Search results for 'Mental healing' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. R. R. Pathak (1999). The'Gita'and Mental Healing. Journal of Dharma 24 (2):18-22.score: 45.0
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  2. Raya A. Jones (ed.) (2010). Body, Mind and Healing After Jung: A Space of Questions. Routledge.score: 42.0
    In this book Raya Jones draws on the triad of body, mind and healing and (re)presents it as a domain of ongoing uncertainty within which Jung's answers stir up ...
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  3. Franklin G. Miller, Luana Colloca & Ted J. Kaptchuk (2009). The Placebo Effect: Illness and Interpersonal Healing. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52 (4):518-539.score: 39.0
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  4. Chip Brown (1998). Afterwards, You're a Genius: Faith, Medicine, and the Metaphysics of Healing. Riverhead Books.score: 39.0
     
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  5. Alex Loyd (2010). The Healing Code: 6 Minutes to Heal the Source of Any Health, Success or Relationship Issue. Intermedia Publishing Group.score: 39.0
     
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  6. Joan D. Koss-Chioino (2005). Spirit Healing, Mental Health, and Emotion Regulation. Zygon 40 (2):409-422.score: 36.0
  7. Phyllis Chesler (forthcoming). Twenty Years Since Women and Madness: Toward a Feminist Institute of Mental Health and Healing. Journal of Mind and Behavior.score: 36.0
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  8. Steven Goldsmith (2013). The Healing Paradox: A Revolutionary Approach to Treating and Curing Physical and Mental Illness. North Atlantic Books.score: 36.0
    Questioning reality -- The hair of the dog -- Good/bad -- Resistance and the side effect -- Putting resistance on the couch -- Modern medicine : a health report -- Psychotherapeutic paradox -- Loops -- Dialectics -- Paradox within the home -- The staying-with-it principle -- Immunization and immunotherapy -- A little poison is good for you -- The strange obsession of Dr. Hahnemann -- From gods to genes -- RPM -- Such stuff as dreams -- The attack of the (...)
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  9. M. Brinton Lykes & Marcie Mersky (2006). Reparations and Mental Health: Psychosocial Interventions Towards Healing, Human Agency, and Rethreading Social Realities. In Pablo De Greiff (ed.), The Handbook of Reparations. Oxford University Press. 589.score: 36.0
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  10. Janet Sayers (2003). Divine Therapy: Love, Mysticism, and Psychoanalysis. Oxford University Press.score: 33.0
    There is mounting evidence that strong personal relationships and spiritual beliefs contribute to our well-being. In Divine Therapy, Janet Sayers employs a biographical approach to the lives and writings of a range of eminent psychotherapists and psychologists to illuminate the link between physical and mental well-being and the 'at-one-ness' provided by love, religious and mystical experiences.
     
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  11. Gandhi (1947). Ramanama. Rupa, Calcutta.score: 30.0
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  12. Raj Kapoor (2006). Secrets of Reality: Bridging the Gap Between Ancient Wisdom and Contemporary Science. Cfw Books.score: 30.0
    Preface. Quest for reality -- The history that vanished -- From zero to infinity -- Nanocosm. Quantum revolution -- Subatomic world -- Quantum mysticism -- Secrets -- Macrocosm. Fabric of space-time -- Elegant universe -- Conscious universe -- Secrets -- Microcosm. Biocosm -- Circle of life -- Blueprint of life -- Secrets -- Reality. Self-aware universe -- Perception -- Karmic footprints -- Secrets.
     
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  13. John Grant McKenzie (1940). Psychology, Psychotherapy and Evangelicalism. London, G. Allen and Unwin.score: 30.0
     
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  14. Lynne Rudder Baker (1993). Metaphysics and Mental Causation. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press. 75-96.score: 21.0
    My aim is twofold: first, to root out the metaphysical assumptions that generate the problem of mental causation and to show that they preclude its solution; second, to dissolve the problem of mental causation by motivating rejection of one of the metaphysical assumptions that give rise to it. There are three features of this metaphysical background picture that are important for our purposes. The first concerns the nature of reality: all reality depends on physical reality, where physical reality (...)
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  15. Toine Pieters & Stephen Snelders (2009). Psychotropic Drug Use: Between Healing and Enhancing the Mind. Neuroethics 2 (2):63-73.score: 21.0
    The making and taking of psychotropic drugs, whether on medical prescription or as self-medication, whether marketed by pharmaceutical companies or clamoured for by an anxious population, has been an integral part of the twentieth century. In this modern era of speed, uncertainty, pleasure and anguish the boundaries between healing and enhancing the mind by chemical means have been redefined. Long before Prozac would become a household name for an ‘emotional aspirin’ did consumers embrace the idea and practice of taking (...)
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  16. Robert N. Audi (1993). Mental Causation: Sustaining and Dynamic. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    I. the view that reasons cannot be causes. II. the view that the explanatory relevance of psychological states such as beliefs and intentions derives from their content, their explanatory role is not causal and we thus have no good reason to ascribe causal power to them. III. the idea that if the mental supervenes on the physical, then what really explains our actions is the physical properties determining our propositional attitudes, and not those attitudes themselves. IV. the thesis that (...)
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  17. Lubomira Radoilska (2012). Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder. In , Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.score: 21.0
    In this Introduction, I situate the underlying project “Autonomy and Mental Disorder” with reference to current debates on autonomy in moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of action. I then offer an overview of the individual contributions. More specifically, I begin by identifying three points of convergence in the debates at issue, stating that autonomy is: 1) a fundamentally liberal concept; 2) an agency concept and; 3) incompatible with (severe) mental disorder. Next, I explore, in the context (...)
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  18. Janna Hastings, Werner Ceusters, Mark Jensen, Kevin Mulligan & Barry Smith (2012). Representing Mental Functioning: Ontologies for Mental Health and Disease. In Towards an Ontology of Mental Functioning (ICBO Workshop), Proceeedings of the Third International Conference on Biomedical Ontology.score: 21.0
    Mental and behavioral disorders represent a significant portion of the public health burden in all countries. The human cost of these disorders is immense, yet treatment options for sufferers are currently limited, with many patients failing to respond sufficiently to available interventions and drugs. High quality ontologies facilitate data aggregation and comparison across different disciplines, and may therefore speed up the translation of primary research into novel therapeutics. Realism-based ontologies describe entities in reality and the relationships between them in (...)
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  19. Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe (2009). Jerónimo Pardo on the Unity of Mental Propositions. In J. Biard (ed.), Le langage mental du Moyen Âge à l'Âge Classique. Peeters Publishers.score: 21.0
    Originally motivated by a sophism, Pardo's discussion about the unity of mental propositions allows him to elaborate on his ideas about the nature of propositions. His option for a non-composite character of mental propositions is grounded in an original view about syncategorems: propositions have a syncategorematic signification, which allows them to signify aliquid aliqualiter, just by virtue of the mental copula, without the need of any added categorematic element. Pardo's general claim about the simplicity of mental (...)
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  20. Karen Carnabucci (2012). Integrating Psychodrama and Systemic Constellation Work: New Directions for Action Methods, Mind-Body Therapies, and Energy Healing. Jessica Kingsley Publishers.score: 21.0
    Systemic Constellation Work is a rapidly growing experiential healing process that is being embraced by a variety of helping professionals, both traditional and alternative, worldwide. This book explores the history, principles and methodology of this approach, and offers a detailed comparison with psychodrama - the original mind-body therapy - explaining how each method can enhance the other. Constellation work is based on the notion that people are connected by unseen energetic forces and suggests that the psychological, traumatic and survival (...)
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  21. John Heil & Alfred Mele (eds.) (1993). Mental Causation. Clarendon Press.score: 21.0
    I argue that the two standard models of mental causation fail to capture the crucial causal relevance of the reason-giving relations involved. Their common error is an exclusively mechanical conception of causation, on which any justification is bound to be independent of the causal process involved, based upon a general rule from which the correctness of the particular case follows only by subsumption. I establish possibility of an alternative model, by sketching an account of the causal dependence of perceptual (...)
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  22. Yasuhiko Murakami (2010). Affection, Autism and Mental Disorders: Husserl's Theory of Meaning and Psychopathology. Studia Phaenomenologica 10:193-204.score: 21.0
    Behind the phase of cognition analysed by Husserl, there is a phase of affection. In this phase, there are significant mental disorders occurring. Similar to the way in which the phase of cognition is divided into reference, meaning (referent), and representation of words (classification according to Husserl's theory of meaning), the phase of affection is also divided into reference, “meaning,” and figure as sphere of “meaning”. The situation as a reference can allow various predications to form different explanations, i.e. (...)
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  23. Nancy Potter (ed.) (2006). Trauma, Truth and Reconciliation: Healing Damaged Relationships. OUP Oxford.score: 21.0
    People do great wrongs to each other all the time, sometimes deliberately, sometimes accidentally. Many within the fields of mental health are centrally involved in helping people to heal from traumatic events and to come to terms with wrongs done to them by others. However, there is surprisingly little in the way of guidance, few texts that situate healing from trauma or evildoing within a combined political and philosophical context. This book looks at how people, communities, and nations (...)
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  24. Robert Briscoe (2011). Mental Imagery and the Varieties of Amodal Perception. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):153-173.score: 18.0
    The problem of amodal perception is the problem of how we represent features of perceived objects that are occluded or otherwise hidden from us. Bence Nanay (2010) has recently proposed that we amodally perceive an object's occluded features by imaginatively projecting them into the relevant regions of visual egocentric space. In this paper, I argue that amodal perception is not a single, unitary capacity. Drawing appropriate distinctions reveals amodal perception to be characterized not only by mental imagery, as Nanay (...)
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  25. E. J. Lowe (2006). Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.score: 18.0
    Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental (...)
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  26. Tim Crane (1998). Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental. In , Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. 229-251.score: 18.0
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, (...)
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  27. Mark Greenberg (2005). A New Map of Theories of Mental Content: Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):299-320.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I propose a new way of understanding the space of possibilities in the field of mental content. The resulting map assigns separate locations to theories of content that have generally been lumped together on the more traditional map. Conversely, it clusters together some theories of content that have typically been regarded as occupying opposite poles. I make my points concrete by developing a taxonomy of theories of mental content, but the main points of the paper (...)
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  28. Angela Mendelovici (2013). Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.score: 18.0
    It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation (e.g. those of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan) have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.
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  29. Evan Thompson (2007). Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.score: 18.0
    This paper (1) sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery; (2) applies this analysis to the mental imagery debate in cognitive science; (3) briefly sketches a neurophenomenological approach to mental imagery; and (4) compares the results of this discussion with Dennett’s heterophenomenology.
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  30. Jennifer Nagel (2013). Knowledge as a Mental State. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:275-310.score: 18.0
    In the philosophical literature on mental states, the paradigmatic examples of mental states are beliefs, desires, intentions, and phenomenal states such as being in pain. The corresponding list in the psychological literature on mental state attribution includes one further member: the state of knowledge. This article examines the reasons why developmental, comparative and social psychologists have classified knowledge as a mental state, while most recent philosophers--with the notable exception of Timothy Williamson-- have not. The disagreement is (...)
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  31. Markus E. Schlosser (2012). Causally Efficacious Intentions and the Sense of Agency: In Defense of Real Mental Causation. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):135-160.score: 18.0
    Empirical evidence, it has often been argued, undermines our commonsense assumptions concerning the efficacy of conscious intentions. One of the most influential advocates of this challenge has been Daniel Wegner, who has presented an impressive amount of evidence in support of a model of "apparent mental causation". According to Wegner, this model provides the best explanation of numerous curious and pathological cases of behavior. Further, it seems that Benjamin Libet's classic experiment on the initiation of action and the empirical (...)
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  32. Wayne Wu (forthcoming). Mental Action and the Threat of Automaticity. In Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillman Vierkant (eds.), Decomposing the Will. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
    This paper considers the connection between automaticity, control and agency. Indeed, recent philosophical and psychological works play up the incompatibility of automaticity and agency. Specifically, there is a threat of automaticity, for automaticity eliminates agency. Such conclusions stem from a tension between two thoughts: that automaticity pervades agency and yet automaticity rules out control. I provide an analysis of the notions of automaticity and control that maintains a simple connection: automaticity entails the absence of control. An appropriate analysis, however, shows (...)
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  33. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2008). The Reality and Classification of Mental Disorders. Dissertation, University of Chicagoscore: 18.0
    This dissertation examines psychiatry from a philosophy of science perspective, focusing on issues of realism and classification. Questions addressed in the dissertation include: What evidence is there for the reality of mental disorders? Are any mental disorders natural kinds? When are disease explanations of abnormality warranted? How should mental disorders be classified? -/- In addressing issues concerning the reality of mental disorders, I draw on the accounts of realism defended by Ian Hacking and William Wimsatt, arguing (...)
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  34. Bence Nanay (2010). Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239 - 254.score: 18.0
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we (...)
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  35. Irwin Goldstein (1994). Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.score: 18.0
    Functionalists think an event's causes and effects, its 'causal role', determines whether it is a mental state and, if so, which kind. Functionalists see this causal role principle as supporting their orthodox materialism, their commitment to the neuroscientist's ontology. I examine and refute the functionalist's causal principle and the orthodox materialism that attends that principle.
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  36. Uriah Kriegel (2013). Two Notions of Mental Representation. In , Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.score: 18.0
    The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
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  37. Simona Aimar (2011). Counterfactuals, Overdetermination and Mental Causation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3):469-477.score: 18.0
    The Exclusion Problem (EP) for mental causation suggests that there is a tension between the claim that the mental causes physical effects, and the claim that the mental does not overdetermine its physical effects. In response, Karen Bennett (2008, 2003) puts forward an extra necessary condition for overdetermination: if one candidate cause were to occur but the other were not to occur, the effect would still occur. She thus denies one of the assumptions of EP, the assumption (...)
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  38. Jessica M. Wilson (2009). Determination, Realization and Mental Causation. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):149 - 169.score: 18.0
    How can mental properties bring about physical effects, as they seem to do, given that the physical realizers of the mental goings-on are already sufficient to cause these effects? This question gives rise to the problem of mental causation (MC) and its associated threats of causal overdetermination, mental causal exclusion, and mental causal irrelevance. Some (e.g., Cynthia and Graham Macdonald, and Stephen Yablo) have suggested that understanding mental-physical realization in terms of the determinable/determinate relation (...)
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  39. James Baillie (1997). Personal Identity and Mental Content. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):323-33.score: 18.0
    In this paper, I attempt to map out the 'logical geography' of the territory in which issues of mental content and of personal identity meet. In particular, I investigate the possibility of combining a psychological criterion of personal identity with an externalist theory of content. I argue that this can be done, but only by accepting an assumption that has been widely accepted but barely argued for, namely that when someone switches linguistic communities, the contents of their thoughts do (...)
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  40. Timothy Lane (2012). Toward an Explanatory Framework for Mental Ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.score: 18.0
    Philosophical and scientific investigations of the proprietary aspects of self—mineness or mental ownership—often presuppose that searching for unique constituents is a productive strategy. But there seem not to be any unique constituents. Here, it is argued that the “self-specificity” paradigm, which emphasizes subjective perspective, fails. Previously, it was argued that mode of access also fails to explain mineness. Fortunately, these failures, when leavened by other findings (those that exhibit varieties and vagaries of mineness), intimate an approach better suited to (...)
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  41. Panu Raatikainen (2013). Can The Mental Be Causally Efficacious? In K. Talmont-Kaminski M. Milkowski (ed.), Regarding the Mind, Naturally: Naturalist Approaches to the Sciences of the Mental. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.score: 18.0
  42. Pete Mandik (2001). Mental Representation and the Subjectivity of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):179-202.score: 18.0
    Many have urged that the biggest obstacles to a physicalistic understanding of consciousness are the problems raised in connection with the subjectivity of consciousness. These problems are most acutely expressed in consideration of the knowledge argument against physicalism. I develop a novel account of the subjectivity of consciousness by explicating the ways in which mental representations may be perspectival. Crucial features of my account involve analogies between the representations involved in sensory experience and the ways in which pictorial representations (...)
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  43. John Heil & David Robb (2003). Mental Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (3):175-196.score: 18.0
    It is becoming increasingly clear that the deepest problems currently exercising philosophers of mind arise from an ill-begotten ontology, in particular, a mistaken ontology of properties. After going through some preliminaries, we identify three doctrines at the heart of this mistaken ontology: (P) For each distinct predicate, “F”, there exists one, and only one, property, F, such that, if “F” is applicable to an object a, then “F” is applicable in virtue of a’s being F. (U) Properties are universals, not (...)
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  44. Jason Kawall (1999). The Experience Machine and Mental State Theories of Well-Being. Journal of Value Inquiry 33 (3):381-387.score: 18.0
    It is argued that Nozick's experience machine thought experiment does not pose a particular difficulty for mental state theories of well-being. While the example shows that we value many things beyond our mental states, this simply reflects the fact that we value more than our own well-being. Nor is a mental state theorist forced to make the dubious claim that we maintain these other values simply as a means to desirable mental states. Valuing more than our (...)
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  45. Todd Buras (2009). An Argument Against Causal Theories of Mental Content. American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (2):117-129.score: 18.0
    Some mental states are about themselves. Nothing is a cause of itself. So some mental states are not about their causes; they are about things distinct from their causes. If this argument is sound, it spells trouble for causal theories of mental content—the precise sort of trouble depending on the precise sort of causal theory. This paper shows that the argument is sound (§§1-3), and then spells out the trouble (§4).
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  46. John Gibbons (2006). Mental Causation Without Downward Causation. Philosophical Review 115 (1):79-103.score: 18.0
    to counterintuitive results. Suppose a mental event, m1, causes another mental event, m2. Unless the mental and the physical are completely independent, there will be a physical event in your brain or your body or the physical world as a whole that underlies this event. The mental event occurs at least partly in virtue of the physical event’s occurring. And the same goes for m2 [2] and p2. Let’s not worry about what exactly “underlying” or “in (...)
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  47. Serife Tekin (2011). Self-Concept Through the Diagnostic Looking Glass: Narratives and Mental Disorder. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):357-380.score: 18.0
    This paper explores how the diagnosis of mental disorder may affect the diagnosed subject’s self-concept by supplying an account that emphasizes the influence of autobiographical and social narratives on self-understanding. It focuses primarily on the diagnoses made according to the criteria provided by the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and suggests that the DSM diagnosis may function as a source of narrative that affects the subject’s self-concept. Engaging in this analysis by appealing to autobiographies and memoirs (...)
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  48. David Robb (1997). The Properties of Mental Causation. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):178-94.score: 18.0
    Recent discussions of mental causation have focused on three principles: (1) Mental properties are (sometimes) causally relevant to physical effects; (2) mental properties are not physical properties; (3) every physical event has in its causal history only physical events and physical properties. Since these principles seem to be inconsistent, solutions have focused on rejecting one or more of them. But I argue that, in spite of appearances, (1)–(3) are not inconsistent. The reason is that 'properties' is used (...)
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  49. Joseph Shieber (2013). Toward a Truly Social Epistemology: Babbage, the Division of Mental Labor, and the Possibility of Socially Distributed Warrant. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):266-294.score: 18.0
    In what follows, I appeal to Charles Babbage’s discussion of the division of mental labor to provide evidence that—at least with respect to the social acquisition, storage, retrieval, and transmission of knowledge—epistemologists have, for a broad range of phenomena of crucial importance to actual knowers in their epistemic practices in everyday life, failed adequately to appreciate the significance of socially distributed cognition. If the discussion here is successful, I will have demonstrated that a particular presumption widely held within the (...)
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  50. Thomas Kroedel (2008). Mental Causation as Multiple Causation. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):125-143.score: 18.0
    The paper argues that mental causation can be explained from the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation together with relatively weak assumptions about the metaphysics of mind. If a physical event counterfactually depends on an earlier physical event, it also counterfactually depends on, and hence is caused by, a mental event that correlates with (or supervenes on) this earlier physical event, provided that this correlation (or supervenience) is sufficiently modally robust. This account of mental causation is consistent (...)
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