Search results for 'Metaethics, Dissertation' (try it on Scholar)

11 found
Sort by:
  1. Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.score: 30.0
    Why, when asking oneself whether to believe that p, must one immediately recognize that this question is settled by, and only by, answering the question whether p is true? Truth is not an optional end for first-personal doxastic deliberation, providing an instrumental or extrinsic reason that an agent may take or leave at will. Otherwise there would be an inferential step between discovering the truth with respect to p and determining whether to believe that p, involving a bridge premise that (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman (2005). Doxastic Deliberation. Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.score: 30.0
    Believing that p, assuming that p, and imagining that p involve regarding p as true—or, as we shall call it, accepting p. What distinguishes belief from the other modes of acceptance? We claim that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being correct if and only if it is true. We argue (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Allan Gibbard (2005). Truth and Correct Belief. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.score: 24.0
  4. Julia Driver (2008). Imaginative Resistance and Psychological Necessity. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):301-313.score: 24.0
    Some of our moral commitments strike us as necessary, and this feature of moral phenomenology is sometimes viewed as incompatible with sentimentalism, since sentimentalism holds that our commitments depend, in some way, on sentiment. His dependence, or contingency, is what seems incompatible with necessity. In response to this sentimentalists hold that the commitments are psychologically necessary. However, little has been done to explore this kind of necessity. In this essay I discuss psychological necessity, and how the phenomenon of imaginative resistance (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Peter Railton (1994). Truth, Reason, and the Regulation of Belief. Philosophical Issues 5:71-93.score: 24.0
  6. Neil Levy (2005). Imaginative Resistance and the Moral/Conventional Distinction. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):231 – 241.score: 24.0
    Children, even very young children, distinguish moral from conventional transgressions, inasmuch as they hold that the former, but not the latter, would still be wrong if there was no rule prohibiting them. Many people have taken this finding as evidence that morality is objective, and therefore universal. I argue that reflection on the phenomenon of imaginative resistance will lead us to question these claims. If a concept applies in virtue of the obtaining of a set of more basic facts, then (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Terence E. Horgan (2002). Themes in My Philosophical Work. In Johannes L. Brandl (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Atlanta: Rodopi. 1-26.score: 18.0
    I invoked the notion of supervenience in my doctoral disseration, Microreduction and the Mind-Body Problem, completed at the University of Michigan in 1974 under the direction of Jaegwon Kim. I had been struck by the appeal to supervenience in Hare (1952), a classic work in twentieth century metaethics that I studied at Michigan in a course on metaethics taught by William Frankena; and I also had been struck by the brief appeal to supervenience in Davidson (1970). Kim was already, in (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ragnar Francén (2007). Metaethical Relativism: Against the Single Analysis Assumption. Dissertation, University of Gothenburgscore: 15.0
    This dissertation investigates the plausibility of metaethical relativism, or more specifically, what I call “moral truth-value relativism”: the idea that the truth of a moral statement or belief depends on who utters or has it, or who assesses it. According to the most prevalent variants of this view in philosophical literature – “standard relativism” – the truth-values are relative to people’s moralities, often understood as some subset of their affective or desirelike attitudes. Standard relativism has two main contenders: absolutism (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Errol Lord (2013). The Importance of Being Rational. Dissertation, Princeton Universityscore: 12.0
    My dissertation is a systematic defense of the claim that what it is to be rational is to correctly respond to the reasons you possess. The dissertation is split into two parts, each consisting of three chapters. In Part I--Coherence, Possession, and Correctly Responding--I argue that my view has important advantages over popular views in metaethics that tie rationality to coherence (ch. 2), defend a novel view of what it is to possess a reason (ch. 3), and defend (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Michael Rubin, Synthetic Ethical Naturalism.score: 12.0
    This dissertation is a critique of synthetic ethical naturalism (SEN). SEN is a view in metaethics that comprises three key theses: first, there are moral properties and facts that are independent of the beliefs and attitudes of moral appraisers (moral realism); second, moral properties and facts are identical to (or constituted only by) natural properties and facts (ethical naturalism); and third, sentences used to assert identity or constitution relations between moral and natural properties are expressions of synthetic, a posteriori (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Joseph Cruz, Robert Gordon Research Professor.score: 12.0
    Robert Gordon (Ph.D., Columbia) works primarily in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. For his Master's degree he specialized in Medieval and Renaissance philosophy, with a thesis on Nicholas of Cusa. His doctoral dissertation was in ethics and metaethics, on universalizability and analogy in moral arguments.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation