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Trenton Merricks [61]T. Merricks [2]
  1. T. Merricks (2013). Three Comments on Writing the Book of the World. Analysis 73 (4):722-736.
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  2. T. Merricks (2011). Foreknowledge and Freedom. Philosophical Review 120 (4):567-586.
    The bulk of the essay “Truth and Freedom” (Philosophical Review 118 [2009]: 29–57) opposes fatalism, which is the claim that if there is a true proposition to the effect that an action A will occur, then A will not be free. But that essay also offers a new way to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom. In “The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks” (Philosophical Review 120 [2011]: 97–115), John Martin Fischer and Patrick Todd raise a number of objections (...)
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  3. Trenton Merricks (2011). I. Hasker's Argument Against Molinism. In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oup Oxford. 50.
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  4. Trenton Merricks (2011). Précis of Truth and Ontology. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):184-186.
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  5. Trenton Merricks (2011). Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):212-233.
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  6. Trenton Merricks (2011). Reply to Bennett. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83:212-233.
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  7. Trenton Merricks (2011). Truth and Molinism. In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oup Oxford. 50--72.
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  8. St Augustine, John Bigelow, Craig Bourne, William Lane Craig, Thomas Crisp, Matthew Davidson, Rafael De Clercq, M. Oreste Fiocco, Mark Hinchliff, Simon Keller, Ernâni Magalhães, J. M. E. McTaggart, Trenton Merricks, Ulrich Meyer, L. Nathan Oaklander, Arthur Prior, Hilary Putnam & Dean Zimmerman (2010). Presentism: Essential Readings. Lexington Books.
     
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  9. Trenton Merricks (2010). Veridador. Critica.
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  10. Trenton Merricks (2009). Kathrin Koslicki: The Structure of Objects. Journal of Philosophy 106 (5).
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  11. Trenton Merricks (2009). Propositional Attitudes? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):207 - 232.
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  12. Trenton Merricks (2009). Review of Kathrin Koslicki: The Structure of Objects. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 106 (5).
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  13. Trenton Merricks (2009). Truth and Freedom. Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.
    is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t . Those arguments do not require the complex machinery of Ockhamism, with its (...)
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  14. Trenton Merricks (2009). The Structure of Objects. Journal of Philosophy 106 (5):301-307.
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  15. Trenton Merricks (2008). Replies to Cameron, Schaffer, and Soames. Philosophical Books 49 (4):328-343.
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  16. Trenton Merricks (2008). Summary. Philosophical Books 49 (4):289-291.
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  17. Trenton Merricks (2008). The Resurrection of the Body. In Thomas P. Flint & Michael C. Rea (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press.
     
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  18. Trenton Merricks (2007). Remarks on Vagueness and Arbitrariness. Mind 116 (461):115-119.
    other things, that the Vagueness Argument for unrestricted composition fails. In ‘Vagueness and Arbitrariness: Merricks on Composition’, Elizabeth Barnes objects to my argument. This paper replies to Barnes, and also offers further support for the views defended in my original paper.
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  19. Trenton Merricks (2007). Truth and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    Truth and Ontology concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any substantive way at all.
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  20. Trenton Merricks (2007). ``The Word Made Flesh: Dualism, Physicalism, and the Incarnation&Quot. In Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 281-301.
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  21. Trenton Merricks (2006). 4. Goodbye Growing Block. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:103.
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  22. Trenton Merricks (2006). I. Three Theories. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:103.
     
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  23. Trenton Merricks (2005). Composition and Vagueness. Mind 114 (455):615-637.
    says that there are some composite objects. And it says that some objects jointly compose nothing at all. The main threat to restricted composition is the in.uential and widely defended Vagueness Argument. We shall see that the Vagueness Argument fails. In seeing how this argument fails, we shall discover a new focus for the debate over composition's extent.
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  24. Trenton Merricks (2003). How Things Persist. Mind 112 (445):146-148.
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  25. Trenton Merricks (2003). Maximality and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):150-158.
  26. Trenton Merricks (2003). Précis of Objects and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):700–703.
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  27. Trenton Merricks (2003). Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):727–744.
  28. Trenton Merricks (2003). Review: How Things Persist. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (445):146-148.
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  29. Trenton Merricks (2003). Review: Précis of Objects and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):700 - 703.
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  30. Trenton Merricks (2003). Review: Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):727 - 744.
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  31. Trenton Merricks (2003). The End of Counterpart Theory. Journal of Philosophy 100 (10):521 - 549.
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  32. Trenton Merricks (2003). Objects and Persons. Clarendon Press.
    Objects and Persons presents an original theory about what kinds of things exist. Trenton Merricks argues that there are no non-living inanimate macrophysical objects -- no statues or rocks or chairs or stars -- because they would have no causal role over and above the causal role of their microphysical parts. Humans do exist: we have non-redundant causal powers. Along the way, Merricks has interesting things to say about mental causation, free will, and various philosophical puzzles. Anyone working in metaphysics (...)
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  33. Nathan Salmon, Andrew Melnyk, Trenton Merricks, John Stuart Mill, Matt Millen, Ruth G. Millikan, Piet Mondrian, Isaac Newton, David Owens & David Papineau (2002). Ramsey 311,314 Rembrandt 388 Rosenberg, Alexander Xxi Ross, WD. 274. In Jaegwon Kim (ed.), Supervenience. Ashgate. 397.
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  34. Trenton Merricks (2001). How to Live Forever Without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 183-201.
     
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  35. Trenton Merricks (2001). Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press.
    With ontology motivated largely by causal considerations, this lucid and provocative work focuses on the idea that physical objects are causally non-redundant. Merricks "eliminates" inanimate composite macrophysical objects on the grounds that they would--if they existed--be at best completely causally redundant. He defends human existence by arguing, from certain facts about mental causation, that we cause things that are not determined by our proper parts. He also provides insight into a variety of philosophical puzzles, while addressing many significant issues like (...)
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  36. Trenton Merricks (2001). Physicalism and Immortality. In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Cornell University Press.
     
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  37. Trenton Merricks (2001). Varieties of Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):145-157.
    According to one account, vagueness is "metaphysical." The friend of metaphysical vagueness believes that, for some object and some property, there can be no determinate fact of the matter whether that object exemplifies that property. A second account maintains that vagueness is due only to ignorance. According to the epistemic account, vagueness is explained completely by and is nothing over and above our not knowing some relevant fact or facts. These are the minority views. The dominant position maintains that there (...)
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  38. Trenton Merricks (2001). Realism About Personal Identity Over Time. Noûs 35 (s15):173 - 187.
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  39. Trenton Merricks (2000). No Statues. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):47 – 52.
  40. Trenton Merricks (2000). Perdurance and Psychological Continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):195-199.
  41. Trenton Merricks (1999). Composition as Identity, Mereological Essentialism, and Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):192 – 195.
  42. Trenton Merricks (1999). Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):983-997.
  43. Trenton Merricks (1999). Persistence, Parts, and Presentism. Noûs 33 (3):421-438.
  44. Trenton Merricks (1999). Reading Parfit. Philosophical Review 108 (3):422-425.
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  45. Trenton Merricks (1998). Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience. Mind 107 (425):59-71.
    The doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience (MS) states that: Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplified intrinsic qualitative properties Q1 through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn. I show that MS entails a contradiction and so must be rejected. And my argument against MS provides the resources (...)
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  46. Trenton Merricks (1998). On Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic. Mind 107 (428):845-846.
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  47. Trenton Merricks (1998). Singular Propositions. Philosophy 23:67-83.
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  48. Trenton Merricks (1998). There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time. Noûs 32 (1):106-124.
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