Search results for 'Mentalism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
    Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of mentalism about evidence. If all evidence is transparent, then factive mentalism is false, since no factive mental states are transparent. However, Timothy Williamson has argued that transparency is a myth and that no conditions are transparent except trivial ones. This paper responds by drawing a distinction between doxastic and epistemic notions of transparency. Williamson's argument may show that no conditions are doxastically transparent, (...)
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  2.  48
    Christian List & Franz Dietrich (forthcoming). Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: A Philosophy-of-Science Perspective. Economics and Philosophy.
    Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social-scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people's behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobservables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best (...)
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  3. Roger W. Sperry (1991). In Defense of Mentalism and Emergent Interaction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 12 (2):221-245.
    The mentalist mind-brain model is defended against alleged weaknesses. I argue that the perceived failings are based mostly on misinterpretation of mentalism and emergent interaction. Considering the paradigmatic concepts at issue and broad implications, I try to better clarify the misread mentalist view, adding more inclusive detail, relevant background, further analysis, and comparing its foundational concepts with those of the new cognitive paradigm in psychology. A changed "emergent interactionist" form of causation is posited that combines traditional microdeterminism with emergent (...)
     
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  4.  62
    Beth Preston (1994). Behaviorism and Mentalism: Is There a Third Alternative? Synthese 100 (2):167-96.
    Behaviorism and mentalism are commonly considered to be mutually exclusive and conjunctively exhaustive options for the psychological explanation of behavior. Behaviorism and mentalism do differ in their characterization of inner causes of behavior. However, I argue that they are not mutually exclusive on the grounds that they share important foundational assumptions, two of which are the notion of an innerouter split and the notion of control. I go on to argue that mentalism and behaviorism are not conjunctively (...)
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  5.  56
    Roger W. Sperry (1992). Turnabout on Consciousness: A Mentalist View. Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):259-80.
    Conceptual foundations for the changeover from behaviorism to mentalism are reviewed in an effort to better clarify frequently contested and misinterpreted features. The new mentalist tenets which I continue to support have been differently conceived to be a form of dualism, mind-brain identity theory, functionalism, nonreductive physical monism, dualist interactionism, emergent interactionism, and various other things. This diversity and contradiction are attributed to the fact that the new mentalist paradigm is a distinctly new position that fails to fit traditional (...)
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  6.  39
    Todd Long (2012). Mentalist Evidentialism Vindicated (and a Super-Blooper Epistemic Design Problem for Proper Function Justification). Philosophical Studies 157 (2):251-266.
    Michael Bergmann seeks to motivate his externalist, proper function theory of epistemic justification by providing three objections to the mentalism and mentalist evidentialism characteristic of nonexternalists such as Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. Bergmann argues that (i) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that justification depends on mental states; (ii) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that the epistemic fittingness of an epistemic input to a belief-forming process must be due to an essential feature of (...)
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  7.  9
    William A. Rottschaefer (1983). Verbal Behaviorism and Theoretical Mentalism: An Assessment of Marras-Sellars Dialogue. Philosophy Research Archives 9:511-534.
    Sellars’ verbal behaviorism demands that linguistic episodes be conceptual in an underivative sense and his theoretical mentalism that thoughts as postulated theoretical entities be modelled on linguistic behaviors. Marras has contended that Sellars’ own methodology requires that semantic categories be theoretical. Thus linguistic behaviors can be conceptual in only a derivative sense. Further he claims that overt linguistic behaviors cannot serve as a model for all thought because thought is primarily symbolic. I support verbal behaviorism by showing that semantic (...)
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  8.  3
    William Meehan (2009). Partem Totius Naturae Esse: Spinoza's Alternative to the Mutual Incomprehension of Physicalism and Mentalism in Psychology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):47-59.
    Spinoza’s account of human agency is presented as a solution to the fundamental dichotomy between physicalism and mentalism in psychology. It is argued that this dichotomy originates in the 17th century with the Cartesian and Hobbesian responses to the collapse of the Scholastic synthesis. Spinoza’s view of nature as equally Mind and Body, and his understanding of efficient causality as grounded in a self-caused natural totality are described. Spinozism’s relative lack of influence on contemporary scientific culture is attributed to (...)
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  9. James W. Haag (2006). Between Physicalism and Mentalism: Philip Clayton on Mind and Emergence. Zygon 41 (3):633-647.
  10.  14
    Andrew G. Bjelland (1982). Popper's Critique of Panpsychism and Process Proto-Mentalism. Modern Schoolman 59 (May):233-43.
  11.  26
    Theo C. Meyering (1997). Fodor's Information Semantics Between Naturalism and Mentalism. Inquiry 40 (2):187-207.
  12.  17
    Hugh T. Wilder (1991). Against Naive Mentalism. Metaphilosophy (October) 281 (October):281-291.
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  13. D. J. Howard (1986). The New Mentalism. International Philosophical Quarterly 26 (December):353-7.
     
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  14.  14
    Rene Marres (1989). In Defense Of Mentalism: A Critical Review Of The Philosophy Of Mind. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
    INTRODUCTION The philosophy of mind was once practiced under the description ' doctrine of the soul.' The word 'soul' is no longer much used in philosophy ...
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  15.  28
    Jason Low & Bo Wang (2011). On the Long Road to Mentalism in Children's Spontaneous False-Belief Understanding: Are We There Yet? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):411-428.
    We review recent anticipatory looking and violation-of-expectancy studies suggesting that infants and young preschoolers have spontaneous (implicit) understanding of mind despite their known problems until later in life on elicited (explicit) tests of false-belief reasoning. Straightforwardly differentiating spontaneous and elicited expressions of complex mental state understanding in relation to an implicit-explicit knowledge framework may be challenging; early action predictions may be based on behavior rules that are complementary to the mentalistic attributions under consideration. We discuss that the way forward for (...)
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  16.  4
    William A. Rottschaefer (2010). Verbal Behaviorism and Theoretical Mentalism. Philosophy Research Archives 9:511-533.
    Sellars’ verbal behaviorism demands that linguistic episodes be conceptual in an underivative sense and his theoretical mentalism that thoughts as postulated theoretical entities be modelled on linguistic behaviors. Marras has contended that Sellars’ own methodology requires that semantic categories be theoretical. Thus linguistic behaviors can be conceptual in only a derivative sense. Further he claims that overt linguistic behaviors cannot serve as a model for all thought because thought is primarily symbolic. I support verbal behaviorism by showing that semantic (...)
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  17.  34
    Evan Butts (2012). Mentalism is Not Epistemic Ur-Internalism. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):233 - 249.
    Earl Conee and Richard Feldman claim that mentalism identifies the core of internalist epistemology. This is what I call identifying ur-internalism. Their version of ur-internalism differs from the traditional one ? viz., accessibilism ? by not imposing requirements stipulating that subjects must have reflective access to facts which justify their beliefs for these beliefs to be justified. Instead, justification simply supervenes on the mental lives of subjects. I argue that mentalism fails to establish itself as ur-internalism by demonstrating (...)
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  18.  9
    Jay Moore (1990). On Mentalism, Privacy, and Behaviorism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 11 (1):19-36.
    The present paper examines three issues from the perspective of Skinner's radical behaviorism: the nature of mentalism, the relation between behaviorism and mentalism, and the nature of behavioristic objections to mentalism. Mentalism is characterized as a particular orientation to the explanation of behavior that entails an appeal to inner causes. Methodological and radical behaviorism are examined with respect to this definition, and methodological behaviorism is held to be mentalistic by virtue of its implicit appeal to mental (...)
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  19.  4
    Nicholas S. Thompson (2000). Evolutionary Psychology Can Ill Afford Adaptionist and Mentalist Credulity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (6):1013-1014.
    The idea that dreams function as fright-simulations rests on the adaptionist notion that anything that has form has function, and psychological argument relies on the mentalist assumption that dream reports are accurate reports of experienced events. Neither assumption seems adequately supported by the evidence presented. [Revonsuo].
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  20.  10
    Richard A. Carlson (2002). Mentalism, Information, and Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):333-333.
    The target article addresses important empirical issues, but adopts a nonanalytic stance toward consciousness and presents the mentalistic view as a very radical position that rules out informational description of anything other than conscious mental states. A better mentalistic strategy is to show how the structure of some informational states is both constitutive of consciousness and necessary for psychological functions.
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  21.  5
    Rudolf P. Botha (1982). On Chomskyan Mentalism: A Reply to Peter Slezak. Synthese 53 (1):123 - 141.
    Introducing his paper, Slezak (p. 428) proposes “to examine Botha's criticisms in detail with a view to demonstrating that they are without foundation and are based on the most fundamental misunderstandings”. Concluding his paper, Slezak (p. 439) expresses the hope that he has shown “that the conceptions on which these criticisms rest are so seriously flawed as to make it unprofitable to attempt to unravel the rest of his analysis”. These formulations, by all standards, represent rather strong rhetoric. But, as (...)
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  22.  12
    Rudolf P. Botha (1980). Methodological Bases of a Progressive Mentalism. Synthese 44 (1):1 - 112.
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  23.  1
    Judson Webb (1980). Mechanism, Mentalism and Metamathematics. Kluwer.
  24. Roger W. Sperry (1980). Mind-Brain Interaction: Mentalism Yes, Dualism No. Neuroscience 5 (2):195-206.
  25.  5
    Harold T. Hodes (1984). Mechanism, Mentalism, and Metamathematics: An Essay on Finitism by Judson C. Webb. Journal of Philosophy 81 (8):456-464.
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  26.  13
    Russell Keat (1972). A Critical Examination of BF Skinner's Objections to Mentalism. Behaviorism 1 (1):53-70.
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  27.  3
    Deryl J. Howard (1986). The New Mentalism and the Mind. International Philosophical Quarterly 26 (4):353-357.
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  28.  79
    Roger W. Sperry (1993). A Mentalist View of Consciousness. Social Neuroscience Bulletin 6 (2):15-19.
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  29.  49
    J. Comesana (2011). Conservatism, Preservationism, Conservationism and Mentalism. Analysis 71 (3):489-492.
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  30.  12
    Harold T. Hodes (1984). Book Review. Mechanism, Mentalism and Metamathematics. J Webb. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 81 (8):456-64.
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  31.  3
    Martine Nida-Rümelin (1990). In Defense of Mentalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 37:217-220.
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  32.  18
    Mark Bedau (1990). Against Mentalism in Teleology. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):61 - 70.
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  33.  2
    Roger Sperry (1986). The New Mentalist Paradigm and Ultimate Concern. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 29 (3):413-422.
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  34.  9
    Christopher Peacocke (1992). A Moderate Mentalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (2):425 - 430.
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  35.  7
    Stewart Shapiro (1986). Review: Judson Chambers Webb, Mechanism, Mentalism, and Metamathematics. An Essay on Finitism. [REVIEW] Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (2):472-476.
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  36.  7
    Roger Sperry (1978). Mentalist Monism: Consciousness as a Causal Emergent of Brain Processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (3):365.
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  37.  34
    Roger W. Sperry (1985). The Cognitive Role of Belief: Implications of the New Mentalism. Contemporary Philosophy 10 (10).
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  38.  12
    Klaus Puhl & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (1998). Is Every Mentalism a Kind of Psychologism? Grazer Philosophische Studien 55:213-237.
    First, we argue that Dummett, in his accusing Husserl of psychologism, does not pay sufficient attention to the phenomenological framework of Husserl's philosophy. This framework must be taken into account for understanding why Husserl is not a psychologist in the theory of meaning. Second, it is shown that the thoughts required by Evans' theory of understanding indexical utterances are not to be identified with mental events as understood by psychologism. We then emphasize what Husserl's and Evans' explanation of the mind (...)
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  39.  7
    Steven C. Hayes & Aaron J. Brownstein (1985). Mentalism and the" as-yet Unexplained": A Reply to Killeen. Behaviorism 13 (2):151-154.
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  40.  24
    Bruno G. Bara & Maurizio Tirassa (2010). A Mentalist Framework for Linguistic and Extralinguistic Communication. Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 9:182-193.
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  41.  25
    Harry Beatty (1974). Behaviourism, Mentalism, and Quine's Indeterminacy Thesis. Philosophical Studies 26 (2):97 - 110.
  42.  1
    Steven G. Smith (1989). In Defense of Mentalism. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 43 (1):173-174.
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  43.  1
    Martine Nida-Rümelin (1990). In Defense of Mentalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 37:217-220.
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  44.  3
    Jay Moore (1981). On Mentalism, Methodological Behaviorism, and Radical Behaviorism. Behaviorism 9 (1):55-77.
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  45.  19
    Peter Achinstein (1978). Teleology and Mentalism. Journal of Philosophy 75 (10):551-553.
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  46.  1
    William Etkin (forthcoming). Evolution of the Human Mind and Emergence of Tribal Culture: A Mentalist Approach. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine.
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  47.  6
    Martine Nida-Rümelin (1990). In Defense of Mentalism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 37:217-220.
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  48.  9
    Andrew G. Bjelland (1981). Čapek, Bergson, and Process Proto-Mentalism. Process Studies 11 (3):180-189.
  49.  3
    Georges Rey (1984). Ontology and Ideology of Behaviorism and Mentalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):640.
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  50.  8
    B. J. (1981). Mechanism, Mentalism and Metamathematics. Review of Metaphysics 35 (1):176-178.
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