive Materialism and Mental Causation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):465-93.score: 68.0
    The aim of this paper is to defend a version of nonreductive materialism against the epiphenomenalist objection to which Davidson's anomalous monism has often been held to be vulnerable. After considering a number of options for dealing with the objection, I argue that an appeal to the notion of strong supervenience (properly explicated) can both rebut a common form of the "property" ("type") epiphenomenalist objection and provide a grounding for the causal relevance ("efficacy") of mental properties.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Francis X. Williamson (1998). Autonomy, Reduction and the Artificiality of Mental Properties. South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):1-7.score: 68.0
  32. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2008). The Reality and Classification of Mental Disorders. Dissertation, University of Chicagoscore: 66.0
    This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? -/- In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hacking and William Wimsatt, arguing (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. George Bealer (1997). Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.score: 66.0
    Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Sydney Shoemaker (2001). Realization and Mental Causation. In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. 23-33.score: 66.0
    A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. John-Michael Kuczynski (1999). Is Mind an Emergent Property? Cogito 13 (2):117-119.score: 66.0
    It is often said that (M) "mind is an emergent property of matter." M is ambiguous, the reason being that, for all x and y, "x is an emergent property of y" has two distinct and mutually opposed meanings, namely: (i) x is a product of y (in the sense in which a chair is the product of the activity of a furniture-maker); and (ii) y is either identical or constitutive of x, but, relative to the information available (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Lilly-Marlene Russow (1980). Audi on Mental Images. Inquiry 23 (September):353-356.score: 66.0
    In an article entitled ?The Ontological Status of Mental Images?, Robert Audi rejects the view presented in Hannay's Mental Images: A Defence, and proposes ?the property account of imaging? as an alternative. Some of the strengths and weaknesses of Audi's proposal are discussed, and a more detailed and specific version of the property account offered; it is suggested that imaging ? should be described as entertaining the thought that if one were looking at (or smelling, touching, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Josep E. Corbí & Josep L. Prades (2000). Mental Contents, Tracking Counterfactuals, and Implementing Mechanisms. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 9: Philosophy of Mind. Charlottesville: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 1-11.score: 66.0
    In the ongoing debate, there are a set of mind-body theories sharing a certain physicalist assumption: whenever a genuine cause produces an effect, the causal efficacy of each of the nonphysical properties that participate in that process is determined by the instantiation of a well-defined set of physical properties. These theories would then insist that a nonphysical property could only be causally efficacious insofar as it is physically implemented. However, in what follows we will argue against the idea that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. J. Barrett (1995). Causal Relevance and Nonreductive Physicalism. Erkenntnis 42 (3):339-62.score: 62.0
    It has been argued that nonreductive physicalism leads to epiphenominalism about mental properties: the view that mental events cannot cause behavioral effects by virtue of their mental properties. Recently, attempts have been made to develop accounts of causal relevance for irreducible properties to show that mental properties need not be epiphenomenal. In this paper, I primarily discuss the account of Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit. I show how it can be developed to meet several obvious objections (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. David Robb (2013). The Identity Theory as a Solution to the Exclusion Problem. In S. C. Gibb, E. J. Lowe & R. D. Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    This is about a proposed solution to the exclusion problem, one I've defended elsewhere (for example, in "The Properties of Mental Causation"). Details aside, it's just the identity theory: mental properties face no threat of exclusion from, or preemption by, physical properties, because every mental property is a physical property. Here I elaborate on this solution and defend it from some objections. One of my goals is to place it in the context of a more (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. David Robb (forthcoming). Power for the Mental as Such. In Jonathan D. Jacobs (ed.), Putting Powers to Work: Causal Powers in Contemporary Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.score: 60.0
    An adequate solution to the problem of mental causation should deliver, not just the efficacy of mental properties, but the efficacy of mental properties as such, of mentality in its own right. But this appears to block an identity solution from the outset. Any property that’s both mental and physical, the argument goes, has a dual nature, and this just reintroduces the problem of mental causation, now framed in terms of these two natures. But (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Derk Pereboom (1991). Why a Scientific Realist Cannot Be a Functionalist. Synthese 88 (September):341-58.score: 60.0
    According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the consequence (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Anthony B. Dardis (2002). A No Causal Rivalry Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 17 (28):69-77.score: 60.0
    Stephen Yablo has recently argued for a novel solution to the mental causation problem: the mental is related to the physical as determinables are related to determinates; determinables are not causal rivals with their determinates; so the mental and the physical are not causal rivals. Despite its attractions the suggestion seems hard to accept. In this paper I develop the idea that mental properties and physical properties are not causal rivals. Start with property dualism, supervenience, (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Evan Butts (2008). Attributing Mental Properties to Wide Subjects. Dissertation, University of Edinburghscore: 60.0
    Rob Wilson (2001) claims that mental properties are not attributable to wide subjects, despite the claims of authors like Clark and Chalmers (1998). I examine Wilson's objection and endeavor to demonstrate that Clark and Chalmers' account does support the attribution of mental properties to wide subjects.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Graham Oppy (1998). Swinburne on ‘Mental’ and ‘Physical’. Religious Studies 34 (4):483-495.score: 60.0
    This paper examines Richard Swinburne's definitions of 'mental property' and 'physical property'. After some preliminary tidying up (Section 1), the paper introduces eight putative counter-examples to Swinburne's definitions (Section 2). The paper then considers amendments to Swinburne's account of 'mental property' (Section 3) and 'physical property' (Section 4) which deal with these counter-examples. Finally, the paper closes with some brief remarks about the metaphysics of properties (Appendix). Along the way, the paper provides various reasons (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Ronald P. Endicott (1991). MacDonald on Type Reduction Via Disjunction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):209-14.score: 60.0
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. George Bealer (1994). The Rejection of the Identity Thesis. In The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate. Cambridge: Blackwell.score: 60.0
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Jonathan C. W. Edwards (2005). Is Consciousness Only a Property of Individual Cells? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):60-76.score: 58.0
    We perceive colour, shape, sound and touch 'bound together' in a single experience. The following arguments about this binding phenomenon are raised: (1) The individual signals passing from neurone to neurone are not bound together, whether as elements of information or physically. (2) Within a single cell, binding in terms of bringing together of information is potentially feasible. A physical substrate may also be available. (3) It is therefore proposed that a bound conscious experience must be a property of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Paul Raymont (2001). Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant? Dialogue 40 (3):509-528.score: 58.0
    Non-reductive physicalists are increasingly regarded as unwitting epiphenomenalists, since their refusal to reduce mental features to physical properties allegedly implies that while there are mental causes, none of these causes produces its effects in virtue of being the type of mental state that it is. I examine, and reject, the “trope” response to this charge. I take the failure of the trope model of causal relevance to be instructive, since it illustrates a confusion that lies at the (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Stewart Candlish (1975). Mental Images and Pictorial Properties. Mind 84 (April):260-2.score: 58.0
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. David H. Jones (1972). Emergent Properties, Persons, and the Mind-Body Problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):423-33.score: 58.0
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 1000