Search results for 'Metacognition' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Joëlle Proust (2007). Metacognition and Metarepresentation: Is a Self-Directed Theory of Mind a Precondition for Metacognition? [REVIEW] Synthese 159 (2):271 - 295.score: 24.0
    Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations (...)
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  2. J. Smith, W. Shields & D. Washburn (2003). The Comparative Psychology of Uncertainty Monitoring and Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):317-339.score: 24.0
    Researchers have begun to explore animals' capacities for uncertainty monitoring and metacognition. This exploration could extend the study of animal self-awareness and establish the relationship of self-awareness to other-awareness. It could sharpen descriptions of metacognition in the human literature and suggest the earliest roots of metacognition in human development. We summarize research on uncertainty monitoring by humans, monkeys, and a dolphin within perceptual and metamemory tasks. We extend phylogenetically the search for metacognitive capacities by considering studies that (...)
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  3. Santiago Arango-Muñoz (2011). Two Levels of Metacognition. Philosophia 39 (1):71-82.score: 24.0
    Two main theories about metacognition are reviewed, each of which claims to provide a better explanation of this phenomenon, while discrediting the other theory as inappropriate. The paper claims that in order to do justice to the complex phenomenon of metacognition, we must distinguish two levels of this capacity—each having a different structure, a different content and a different function within the cognitive architecture. It will be shown that each of the reviewed theories has been trying to explain (...)
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  4. David Kirsh (2005). Metacognition, Distributed Cognition and Visual Design. In Peter Gardenfors, Petter Johansson & N. J. Mahwah (eds.), Cognition, education, and communication technology. Erlbaum Associates. 147--180.score: 24.0
    Metacognition is associated with planning, monitoring, evaluating and repairing performance Designers of elearning systems can improve the quality of their environments by explicitly structuring the visual and interactive display of learning contexts to facilitate metacognition. Typically page layout, navigational appearance, visual and interactivity design are not viewed as major factors in metacognition. This is because metacognition tends to be interpreted as a process in the head, rather than an interactive one. It is argued here, that cognition (...)
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  5. Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Inner Speech and Metacognition: In Search of a Connection. Mind and Language.score: 24.0
    Many theorists claim that inner speech is importantly linked to human metacognition (thinking about one’s own thinking). However, their proposals all rely upon unworkable conceptions of the content and structure of inner speech episodes. The core problem is that they require inner speech episodes to have both auditory-phonological contents and propositional/semantic content. Difficulties for the views emerge when we look closely at how such contents might be integrated into one or more states or processes. The result is that, if (...)
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  6. Jérôme Dokic & Jean-Rémy Martin (2012). Disjunctivism, Hallucination and Metacognition. WIREs Cognitive Science 3:533-543.score: 24.0
    Perceptual experiences have been construed either as representational mental states—Representationalism—or as direct mental relations to the external world—Disjunctivism. Both conceptions are critical reactions to the so-called ‘Argument from Hallucination’, according to which perceptions cannot be about the external world, since they are subjectively indiscriminable from other, hallucinatory experiences, which are about sense-data ormind-dependent entities. Representationalism agrees that perceptions and hallucinations share their most specific mental kind, but accounts for hallucinations as misrepresentations of the external world. According to Disjunctivism, the phenomenal (...)
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  7. Patrick Stokes (2012). Philosophy Has Consequences! Encouraging Metacognition and Active Learning in the Ethics Classroom. Teaching Philosophy 35 (2):143-169.score: 24.0
    The importance of enchancing metacognition and encouraging active learning in philosophy teaching has been increasingly recognised in recent years. Yet traditional teaching methods have not always centralised helping students to become reflectively and critically aware of the quality and consistency of their own thinking. This is particularly relevant when teaching moral philosophy, where apparently inconsistent intuitions and responses are common. In this paper I discuss the theoretical basis of the relevance of metacognition and active learning for teaching moral (...)
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  8. Derrick L. Hassert Kevin B. Clark (2013). Undecidability and Opacity of Metacognition in Animals and Humans. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 24.0
    Undecidability and opacity of metacognition in animals and humans.
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  9. Joel Pearson Rosanne L. Rademaker (2012). Training Visual Imagery: Improvements of Metacognition, but Not Imagery Strength. Frontiers in Psychology 3.score: 24.0
    Visual imagery has been closely linked to brain mechanisms involved in perception. Can visual imagery, like visual perception, improve by means of training? Previous research has demonstrated that people can reliably evaluate the vividness of single episodes of sensory imagination – might the metacognition of imagery also improve over the course of training? We had participants imagine colored Gabor patterns for an hour a day, over the course of five consecutive days, and again two weeks after training. Participants rated (...)
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  10. Kristina Musholt (2012). Concepts or Metacognition - What is the Issue? Commentary on Stephane Savanah’s “The Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness”. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):721-722.score: 22.0
    The author claims that concept possession is not only necessary but also sufficient for self-consciousness, where self-consciousness is understood as the awareness of oneself as a self. Further, he links concept possession to intelligent behavior. His ultimate aim is to provide a framework for the study of self-consciousness in infants and non-human animals. I argue that the claim that all concepts are necessarily related to the self-concept remains unconvincing and suggest that what might be at issue here are not so (...)
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  11. Beate Sodian Markus Paulus, Joelle Proust (2013). Examining Implicit Metacognition in 3.5-Year-Old Children: An Eye-Tracking and Pupillometric Study. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 22.0
    The current study examined early signs of implicit metacognitive monitoring in 3.5-year-old children. During a learning phase children had to learn paired associates. In the test phase, children had to perform a recognition task and choose the correct associate for a given target among four possible answers. Subsequently, children’s explicit confidence judgments and their fixation time allocation at the confidence scale were assessed. Analyses showed that explicit confidence judgments did not differ for remembered compared to non-remembered items. In contrast, children’s (...)
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  12. Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). The Meanings of Metacognition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.score: 21.0
    Noetic feelings, like the feeling of certainty and the tip-of-the-tongue state, have an interesting place in our cognitive economy. Joelle Proust’s account of these feelings emphasizes the procedural guidance they supply, while arguing that this guidance does not depend on any conceptual ability to attribute mental states. I argue that she has made a strong case for their procedural value but hasn’t conclusively shown that they work in a way that is independent of our capacities for mental state attribution.
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  13. Peter Carruthers (2009). How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121.score: 21.0
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  14. Joëlle Proust (2012). Metacognition and Mindreading: One or Two Functions? In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The foundations of metacognition. Oxford University Press. 234.score: 21.0
    Given disagreements about the architecture of the mind, the nature of self-knowledge, and its epistemology, the question of how to understand the function and scope of metacognition – the control of one's cognition - is still a matter of hot debate. A dominant view, the self-ascriptive view (or one-function view), has been that metacognition necessarily requires representing one's own mental states as mental states, and, therefore, necessarily involves an ability to read one's own mind. The self-evaluative view (or (...)
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  15. James A. Marcum (2012). An Integrated Model of Clinical Reasoning: Dual‐Process Theory of Cognition and Metacognition. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):954-961.score: 21.0
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  16. Eleonora Papaleontiou-Louca (2008). Metacognition and Theory of Mind. Cambridge Scholars Pub..score: 21.0
  17. Peter Carruthers (2009). Banishing" I" and" We" From Accounts of Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):148.score: 18.0
    SHORT ABSTRACT: A number of accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of these accounts endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. The different types of theory are developed and evaluated, and multiple lines of evidence are reviewed, including evolutionary and comparative data, evidence of confabulation when self-attributing attitudes, phenomenological (...)
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  18. David Kirsh (2004). Metacognition, Distributed Cognition and Visual Design. Cognition, Education and Communication Technology:147--180.score: 18.0
    Metacognition is associated with planning, monitoring, evaluating and repairing performance Designers of elearning systems can improve the quality of their environments by explicitly structuring the visual and interactive display of learning contexts to facilitate metacognition. Typically page layout, navigational appearance, visual and interactivity design are not viewed as major factors in metacognition. This is because metacognition tends to be interpreted as a process in the head, rather than an interactive one. It is argued here, that cognition (...)
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  19. Diego Fernandez-Duque, J. A. Baird & Michael I. Posner (2000). Awareness and Metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):324-326.score: 18.0
    Kentridge and Heywood (this issue) extend the concept of metacognition to include unconscious processes. We acknowledge the possible contribution of unconscious processes, but favor a central role of awareness in metacognition. We welcome Shimamura's (this issue) extension of the concept of metacognitive regulation to include aspects of working memory, and its relation to executive attention.
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  20. Peter Carruthers (2009). Mindreading Underlies Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):164-182.score: 18.0
    This response defends the view that human metacognition results from us turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves, and that our access to our own propositional attitudes is through interpretation rather than introspection. Relevant evidence is considered, including that deriving from studies of childhood development and other animal species. Also discussed are data suggesting dissociations between metacognitive and mindreading capacities, especially in autism and schizophrenia.
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  21. Joëlle Proust (2008). Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268.score: 18.0
    Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brain in the lab' thought experiment suggests (...)
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  22. A. P. Shimamura (2000). Toward a Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):313-323.score: 18.0
    The relationship between metacognition and executive control is explored. According to an analysis by Fernandez-Duque, Baird, and Posner (this issue), metacognitive regulation involves attention, conflict resolution, error correction, inhibitory control, and emotional regulation. These aspects of metacognition are presumed to be mediated by a neural circuit involving midfrontal brain regions. An evaluation of the proposal by Fernandez-Duque et al. is made, and it is suggested that there is considerable convergence of issues associated with metacognition, executive control, working (...)
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  23. Justin J. Couchman, Mariana V. C. Coutinho, Michael J. Beran & J. David Smith (2009). Metacognition is Prior. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):142-142.score: 18.0
    We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-prior account. We discuss this existing evidence and explain why an evolutionary perspective favors the former account and poses serious problems for the latter account.
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  24. Bryce Huebner & Daniel C. Dennett (2009). Banishing “I” and “We” From Accounts of Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):148-149.score: 18.0
    Carruthers offers a promising model for how know the propositional contents of own minds. Unfortunately, in retaining talk of first-person access to mental states, his suggestions assume that a higher-order self is already We invite Carruthers to eliminate the first-person from his model and to develop a more thoroughly third-person model of metacognition.
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  25. Bernard W. Kobes (1997). Metacognition and Consciousness: Review Essay of Janet Metcalfe and Arthur P. Shimamura (Eds), Metacognition: Knowing About Knowing. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):93-102.score: 18.0
    The field of metacognition, richly sampled in the book under review, is recognized as an important and growing branch of psychology. However, the field stands in need of a general theory that (1) provides a unified framework for understanding the variety of metacognitive processes, (2) articulates the relation between metacognition and consciousness, and (3) tells us something about the form of meta-level representations and their relations to object-level representations. It is argued that the higher-order thought theory of consciousness (...)
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  26. Michael L. Anderson & Don Perlis (2009). What Puts the “Meta” in Metacognition? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):138-139.score: 18.0
    This commentary suggests an alternate definition for metacognition, as well as an alternate basis for the relation in representation. These together open the way for an understanding of mindreading that is significantly different from the one advocated by Carruthers.
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  27. David M. Williams, Sophie E. Lind & Francesca Happé (2009). Metacognition May Be More Impaired Than Mindreading in Autism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):162-163.score: 18.0
    This commentary focuses on evidence from autism concerning the relation between metacognition and mindreading. We support Carruthers' rejection of models 1 (independent systems) and 3 (metacognition before mindreading), and provide evidence to strengthen his critique. However, we also present evidence from autism that we believe supports model 2 (one mechanism, two modes of access) over model 4 (mindreading is prior).
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  28. David M. Rosenthal (2000). Metacognition and Higher-Order Thoughts. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):231-242.score: 18.0
    Because there is a fair amount of overlap in the points by Balog and Rey, I will organize this response topically, referring specifically to each commentator as rele- vant. And, because much of the discussion focuses on my higher-order-thought (HOT) hypothesis independent of questions about metacognition, I will begin by addressing a cluster of issues that have to do with the status, motivation, and exact formulation of that hypothesis.
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  29. Joëlle Proust (2003). Does Metacognition Necessarily Involve Metarepresentation? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):352-352.score: 18.0
    Against the view that metacognition is a capacity that parallels theory of mind, it is argued that metacognition need involve neither metarepresentation nor semantic forms of reflexivity, but only process-reflexivity, through which a task-specific system monitors its own internal feedback by using quantitative cues. Metacognitive activities, however, may be redescribed in metarepresentational, mentalistic terms in species endowed with a theory of mind.
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  30. Ori Friedman & Adam R. Petrashek (2009). Non-Interpretative Metacognition for True Beliefs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):146-147.score: 18.0
    Mindreading often requires access to beliefs, so the mindreading system should be able to self-attribute beliefs, even without self-interpretation. This proposal is consistent with Carruthers' claim that mindreading and metacognition depend on the same cognitive system and the same information as one another; and it may be more consistent with this claim than is Carruthers' account of metacognition.
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  31. Ben Wiffen & Anthony David (2009). Metacognition, Mindreading, and Insight in Schizophrenia. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):161-162.score: 18.0
    Mindreading in schizophrenia has been shown to be impaired in a multitude of studies. Furthermore, there is increasing evidence to suggest that metacognition is damaged as well. Lack of insight, or the inability to recognise one's own disorder, is an example of such a failure. We suggest that mindreading and metacognition are linked, but separable.
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  32. Mikolaj Hernik, Pasco Fearon & Peter Fonagy (2009). There Must Be More to Development of Mindreading and Metacognition Than Passing False Belief Tasks. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):147-148.score: 18.0
    We argue that while it is a valuable contribution, Carruthers' model may be too restrictive to elaborate our understanding of the development of mindreading and metacognition, or to enrich our knowledge of individual differences and psychopathology. To illustrate, we describe pertinent examples where there may be a critical interplay between primitive social-cognitive processes and emerging self-attributions.
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  33. Roger Fontaine, Isabelle Nanty, Olivier Sorel & Valérie Pennequin (2011). Metacognition and Low Achievement in Mathematics: The Effect of Training in the Use of Metacognitive Skills to Solve Mathematical Word Problems. Thinking and Reasoning 16 (3):198-220.score: 18.0
    The central question underlying this study was whether metacognition training could enhance the two metacognition components—knowledge and skills—and the mathematical problem-solving capacities of normal children in grade 3. We also investigated whether metacognitive training had a differential effect according to the children's mathematics level. A total of 48 participants took part in this study, divided into an experimental and a control group, each subdivided into a lower and a normal achievers group. The training programme took an interactive approach (...)
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  34. Lisa K. Son, Bennett L. Schwartz & Nate Kornell (2003). Implicit Metacognition, Explicit Uncertainty, and the Monitoring/Control Distinction in Animal Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):355-356.score: 18.0
    Smith et al. demonstrate the viability of animal metacognition research. We commend their effort and suggest three avenues of research. The first concerns whether animals are explicitly aware of their metacognitive processes. The second asks whether animals have metaknowledge of their own uncertain responses. The third issue concerns the monitoring/control distinction. We suggest some ways in which these issues elucidate metacognitive processes in nonhuman animals.
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  35. Nate Kornell, Bennett L. Schwartz & Lisa K. Son (2009). What Monkeys Can Tell Us About Metacognition and Mindreading. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):150-151.score: 18.0
    Thinkers in related fields such as philosophy, psychology, and education define metacognition in a variety of different ways. Based on an emerging standard definition in psychology, we present evidence for metacognition in animals, and argue that mindreading and metacognition are largely orthogonal.
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  36. Josep Call (2003). On Linking Comparative Metacognition and Theory of Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):341-342.score: 18.0
    Smith et al.'s article provides a convincing argument for devoting increased research attention to comparative metacognition. However, this increased attention should be complemented with establishing links with comparative theory of mind (ToM) research, which are currently missing. I present a task in which pairs of subjects are presented with incomplete information in an object-choice situation that could be used to establish that link.
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  37. Robert Russell Hampton (2003). Metacognition as Evidence for Explicit Representation in Nonhumans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):346-347.score: 18.0
    Metacognition is either direct, as when information is recalled before making a confidence judgment, or indirect, as when the probability of successful future retrieval is determined inferentially. Direct metacognition may require an explicit mental representation as its object and can only be demonstrated under specific experimental circumstances. Other forms of metacognition can be based on publicly observable stimuli rather than introspection.
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  38. Janet Metcalfe (2003). Drawing the Line on Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):350-351.score: 18.0
    Only two of the many experiments described by Smith et al., as indicating metacognitive ability in nonhuman animals, involved metacognition as understood in the human literature. Of these, one gave negative results. In the other, one of two rhesus monkeys provided data suggesting that he might have metacognitive ability. The conjecture that any nonhuman animals have metacognitive ability is, therefore, tenuous.
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  39. Kourken Michaelian (2012). Metacognition and Endorsement. Mind and Language 27 (3):284-307.score: 18.0
    Real agents rely, when forming their beliefs, on imperfect informational sources (sources which deliver, even under normal conditions of operation, both accurate and inaccurate information). They therefore face the ‘endorsement problem’: how can beliefs produced by endorsing information received from imperfect sources be formed in an epistemically acceptable manner? Focussing on the case of episodic memory and drawing on empirical work on metamemory, this article argues that metacognition likely plays a crucial role in explaining how agents solve the endorsement (...)
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  40. Philip Robbins (2009). Guilt by Dissociation: Why Mindreading May Not Be Prior to Metacognition After All. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):159-160.score: 18.0
    Carruthers argues that there is no developmental or clinical evidence that metacognition is dissociable from mindreading, and hence there is no reason to think that metacognition is prior to mindreading. A closer look at the evidence, however, reveals that these conclusions are premature at best.
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  41. Philippe Rochat (2009). Social-Affective Origins of Mindreading and Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):160-161.score: 18.0
    The engineer's look at how the mind works omits a central piece of the puzzle. It ignores the dynamic of motivations and the social context in which mindreading and metacognition evolved and developed in the first place. Mindreading and metacognition derive from a primacy of affective mindreading and meta-affectivity (e.g., secondary emotions such as shame or pride), both co-emerging in early development.
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  42. Joëlle Proust (2013). The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness. Oup Oxford.score: 18.0
    Does metacognition--the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance--derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations, and is essentially related to mental agency.
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  43. Edmund Fantino (2003). Pigeon Parallels to Human Metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):343-344.score: 18.0
    The target authors make a strong case for parallels between human and nonhuman metacognition. The case may be bolstered by an appeal to the literatures on commitment and self-control and to that on observing behavior.
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  44. Juha Silvanto Silvia Bona, Zaira Cattaneo, Tomaso Vecchi, David Soto (2013). Metacognition of Visual Short-Term Memory: Dissociation Between Objective and Subjective Components of VSTM. Frontiers in Psychology 4.score: 18.0
    The relationship between the objective accuracy of visual-short term memory (VSTM) representations and their subjective conscious experience is unknown. We investigated this issue by assessing how the objective and subjective components of VSTM in a delayed cue-target orientation discrimination task are affected by intervening distracters. On each trial, participants were shown a memory cue (a grating), the orientation of which they were asked to hold in memory. On approximately half of the trials, a distractor grating appeared during the maintenance interval; (...)
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  45. Michael J. Beran, Johannes L. Brandl, Josef Perner & Joélle Proust (2012). On the Nature, Evolution, Development, and Epistemology of Metacognition: Introductory Thoughts. In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
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  46. Jonathon D. Crystal (2012). Validating Animal Models of Metacognition. In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press. 36.score: 18.0
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  47. Zoltán Dienes, Michael Beran, Johannes L. Brandl, Josef Perner & Joelle Proust (2012). Is Hypnotic Responding the Strategic Relinquishment of Metacognition? In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
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  48. Jerome Dokic (2012). Seeds of Self-Knowledge: Noetic Feelings and Metacognition. In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press. 302--321.score: 18.0
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  49. Frank Esken (2012). Early Forms of Metacognition in Human Children. In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press. 134.score: 18.0
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  50. Janet Metcalfe & Lisa K. Son (2012). Anoetic, Noetic, and Autonoetic Metacognition. In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press.score: 18.0
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