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  1. Micah Schwartzman (2012). The Ethics of Reasoning From Conjecture. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (4):521-544.
    An important objection to political liberalism is that it provides no means by which to decide conflicts between public and non-public reasons. This article develops John Rawls' idea of `reasoning from conjecture' as one way to argue for a commitment to public reason. Reasoning from conjecture is a form of non-public justification that allows political liberals to reason from within the comprehensive views of at least some unreasonable citizens. After laying out the basic features of this form of non-public justification, (...)
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  2. Micah Schwartzman (2011). The Sincerity of Public Reason. Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (4):375-398.
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  3. Micah Schwartzman (2005). The Relevance of Locke's Religious Arguments for Toleration. Political Theory 33 (5):678 - 705.
    John Locke's theory of toleration has been criticized as having little relevance for politics today because it rests on controversial theological foundations. Although there have been some recent attempts to develop secular; or publicly accessible, arguments out of Locke's writings, these tend to obscure and distort the religious arguments that Locke used to defend toleration. More importantly, these efforts ignore the role that religious arguments may play in supporting the development of a normative consensus on the legitimacy of liberal political (...)
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  4. Micah Schwartzman (2004). The Completeness of Public Reason. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (2):191-220.
    A common objection to the idea of public reason is that it cannot resolve fundamental political issues because it excludes too many moral considerations from the political domain. Following an important but often overlooked distinction drawn by Gerald Gaus, there are two ways to understand this objection. First, public reason is often said to be inconclusive because it fails to generate agreement on fundamental political issues. Second, and more radically, some critics have claimed that public reason is indeterminate because it (...)
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