Search results for 'Mental disorder' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  99
    Lubomira Radoilska (2012). Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder. In Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press
    In this Introduction, I situate the underlying project “Autonomy and Mental Disorder” with reference to current debates on autonomy in moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of action. I then offer an overview of the individual contributions. More specifically, I begin by identifying three points of convergence in the debates at issue, stating that autonomy is: 1) a fundamentally liberal concept; 2) an agency concept and; 3) incompatible with (severe) mental disorder. Next, I explore, in (...)
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  2.  7
    Alexandre Erler & Tony Hope (2014). Mental Disorder and the Concept of Authenticity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (3):219-232.
    Authenticity has recently emerged as an important issue in discussions of mental disorder. We show, on the basis of personal accounts and empirical studies, that many people with psychological disorders are preoccupied with questions of authenticity. Most of the data considered in this paper are from studies of people with bipolar disorder and anorexia nervosa. We distinguish the various ways in which these people view the relationship between the disorder and their sense of their authentic self. (...)
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  3. Serife Tekin (2011). Self-Concept Through the Diagnostic Looking Glass: Narratives and Mental Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):357-380.
    This paper explores how the diagnosis of mental disorder may affect the diagnosed subject’s self-concept by supplying an account that emphasizes the influence of autobiographical and social narratives on self-understanding. It focuses primarily on the diagnoses made according to the criteria provided by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and suggests that the DSM diagnosis may function as a source of narrative that affects the subject’s self-concept. Engaging in this analysis by appealing to autobiographies and (...)
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  4.  48
    Bengt Brülde (2010). On Defining “Mental Disorder”: Purposes and Conditions of Adequacy. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):19-33.
    All definitions of mental disorder are backed up by arguments that rely on general criteria (e.g., that a definition should be consistent with ordinary language). These desiderata are rarely explicitly stated, and there has been no systematic discussion of how different definitions should be assessed. To arrive at a well-founded list of desiderata, we need to know the purpose of a definition. I argue that this purpose must be practical; it should, for example, help us determine who is (...)
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  5.  13
    Maël Lemoine (2012). How Does a Psychiatrist Infer From an Observed Condition to a Case of Mental Disorder? Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):979-983.
    The main thesis of this paper is that mental health practitioners can legitimately infer that a patient's given condition is a case of mental disorder without having diagnosed any specific mental disorder. The article shows how this is justifiable by relying either on psychopathological reasoning, on 'intentional' analysis or possibly on other modes of reasoning. In the end, it highlights the clinical and philosophical consequences of the plurality of modes of 'inferences to mental (...)'. (shrink)
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  6.  41
    Lubomira Radoilska (ed.) (2012). Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.
    Autonomy is a fundamental though contested concept both in philosophy and the broader intellectual culture of today’s liberal societies. For instance, most of us place great value on the opportunity to make our own decisions and to lead a life of our own choosing. Yet, there is stark disagreement on what is involved in being able to decide autonomously, as well as how important this is compared to other commitments. For example, the success of every group project requires that group (...)
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  7.  78
    Alfredo Gaete (2009). The Concept of Mental Disorder: A Proposal. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (4):327-339.
    During the last years, there has been an important discussion on the concept of mental disorder. Several accounts of such a concept have been offered by theorists, although neither of these accounts seems to have successfully answered both the question of what it means for a certain mental condition to be a disorder and the question of what it means for a certain disorder to be mental. In this paper, I propose an account of (...)
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  8.  79
    Gerben Meynen (2010). Free Will and Mental Disorder: Exploring the Relationship. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (6):429-443.
    A link between mental disorder and freedom is clearly present in the introduction of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). It mentions “an important loss of freedom” as one of the possible defining features of mental disorder. Meanwhile, it remains unclear how “an important loss of freedom” should be understood. In order to get a clearer view on the relationship between mental disorder and (a loss of) (...)
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  9.  22
    Jukka Varelius (2009). Still Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):67-72.
    A response to the commentaries presented by Eric Matthews and Julian Savulescu on Jukka Varelius, 'Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder.’ Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2009 Vol. 16 (1): 35-52.
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  10.  62
    Thomas Schramme (2010). Can We Define Mental Disorder by Using the Criterion of Mental Dysfunction? Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (1):35-47.
    The concept of mental disorder is often defined by reference to the notion of mental dysfunction, which is in line with how the concept of disease in somatic medicine is often defined. However, the notions of mental function and dysfunction seem to suffer from some problems that do not affect models of physiological function. Functions in general have a teleological structure; they are effects of traits that are supposed to have a particular purpose, such that, for (...)
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  11.  24
    Panagiotis Oulis (2012). On the Nature of Mental Disorder: Towards an Objectivist Account. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 33 (5):343-357.
    According to the predominant view within contemporary philosophy of psychiatry, mental disorders involve essentially personal and societal values, and thus, the concept of mental disorder cannot, even in principle, be elucidated in a thoroughly objective manner. Several arguments have been adduced in support of this impossibility thesis. My critical examination of two master arguments advanced to this effect by Derek Bolton and Jerome Wakefield, respectively, raises serious doubts about their soundness. Furthermore, I articulate an alternative, thoroughly objective, (...)
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  12.  17
    R. Cummins (1980). Culpability and Mental Disorder. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):207 - 232.
    The "conservative" holds that mental disorder exculpates only if it is evidence of a standard excuse or justification, i.e., one that a mentally "normal" person could have. The Liberal holds that mental disorder sometimes exculpates in itself. I argue that moral culpability in the case of mental disorder is often moot, and that the real issue is what a court should be allowed to do with such individuals. This undermines the idea that culpability is (...)
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  13.  4
    David Gurnham (2008). “Reader, I Detained Him Under the Mental Health Act”: A Literary Response to Professor Fennell's Best Interests and Treatment for Mental Disorder. [REVIEW] Health Care Analysis 16 (3):268-278.
    This is a response to Professor Fennell's paper on the recent influence and impact of the best interests test on the treatment of patients detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA) for mental disorder. I discuss two points of general ethical significance raised by Professor Fennell. Firstly, I consider his argument on the breadth of the best interests test, incorporating as it does factors considerably wider than those of medical justifications and the risk of harm. Secondly, (...)
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  14.  89
    David Papineau (1994). Mental Disorder, Illness and Biological Disfunction. Philosophy 37:73-82.
    I shall begin with the "anti-psychiatry" view that the lack of a physical basis excludes many familiar mental disorders from the category of "illness". My response to this argument will be that anti-psychiatrists are probably right to hold that most mental disorders do not involve any physical disorder, but that they are wrong to conclude from this that these mental disorders are not illnesses.
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  15.  3
    Ofra Koffman (2015). ‘A Healthier and More Hopeful Person’: Illegitimacy, Mental Disorder and the Improved Prognosis of the Adolescent Mother. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Humanities 36 (2):113-126.
    This paper aims to contribute to the exploration of the shift from a problematisation of ‘unwed motherhood’ to ‘teenage motherhood’ in late twentieth century Britain. It does so by exploring the dominant social scientific understanding of ‘unwed mothers’ during the 1950s and 1960s which suggested that these women suffered from a psychological disorder. I then analyse the conceptualisation of ‘adolescent unwed mothers’ exploring why professionals deemed them to be less disturbed than older women in their predicament. This finding is (...)
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  16. Dominic Murphy & Robert L. Woolfolk (2000). The Harmful Dysfunction Analysis of Mental Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (4):241-252.
  17. Jerome C. Wakefield (2006). What Makes a Mental Disorder Mental? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):123-131.
  18. Bengt Brülde & Filip Radovic (2006). What is Mental About Mental Disorder? Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):99-116.
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  19.  50
    Richard Gipps (2006). Mental Disorder and Intentional Order. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (2):117-121.
  20. Bernard Gert & Charles M. Culver (2004). Defining Mental Disorder. In Jennifer Radden (ed.), The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press
  21. Derek Bolton (2008). What is Mental Disorder?: An Essay in Philosophy, Science, and Values. Oxford University Press.
    The effects of mental disorder are apparent and pervasive, in suffering, loss of freedom and life opportunities, negative impacts on education, work satisfaction and productivity, complications in law, institutions of healthcare, and more. With a new edition of the 'bible' of psychiatric diagnosis - the DSM - under developmental, it is timely to take a step back and re-evalutate exactly how we diagnose and define mental disorder. This new book by Derek Bolton tackles the problems involved (...)
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  22.  99
    Derek Bolton (2001). Problems in the Definition of 'Mental Disorder'. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):182-199.
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  23.  10
    Phil Fennell (2008). Best Interests and Treatment for Mental Disorder. Health Care Analysis 16 (3):255-267.
    This paper considers the role of the concept of best interests in the treatment of mental disorder. It considers the Mental Capacity Act 2005 where treatment of an incapacitated person’s mental disorder is authorized if treatment is in the patient’s own best interests. It also examines the Mental Health Act 1983 as amended by the Mental Health Act 2007 where treatment without consent of a detained patient is allowed where necessary for the patient’s (...)
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  24.  26
    Jukka Varelius (2009). Defining Mental Disorder in Terms of Our Goals for Demarcating Mental Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 16 (1):35-52.
    What mental disorder means is controversial. I attempt to solve that controversy by applying the method of defining a phenomenon in terms of the goals we have for demarcating that phenomenon from other phenomena to the case of mental disorder. I thus address the question about the nature of mental disorder by paying attention to the goals we have for demarcating mental disorder. I maintain that these goals, which embody the reasons why (...)
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  25.  27
    Paul G. Muscari (1981). The Structure of Mental Disorder. Philosophy of Science 48 (December):553-572.
    The present trend towards an atheoretical statistical method of psychiatric classification has prompted many psychiatrists to conceive of "mental disorder", or for that matter any other psychopathological designation, as an indexical cluster of properties and events more than a distinct psychological impairment. By employing different combinations of inclusion and exclusion criteria, the current American Psychiatric Association's scheme (called DSM-III) hopes to avoid the over-selectivity of more metaphysical systems and thereby provide the clinician with a flexible means of dealing (...)
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  26.  4
    O. Olugbile & M. P. Zachariah (2011). The Relationship Between Creativity and Mental Disorder in an African Setting. Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1):225.
    Background: There has for some time now been recognition that there was a relationship between exceptional creative talent and mental disorder. The works of Andreasen (2008) and others in this area have been very significant. However, most of the research has been carried out in USA and Europe. Very little has come out of Africa on the subject. Aim : To survey the beliefs of different groups within an African society, concerning the possibility of a relationship between creative (...)
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  27. Derek Bolton (1996). Mind, Meaning, and Mental Disorder: The Nature of Causal Explanation in Psychology and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical ideas about the mind, brain, and behavior can seem theoretical and unimportant when placed alongside the urgent questions of mental distress and disorder. However, there is a need to give direction to attempts to answer these questions. On the one hand, a substantial research effort is going into the investigation of brain processes and the development of drug treatments for psychiatric disorders, and on the other, a wide range of psychotherapies is becoming available to adults and children (...)
     
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  28. Piers Allott (2009). Mental Disorder, Diagnosis, Treatment and Ethics. Journal of Ethics in Mental Health 1 (1):8.
    This short contribution questions the ethics of basing the way we think and act in relation to mental disorder on beliefs and assumptions that are in the view of the author at best, unhelpful and at worst, simply incorrect.
     
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  29. Bengt Brülde (2007). Mental Disorder and Values. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 93-102.
    It is now generally agreed that we have to rely on value judgments to distinguish mental disorders from other conditions, but it is not quite clear how. To clarify this, we need to know more than to what extent attributions of disorder are dependent on values. We also have to know (1) what kind of evaluations we have to rely on to identify the class of mental disorder; (2) whether attributions of disorder contain any implicit (...)
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  30.  25
    Pascal Boyer (2011). Intuitive Expectations and the Detection of Mental Disorder: A Cognitive Background to Folk-Psychiatries. Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):95-118.
    How do people detect mental dysfunction? What is the influence of cultural models of dysfunction on this detection process? The detection process as such is not usually researched as it falls between the domains of cross-cultural psychiatry and anthropological ethno-psychiatry . I provide a general model for this “missing link” between behavior and cultural models, grounded in empirical evidence for intuitive psychology. Normal adult minds entertain specific intuitive expectations about mental function and behavior, and by implication they infer (...)
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  31.  16
    C. W. van Staden (2003). Incapacity to Give Informed Consent Owing to Mental Disorder. Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (1):41-43.
    What renders some mentally disordered patients incapable of informed consent to medical interventions? It is argued that a patient is incapable of giving informed consent owing to mental disorder, if a mental disorder prevents a patient from understanding what s/he consents to; if a mental disorder prevents a patient from choosing decisively; if a mental disorder prevents a patient from communicating his/her consent; or if a mental disorder prevents a patient (...)
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  32.  4
    Jerome C. Wakefield (2015). Social Construction, Biological Design, and Mental Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (4):349-355.
    Pierre-Henri Castel provides a short but richly argued precis of his recently published two-volume 1,000-page masterwork on the history of obsessive-compulsive disorder. Having not read the as-yet-untranslated books, I write this commentary from Plato’s cave, trying to infer the reality of Castel’s analysis from expository shadows. I am unlikely to be more successful than Plato’s poor troglodytes, so I apologize ahead of time for any misunderstandings. Moreover, I cannot assess Castel’s detailed evidential case for his substantive theses.1 I thus (...)
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  33.  16
    Fabian Freyenhagen & Tom O'Shea (2013). Hidden Substance: Mental Disorder as a Challenge to Normatively Neutral Accounts of Autonomy. International Journal of Law in Context 9 (1):53-70.
    Mental capacity and autonomy are often understood to be normatively neutral – the only values or other norms they may presuppose are those the assessed person does or would accept. We show how mental disorder threatens normatively neutral accounts of autonomy. These accounts produce false positives, particularly in the case of disorders that affect evaluative abilities. Two normatively neutral strategies for handling autonomy-undermining disorder are explored and rejected: a blanket exclusion of mental disorder, and (...)
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  34.  14
    Derek Bolton & Natalie Banner (2012). Does Mental Disorder Involve Loss of Personal Autonomy? In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press
  35.  32
    Somogy Varga (2011). Defining Mental Disorder. Exploring the 'Natural Function' Approach. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 6 (1):1-.
    Due to several socio-political factors, to many psychiatrists only a strictly objective definition of mental disorder, free of value components, seems really acceptable. In this paper, I will explore a variant of such an objectivist approach to defining metal disorder, natural function objectivism. Proponents of this approach make recourse to the notion of natural function in order to reach a value-free definition of mental disorder. The exploration of Christopher Boorse's 'biostatistical' account of natural function (1) (...)
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  36. Guy A. Boysen (2007). An Evaluation of the DSM Concept of Mental Disorder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):157-173.
    The stated purpose of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is to classify mental disorders. However, no tenable operational definition of mental disorder is offered in the manual. This leaves the possibility open that the behaviors labeled as disordered in the DSM are not members of a valid category. Attempts to define mental illness fall into the category of essentialist or relativist based, respectively, on the acceptance or denial of the existence of a (...)
     
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  37.  9
    R. Bingham & N. Banner (2014). The Definition of Mental Disorder: Evolving but Dysfunctional? Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (8):537-542.
    Extensive and diverse conceptual work towards developing a definition of ‘mental disorder’ was motivated by the declassification of homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1973. This highly politicised event was understood as a call for psychiatry to provide assurances against further misclassification on the basis of discrimination or socio-political deviance. Today, if a definition of mental disorder fails to exclude homosexuality, then it fails to provide this safeguard against potential abuses and therefore fails to (...)
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  38.  3
    D. P. Olsen (2000). Policy Implications of the Biological Model of Mental Disorder. Nursing Ethics 7 (5):412-424.
    The current dominant paradigm of mental disorder is that psychopathology is a deviation from normal physiological functioning of the brain. This paradigm is closely allied to the identity theory of mind in philosophy, which holds that mental phenomena are identical with the physical state of the brain. The assumptions of the biological model have policy implications, regardless of the utility or ‘truth’ of the paradigm, which should be made explicit for the assessment of ethics in mental (...)
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  39.  10
    Bernard Gert (1992). A Sex Caused Inconsistency in Dsm-III-R: The Definition of Mental Disorder and the Definition of Paraphilias. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (2):155-171.
    The DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder is inconsistent with the DSM-III-R definition of paraphilias. The former requires the suffering or increased risk of suffering some harm while the latter allows that deviance, by itself, is sufficient to classify a behavioral syndrome as a paraphilia. This inconsistency is particularly clear when examining the DSM-III-R account of a specific paraphilia, Transvestic Fetishism. The author defends the DSM-III-R definition of mental disorder and argues that the DSM-III-R definition of paraphilias (...)
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  40.  20
    Suzanne M. Phillips Monique D. Boivin (2007). Medieval Holism: Hildegard of Bingen on Mental Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (4):pp. 359-368.
    Current efforts to think holistically about mental disorder may be assisted by considering the integrative strategies used by Hildegard of Bingen, a twelfth-century abbess and healer. We search for integrative strategies in the detailed records of Hilde-gard’s treatment of the noblewoman Sigewiza and in Hildegard’s more general writings. Three strategies support Hildegard’s holistic thinking: the use of narrative approaches to mental illness, acknowledging interdependence between perspectives, and applying principles of balance to the relationships between perspectives. Applying these (...)
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  41.  10
    Richard Griffin, Mind, Meaning and Cause: So What If the Mind Doesn't Fit in the Head Book Review of Bolton & Hill on Mental Disorder.
    This review of Bolton & Hill's (B&H) Mind, Meaning, & Mental Disorder examines their non-reductionist yet realist position on mental content. Their arguments are compared to the writings of Dennett and Millikan, where determining function is central to determining information-processing capabilities. The normative nature of function (malfunction) is considered as is its relation to mental states more broadly. Their Wittgensteinian view of meaning as action is accepted as insightful and useful, though some questions remain about their (...)
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  42. David H. Jacobs (2011). Is the DSM's Formulation of Mental Disorder a Technical-Scientific Term? Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (1):63-79.
    Although the “Introduction” to the DSM makes it clear that the presence of “clinical” distress or impairment is insufficient for a diagnosis of “mental disorder” , in practice the clinician is completely unshackled from the conceptual definition and is free to decide on a case-by-case basis if “enough” distress or impairment is present, regardless of circumstances, to judge that “mental disorder” can be diagnosed. It is argued that reference to a biological or psychological dysfunction cannot raise (...)
     
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  43. Somogy Varga (2015). Naturalism, Interpretation, and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The Philosophy of Psychiatry is a unique area of research because the nature of the subject matter leads to quite distinct methodological issues. Naturalism, Interpretation, and Mental Disorder is an original new work focusing on the challenges we face when trying to interpret and understand mental illness. The book integrates a hermeneutical perspective, and shows how such an approach can reveal important facts about historical sources in psychiatry and the nature of dialogue in the therapeutic encounter. In (...)
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  44.  10
    Jeanette Kennett (2007). Mental Disorder, Moral Agency, and the Self. In Bonnie Steinbock (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. Oxford University Press 90-113.
    A person suffering a mental illness or disorder may differ dramatically from his or her previous well self. Family and close friends who knew the person before the onset of illness tend to regard the illness as obscuring their loved one's true self and see the goal of treatment as the restoration of that self. ‘He is not really like this,’ they will say with increasing desperation. Treatment teams and others, who have no acquaintance with the person when (...)
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  45.  51
    J. R. McMillan (2003). Dangerousness, Mental Disorder, and Responsibility. Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (4):232-235.
    While the UK Home Office’s proposals to preventively detain people with what it has called dangerous severe personality disorder have been subjected to debate and criticism the deeply troubling jurisprudential issues in these proposals have not yet entered into public debate in a way that their seriousness deserves.1 It is good that a commentator as well known as Professor Szasz is speaking out on this issue.Professor Szasz focuses upon a crucial question by calling into question the medicalisation of (...)
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  46.  42
    S. Wilkinson (2000). Is 'Normal Grief' a Mental Disorder? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):289-305.
  47.  27
    Guy Widdershoven (1999). Cognitive Psychology and Hermeneutics: Two Approaches to Meaning and Mental Disorder. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 6 (4):245-253.
  48.  8
    Bernard Gert (1990). Irrationality and the DSM-III-R Definition of Mental Disorder. Analyse & Kritik 12 (1):34-46.
    I provide an account of irrationality that takes the concept of an irrational action as more basic than that of an irrational belief. While explaining the various elements of the DSM-III-R definition of mental disorders, I show that even though not all mental disorders involve irrational beliefs or delusions, not all irrational actions are due to mental disorders, and not all mental disorders lead to irrational actions, there is a close conceptual connection between irrationality (...)
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  49.  24
    Elliot D. Cohen (2012). Is Perfectionism a Mental Disorder? International Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):245-252.
    This paper brings to bear empirical evidence from a sample of undergraduate students to show that perfectionism can be a fundamental cognition behind the essential symptoms of some anxiety and mood disorders, notably Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Major Depression; and it suggests that this popular “philosophy of life” may helpfully be used in diagnosing these disorders.
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  50.  17
    Jerome C. Wakefield (2006). High Mental Disorder Rates Are Based on Invalid Measures: Questions About the Claimed Ubiquity of Mutation-Induced Dysfunction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (4):424-426.
    Three reservations about Keller & Miller's (K&M's) argument are explored: Serious validity problems afflict epidemiological criteria discriminating disorders from non-disorders, so high rates may be misleading. Normal variation need not be mild disorder, contrary to a possible interpretation of K&M's article. And, rather than mutation-selection balance, true disorders may result from unselected combinations of normal variants over many loci. (Published Online November 9 2006).
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