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Trenton Merricks [79]Trenton Douglas Merricks [1]
  1.  93
    Trenton Merricks (2007). Truth and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
    Truth and Ontology concludes that some truths do not depend on being in any substantive way at all.
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  2. Trenton Merricks (2001). Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press.
    With ontology motivated largely by causal considerations, this lucid and provocative work focuses on the idea that physical objects are causally non-redundant. Merricks "eliminates" inanimate composite macrophysical objects on the grounds that they would--if they existed--be at best completely causally redundant. He defends human existence by arguing, from certain facts about mental causation, that we cause things that are not determined by our proper parts. He also provides insight into a variety of philosophical puzzles, while addressing many significant issues like (...)
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  3.  56
    Trenton Merricks (2016). Replies to Wang, Speaks, and Pautz. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):487-505.
    Replies for a symposium on Propositions.
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  4. Trenton Merricks (2001). Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press.
    Objects and Persons presents an original theory about what kinds of things exist. Trenton Merricks argues that there are no non-living inanimate macrophysical objects -- no statues or rocks or chairs or stars -- because they would have no causal role over and above the causal role of their microphysical parts. Humans do exist: we have non-redundant causal powers. Along the way, Merricks has interesting things to say about mental causation, free will, and various philosophical puzzles. Anyone working in metaphysics (...)
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  5.  44
    Trenton Merricks (2016). Précis of Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):460-461.
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  6.  35
    Trenton Merricks (forthcoming). Do Ordinary Objects Exist? No. In Elizabeth Barnes (ed.), Current Controversies in Metaphysics. Routledge
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  7. Trenton Merricks (2009). Truth and Freedom. Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.
    Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t . Those arguments do not require the complex machinery (...)
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  8. Trenton Merricks (1999). Persistence, Parts, and Presentism. Noûs 33 (3):421-438.
  9. Trenton Merricks (2015). Propositions. Oxford University Press.
    Trenton Merricks presents an original argument for the existence of propositions, and defends an account of their nature. He draws a variety of controversial conclusions, for instance about supervaluationism, the nature of possible worlds, truths about non-existent entities, and whether and how logical consequence depends on modal facts.
     
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  10.  77
    Trenton Merricks (2006). Split Brains and the Godhead. In Thomas Crisp, David Vander Laan & Matthew Davidson (eds.), Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga. Kluwer 299-326.
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  11. Trenton Merricks (2005). Composition and Vagueness. Mind 114 (455):615-637.
    says that there are some composite objects. And it says that some objects jointly compose nothing at all. The main threat to restricted composition is the in.uential and widely defended Vagueness Argument. We shall see that the Vagueness Argument fails. In seeing how this argument fails, we shall discover a new focus for the debate over composition's extent.
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  12. Trenton Merricks (1994). Endurance and Indiscernibility. Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):165-184.
  13. Trenton Merricks (2001). Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press Uk.
    'With style and wit, Merricks stakes out an original position and defends it with an abundance of interesting, carefully formulated arguments. His book is sure to be one of the standard points of reference for the growing number of philosophers interested in these issues.' -Michael B. Burke, Philosophical Review 'The argument is densely woven, ingeniously defended... Merricks is a first-rate young philosopher with a book that deserves the attention of anyone interested in the metaphysics of human persons. There is much (...)
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  14. Trenton Merricks (1998). There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time. Noûs 32 (1):106-124.
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  15. Trenton Merricks (1995). On the Incompatibility of Enduring and Perduring Entities. Mind 104 (415):521-531.
  16.  39
    Trenton Merricks (2011). Foreknowledge and Freedom. Philosophical Review 120 (4):567-586.
    The bulk of the essay “Truth and Freedom” (Philosophical Review 118 [2009]: 29–57) opposes fatalism, which is the claim that if there is a true proposition to the effect that an action A will occur, then A will not be free. But that essay also offers a new way to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom. In “The Truth about Freedom: A Reply to Merricks” (Philosophical Review 120 [2011]: 97–115), John Martin Fischer and Patrick Todd raise a number of objections (...)
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  17.  46
    Trenton Merricks (2009). Propositional Attitudes? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):207 - 232.
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  18. Trenton Merricks (2013). Three Comments on Theodore Sider's Writing the Book of the World. Analysis 73 (4):722-736.
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  19. Trenton Merricks (2001). Varieties of Vagueness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):145-157.
    According to one account, vagueness is "metaphysical." The friend of metaphysical vagueness believes that, for some object and some property, there can be no determinate fact of the matter whether that object exemplifies that property. A second account maintains that vagueness is due only to ignorance. According to the epistemic account, vagueness is explained completely by and is nothing over and above our not knowing some relevant fact or facts. These are the minority views. The dominant position maintains that there (...)
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  20. Trenton Merricks (1995). Warrant Entails Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):841-855.
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  21. Trenton Merricks (1999). Composition as Identity, Mereological Essentialism, and Counterpart Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):192 – 195.
  22.  47
    Trenton Merricks (2011). Singular Propositions. In Clark Kelly James & Rea Michael C. (eds.), Science, Religion, and Metaphysics: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga. Oxford University Press
  23. Trenton Merricks (1998). Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience. Mind 107 (425):59-71.
    The doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience (MS) states that: Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplified intrinsic qualitative properties Q1 through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn. I show that MS entails a contradiction and so must be rejected. And my argument against MS provides the resources (...)
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  24.  69
    Trenton Merricks (2006). 4. Goodbye Growing Block. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:103.
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  25.  72
    Trenton Merricks (1997). More on Warrant's Entailing Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):627-631.
    Warrant is that, whatever it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. In "Warrant Entails Truth" (PPR, December 1995), I argued that it is impossible that a false belief be warranted. Sharon Ryan attacked the argument of that paper in her "Does Warrant Entail Truth?" (PPR, March 1996). In "More on Warrant's Entailing Truth" I present arguments for the claim that warrant entails truth that are, I think, significantly more compelling than the arguments of my original (...)
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  26.  71
    Trenton Merricks (2003). The End of Counterpart Theory. Journal of Philosophy 100 (10):521 - 549.
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  27. Trenton Merricks (2008). Replies to Cameron, Schaffer, and Soames for Symposium on Truth and Ontology. Philosophical Books 49 (4):328-343.
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  28. Trenton Merricks (1999). Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):983-997.
    This paper argues that if persons last over time by “enduring”, then no analysis or reduction of personal identity over time in tenus of any sort of psychological continuity can be correct. In other words, any analysis of personal identity over time in tenus of psychological continuity entails that persons are four-dimensional and have temporal parts. The paper then shows that if we abandon psychological analyses of personal identity---as we must if persons endure---Parfit’s argument for the claim that identity does (...)
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  29.  21
    Trenton Merricks (1995). On Behalf of the Coherentist. Analysis 55 (4):306 - 309.
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  30. Trenton Merricks (1997). Fission and Personal Identity Over Time. Philosophical Studies 88 (2):163-186.
  31.  69
    Trenton Merricks (2003). Maximality and Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):150-158.
  32.  51
    Trenton Merricks (2007). ``The Word Made Flesh: Dualism, Physicalism, and the Incarnation&Quot. In Peter van Inwagen & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Persons: Human and Divine. Oxford: Oxford University Press 281-301.
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  33. Trenton Merricks (2007). Remarks on Vagueness and Arbitrariness. Mind 116 (461):115-119.
    other things, that the Vagueness Argument for unrestricted composition fails. In ‘Vagueness and Arbitrariness: Merricks on Composition’, Elizabeth Barnes objects to my argument. This paper replies to Barnes, and also offers further support for the views defended in my original paper.
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  34. Trenton Merricks (2003). Review: How Things Persist. [REVIEW] Mind 112 (445):146-148.
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  35.  54
    Trenton Merricks (2003). Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):727–744.
  36. Trenton Merricks (1994). A New Objection to A Priori Arguments for Dualism. American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1):81-85.
  37.  86
    Trenton Merricks (2000). 'No Statues'. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):47 – 52.
  38. Trenton Merricks (2011). Truth and Molinism. In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. OUP Oxford 50--72.
     
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  39.  14
    Trenton Merricks (2009). Review of Peter van Inwagen's The Problem of Evil. Times Literary Supplement (5444):26.
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  40.  42
    Trenton Merricks (2003). Précis of Objects and Persons for Book Symposium. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):700–703.
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  41.  82
    Trenton Merricks (2001). Realism About Personal Identity Over Time. Noûs 35 (s15):173 - 187.
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  42.  45
    Trenton Merricks (2011). Replies. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):212-233.
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  43. Trenton Merricks (2009). Review of Kathrin Koslicki: The Structure of Objects. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 106 (5).
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  44. Trenton Merricks (2000). Perdurance and Psychological Continuity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):195-199.
    If persons endure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. That is one conclusion defended in my “Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity’ . Rea and Silver claim that my argument for that conclusion is sound only if a parallel argument is sound. The parallel argument concludes that if persons perdure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. In this paper, I show that Rea and Silver are mistaken. My argument is (...)
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  45. Trenton Merricks (2006). Good-Bye Growing Block. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:103-110.
     
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  46.  57
    Trenton Merricks (1998). On Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic. Mind 107 (428):845-846.
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  47. Trenton Merricks (2008). The Resurrection of the Body. In Thomas P. Flint & Michael C. Rea (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press
     
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  48. St Augustine, John Bigelow, Craig Bourne, William Lane Craig, Thomas Crisp, Matthew Davidson, Rafael De Clercq, M. Oreste Fiocco, Mark Hinchliff, Simon Keller, J. M. E. McTaggart, Trenton Merricks, Ulrich Meyer, Arthur Prior, Hilary Putnam & Dean Zimmerman (2010). Presentism: Essential Readings. Lexington Books.
    Presentism: Essential Readings contains writings—classic and contemporary—that acquaint the reader with different versions of presentism, standard philosophical and scientific objections to presentism, and their attempted solutions. Detailed introductions to each part of the book make the discussions accessible to students and those unfamiliar with this fascinating and controversial philosophy.
     
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  49.  23
    Trenton Merricks (2003). Replies to Lowe, Dorr, and Sider for Symposium on Objects and Persons. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):727-744.
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  50.  8
    Trenton Merricks (2009). Review of Eric Olson's What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. Times Literary Supplement (5521):24.
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