Search results for 'Metaethics, Dissertation' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
    Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...)
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  2. Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman (2005). Doxastic Deliberation. Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
    Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...)
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  3. Allan Gibbard (2005). Truth and Correct Belief. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.
  4. Peter Railton (1994). Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief. Philosophical Issues 5:71-93.
  5.  86
    Neil Levy (2005). Imaginative Resistance and the Moral/Conventional Distinction. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):231 – 241.
    Children, even very young children, distinguish moral from conventional transgressions, inasmuch as they hold that the former, but not the latter, would still be wrong if there was no rule prohibiting them. Many people have taken this finding as evidence that morality is objective, and therefore universal. I argue that reflection on the phenomenon of imaginative resistance will lead us to question these claims. If a concept applies in virtue of the obtaining of a set of more basic facts, then (...)
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  6. Julia Driver (2008). Imaginative Resistance and Psychological Necessity. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):301-313.
    Some of our moral commitments strike us as necessary, and this feature of moral phenomenology is sometimes viewed as incompatible with sentimentalism, since sentimentalism holds that our commitments depend, in some way, on sentiment. His dependence, or contingency, is what seems incompatible with necessity. In response to this sentimentalists hold that the commitments are psychologically necessary. However, little has been done to explore this kind of necessity. In this essay I discuss psychological necessity, and how the phenomenon of imaginative resistance (...)
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  7.  54
    Terence E. Horgan (2002). Themes in My Philosophical Work. In Johannes L. Brandl (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi 1-26.
    I invoked the notion of supervenience in my doctoral disseration, Microreduction and the Mind-Body Problem, completed at the University of Michigan in 1974 under the direction of Jaegwon Kim. I had been struck by the appeal to supervenience in Hare (1952), a classic work in twentieth century metaethics that I studied at Michigan in a course on metaethics taught by William Frankena; and I also had been struck by the brief appeal to supervenience in Davidson (1970). Kim was already, in (...)
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  8. Michael Steven Green (1990). Elements of Noncognitivism in Nietzsche's Metaethics and Epistemology. Dissertation, Yale University
    The dissertation is an account of Nietzsche's denial of cognitive objectivity, that is, his denial that there can be such a thing as a true judgment. I claim that plausible arguments for denying cognitive objectivity can be found in Nietzsche, but only after some strong analogies between this denial and traditional arguments against evaluative objectivity are made apparent. Judgments of value are not considered objective because they are motivational, that is, because making an evaluative judgment is necessarily connected with (...)
     
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  9. Helen Yetter-Chappell & Richard Yetter Chappell (2013). Mind-Body Meets Metaethics: A Moral Concept Strategy. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):865-878.
    The aim of this paper is to assess the relationship between anti-physicalist arguments in the philosophy of mind and anti-naturalist arguments in metaethics, and to show how the literature on the mind-body problem can inform metaethics. Among the questions we will consider are: (1) whether a moral parallel of the knowledge argument can be constructed to create trouble for naturalists, (2) the relationship between such a "Moral Knowledge Argument" and the familiar Open Question Argument, and (3) how naturalists can respond (...)
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  10.  57
    Joshua Schechter (forthcoming). Explanatory Challenges in Metaethics. In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge
    There are several important arguments in metaethics that rely on explanatory considerations. Gilbert Harman has presented a challenge to the existence of moral facts that depends on the claim that the best explanation of our moral beliefs does not involve moral facts. The Reliability Challenge against moral realism depends on the claim that moral realism is incompatible with there being a satisfying explanation of our reliability about moral truths. The purpose of this chapter is to examine these and related arguments. (...)
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  11. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain & Nishi Shah (2006). Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1. Clarendon Press 265-94.
    Contemporary Kantianism is often regarded as both a position within normative ethics and as an alternative to metaethical moral realism. We argue that it is not clear how contemporary Kantianism can distinguish itself from moral realism. There are many Kantian positions. For reasons of space we focus on the position of one of the most prominent, contemporary Kantians, Christine Korsgaard. Our claim is that she fails to show either that Kantianism is different or that it is better than realism. Our (...)
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  12. John M. Mikhail (2000). Rawls' Linguistic Analogy. Dissertation, Cornell University
    The aim of the dissertation is to formulate a research program in moral cognition modeled on aspects of Universal Grammar and organized around three classic problems in moral epistemology: What constitutes moral knowledge? How is moral knowledge acquired? How is moral knowledge put to use? Drawing on the work of Rawls and Chomsky, a framework for investigating -- is proposed. The framework is defended against a range of philosophical objections and contrasted with the approach of developmentalists like Piaget and (...)
     
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  13. Carla Bagnoli, Constructivism in Metaethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Constructivism in ethics is the view that insofar as there are normative truths, for example, truths about what we ought to do, they are in some sense determined by an idealized process of rational deliberation, choice, or agreement. As a “first-order moral account”--an account of which moral principles are correct-- constructivism is the view that the moral principles we ought to accept or follow are the ones that agents would agree to or endorse were they to engage in a hypothetical (...)
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  14. Karen Jones (2006). Metaethics and Emotions Research: A Response to Prinz. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53.
    Prinz claims that empirical work on emotions and moral judgement can help us resolve longstanding metaethical disputes in favour of simple sentimentalism. I argue that the empirical evidence he marshals does not have the metaethical implications he claims: the studies purporting to show that having an emotion is sufficient for making a moral judgement are tendentiously described. We are entitled to ascribe competence with moral concepts to experimental subjects only if we suppose that they would withdraw their moral judgement on (...)
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  15.  30
    Alexander Miller (2013). Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction. Polity.
    1. Introduction. In this chapter, I provide a brief account of the territory covered in metaethics, and of the main philosophical positions in metaethics to be covered in detail in the course of the book.
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  16. John Danaher (2014). Necessary Moral Truths and Theistic Metaethics. Sophia 53 (3):309-330.
    Theistic metaethics usually places one key restriction on the explanation of moral facts, namely: every moral fact must ultimately be explained by some fact about God. But the widely held belief that moral truths are necessary truths seems to undermine this claim. If a moral truth is necessary, then it seems like it neither needs nor has an explanation. Or so the objection typically goes. Recently, two proponents of theistic metaethics — William Lane Craig and Mark Murphy — have argued (...)
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  17. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain & Nishi Shah (forthcoming). Metaethics and Its Discontents: A Case Study of Korsgaard. In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Moral Constructivism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press
    The maturing of metaethics has been accompanied by widespread, but relatively unarticulated, discontent that mainstream metaethics is fundamentally on the wrong track. The malcontents we have in mind do not simply champion a competitor to the likes of noncognitivism or realism; they disapprove of the supposed presuppositions of the existing debate. Their aim is not to generate a new theory within metaethics, but to go beyond metaethics and to transcend the distinctions it draws between metaethics and normative ethics and between (...)
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  18.  84
    Ben Fraser (2013). Moral Error Theories and Folk Metaethics. Philosophical Psychology 6 (6):1-18.
    In this paper, I distinguish between two error theories of morality: one couched in terms of truth ; the other in terms of justification. I then present two arguments: the Poisoned Presupposition Argument for ET1; and the Evolutionary Debunking Argument for ET2. I go on to show how assessing these arguments requires paying attention to empirical moral psychology, in particular, work on folk metaethics. After criticizing extant work, I suggest avenues for future research.
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  19.  22
    Jussi Suikkanen (2016). Naturalism in Metaethics. In Kelly James Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Wiley-Blackwell 351-368.
    This chapter offers an introduction to naturalist views in contemporary metaethics. Such views attempt to find a place for normative properties (such as goodness and rightness) in the concrete physical world as it is understood by both science and common sense. The chapter begins by introducing simple naturalist conceptual analyses of normative terms. It then explains how these analyses were rejected in the beginning of the 20th Century due to G.E. Moore’s influential Open Question Argument. After this, the chapter considers (...)
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  20.  51
    Ragnar Francén (2007). Metaethical Relativism: Against the Single Analysis Assumption. Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    This dissertation investigates the plausibility of metaethical relativism, or more specifically, what I call “moral truth-value relativism”: the idea that the truth of a moral statement or belief depends on who utters or has it, or who assesses it. According to the most prevalent variants of this view in philosophical literature – “standard relativism” – the truth-values are relative to people’s moralities, often understood as some subset of their affective or desirelike attitudes. Standard relativism has two main contenders: absolutism (...)
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  21. Andrew Reisner (2010). Metaethics for Everyone. Problema 4:39-64.
    As Dworkin puts it: moral scepticism is a moral view. This is in contrast to the more popular idea that the real challenge for moral realism is external scepticism, scepticism which arises because of non-moral considerations about the metaphysics of morality. I, too, do not concur with Dworkin’s strongest conclusions about the viability of external scepticism. But, I think his criticism of error scepticism offers a much needed corrective to more traditional metaethical projects. My aim in this paper is to (...)
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  22. Mark Schroeder (2012). Philosophy of Language for Metaethics. In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge
    Metaethics is the study of metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language, insofar as they relate to the subject matter of moral or, more broadly, normative discourse – the subject matter of what is good, bad, right or wrong, just, reasonable, rational, what we must or ought to do, or otherwise. But out of these four ‘core’ areas of philosophy, it is plausibly the philosophy of language that is most central to metaethics – and not simply (...)
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  23.  46
    Nathaniel Jezzi, Constructivism in Metaethics. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Recent defenders of metaethical constructivism (like Christine Korsgaard, Sharon Street, Aaron James, and Carla Bagnoli) argue that this view can be shown to represent a new, free-standing alternative to familiar approaches in metaethics. If they are correct, traditional discussions in metaethics have overlooked an important position, one that is supposed to adequately explain the nature of our ethical thinking and practice while avoiding the kinds of objections that traditional views struggle with. However, what form constructivism should take and whether constructivists (...)
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  24.  16
    Christine Tiefensee (2016). Inferentialist Metaethics, Bifurcations and Ontological Commitment. Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2437-2459.
    According to recent suggestions within the global pragmatism discussion, metaethical debate must be fundamentally re-framed. Instead of carving out metaethical differences in representational terms, it has been argued that metaethics should be given an inferentialist footing. In this paper, I put inferentialist metaethics to the test by subjecting it to the following two criteria for success: Inferentialist metaethicists must be able to save the metaethical differences between moral realism and expressivism, and do so in a way that employs understandings of (...)
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  25.  11
    Andrew Fisher & Simon Kirchin (eds.) (2006). Arguing About Metaethics. Routledge.
    _Arguing about Metaethics_ collects together some of the most exciting contemporary work in metaethics in one handy volume. In it, many of the most influential philosophers in the field discuss key questions in metaethics: Do moral properties exist? If they do, how do they fit into the world as science conceives it? If they don’t exist, then how should we understand moral thought and language? What is the relation between moral judgement and motivation? As well as these questions, this volume (...)
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  26.  4
    Jeremiah Joven Joaquin (2013). An Introduction to Metaethics. In Exploring the Philosophical Terrain. C&E
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  27.  16
    Peter D. Zuk (2015). A Third Version of Constructivism: Rethinking Spinoza’s Metaethics. Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2565-2574.
    In this essay, I claim that certain passages in Book IV of Benedict de Spinoza’s Ethics suggest a novel version of what is known as metaethical constructivism. The constructivist interpretation emerges in the course of attempting to resolve a tension between Spinoza’s apparent ethical egoism and some remarks he makes about the efficacy of collaborating with the right partners when attempting to promote our individual self-interest . Though Spinoza maintains that individuals necessarily aim to promote their self-interest, I argue that (...)
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  28.  41
    Michael Rubin, Synthetic Ethical Naturalism.
    This dissertation is a critique of synthetic ethical naturalism (SEN). SEN is a view in metaethics that comprises three key theses: first, there are moral properties and facts that are independent of the beliefs and attitudes of moral appraisers (moral realism); second, moral properties and facts are identical to (or constituted only by) natural properties and facts (ethical naturalism); and third, sentences used to assert identity or constitution relations between moral and natural properties are expressions of synthetic, a posteriori (...)
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  29.  30
    Jeff Wisdom (2012). Why a Diachronic View of Base Property Exemplification is Necessary in Metaethics. Metaphysica 13 (1):43-50.
    In a recent issue of this journal, Jorn Sonderholm presents two main criticisms of my 2008 case for a diachronic view of base property exemplification in metaethics. This essay contends that neither of Sonderholm’s criticisms hit their mark, and that there are additional reasons to adopt a diachronic view of base property exemplification. Thus, the case for a diachronic view of base property exemplification in metaethics is stronger than previously thought.
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  30.  42
    Frederick Rauscher (1997). How a Kantian Can Accept Evolutionary Metaethics. Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):303-326.
    Contrary to widely held assumptions, an evolutionary metaethics need not be non-cognitivist. I define evolutionary metaethics as the claim that certain phenotypic traits expressing certain genes are both necessary and sufficient for explanation of all other phenotypic traits we consider morally significant. A review of the influential cognitivist Immanuel Kants metaethics shows that much of his ethical theory is independent of the anti-naturalist metaphysics of transcendental idealism which itself is incompatible with evolutionary metaethics. By matching those independent aspects to an (...)
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  31.  4
    Daniel R. Kelly, Projectivism Psychologized: The Philosophy and Psychology of Disgust.
    This dissertation explores issues in the philosophy of psychology and metaphysics through the lens of the emotion of disgust, and its corresponding property, disgustingness. The first chapter organizes an extremely large body of data about disgust, imposes two constraints any theory must meet, and offers a cognitive model of the mechanisms underlying the emotion. The second chapter explores the evolution of disgust, and argues for the Entanglement thesis: this uniquely human emotion was formed when two formerly distinct mechanisms, one (...)
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  32. Joseph Cruz, Robert Gordon Research Professor.
    Robert Gordon (Ph.D., Columbia) works primarily in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. For his Master's degree he specialized in Medieval and Renaissance philosophy, with a thesis on Nicholas of Cusa. His doctoral dissertation was in ethics and metaethics, on universalizability and analogy in moral arguments.
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  33. Daniel R. Boisvert (2003). Expressive-Assertivism: A Dual-Use Solution to the Moral Problem. Dissertation, University of Florida
    This dissertation argues for a metaethical theory I call "Expressive-Assertivism." Expressive-Assertivism is a distinctive, substantial refinement of dual-use metaethical theories traditionally associated with R. M. Hare, C. L. Stevenson, and, more recently, with David Copp. If true, Expressive-Assertivism clarifies, resolves, or dissolves---without, in turn, raising additional difficulties---a number of philosophical problems, including what Michael Smith calls "The Moral Problem," which many consider to be the central organizing problem in contemporary metaethics. The following are the three most important features of (...)
     
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  34.  30
    Andrew Fisher (2011). Metaethics: An Introduction. Acumen.
    Do moral facts exist? What would they be like if they did? What does it mean to say that a moral claim is true? What is the link between moral judgement and motivation? Can we know whether something is right and wrong? And is morality a fiction? " Metaethics : An Introduction" presents a very clear and engaging survey of the key concepts and positions in what has become one of the most exciting and influential fields of philosophy. Free from (...)
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  35.  2
    Aaron Harper (2012). Nietzsche on Value Creation. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
    My dissertation examines the significance of value creation in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. In working out Nietzsche’s view, my strategy is twofold. I begin by reconstructing Nietzsche’s metaethical commitments, offering an interpretation of Nietzsche’s conception of values that shows it to be consistent, and then I explore the nature and importance of value creation to Nietzsche’s project. I argue that value creation provides the core of Nietzsche’s response to his two most significant concerns: the failures of traditional morality (...)
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  36. Errol Lord (2013). The Importance of Being Rational. Dissertation, Princeton University
    My dissertation is a systematic defense of the claim that what it is to be rational is to correctly respond to the reasons you possess. The dissertation is split into two parts, each consisting of three chapters. In Part I--Coherence, Possession, and Correctly Responding--I argue that my view has important advantages over popular views in metaethics that tie rationality to coherence (ch. 2), defend a novel view of what it is to possess a reason (ch. 3), and defend (...)
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  37. Timothy Dean Roche (1984). Aristotle on the Good for Man. Dissertation, University of California, Davis
    It is commonly believed that Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics argues for a "dominant end" intellectualist theory of the human good. This theory specifies contemplative activity as the sole element in the best life for man, and it implies that all other goods, including moral and political activities, have value only as means to contemplative activity. It is conceded that Aristotle sometimes appears to regard the highest good as an "inclusive end," an end composed of several independently valued things, but this is (...)
     
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  38. Elise Springer (2000). Critical Virtue: Evaluative Moves and the Emergence of Moral Agency. Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    Moral theories often take the guidance of individual conduct as their central task, and seek to provide grounds for confidence in deliberation. Yet they are inevitably also drawn into justifying our reactions to and interventions in one another's actions. This dissertation takes critical encounters to mark a central aspect of moral life. Yet standard deontological and consequentialist theories fall short of providing conceptual tools adequate for reflection on this aspect, and virtue theory is surprisingly undeveloped here. I develop a (...)
     
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  39.  98
    Jonas Olson (forthcoming). Brentano's Metaethics. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge
  40. Mark Eli Kalderon (2013). Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake? [REVIEW] Analysis 73 (1):129-138.
    Review of part one of Ronald Dworkin's Justice for Hedgehogs.
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  41. Jamin Asay (2013). Truthmaking, Metaethics, and Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):213-232.
    Creeping minimalism threatens to cloud the distinction between realist and anti-realist metaethical views. When anti-realist views equip themselves with minimalist theories of truth and other semantic notions, they are able to take on more and more of the doctrines of realism (such as the existence of moral truths, facts, and beliefs). But then they start to look suspiciously like realist views. I suggest that creeping minimalism is a problem only if moral realism is understood primarily as a semantic doctrine. I (...)
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  42. Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (2012). Metaethics and Nihilism in Reginster's The Affirmation of Life. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 43 (1):99-117.
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  43. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2006). Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume's Metaethics. Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that (...)
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  44.  54
    Andrew Light (2002). Contemporary Environmental Ethics From Metaethics to Public Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 33 (4):426-449.
    In the past thirty years environmental ethics has emerged as one of the most vibrant and exciting areas of applied philosophy. Several journals and hundreds of books testify to its growing importance inside and outside philosophical circles. But with all of this scholarly output, it is arguably the case that environmental ethics is not living up to its promise of providing a philosophical contribution to the resolution of environmental problems. This article surveys the current state of the field and offers (...)
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  45.  65
    Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (2008). Archimedean Metaethics Defended. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):508-529.
    Abstract: We sometimes say our moral claims are "objectively true," or are "right, even if nobody believes it." These additional claims are often taken to be staking out metaethical positions, representative of a certain kind of theorizing about morality that "steps outside" the practice in order to comment on its status. Ronald Dworkin has argued that skepticism about these claims so understood is not tenable because it is impossible to step outside such practices. I show that externally skeptical metaethical theory (...)
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  46.  16
    Dan Baras (2015). Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 7, Edited by R. Shafer-Landau. Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):359-362.
    This review article focuses on David Copp's article 'Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory'. Copp argues that recent developments in moral psychology challenge the common method in ethics, which infers moral truths from moral intuitions, as these intuitions are shown to likely be unreliable. Copp responds to the worry by arguing that even if moral intuitions cannot be trusted to indicate objective moral truths, the common method remains valuable for other reasons. In this article I raise several (...)
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  47.  47
    Andrew Alwood (2014). Book Review: Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 6, Edited by Russ Shafer-Landau. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (3):357-360.
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  48.  40
    James Dreier (2002). Troubling Developments in Metaethics. [REVIEW] Noûs 36 (1):152 - 168.
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  49.  15
    Thomas Williams (2003). From Metaethics to Action Theory. In The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus. Cambridge University Press 332-351.
    Work on Scotus's moral psychology and action theory has been concerned almost exclusively with questions about the relationship between will and intellect and in particular about the freedom of the will itself. In this essay I broaden the scope of inquiry. For I contend that Scotus's views in moral psychology are best understood against the background of a long tradition of metaethical reflection on the relationship between being and goodness. In the first section of this essay, therefore, I sketch the (...)
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  50. Richard Double (2002). Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, and Free Will Subjectivism. In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press
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