Search results for 'Mental Realism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Tamás Demeter (2009). Two Kinds of Mental Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):59-71.
    I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the (...)
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    Michael Bergin, John S. G. Wells & Sara Owen (2008). Critical Realism: A Philosophical Framework for the Study of Gender and Mental Health. Nursing Philosophy 9 (3):169-179.
    Abstract This paper explores gender and mental health with particular reference to the emerging philosophical field of critical realism. This philosophy suggests a shared ontology and epistemology for the natural and social sciences. Until recently, most of the debate surrounding gender and mental health has been guided either implicitly or explicitly within a positivist or constructivist philosophy. With this in mind, key areas of critical realism are explored in relation to gender and mental health, and (...)
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  3.  30
    Werner Ceusters & Barry Smith (2010). Foundations for a Realist Ontology of Mental Disease. Journal of Biomedical Semantics 1 (10):1-23.
    While classifications of mental disorders have existed for over one hundred years, it still remains unspecified what terms such as 'mental disorder', 'disease' and 'illness' might actually denote. While ontologies have been called in aid to address this shortfall since the GALEN project of the early 1990s, most attempts thus far have sought to provide a formal description of the structure of some pre-existing terminology or classification, rather than of the corresponding structures and processes on the side of (...)
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  4.  41
    János Tözsér (2009). Mental Realism Reloaded. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):337 - 340.
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  5.  68
    Micah Sparacio (2002). Mental Realism: Rejecting the Causal Closure Thesis and Expanding Our Physical Ontology. Pcid 2 (3-8).
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  6. Tamás Demeter (2009). Two Kinds of Mental Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):59-71.
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  7. János Tözsér (2009). Mental Realism Reloaded. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (2):337-340.
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  8.  6
    Anthony Wrigley (2007). Realism and Anti-Realism About Mental Illness. Philosophical Papers 36 (3):371-397.
    In this paper I provide an account of the metaphysical foundations of mental illness in terms of a realism debate. I motivate the importance of such metaphysical analysis as a means of avoiding some intractable problems that beset discussion of the concept of mental illness. I apply aspects of the framework developed by Crispin Wright for realism debates in order to examine the ontological commitments to mental illness as a property that humans may exhibit and (...)
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  9. Eric Marcus, Defending Naïve Realism About Mental Properties.
    _metaphysically transparent_: we do not arrive at a better understanding of the realm of facts that make such talk true or false when we abandon ordinary mental concepts in favor of naturalistic concepts—or, for that matter, in favor of supernaturalistic concepts, although _super_naturalism will not be my concern here. Rather, it is ordinary mental concepts themselves that provide the best framework for understanding the metaphysics of mind. In this essay, I will be concerned just with naïve realism (...)
     
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  10. Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (2009). Mental Illness as Mental: A Defence of Psychological Realism. Humana.Mente 11:25-44.
    This paper argues for psychological realism in the conception of psychiatric disorders. We review the following contemporary ways of understanding the future of psychiatry: (1) psychiatric classification cannot be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should not be conceived of as biological kinds; (2) psychiatric classification can be successfully reduced to neurobiology, and thus psychiatric disorders should be conceived of as biological kinds. Position (1) can lead either to instrumentalism or to eliminativism about psychiatry, depending on whether (...)
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  11.  62
    Axel Mueller, Can Mental Content Externalism Prove Realism?
    Recently, Kenneth Westphal has presented a highly interesting and innovative reading of Kant's critical philosophy.2 This reading continues a tradition of Kantscholarship of which, e.g., Paul Guyer's work is representative, and in which the antiidealistic potential of Kant's critical philosophy is pitted against its idealistic selfunderstanding. Much of the work in this tradition leaves matters at observing the tensions this introduces in Kant's work. But Westphal's proposed interpretation goes farther. Its attractiveness derives for the most part from the promise that (...)
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  12.  9
    Michael Bergin, John S. G. Wells & Sara Owen (2008). Critical Realism: A Philosophical Framework for the Study of Gender and Mental Health. Nursing Philosophy 9 (3):169-179.
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  13.  2
    Rebecca Saltmarsh, Peter Mitchell & Elizabeth Robinson (1995). Realism and Children's Early Grasp of Mental Representation: Belief-Based Judgements in the State Change Task. Cognition 57 (3):297-325.
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  14.  1
    Wendy Sword, Alexander M. Clark, Kathleen Hegadoren, Sandra Brooks & Dawn Kingston (2012). The Complexity of Postpartum Mental Health and Illness: A Critical Realist Study. Nursing Inquiry 19 (1):51-62.
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  15.  26
    Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (2013). Mental Contents, Transparency, Realism: News From the Phenomenological Camp. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 29 (1):33-50.
  16.  1
    Timothy Wand, Kathryn White & Joanna Patching (2010). Applying a Realist Framework to the Evaluation of a New Model of Emergency Department Based Mental Health Nursing Practice. Nursing Inquiry 17 (3):231-239.
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  17.  6
    J. E. Tiles (1995). Dewey's Realism: Applying the Term 'Mental' in a World Without Withins. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 31 (1):137 - 166.
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  18.  4
    R. G. N. Rpn, John S. G. Wells Phd Msc Ba Rnt & R. N. T. Srn (2008). Critical Realism: A Philosophical Framework for the Study of Gender and Mental Health. Nursing Philosophy 9 (3):169–179.
  19. J. E. Tiles (1995). Applying the Term 'Mental' in a World Without a Within: Dewey's Realism. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 31 (1):137.
     
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  20.  23
    Jacob Beck & Keith Schneider (forthcoming). Attention and Mental Primer. Mind and Language.
    Drawing on the empirical premise that attention makes objects look more intense (bigger, faster, higher in contrast), Ned Block has argued for mental paint, a phenomenal residue that cannot be reduced to what is perceived or represented. If sound, Block’s argument would undermine direct realism and representationism, two widely held views about the nature of conscious perception. We argue that Block’s argument fails because the empirical premise it is based upon is false. Attending to an object alters its (...)
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  21. Ricardo Restrepo (2010). Realism in Mind. University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
    The thesis develops solutions to two main problems for mental realism. Mental realism is the theory that mental properties, events, and objects exist, with their own set of characters and causal powers. The first problem comes from the philosophy of science, where Psillos proposes a notion of scientific realism that contradicts mental realism, and consequently, if one is to be a scientific realist in the way Psillos recommends, one must reject mental (...)
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  22.  56
    Derk Pereboom (1991). Why a Scientific Realist Cannot Be a Functionalist. Synthese 88 (September):341-58.
    According to functionalism, mental state types consist solely in relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental states. I argue that two central claims of a prominent and plausible type of scientific realism conflict with the functionalist position. These claims are that natural kinds in a mature science are not reducible to natural kinds in any other, and that all dispositional features of natural kinds can be explained at the type-level. These claims, when applied to psychology, have the (...)
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  23.  9
    Kenneth R. Westphal (1998). ‘Transcendental Reflections on Pragmatic Realism’. In K. R. Westphal (ed.), Pragmatism, Reason, & Norms: A Realistic Assessment. Fordham UP 17--58.
    By deepening Austin’s reflections on the ‘open texture’ of empirical concepts, Frederick L. Will defends an ‘externalist’ account of mental content: as human beings we could not think, were we not in fact cognizant of a natural world structured by events and objects with identifiable and repeatable similarities and differences. I explicate and defend Will’s insight by developing a parallel critique of Kant’s and Carnap’s rejections of realism, both of whom cannot account properly for the content of experience. (...)
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  24.  11
    Arno L. Goudsmit (2000). On the Construction of Mental Objects in Third and in First Persons. Foundations of Science 5 (4):399-428.
    This paper deals with some formal properties of objects that are supposed to be internal to persons, that is, mental structures and mental functions. Depending on the ways of talking about these internal objects, they will appear different. Two types of discourse will be presented, to be called the realist and the nominalist discourses, and for eachdiscourse I will focus upon the construction of `self'.The realist discourse assumes an identity between the person and his construction of himself. I (...)
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  25. Kenneth R. Westphal (1997). ‘Frederick L. Will’s Pragmatic Realism: An Introduction’. In K. R. Westphal (ed.), Frederick L. Will, Pragmatism and Realism. Rowman & Littlefield
    This critical editorial introduction summarizes and explicates Frederick Will’s pragmatic realism and his account of the nature, assessment, and revision of cognitive and practical norms in connection with: the development of Will’s pragmatic realism, Hume’s problem of induction, the oscillations between foundationalism and coherentism, the nature of philosophical reflection, Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’, the open texture of empirical concepts, the correspondence conception of truth, Putnam’s ‘internal realism’, the redundancy theory of truth, sociology of knowledge, the governance of (...)
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  26. Elizabeth Schechter (2010). Individuating Mental Tokens: The Split-Brain Case. Philosophia 38 (1):195-216.
    Some philosophers have argued that so long as two neural events, within a subject, are both of the same type and both carry the same content, then these events may jointly constitute a single mental token, regardless of the sort of causal relation to each other that they bear. These philosophers have used this claim—which I call the “singularity-through-redundancy” position—in order to argue that a split-brain subject normally has a single stream of consciousness, disjunctively realized across the two hemispheres. (...)
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  27.  37
    Karim Zahidi (2014). Non-Representationalist Cognitive Science and Realism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):461-475.
    Embodied and extended cognition is a relatively new paradigm within cognitive science that challenges the basic tenet of classical cognitive science, viz. cognition consists in building and manipulating internal representations. Some of the pioneers of embodied cognitive science have claimed that this new way of conceptualizing cognition puts pressure on epistemological and ontological realism. In this paper I will argue that such anti-realist conclusions do not follow from the basic assumptions of radical embodied cognitive science. Furthermore I will show (...)
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  28.  5
    Natalie F. Banner (2013). Mental Disorders Are Not Brain Disorders. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (3):509-513.
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  29. Harold I. Brown (1992). Direct Realism, Indirect Realism, and Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):341-363.
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  30. Kenneth R. Westphal (2003). ‘Can Pragmatic Realists Argue Transcendentally?’. In John Shook (ed.), Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism. Prometheus
    Kant’s and Hegel’s transcendental argument for mental-content externalism breaks the deadlock between ‘internal’ and genuine realists. This argument shows that human beings can only be self-conscious in a world that provides a humanly recognizable regularity and variety among the things (or events) we sense. This feature of the world cannot result from human thought or language. Hence semantic arguments against realism can only be developed if realism about the world is true. Some of Putnam’s arguments for internal (...)
     
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  31.  9
    Andrew Ward (1999). Naturalism and the Mental Realm. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):157-167.
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  32.  2
    Eleonora Orlando (forthcoming). Files for Fiction. Acta Analytica:1-17.
    In this essay, I appeal to the mental file approach in order to give an anti-realist semantic analysis of statements containing fictional names. I claim that fictive and parafictive uses of them express conceptual, though not general, propositions constituted by mental files, anchored in the conceptual world of the corresponding fictional story. Moreover, by positing a referential shift determined by the presence of a simulative referential intention characteristic of those uses, it is possible to take them to be (...)
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  33.  43
    Janna Hastings, Werner Ceusters, Mark Jensen, Kevin Mulligan & Barry Smith (2012). Representing Mental Functioning: Ontologies for Mental Health and Disease. In Towards an Ontology of Mental Functioning (ICBO Workshop), Proceeedings of the Third International Conference on Biomedical Ontology.
    Mental and behavioral disorders represent a significant portion of the public health burden in all countries. The human cost of these disorders is immense, yet treatment options for sufferers are currently limited, with many patients failing to respond sufficiently to available interventions and drugs. High quality ontologies facilitate data aggregation and comparison across different disciplines, and may therefore speed up the translation of primary research into novel therapeutics. Realism-based ontologies describe entities in reality and the relationships between them (...)
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  34.  23
    Dan D. Crawford (1974). Bergmann on Perceiving, Sensing, and Appearing. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (April):103-112.
    In this study I am going to present and discuss some of the central themes of Gustav Bergmann's theory of perception. I shall be concerned, however, only with "later Bergmann," that is, with the perceptual theory worked out in a series of essays in which Bergmann shifts from phenomenalism to a form of intentional realism. This label ("intentional realism") indicates the two dominant themes in Bergmann's later thought about perception: perceivings are analyzed as mental acts (thoughts) which (...)
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  35. Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.) (2001). Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
    The philosophy of mind has long been dominated by the view that mental states are identical with, constituted by, or grounded in brain states. Lynne Rudder Baker has been a persistent critic of this view, developing instead a theory grounded in a larger metaphysical outlook called Practical Realism. This volume is the first critical book-length evaluation of her views and criticism; leading philosophers answer her challenges and explore the consequences of Practical Realism, and Baker herself provides thoughtful (...)
     
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  36. Alfredo Paternoster (2016). Is Intentionality Real Enough? Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (1):108-116.
    : According to Crane intentionality is nothing less than the mark of the mental. Nonetheless, there are many issues raised by this concept, beginning with the problem of non-existent relata. In this comment-article I discuss the concept of intentionality in its generality, trying to state its ontological status and to assess its explanatory dispensability. In particular, I focus on the argument, addressed by Crane, whereby Wittgenstein eliminates intentionality, characterizing it as a grammatical fiction, a pseudo-entity created by the grammar (...)
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  37. Galen Strawson (1994). Mental Reality. MIT Press.
    Introduction -- A default position -- Experience -- The character of experience -- Understanding-experience -- A note about dispositional mental states -- Purely experiential content -- An account of four seconds of thought -- Questions -- The mental and the nonmental -- The mental and the publicly observable -- The mental and the behavioral -- Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- Conclusion: The three questions -- Agnostic materialism, part 1 -- Monism (...)
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  38. Matthew Kennedy (2011). Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety. Noûs 45 (1):77-102.
    Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of (...)
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  39.  53
    Lisa Bortolotti & Magdalena Antrobus (2015). Costs and Benefits of Realism and Optimism. Current Opinion in Psychiatry 28 (2):194-198.
    Purpose of review: What is the relationship between rationality and mental health? By considering the psychological literature on depressive realism and unrealistic optimism it was hypothesized that, in the context of judgments about the self, accurate cognitions are psychologically maladaptive and inaccurate cognitions are psychologically adaptive. Recent studies recommend being cautious in drawing any general conclusion about style of thinking and mental health. Recent findings: Recent investigations suggest that people with depressive symptoms are more accurate than controls (...)
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  40. Eric Marcus (2005). Mental Causation in a Physical World. Philosophical Studies 122 (1):27-50.
    Abstract: It is generally accepted that the most serious threat to the possibility of mental causation is posed by the causal self-sufficiency of physical causal processes. I argue, however, that this feature of the world, which I articulate in principle I call Completeness, in fact poses no genuine threat to mental causation. Some find Completeness threatening to mental causation because they confuse it with a stronger principle, which I call Closure. Others do not simply conflate Completeness (...)
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  41.  3
    Drew Khlentzos (2004). Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge. A Bradford Book.
    In this important book, Drew Khlentzos explains the antirealist argument from a realist perspective. He defends naturalistic realism against the antirealist challenge, and he considers the consequences of his defense for our understanding of realism and truth. Khlentzos argues that the naturalistic realist view that the world exists independently of the mind must take into consideration what he calls the representation problem: if the naturalistic realist view is true, how can mental representation of the world be explained?He (...)
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  42.  98
    Michael Sollberger (2008). Naïve Realism and the Problem of Causation. Disputatio 3 (25):1-19.
    In the present paper, I shall argue that disjunctively construed naïve realism about the nature of perceptual experiences succumbs to the empirically inspired causal argument. The causal argument highlights as a first step that local action necessitates the presence of a type-identical common kind of mental state shared by all perceptual experiences. In a second step, it sets out that the property of being a veridical perception cannot be a mental property. It results that the mental (...)
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  43.  69
    Michael Sollberger (2012). Causation in Perception: A Challenge to Naïve Realism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):581-595.
    Defending a form of naïve realism about visual experiences is quite popular these days. Those naïve realists who I will be concerned with in this paper make a central claim about the subjective aspects of perceptual experiences. They argue that how it is with the perceiver subjectively when she sees worldly objects is literally determined by those objects. This way of thinking leads them to endorse a form of disjunctivism, according to which the fundamental psychological nature of seeings and (...)
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  44.  75
    Ralph Wedgwood (1999). The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):199-215.
    Non-reductive moral realism is the view that there are moral properties which cannot be reduced to natural properties. If moral properties exist, it is plausible that they strongly supervene on non-moral properties- more specifically, on mental, social, and biological properties. There may also be good reasons for thinking that moral properties are irreducible. However, strong supervenience and irreducibility seem incompatible. Strong supervenience entails that there is an enormous number of modal truths (specifically, truths about exactly which non-moral properties (...)
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  45.  56
    Bradley Monton (2010). Common-Sense Realism and the Unimaginable Otherness of Science. Principia 11 (2):117-126.
    Bas van Fraassen endorses both common - sense realism — the view, roughly, that the ordinary macroscopic objects that we take to exist actually do exist — and constructive empiricism — the view, roughly, that the aim of science is truth about the observable world. But what happens if common - sense realism and science come into conflict? I argue that it is reasonable to think that they could come into conflict, by giving some motivation for a (...) monist solution to the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. I then consider whether, in a situation where science favors the mental monist interpretation, van Fraassen would want to give up common - sense realism or would want to give up science. 1. The Potential Tension Bas van Fraassen is a common - sense realist: Constructive empiricism. (shrink)
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  46.  51
    Axel Mueller (2011). Does Kantian Mental Content Externalism Help Metaphysical Realists? Synthese 182 (3):449-473.
    Standard interpretations of Kant’s transcendental idealism take it as a commitment to the view that the objects of cognition are structured or made by conditions imposed by the mind, and therefore to what Van Cleve calls “honest-to-God idealism”. Against this view, many more recent investigations of Kant’s theory of representation and cognitive significance have been able to show that Kant is committed to a certain form of Mental Content Externalism, and therefore to the realist view that the objects involved (...)
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  47.  73
    Ausonio Marras (2001). On Putnam's Critique of Metaphysical Realism: Mind-Body Identity and Supervenience. Synthese 126 (3):407-426.
    As part of his ongoing critique of metaphysical realism, Hilary Putnam has recently argued that current materialist theories of mind that locate mental phenomena in the brain can make no sense of the proposed identifications of mental states with physical (or physical cum computational) states, or of the supervenience of mental properties with physical properties. The aim of this paper is to undermine Putnam's objections and reassert the intelligibility – and perhaps the plausibility – of some (...)
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  48.  49
    Nino Cocchiarella (2013). Predication in Conceptual Realism. Axiomathes 23 (2):301-321.
    Conceptual realism begins with a conceptualist theory of the nexus of predication in our speech and mental acts, a theory that explains the unity of those acts in terms of their referential and predicable aspects. This theory also contains as an integral part an intensional realism based on predicate nominalization and a reflexive abstraction in which the intensional contents of our concepts are “object”-ified, and by which an analysis of predication with intensional verbs can be given. Through (...)
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  49. Frank B. Farrell (1994). Subjectivity, Realism, and Postmodernism: The Recovery of the World. Cambridge University Press.
    This unusually accessible account of recent Anglo-American philosophy focuses on how that philosophy has challenged deeply held notions of subjectivity, mind, and language. The book is designed on a broad canvas in which recent arguments are placed in a historical context (in particular they are related to medieval philosophy and German idealism). The author then explores such topics as mental content, moral realism, realism and antirealism, and the character of subjectivity. Much of the book is devoted to (...)
     
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  50.  16
    Ryan Hickerson (2004). An Indirect Defense of Direct Realism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 25 (1):1-6.
    Smythies and Ramachandran claim that the direct realist theory of perception has been refuted by recent psychophysics. This paper takes up the psychophysics, and the definition of direct realism employed by Smythies and Ramachandran, to show that direct realism has not been so refuted. I argue that the direct realist may grant that perceptual images are constructed by the central nervous system, without treating those images as “phenomenal objects.” Until phenomenal objects are shown to be distinct from extra- (...) objects, and the only objects of perception properly so-called, the direct realist will remain generally edified by the relevant psychophysics. (shrink)
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