Search results for 'Metaphysical assumptions of science' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Nicholas Maxwell, The Problem of Induction and Metaphysical Assumptions Concerning the Comprehensibility and Knowability of the Universe. PhilSci Archive.score: 237.0
    Even though evidence underdetermines theory, often in science one theory only is regarded as acceptable in the light of the evidence. This suggests there are additional unacknowledged assumptions which constrain what theories are to be accepted. In the case of physics, these additional assumptions are metaphysical theses concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe. Rigour demands that these implicit assumptions be made explicit within science, so that they can be critically assessed and, we (...)
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  2. Nicholas Maxwell (1997). Must Science Make Cosmological Assumptions If It is to Be Rational?,. In T. Kelly (ed.), The Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the Irish Philosophical Society Spring Conference. Irish Philosophical Society.score: 180.0
    Cosmological speculation about the ultimate nature of the universe, being necessary for science to be possible at all, must be regarded as a part of scientific knowledge itself, however epistemologically unsound it may be in other respects. The best such speculation available is that the universe is comprehensible in some way or other and, more specifically, in the light of the immense apparent success of modern natural science, that it is physically comprehensible. But both these speculations may be (...)
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  3. Kenneth R. Westphal (1998). ‘On Hegel’s Early Critique of Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science’. In S. Houlgate (ed.), Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature. SUNY.score: 148.5
    In 1801 Hegel charged that, on Kant’s analysis, forces are ‘either purely ideal, in which case they are not forces, or else they are transcendent’. I argue that this objection, which Hegel did not spell out, reveals an important and fundamental line of internal criticism of Kant’s Critical philosophy. I show that Kant’s basic forces of attraction and repulsion, which constitute matter, are merely ideal because Kant’s arguments for them are circular and beg the question, and they have no determinate (...)
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  4. Nicholas Maxwell (2002). The Need for a Revolution in the Philosophy of Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33 (2):381-408.score: 137.5
    There is a need to bring about a revolution in the philosophy of science, interpreted to be both the academic discipline, and the official view of the aims and methods of science upheld by the scientific community. At present both are dominated by the view that in science theories are chosen on the basis of empirical considerations alone, nothing being permanently accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Biasing choice of theory in the direction (...)
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  5. Nicholas Maxwell (2009). The Metaphysics of Science: An Account of Modern Science in Terms of Principles, Laws and Theories. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):228 – 232.score: 134.5
    This is a review of Craig Dilworth's The Metaphysics of Science (Dordrecht, Springer, 2007). The book propounds an immensely important idea. Science makes metaphysical presuppositions. Unfortunately, Dilworth ignores work that has been done on this issue which takes the matter much further than he does.
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  6. Jennifer McRobert, Concept Construction in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.score: 127.0
    Kant's reasoning in his special metaphysics of nature is often opaque, and the character of his a priori foundation for Newtonian science is the subject of some controversy. Recent literature on the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science has fallen well short of consensus on the aims and reasoning in the work. Various of the doctrines and even the character of the reasoning in the Metaphysical Foundations have been taken to present insuperable obstacles to accepting Kant's claim (...)
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  7. Marko Ahteensuu (2012). Assumptions of the Deficit Model Type of Thinking: Ignorance, Attitudes, and Science Communication in the Debate on Genetic Engineering in Agriculture. [REVIEW] Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 25 (3):295-313.score: 123.0
    This paper spells out and discusses four assumptions of the deficit model type of thinking. The assumptions are: First, the public is ignorant of science. Second, the public has negative attitudes towards (specific instances of) science and technology. Third, ignorance is at the root of these negative attitudes. Fourth, the public’s knowledge deficit can be remedied by one-way science communication from scientists to citizens. It is argued that there is nothing wrong with ignorance-based explanations per (...)
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  8. Giridhari Lal Pandit (2010). How Simple is It for Science to Acquire Wisdom According to its Choicest Aims? Philosophia 38 (4):649-666.score: 120.0
    Focusing on Nicholas Maxwell’s thesis that “science, properly understood, provides us the methodological key to the salvation of humanity”, the article discusses Maxwell’s aim oriented empiricism and his conception of Wisdom Inquiry as advocated in Maxwell’s (2009b, pp.1–56) essay entitled “How Can Life of Value Best Flourish in the Real World?” (in Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Studies in the Philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell 2009, edited by Leemon McHenry) and in Maxwell (2004 & 2009a).
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  9. Nicholas Maxwell (1977). Articulating the Aims of Science. Nature 265 (January 6):2.score: 117.0
    Most scientists and philosophers of science take for granted the standard empiricist view that the basic intellectual aim of science is truth per se. But this seriously misrepresents the aims of scieince. Actually, science seeks explanatory truth and, more generally, important truth. Problematic metaphysical and value assumptions are inherent in the real aims of science. Precisely because these aims are profoundly problematic, they need to be articulated, imaginatively explored and critically assesseed, in order to (...)
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  10. Michael Friedman (2012). Newton and Kant: Quantity of Matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):482-503.score: 117.0
    Immanuel Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786) provides metaphysical foundations for the application of mathematics to empirically given nature. The application that Kant primarily has in mind is that achieved in Isaac Newton's Principia (1687). Thus, Kant's first chapter, the Phoronomy, concerns the mathematization of speed or velocity, and his fourth chapter, the Phenomenology, concerns the empirical application of the Newtonian notions of true or absolute space, time, and motion. This paper concentrates on Kant's second and (...)
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  11. Immanuel Kant (2004). Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Cambridge University Press.score: 116.0
    Kant was centrally concerned with issues in the philosophy of natural science throughout his career. The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science presents his most mature reflections on these themes in the context of both his 'critical' philosophy, presented in the Critique of Pure Reason, and the natural science of his time. This volume presents a new translation, by Michael Friedman, which is especially clear and accurate. There are explanatory notes indicating some of the main connections between (...)
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  12. Nicholas Maxwell, What’s Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism?score: 115.5
    For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity (...)
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  13. Kenneth R. Westphal (1995). Does Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Fill a Gap in the Critique of Pure Reason? Synthese 103 (1):43 - 86.score: 114.0
    In 1792 and 1798 Kant noticed two basic problems with hisMetaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MAdN) which opened a crucial gap in the Critical system as a whole. Why is theMAdN so important? I show that the Analogies of Experience form an integrated proof of transeunt causality. This is central to Kant's answer to Hume. This proof requires explicating the empirical concept of matter as the moveable in space, it requires the specifically metaphysical principle that every physical event (...)
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  14. Loet Leydesdorff (1992). The Knowledge Content of Science and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 23 (2):241-263.score: 109.5
    Several, seemingly unrelated problems of empirical research in the 'sociology of scientific knowledge' can be analyzed as following from initial assumptions with respect to the status of the knowledge content of science. These problems involve: (1) the relation between the level of the scientific field and the group level; (2) the boundaries and the status of 'contexts', and (3) the emergence of so-called 'asymmetry' in discourse analysis. It is suggested that these problems can be clarified by allowing for (...)
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  15. Lois Isenman (2009). Digestive Enzyme Secretion, Intuition, and the History of Science: Part II. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 14 (4):331-349.score: 109.5
    A companion paper explored the role of intuition in the genesis of an alternative theory for the secretion of pancreatic digestive enzymes, looking through the lens of three philosophers/historians of science. Gerald Holton, the last scholar, proposed that scientific imagination is shaped by a number of thematic presuppositions, which function largely below awareness. They come in pairs of opposites that alternately gain cultural preeminence. The current paper examines three thematic presuppositions inherent to both the generally accepted model for digestive (...)
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  16. Edwin A. Burtt (1954/2003). The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science. Dover Publications.score: 107.0
    To the medieval thinker, man was the center of creation and all of nature existed purely for his benefit. The shift from the philosophy of the Middle Ages to the modern view of humanity's less central place in the universe ranks as the greatest revolution in the history of Western thought, and this classic in the philosophy of science describes and analyzes how the profound change occurred. A fascinating analysis of the works of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Gilbert, (...)
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  17. David Davies (1996). Explanatory Disunities and the Unity of Science. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (1):5 – 21.score: 103.5
    Abstract According to John Dupré, the metaphysics underpinning modern science posits a deterministic, fully law?governed and potentially fully intelligible structure that pervades the entire universe. To reject such a metaphysical framework for science is to subscribe to ?the disorder of things?, and the latter, according to Dupré, entails the impossibility of a unified science. Dupré's argument rests crucially upon purported disunities evident in the explanatory practices of science. I critically examine the implied project of drawing (...)
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  18. Uljana Feest (2007). Science and Experience/Science of Experience: Gestalt Psychology and the Anti-Metaphysical Project of the Aufbau. Perspectives on Science 15 (1):1-25.score: 102.0
    : This paper investigates the way in which Rudolf Carnap drew on Gestalt psychological notions when defining the basic elements of his constitutional system. I argue that while Carnap's conceptualization of basic experience was compatible with ideas articulated by members of the Berlin/Frankfurt school of Gestalt psychology, his formal analysis of the relationship between two basic experiences ("recollection of similarity") was not. This is consistent, given that Carnap's aim was to provide a unified reconstruction of scientific knowledge, as opposed to (...)
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  19. Philipp Frank (1950). Metaphysical Interpretations of Science. Part II. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (2):77-91.score: 101.3
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  20. Philipp Frank (1950). Metaphysical Interpretations of Science. Part I. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (1):60-74.score: 101.3
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  21. Haig Khatchadourian (1955). Some Metaphysical Presuppositions of Science. Philosophy of Science 22 (3):194-204.score: 101.3
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  22. Peter A. Carmichael (1953). The Metaphysical Matrix of Science. Philosophy of Science 20 (3):208-216.score: 101.3
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  23. Brad S. Gregory (2008). No Room for God? History, Science, Metaphysics, and the Study of Religion. History and Theory 47 (4):495 - 519.score: 100.5
    Intellectual history, philosophy, and science’s own self-understanding undermine the claim that science entails or need even tend toward atheism. By definition a radically transcendent creator-God is inaccessible to empirical investigation. Denials of the possibility or actual occurrence of miracles depend not on science itself, but on naturalist assumptions that derive originally from a univocal metaphysics with its historical roots in medieval nominalism, which in turn have deeply influenced philosophy and science since the seventeenth century. The (...)
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  24. Stathis Psillos (2012). What is General Philosophy of Science? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 43 (1):93-103.score: 99.5
    The very idea of a general philosophy of science relies on the assumption that there is this thing called science—as opposed to the various individual sciences. In this programmatic piece I make a case for the claim that general philosophy of science is the philosophy of science in general or science as such. Part of my narrative makes use of history, for two reasons. First, general philosophy of science is itself characterised by an intellectual (...)
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  25. Nicholas Maxwell (1974). The Rationality of Scientific Discovery Part 1: The Traditional Rationality Problem. Philosophy of Science 41 (2):123--53.score: 99.0
    The basic task of the essay is to exhibit science as a rational enterprise. I argue that in order to do this we need to change quite fundamentally our whole conception of science. Today it is rather generally taken for granted that a precondition for science to be rational is that in science we do not make substantial assumptions about the world, or about the phenomena we are investigating, which are held permanently immune from empirical (...)
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  26. M. Kusch (2002). Metaphysical Deja Vu: Hacking and Latour on Science Studies and Metaphysics - the Social Construction of What? Ian Hacking; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. And London, England, 1999, Pp. X+261, Price £18.50 Hardback, ISBN 0-674-81200-X.Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies Bruno Latour; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. And London, England, 1999, Pp. X+324, Price £12.50, $19.95 Paperback, ISBN 0-67-465336-X, £27.95, $45.00 Hardback, ISBN 0-67-465335-. [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (3):639-647.score: 99.0
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  27. Mariam Thalos (1995). Book Review:The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science John Dupre. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 62 (2):351-.score: 99.0
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  28. Tm Lennon (1989). Physical and Metaphysical Atomism: 1666-1682 in An Intimate Relation. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 116:81-95.score: 99.0
     
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  29. Ae Miller & Mg Miller (1994). Metaphysical Construction: The Central Method of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 159:62-97.score: 99.0
     
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  30. Ae Miller & Mg Miller (1994). Plaass's Interpretation of Metaphysical Construction'and the Issue of Objective Reality'in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 159:97-131.score: 99.0
     
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  31. Jochen Fahrenberg Marcus Cheetham (2007). Assumptions About Human Nature and the Impact of Philosophical Concepts on Professional Issues: A Questionnaire-Based Study with 800 Students From Psychology, Philosophy, and Science. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (3):pp. 183-201.score: 98.0
    Philosophical anthropology is concerned with assumptions about human nature, differential psychology with the empirical investigation of such belief systems. A questionnaire composed of 64 questions concerning brain and consciousness, free will, evolution, meaning of life, belief in God, and theodicy problem was used to gather data from 563 students of psychology at seven universities and from 233 students enrolled in philosophy or the natural sciences. Essential concepts were monism–dualism–complementarity, atheism–agnosticism–deism–theism, attitude toward transcendence–immanence, and self-ratings of religiosity and interest in (...)
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  32. Anjan Chakravartty (2010). Metaphysics Between the Sciences and Philosophies of Science. In P. D. Magnus & Jacob Busch (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 97.5
    Subsequent to the transition from the era of natural philosophy to what we now regard as the era of the modern sciences, the latter have often been described as independent of the major philosophical preoccupations that previously informed theorizing about the natural world. The extent to which this is a naïve description is a matter of debate, and in particular, views of the place of metaphysics in the interpretation of modern scientific knowledge have varied enormously. Logical positivism spawned a distaste (...)
     
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  33. Greg Frost-Arnold (2005). The Large-Scale Structure of Logical Empiricism: Unity of Science and the Elimination of Metaphysics. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):826-838.score: 97.5
    Two central and well-known philosophical goals of the logical empiricists are the unification of science and the elimination of metaphysics. I argue, via textual analysis, that these two apparently distinct planks of the logical empiricist party platform are actually intimately related. From the 1920’s through 1950, one abiding criterion for judging whether an apparently declarative assertion or descriptive term is metaphysical is that that assertion or term cannot be incorporated into a language of unified science. I explore (...)
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  34. Willis W. Harman & Jane Clark (eds.) (1994). The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science. Ions.score: 97.5
  35. Edwin A. Burtt (1954). The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. Garden City, N.Y.,Doubleday.score: 96.5
    CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION (A) Historical Problem Suggested by the Nature of Modern Thought How curious, after all, is the way in which we moderns think about ...
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  36. Nicholas Maxwell (2014). Unification and Revolution: A Paradigm for Paradigms. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 45 (1):133-149.score: 96.0
    Incommensurability was Kuhn’s worst mistake. If it is to be found anywhere in science, it would be in physics. But revolutions in theoretical physics all embody theoretical unification. Far from obliterating the idea that there is a persisting theoretical idea in physics, revolutions do just the opposite: they all actually exemplify the persisting idea of underlying unity. Furthermore, persistent acceptance of unifying theories in physics when empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted means that physics makes a (...)
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  37. Steven French & Michela Massimi (2013). Philosophy of Science A Personal Peek Into the Future. Metaphilosophy 44 (3):230-240.score: 96.0
    In this opinion piece, the authors offer their personal and idiosyncratic views of the future of the philosophy of science, focusing on its relationship with the history of science and metaphysics, respectively. With regard to the former, they suggest that the Kantian tradition might be drawn upon both to render the history and philosophy of science more relevant to philosophy as a whole and to overcome the challenges posed by naturalism. When it comes to the latter, they (...)
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  38. Nicholas Maxwell (2013). Has Science Established That the Cosmos is Physically Comprehensible? In A. Travena & B. Soen (eds.), Recent Advances in Cosmology. Nova Science Publishers.score: 95.5
    Most scientists would hold that science has not established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – i.e. such that there is some as-yet undiscovered true physical theory of everything that is unified. This is an empirically untestable, or metaphysical thesis. It thus lies beyond the scope of science. Only when physics has formulated a testable unified theory of everything which has been amply corroborated empirically will science be in a position to declare that it has established (...)
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  39. Thomas Mormann (2013). Topology as an Issue for History of Philosophy of Science. In Hanne Andersen, Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, Thomas Uebel & Gregory Wheeler (eds.), New Challenges to Philosophy of Science. Springer. 423--434.score: 94.5
    Since antiquity well into the beginnings of the 20th century geometry was a central topic for philosophy. Since then, however, most philosophers of science, if they took notice of topology at all, considered it as an abstruse subdiscipline of mathematics lacking philosophical interest. Here it is argued that this neglect of topology by philosophy may be conceived of as the sign of a conceptual sea-change in philosophy of science that expelled geometry, and, more generally, mathematics, from the central (...)
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  40. K. Brad Wray (2000). Invisible Hands and the Success of Science. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):163-175.score: 94.5
    David Hull accounts for the success of science in terms of an invisible hand mechanism, arguing that it is difficult to reconcile scientists' self-interestedness or their desire for recognition with traditional philosophical explanations for the success of science. I argue that we have less reason to invoke an invisible hand mechanism to explain the success of science than Hull implies, and that many of the practices and institutions constitutive of science are intentionally designed by scientists with (...)
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  41. Pierluigi Barrotta (1998). Contemporary Philosophy of Science in Italy: An Overview. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 29 (2):327-345.score: 94.5
    The paper analyses the development of some themes in the contemporary philosophy of science in Italy. Section 1 reviews the dabate on the legacy of neopositivism. The spread of the philosophy of Popper is outlined in Section 2, with particular regard to the problem of the vindication of induction. Section 3 deals with the debate on the incommensurability thesis, while Section 4 examines its consequences on the possible relationships between historical and epistemological studies of science. The last section (...)
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  42. Elaine Maria Paiva de Andrade, Jean Faber & Luiz Pinguelli Rosa (2013). A Spontaneous Physics Philosophy on the Concept of Ether Throughout the History of Science: Birth, Death and Revival. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 18 (3):559-577.score: 94.5
    In the course of the history of science, some concepts have forged theoretical foundations, constituting paradigms that hold sway for substantial periods of time. Research on the history of explanations of the action of one body on another is a testament to the periodic revival of one theory in particular, namely, the theory of ether. Even after the foundation of modern Physics, the notion of ether has directly and indirectly withstood the test of time. Through a spontaneous physics philosophical (...)
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  43. Nicholas Maxwell (2014). Three Criticisms of Newton’s Inductive Argument in the Principia. Advances in Historical Studies 3 (1):2-11.score: 94.5
    In this paper, I discuss how Newton’s inductive argument of the Principia can be defended against criticisms levelled against it by Duhem, Popper and myself. I argue that Duhem’s and Popper’s criticisms can be countered, but mine cannot. It requires that we reconsider, not just Newton’s inductive argument in the Principia, but also the nature of science more generally. The methods of science, whether conceived along inductivist or hypothetico-deductivist lines, make implicit metaphysical presuppositions which rigour requires we (...)
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  44. David L. Hull (1988). A Mechanism and its Metaphysics: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 3 (2):123-155.score: 94.5
    The claim that conceptual systems change is a platitude. That our conceptual systems are theory-laden is no less platitudinous. Given evolutionary theory, biologists are led to divide up the living world into genes, organisms, species, etc. in a particular way. No theory-neutral individuation of individuals or partitioning of these individuals into natural kinds is possible. Parallel observations should hold for philosophical theories about scientific theories. In this paper I summarize a theory of scientific change which I set out in considerable (...)
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  45. Philip Mirowski (2004). The Scientific Dimensions of Social Knowledge and Their Distant Echoes in 20th-Century American Philosophy of Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (2):283-326.score: 94.5
    The widespread impression that recent philosophy of science has pioneered exploration of the “social dimensions of scientific knowledge‘ is shown to be in error, partly due to a lack of appreciation of historical precedent, and partly due to a misunderstanding of how the social sciences and philosophy have been intertwined over the last century. This paper argues that the referents of “democracy‘ are an important key in the American context, and that orthodoxies in the philosophy of science tend (...)
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  46. Nicholas Rescher (2000). Nature and Understanding: The Metaphysics and Method of Science. Oxford University Press.score: 94.5
    Exploring the central ideas of traditional metaphysics--such as the simplicity of nature, its comprehensibility, or its systematic integrity--this book analyzes looking at such notions from a scientific point of view. It seeks to describe in a clear, accessible manner the metaphysical situation that characterizes the process of inquiry in natural science, aiming to shed light on reality by examining the modus operandi of natural science itself and focusing as much on its findings as on its conceptual and (...)
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  47. Joseph Rouse (1998). New Philosophies of Science in North America — Twenty Years Later. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 29 (1):71-122.score: 94.5
    This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of (...)
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  48. Rein Vihalemm (2007). Philosophy of Chemistry and the Image of Science. Foundations of Science 12 (3):223-234.score: 94.5
    The philosophical analysis of chemistry has advanced at such a pace during the last dozen years that the existence of philosophy of chemistry as an autonomous discipline cannot be doubted any more. The present paper will attempt to analyse the experience of philosophy of chemistry at the, so to say, meta-level. Philosophers of chemistry have especially stressed that all sciences need not be similar to physics. They have tried to argue for chemistry as its own type of science and (...)
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  49. Dimitri Ginev (2007). A (Post)Foundational Approach to the Philosophy of Science: Part II. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 38 (1):57 - 74.score: 94.5
    This is a sequel to my paper, "Searching for a (Post)Foundational Approach to Philosophy of Science", which appeared in an earlier issue of this Journal [Ginev 2001, Journal for General Philosophy of science 32, 27-37]. In the present paper I continue to scrutinize the possibility of a strong hermeneutics of scientific research. My aim is to defend the position of cognitive existentialism that combines the advocacy of science's cognitive specificity and the rejection of any form of essentialism. (...)
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  50. Peter P. Kirschenmann (1991). Local and Normative Rationality of Science: The 'Content of Discovery' Rehabilitated. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 22 (1):61-72.score: 94.5
    Summary The recent turn to the ‘context of discovery’ and other ‘postmodernist’ developments in the philosophy of science have undermined the idea of a universal rationality of science. This parallels the fate of the classical dream of a logic of discovery. Still, justificational questions have remained as a distinct perspective, though comprising both consequential and generative justification — an insight delayed by certain confusions about the (original) context distinction. An examination of one particular heuristic strategy shows its local (...)
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