Search results for 'Mental States' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Irwin Goldstein (2000). Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States. Philosophy 75 (291):89-104.score: 240.0
    By what types of properties do we specify twinges, toothaches, and other kinds of mental states? Wittgenstein considers two methods. Procedure one, direct, private acquaintance: A person connects a word to the sensation it specifies through noticing what that sensation is like in his own experience. Procedure two, outward signs: A person pins his use of a word to outward, pre-verbal signs of the sensation. I identify and explain a third procedure and show we in fact specify many (...)
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  2. Kristin Andrews (2003). Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    Perhaps because both explanation and prediction are key components to understanding, philosophers and psychologists often portray these two abilities as though they arise from the same competence, and sometimes they are taken to be the same competence. When explanation and prediction are associated in this way, they are taken to be two expressions of a single cognitive capacity that differ from one another only pragmatically. If the difference between prediction and explanation of human behavior is merely pragmatic, then anytime I (...)
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  3. Gualtiero Piccinini (2004). Functionalism, Computationalism, & Mental States. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 35 (4):811-833.score: 240.0
    Some philosophers have conflated functionalism and computationalism. I reconstruct how this came about and uncover two assumptions that made the conflation possible. They are the assumptions that (i) psychological functional analyses are computational descriptions and (ii) everything may be described as performing computations. I argue that, if we want to improve our understanding of both the metaphysics of mental states and the functional relations between them, we should reject these assumptions.
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  4. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.score: 224.0
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  5. Peter Menzies (2003). The Causal Efficacy of Mental States. In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. 195--223.score: 216.0
    You are asked to call out the letters on a chart during an eyeexamination: you see and then read out the letters ‘U’, ‘R’, and ‘X’. Commonsense says that your perceptual experiences causally control your calling out the letters. Or suppose you are playing a game of chess intent on winning: you plan your strategy and move your chess pieces accordingly. Again, commonsense says that your intentions and plans causally control your moving the chess pieces. These causal judgements are as (...)
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  6. William G. Lycan (1974). Mental States and Putnam's Functionalist Hypothesis. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (May):48-62.score: 210.0
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  7. Jerome A. Shaffer (1961). Could Mental States Be Brain Processes? Journal of Philosophy 58 (December):813-22.score: 210.0
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  8. Ruth Weintraub (1987). Unconscious Mental States. Philosophical Quarterly 37 (October):423-32.score: 210.0
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  9. Colin McGinn (1978). Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:195-220.score: 210.0
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  10. Scott R. Sehon (1994). Teleology and the Nature of Mental States. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1):63-72.score: 210.0
  11. William Charlton (1991). Teleology and Mental States. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 17:17-32.score: 210.0
  12. Robert C. Coburn (1963). Shaffer on the Identity of Mental States and Brain Processes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (February):89-92.score: 210.0
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  13. Bredo C. Johnsen (1994). Mental States as Mental. Philosophia 23 (1-4):223-245.score: 210.0
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  14. Scott Hagan & Masayuki Hirafuji (2001). Constraints on an Emergent Formulation of Conscious Mental States. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):99-121.score: 210.0
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  15. David Papineau (1991). Teleology and Mental States. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 65:33-54.score: 210.0
  16. James Hopkins (1978). Mental States, Natural Kinds and Psychophysical Laws. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 221:221-236.score: 210.0
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  17. Michael E. Malone (1994). On Assuming Other Folks Have Mental States. Philosophical Investigations 17 (1):37-52.score: 210.0
  18. Kathleen Emmett (1988). Meaning and Mental States. Behaviorism 16:99-107.score: 210.0
  19. Deepali Bezbaruah (1977). Freud's Concept of Unconscious Mental States. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 4 (September):21-24.score: 210.0
     
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  20. Brian Lahren (1976). Commentary on Margolis' Paper Mental States. Behaviorism 4:77-95.score: 210.0
     
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  21. Craig K. Lehman (1981). Conscious and Unconscious Mental States. Philosophy Research Archives 1451.score: 210.0
     
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  22. Joseph Margolis (1977). Cognitive Agents, Mental States, and Internal Representation. Behaviorism 5 (1):63-74.score: 210.0
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  23. Joseph Margolis (1975). Mental States. Behaviorism 3:23-31.score: 210.0
     
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  24. Mrinal Miri (1982). Mental States. In Logic, Ontology and Action. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.score: 210.0
     
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  25. Georg Northoff (1997). Mental States in Phenomenological and Analytical Philosophy. In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.score: 210.0
     
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  26. Jane Suilin Lavelle (2012). Theory-Theory and the Direct Perception of Mental States. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (2):213-230.score: 180.0
    Philosophers and psychologists have often maintained that in order to attribute mental states to other people one must have a ‘theory of mind’. This theory facilitates our grasp of other people’s mental states. Debate has then focussed on the form this theory should take. Recently a new approach has been suggested, which I call the ‘Direct Perception approach to social cognition’. This approach maintains that we can directly perceive other people’s mental states. It opposes (...)
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  27. Jing Zhu & Andrei A. Buckareff (2006). Intentions Are Mental States. Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):235 – 242.score: 180.0
    Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the 'mental state' theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.
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  28. Hanoch Ben-Yami (1997). Against Characterizing Mental States as Propositional Attitudes. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):84-89.score: 180.0
    The reason for characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes is sentence form: ‘S Vs that p’. However, many mental states are not ascribed by means of such sentences, and the sentences that ascribe them cannot be appropriately paraphrased. Moreover, even if a paraphrase were always available, that in itself would not establish the characterization. And the mental states that are ascribable by appropriate senses do not form any natural subset of mental states. (...)
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  29. Harald Atmanspacher, Mental States as Macrostates Emerging From Brain Electrical Dynamics.score: 180.0
    Psychophysiological correlations form the basis for different medical and scientific disciplines, but the nature of this relation has not yet been fully understood. One conceptual option is to understand the mental as “emerging” from neural processes in the specific sense that psychology and physiology provide two different descriptions of the same system. Stating these descriptions in terms of coarser- and finer-grained system states macro- and microstates , the two descriptions may be equally adequate if the coarse-graining preserves the (...)
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  30. Kepa Korta, Mental States in Conversation.score: 180.0
    It is not unusual to consider linguistic communication as a type of action performed by an individual —the speaker— intended to influence the mental state of another individual —the addressee. It seems more unusual to reach an agreement on what should be the effect of such influence for the communication to be successful. According to the well-known Gricean view, the success of a communicative action depends precisely on the recognition by the addressee of the mental state of the (...)
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  31. Harald Atmanspacher, Contextual Emergence of Mental States From Neurodynamics.score: 180.0
    The emergence of mental states from neural states by partitioning the neural phase space is analyzed in terms of symbolic dynamics. Well-defined mental states provide contexts inducing a criterion of structural stability for the neurodynamics that can be implemented by particular partitions. This leads to distinguished subshifts of finite type that are either cyclic or irreducible. Cyclic shifts correspond to asymptotically stable fixed points or limit tori whereas irreducible shifts are obtained from generating partitions of (...)
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  32. Robert F. Bornstein (1999). Unconscious Motivation and Phenomenal Knowledge: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Implicit Mental States. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):758-758.score: 180.0
    A comprehensive theory of implicit and explicit knowledge must explain phenomenal knowledge (e.g., knowledge regarding one's affective and motivational states), as well as propositional (i.e., “fact”-based) knowledge. Findings from several research areas (i.e., the subliminal mere exposure effect, artificial grammar learning, implicit and self-attributed dependency needs) are used to illustrate the importance of both phenomenal and propositional knowledge for a unified theory of implicit and explicit mental states.
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  33. Jacob Berger (2014). Mental States, Conscious and Nonconscious. Philosophy Compass 9 (6):392-401.score: 180.0
    I discuss here the nature of nonconscious mental states and the ways in which they may differ from their conscious counterparts. I first survey reasons to think that mental states can and often do occur without being conscious. Then, insofar as the nature of nonconscious mentality depends on how we understand the nature of consciousness, I review some of the major theories of consciousness and explore what restrictions they may place on the kinds of states (...)
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  34. Richard A. Carlson (1999). Implicit Representation, Mental States, and Mental Processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):761-762.score: 180.0
    Dienes & Perner's target article constitutes a significant advance in thinking about implicit knowledge. However, it largely neglects processing details and thus the time scale of mental states realizing propositional attitudes. Considering real-time processing raises questions about the possible brevity of implicit representation, the nature of processes that generate explicit knowledge, and the points of view from which knowledge may be represented. Understanding the propositional attitude analysis in terms of momentary mental states points the way toward (...)
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  35. Eli Dresner (2012). Turing, Matthews and Millikan: Effective Memory, Dispositionalism and Pushmepullyou Mental States. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (4):461-472.score: 180.0
    Abstract In the first section of the paper I present Alan Turing?s notion of effective memory, as it appears in his 1936 paper ?On Computable Numbers, With an Application to The Entscheidungsproblem?. This notion stands in surprising contrast with the way memory is usually thought of in the context of contemporary computer science. Turing?s view (in 1936) is that for a computing machine to remember a previously scanned string of symbols is not to store an internal symbolic image of this (...)
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  36. Sara J. Shettleworth (2007). Studying Mental States is Not a Research Program for Comparative Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):332-333.score: 180.0
    The title of the target article suggests an agenda for research on cognitive evolution that is doubly flawed. It implies that we can learn directly about animals' mental states, and its focus on human uniqueness impels a search for an existence proof rather than for understanding what components of given cognitive processes are shared among species and why.
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  37. Maurizio Tirassa, Mental States in Communication.score: 180.0
    Abstract. This paper is concerned with the mental processes involved in intentional communication. I describe an agent's cognitive architecture as the set of cognitive dynamics (i.e., sequences of mental states with contents) she may entertain. I then describe intentional communication as one such specific dynamics, arguing against the prevailing view that communication consists in playing a role in a socially shared script. The cognitive capabilities needed for such dynamics are midreading (i.e., the ability to reason upon another (...)
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  38. M. M. Pitman (2013). Mental States, Processes, and Conscious Intent in Libet's Experiments. South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):71-89.score: 180.0
    The meaning and significance of Benjamin Libet’s studies on the timing of conscious will have been widely discussed, especially by those wishing to draw sceptical conclusions about conscious agency and free will. However, certain important correctives for thinking about mental states and processes undermine the apparent simplicity and logic of Libet’s data. The appropriateness, relevance and ecological validity of Libet’s methods are further undermined by considerations of how we ought to characterise intentional actions, conscious intention, and what it (...)
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  39. Tamar A. Kreps, Benoît Monin & Joshua Knobe (2010). Are Mental States Assessed Relative to What Most People “Should” or “Would” Think? Prescriptive and Descriptive Components of Expected Attitudes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):341.score: 180.0
    For Knobe, observers evaluate mental states by comparing agents' statements with the attitudes they are expected to hold. In our analysis, Knobe's model relies primarily on what agents should think, and little on expectancies of what they would think. We show the importance and complexity of including descriptive and prescriptive norms if one is to take expectancies seriously.
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  40. Marco Mazzone (2013). Mental States as Generalizations From Experience: A Neuro-Computational Hypothesis. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):1-18.score: 180.0
    The opposition between behaviour- and mind-reading accounts of data on infants and non-human primates could be less dramatic than has been thought up to now. In this paper, I argue for this thesis by analysing a possible neuro-computational explanation of early mind-reading, based on a mechanism of associative generalization which is apt to implement the notion of mental states as intervening variables proposed by Andrew Whiten. This account allows capturing important continuities between behaviour-reading and mind-reading, insofar as both (...)
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  41. João de F. Teixeira & Alfredo Pereira Jr (2008). Brain and Behavioral Functions Supporting the Intentionality of Mental States. Abstracta 4 (2):123-147.score: 180.0
    This paper relates intentionality, a central feature of human consciousness, with brain functions controlling adaptive action. Mental intentionality, understood as the “aboutness” of mental states, includes two modalities: semantic intentionality, the attribution of meaning to mental states, and projective intentionality, the projection of conscious content into the world. We claim that both modalities are the evolutionary product of self-organized action, and discuss examples of animal behavior that illustrate some stages of this evolution. The adaptive advantages (...)
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  42. H. M. Giebel (unknown). The Separate Minds of Church and State: Collective Mental States and Th Eir Unsettling Implications. Philosophical Explorations:141-150.score: 180.0
    Claims regarding collective or group mental states are fairly commonplace: we speak of things like the belief of the Church, the will of the faculty, and the opinion of the Supreme Court, often without considering what such claims really mean and whether they are true in any interesting sense. In this paper I take a threefold approach: first, I articulate several ways in which a group might be said to have beliefs and other mental states. Second, (...)
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  43. Baron Reed (2005). Accidentally Factive Mental States. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.score: 164.0
    Knowledge is standardly taken to be belief that is both true and justified (and perhaps meets other conditions as well). Timothy Williamson rejects the standard epistemology for its inability to solve the Gettier problem. The moral of this failure, he argues, is that knowledge does not factor into a combination that includes a mental state (belief) and an external condition (truth), but is itself a type of mental state. Knowledge is, according to his preferred account, the most general (...)
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  44. John McCarthy (1996). Making Robots Conscious of Their Mental States. In S. Muggleton (ed.), Machine Intelligence 15. Oxford University Press.score: 162.0
    In AI, consciousness of self consists in a program having certain kinds of facts about its own mental processes and state of mind. We discuss what consciousness of its own mental structures a robot will need in order to operate in the common sense world and accomplish the tasks humans will give it. It's quite a lot. Many features of human consciousness will be wanted, some will not, and some abilities not possessed by humans have already been found (...)
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  45. Zoltán Dienes (2004). Assumptions of Subjective Measures of Unconscious Mental States: Higher Order Thoughts and Bias. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (9):25-45.score: 162.0
  46. Constantine Sandis (2009). Gods and Mental States : The Causation of Action in Ancient Tragedy and Modern Philosophy of Mind. In , New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 358--385.score: 162.0
    This paper argues that contemporary philosophy of mind and action could learn much from the structure of action explanation manifested in ancient Greek tragedy, which is less deterministic than typically supposed and which does not conflate the motivation of action with its causal production.
     
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  47. Stephen P. Stich (1981). On the Relation Between Occurrents and Contentful Mental States. Inquiry 24 (October):353-358.score: 162.0
     
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  48. Alberto Voltolini (1997). Is Narrow Content the Same as Content of Mental State Types Opaquely Taxonomized? In Analyomen 2, Volume III: Philosophy of Mind, Practical Philosophy, Miscellanea. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.score: 160.0
    Jerry Fodor now holds (1990) that the content of mental state types opaquely taxonomized (de dicto content: DDC) is determined by the 'orthographical' syntax + the computational/functional role of such states. Mental states whose tokens are both orthographically and truth-conditionally identical may be different with regard to the computational/functional role played by their respective representational cores. This make them tantamount to different contentful states, i.e. states with different DDCs, insofar as they are opaquely taxonomized. (...)
     
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  49. Kathleen Akins (1996). Of Sensory Systems and the "Aboutness" of Mental States. Journal of Philosophy 93 (7):337--372.score: 156.0
    La autora presenta una critica a la concepcion clasica de los sentidos asumida por la mayoria de autores naturalistas que pretenden explicar el contenido mental. Esta crítica se basa en datos neurobiologicos sobre los sentidos que apuntan a que estos no parecen describir caracteristicas objetivas del mundo, sino que actuan de forma ʼnarcisita', es decir, representan informacion en funcion de los intereses concretos del organismo.El articulo se encuentra también en: Bechtel, et al., Philosophy and the Neuroscience.
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