Search results for 'Mentalese' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Seven Arguments Against Mentalese (1995). Doing Without Mentalese. Behavior and Philosophy 23:42-47.score: 120.0
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  2. Charles E. M. Dunlop (2004). Mentalese Semantics and the Naturalized Mind. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):77-94.score: 15.0
    In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, (...)
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  3. David J. Cole (1999). I Don't Think So: Pinker on the Mentalese Monopoly. Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):283-295.score: 12.0
    Stephen Pinker sets out over a dozen arguments in The language instinct (Morrow, New York, 1994) for his widely shared view that natural language is inadequate as a medium for thought. Thus he argues we must suppose that the primary medium of thought and inference is an innate propositional representation system, mentalese. I reply to the various arguments and so defend the view that some thought essentially involves natural language. I argue mentalese doesn't solve any of the problems (...)
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  4. David J. Cole, Pinker on the Thinker: Against Mentalese Monopoly.score: 12.0
    thought and problem solving in persons lacking natural language altogether would be a decisive challenge, but there is no clear evidence of any abstract thinking capabilities similar to those evinced by the scientists. Pinker cites languageless persons rebuilding broken locks - this is evidence of perhaps visual imagery, but not mentalese (at least not without quite a bit more detail and argument than we are given). Spiders, e.g., build marvelous things, but no inference to spiderese appears to be warranted. (...)
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  5. Dan I. Slobin (2002). What Language is “Mentalese”? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):700-701.score: 12.0
    Carruthers’ “mentalese expressions” take the form of English sentences, thus suggesting an isomorphism between thought and language that ignores linguistic diversity. Furthermore, complex syntax is not the only linguistic means of combining information from various domain-specific modules into domain-general expressions, nor is such syntax the preferred means of encoding basic experiences in all languages. The analysis seems to rest on an unacknowledged version of linguistic determinism.
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  6. Jacob Beck (forthcoming). Sense, Mentalese, and Ontology. Protosociology, 30 (Special Issue: Concepts.score: 12.0
    Modes of presentation are often posited to accommodate Frege’s puzzle. Philosophers differ, however, in whether they follow Frege in identifying modes of presentation with Fregean senses, or instead take them to be formally individuated symbols of “Mentalese”. Building on Fodor, Margolis and Laurence defend the latter view by arguing that the mind-independence of Fregean senses renders them ontologically suspect in a way that Mentalese symbols are not. This paper shows how Fregeans can withstand this objection. Along the way, (...)
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  7. Brent Silby, Revealing the Language of Thought.score: 9.0
    Language of thought theories fall primarily into two views. The first view sees the language of thought as an innate language known as mentalese, which is hypothesized to operate at a level below conscious awareness while at the same time operating at a higher level than the neural events in the brain. The second view supposes that the language of thought is not innate. Rather, the language of thought is natural language. So, as an English speaker, my language of (...)
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  8. Jesse Prinz (2011). Has Mentalese Earned Its Keep? On Jerry Fodor's LOT 2. [REVIEW] Mind 120 (478):485-501.score: 9.0
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  9. Andrew Pessin (1995). Mentalese Syntax: Between a Rock and Two Hard Places. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 78 (1):33-53.score: 9.0
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  10. Joseph Levine (1988). Demonstrating in Mentalese. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240.score: 9.0
  11. Cass Weller (1997). BonJour and Mentalese. Synthese 113 (2):251-63.score: 9.0
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  12. Larry Hauser (1995). Natural Language and Thought: Doing Without Mentalese. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):41-47.score: 9.0
    Hauser defends the proposition that our languages of thought are public languages. One group of arguments points to the coincidence of clearly productive (novel, unbounded) cognitive competence with overt possession of recursive symbol systems. Another group relies on phenomenological experience. A third group cites practical and methodological considerations: Occam's razor and the "streetlight principle" (other things being equal, look under the lamp) that motivate looking for instantiations of outer languages in thought first.
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  13. Jay L. Garfield (1997). Mentalese Not Spoken Here: Computation, Cognition, and Causation. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):413-35.score: 9.0
    Classical computational modellers of mind urge that the mind is something like a von Neumann computer operating over a system of symbols constituting a language of thought. Such an architecture, they argue, presents us with the best explanation of the compositionality, systematicity and productivity of thought. The language of thought hypothesis is supported by additional independent arguments made popular by Jerry Fodor. Paul Smolensky has developed a connectionist architecture he claims adequately explains compositionality, systematicity and productivity without positing any language (...)
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  14. Larry Hauser (1995). Doing Without Mentalese. Behavior And Philosophy 23 (2):42-47.score: 9.0
    Hauser defends the proposition that public languages are our languages of thought. One argument for this proposition is coincidence of productive (i.e., novel, unbounded) cognitive competence with overt possession of recursive symbol systems. Another is phenomenological experience. A third is Occam's razor and the "streetlight principle.".
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  15. Samuel Guttenplan (1995). The Elm and the Expert. Mentalese and its Semantics By Jerry A. Fodor MIT Press, 1994, Pp. Xiv+129, £15.95. Philosophy 70 (272):293-.score: 9.0
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  16. Paweł Przywara (2010). Problem mentalese. Roczniki Filozoficzne 58 (2):97-123.score: 9.0
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  17. Tevfik Aytekin–Erdinç Sayan (2012). Fodor on Causes of Mentalese Symbols. Organon F 19 (1):3-15.score: 9.0
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  18. Thomas Y. Crowell (2006). 12 Mentalese. Thought 21:379-388.score: 9.0
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  19. J. Fodor (1996). Pierre Jacob, on The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics. European Journal of Philosophy 4:373-378.score: 9.0
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  20. Gyula Klima (2012). Ontological Reduction by Logical Analysis and the Primitive Vocabulary of Mentalese. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):403-414.score: 9.0
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  21. Ruth G. Millikan (1993). On Mentalese Orthography. In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.score: 9.0
  22. Stephen R. Schiffer (1991). Does Mentalese Have a Compositional Semantics? In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.score: 9.0
     
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  23. John-Michael Kuczynski (2002). Does the Idea of a "Language of Thought" Make Sense? Communication and Cognition 35 (4):173-192.score: 6.0
    Sense-perceptions do not have to be deciphered if their contents are to be uploaded, the reason being that they are presentations, not representations. Linguistic expressions do have to be deciphered if their contents are to be uploaded, the reason being that they are representations, not presentations. It is viciously regressive to suppose that information-bearing mental entities are categorically in the nature of representations, as opposed to presentations, and it is therefore incoherent to suppose that thought is mediated by expressions or, (...)
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  24. Daniel D. Hutto (1999). The Presence of Mind. Amsterdam: J Benjamins.score: 6.0
    Will our everyday account of ourselves be vindicated by a new science? Or,will our self-understanding remain untouched by such developments? This book argues that beliefs and desires have a legitimate place in the explanation of action. Eliminativist arguments mistakenly focus on the vehicles of content not content itself. This book asks whether a naturalistic theory of content is possible. It is argued that a modest biosemantic theory of intentional, but nonconceptual, content is the naturalist’s best bet. A theory of this (...)
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  25. Steven E. Boër (2003). Thought-Contents and the Formal Ontology of Sense. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (1):43-114.score: 6.0
    This paper articulates a formal theory of belief incorporating three key theses: (1) belief is a dyadic relation between an agent and a property; (2) this property is not the belief's truth condition (i.e., the intuitively self-ascribed property which the agent must exemplify for the belief to be true) but is instead a certain abstract property (a "thought-content") which contains a way of thinking of that truth condition; (3) for an agent a to have a belief "about" such-and-such items it (...)
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  26. Tim Crane (2003). The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines, and Mental Representation. Routledge.score: 3.0
    This edition has been fully revised and updated, and includes a new chapter on consciousness and a new section on modularity. There are also guides for further reading, and a new glossary of terms such as mentalese, connectionism, and the homunculus fallacy.
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  27. Murat Aydede, The Language of Thought Hypothesis. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.score: 3.0
    1 *Common Sense Conception of Beliefs and Other Propositional Attitudes 2 What is the Language of Thought Hypothesis? 3 Status of LOTH 4 Scope of LOTH 5 *Natural Language as Mentalese? 6 *Nativism and LOTH 7 Naturalism and LOTH.
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  28. Murat Aydede (1998). Fodor on Concepts and Frege Puzzles. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):289-294.score: 3.0
    ABSTRACT. Fodor characterizes concepts as consisting of two dimensions: one is content, which is purely denotational/broad, the other the Mentalese vehicle bearing that content, which Fodor calls the Mode of Presentation (MOP), understood "syntactically." I argue that, so understood, concepts are not interpersonally sharable; so Fodor's own account violates what he calls the Publicity Constraint in his (1998) book. Furthermore, I argue that Fodor's non-semantic, or "syntactic," solution to Frege cases succumbs to the problem of providing interpersonally applicable functional (...)
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  29. Michael Rescorla (2009). Cognitive Maps and the Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):377-407.score: 3.0
    Fodor advocates a view of cognitive processes as computations defined over the language of thought (or Mentalese). Even among those who endorse Mentalese, considerable controversy surrounds its representational format. What semantically relevant structure should scientific psychology attribute to Mentalese symbols? Researchers commonly emphasize logical structure, akin to that displayed by predicate calculus sentences. To counteract this tendency, I discuss computational models of navigation drawn from probabilistic robotics. These models involve computations defined over cognitive maps, which have geometric (...)
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  30. Robert Williams (2008). Gavagai Again. Synthese 164 (2):235 - 259.score: 3.0
    Quine (1960, "Word and object". Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, ch. 2) claims that there are a variety of equally good schemes for translating or interpreting ordinary talk. 'Rabbit' might be taken to divide its reference over rabbits, over temporal slices of rabbits, or undetached parts of rabbits, without significantly affecting which sentences get classified as true and which as false. This is the basis of his famous 'argument from below' to the conclusion that there can be no fact of the (...)
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  31. Nigel J. T. Thomas, Coding Dualism: Conscious Thought Without Cartesianism or Computationalism.score: 3.0
    The principal temptation toward substance dualisms, or otherwise incorporating a question begging homunculus into our psychologies, arises not from the problem of consciousness in general, nor from the problem of intentionality, but from the question of our awareness and understanding of our own mental contents, and the control of the deliberate, conscious thinking in which we employ them. Dennett has called this "Hume's problem". Cognitivist philosophers have generally either denied the experiential reality of thought, as did the Behaviorists, or have (...)
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  32. Robert D. Rupert (2000). Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor's Theory of Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):325-349.score: 3.0
    According to Jerry Fodor’s atomistic theory of content, subjects’ dispositions to token mentalese terms in counterfactual circumstances fix the contents of those terms. I argue that the pattern of counterfactual tokenings alone does not satisfactorily fix content; if Fodor’s appeal to patterns of counterfactual tokenings has any chance of assigning correct extensions, Fodor must take into account the contents of subjects’ various mental states at the times of those tokenings. However, to do so, Fodor must abandon his semantic atomism. (...)
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  33. Stephen Schiffer, The Two-Stage Theory of Meaning.score: 3.0
    A central claim of Paul Horwich’s 1998 book Meaning was that meaning properties reduce to acceptance properties, where  a meaning property is a property of the form e means m for x, e being “a word or phrase—whether it be spoken, written, signed, or merely thought (i.e. an item of ‘mentalese’)” (44);  an acceptance property for an expression e relative to a person x is a relation of the form x is disposed to accept an e-containing sentence (...)
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  34. Stephen Schiffer (2013). Meaning In Speech and In Thought. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):141-159.score: 3.0
    If we think in a lingua mentis, questions about relations between linguistic meaning and propositional-attitude content become questions about relations between meaning in a public language (p-meaning) and meaning in a language of thought (t-meaning). Whether or not the neo-Gricean is correct that p-meaning can be defined in terms of t-meaning and then t-meaning defined in terms of the causal-functional roles of mentalese expressions, it's apt to seem obvious that separate accounts are needed of p-meaning and t-meaning, since p-meaning, (...)
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  35. Stephen R. Schiffer (1992). Boghossian on Externalism and Inference. Philosophical Issues 2:29-38.score: 3.0
    Suppose we think in a language of thought. Then Paul Boghossian' is prepared to argue, first, that there may be ambiguous Mentalese expression types that have unambiguous tokens, and, second, that the way in which this is possible allows for otherwise valid theoretical or practical reasoning to be rendered invalid owing to equivocation of a sort that may be undetectable to the reasoner. Paul sees this as a possible basis from which to launch an argument for what some might (...)
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  36. Jerome C. Wakefield (2002). Broad Versus Narrow Content in the Explanation of Action: Fodor on Frege Cases. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2):119-33.score: 3.0
    A major obstacle to formulating a broad-content intentional psychology is the occurrence of ''Frege cases'' - cases in which a person apparently believes or desires Fa but not Fb and acts accordingly, even though "a" and "b" have the same broad content. Frege cases seem to demand narrow-content distinctions to explain actions by the contents of beliefs and desires. Jerry Fodor ( The elm and the expert: Mentalese and its semantics , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994) argues that an (...)
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  37. Eros Corazza (2011). Unenriched Subsentential Illocutions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):560-582.score: 3.0
    In this paper I challenge the common wisdom (see Dummett and Davidson) that sentences are the minimal units with which one can perform a speech act or make a move in the language game. I thus sit with Perry and Stainton in arguing that subsentences can be used to perform full-fledged speech acts. In my discussion I assume the traditional framework which distinguishes between the proposition expressed and the thought or mental state (possibly a sentence in Mentalese) one comes (...)
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  38. Lynne Rudder Baker (1990). Seeming to See Red. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):121-128.score: 3.0
    In "Understanding the Language of Thought," John Pollock offers a semantics for Mentalese. Along the way, he raises many deep issues concerning, among other things, the indexicality of thought, the relations between thought and communication, the function of 'that'-clauses and the nature of introspection. Regrettably, I must pass over these issues here. Instead, I shall focus on Pollock's views on the nature of appearance and its role in interpreting the language of thought.' I shall examine two aspects of Pollock's (...)
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  39. Andy Clark (2002). Anchors Not Inner Codes, Coordination Not Translation (and Hold the Modules Please). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):681-681.score: 3.0
    Peter Carruthers correctly argues for a cognitive conception of the role of language. But such a story need not include the excess baggage of compositional inner codes, mental modules, mentalese, or translation into logical form (LF).
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  40. James Russell (1988). Cognisance and Cognitive Science. Part One: The Generality Constraint. Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):235 – 258.score: 3.0
    I distinguish between being cognisant and being able to perform intelligent operations. The former, but not the latter, minimally involves the capacity to make adequate judgements about one's relation to objects in the environment. The referential nature of cognisance entails that the mental states of cognisant systems must be inter-related holistically, such that an individual thought becomes possible because of its relation to a system of potential thoughts. I use Gareth Evans' 'Generality Constraint' as a means of describing how the (...)
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  41. Alberto Voltolini (1998). Asymmetrical Dependence Between Causal Laws Does Not Account for Meaning. In V. Abrusci (ed.), Prospettive della Logica e della Filosofia della scienza. ETS. 307-316.score: 3.0
    In (1990), Jerry Fodor has defended a naturalized conception of meaning for Mentalese expressions which relies on the notion of asymmetric dependence. According to this conception, any naturalized theory of meaning must be able to account for the fact that meaning is robust, namely that any token of a certain Mentalese expression “x” retains the expression’s meaning, X, for any Y (≠ X) which happens to cause it. Now, this robustness of “x”‘s meaning can precisely be explained in (...)
     
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  42. Alberto Voltolini (1995). Compositional Supervenience Without Compositional Meaning? In M. De Glas & Z. Pawlak (eds.), WOCFAI 95. Second World Conference on the Fundamentals of Artificial Intelligence, 3-7 July 1995. Angkor. 441-452.score: 3.0
    An attempt is first made to clarify why Stephen Schiffer may legitimately claim that his noncompositional account of meaning differs from other non-compositional semantic doctrines such as the hidden-indexical theory of propositional attitudes. Subsequently, however, doubt is cast upon Schiffer's main contention that, as far as language of thought is concerned, a compositional supervenience theory can adequately satisfy all the desiderata a compositional meaning theory is traditionally called upon for. This doubt basically depends on the fact that, once a physical (...)
     
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