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Profile: Michael Bishop (University of Chicago)
  1. Michael A. Bishop (forthcoming). 2. The Flat Maximum Principle. Episteme.
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  2. Michael A. Bishop (2010). Why the Generality Problem is Everybody's Problem. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.
    The generality problem is widely considered to be a devastating objection to reliabilist theories of justification. My goal in this paper is to argue that a version of the generality problem applies to all plausible theories of justification. Assume that any plausible theory must allow for the possibility of reflective justification—S's belief, B, is justified on the basis of S's knowledge that she arrived at B as a result of a highly (but not perfectly) reliable way of reasoning, R. The (...)
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  3. Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.) (2009). Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Through a challenging collection of original new essays from leading philosophical scholars, the text explores some of philosophy's most hotly-debated ...
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  4. Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout (2008). Strategic Reliabilism: A Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1049-1065.
    Strategic Reliabilism is a framework that yields relative epistemic evaluations of belief-producing cognitive processes. It is a theory of cognitive excellence, or more colloquially, a theory of reasoning excellence (where 'reasoning' is understood very broadly as any sort of cognitive process for coming to judgments or beliefs). First introduced in our book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment (henceforth EPHJ), the basic idea behind SR is that epistemically excellent reasoning is efficient reasoning that leads in a robustly reliable fashion (...)
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  5. Michael A. Bishop (2006). Fast and Frugal Heuristics. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):201–223.
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  6. Michael A. Bishop (2006). Which Rights Should Be Universal? Review of Metaphysics 59 (3):683-685.
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  7. Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout (2006). First Page Preview. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2).
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  8. Michael A. Bishop (2005). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. Oxford University Press.
    Bishop and Trout here present a unique and provocative new approach to epistemology (the theory of human knowledge and reasoning). Their approach aims to liberate epistemology from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science. The approach is novel in its use of cost-benefit analysis to guide people facing real reasoning problems and in its framework for resolving normative disputes in psychology. Based on empirical data, Bishop and Trout show how (...)
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  9. Michael A. Bishop (2005). The Autonomy of Social Epistemology. Episteme 2 (1):65-78.
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  10. Michael A. Bishop, J. D. Trout, L. Johannes Brandl, Marian David, Leopold Stubenberg, Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (2005). Appearance in This List Neither Guarantees nor Precludes a Future Review of the Book. Agamben, Giorgio, Trans. Kevin Attell, State of Exception, London and Chicago: Univer-Sity of Chicago Press, 2005, Pp. Vii+ 95,£ 8.50, $12.00. Aiken, William and John Haldane (Eds), Philosophy and Its Public Role, Exeter, UK and Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 2004, Pp. Vi+ 272,£ 14.95, $29.90. [REVIEW] Mind 114:454.
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  11. Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout (2005). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. OUP USA.
    Bishop and Trout here present a unique and provocative new approach to epistemology (the theory of human knowledge and reasoning). Their approach aims to liberate epistemology from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science. The approach is novel in its use of cost-benefit analysis to guide people facing real reasoning problems and in its framework for resolving normative disputes in psychology. Based on empirical data, Bishop and Trout show how (...)
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  12. Michael A. Bishop (2003). The Pessimistic Induction, the Flight to Reference and the Metaphysical Zoo. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):161 – 178.
    Scientific realism says of our best scientific theories that (1) most of their important posits exist and (2) most of their central claims are approximately true. Antirealists sometimes offer the pessimistic induction in reply: since (1) and (2) are false about past successful theories, they are probably false about our own best theories too. The contemporary debate about this argument has turned (and become stuck) on the question, Do the central terms of successful scientific theories refer? For example, Larry Laudan (...)
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  13. Michael A. Bishop (2002). The Theory Theory Thrice Over: The Child as Scientist, Superscientist, or Social Institution? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (1):121-36.
    Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff have argued for a view they call the ‘theory theory’: theory change in science and children are similar. While their version of the theory theory has been criticized for depending on a number of disputed claims, we argue that there is a fundamental problem which is much more basic: the theory theory is multiply ambiguous. We show that it might be claiming that a similarity holds between theory change in children and (i) individual scientists, (ii) (...)
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  14. Michael A. Bishop (2000). In Praise of Epistemic Irresponsibility: How Lazy and Ignorant Can You Be? Synthese 122 (1-2):179 - 208.
    Epistemic responsibility involves at least two central ideas. (V) To be epistemically responsible is to display the virtue(s) epistemic internalists take to be central to justification (e.g., coherence, having good reasons, fitting the evidence). (C) In normal (non-skeptical)circumstances and in thelong run, epistemic responsibility is strongly positively correlated with reliability. Sections 1 and 2 review evidence showing that for a wide range of real-world problems, the most reliable, tractable reasoning strategies audaciously flout the internalist''s epistemic virtues. In Section 3, I (...)
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  15. Michael A. Bishop (1999). Why Thought Experiments Are Not Arguments. Philosophy of Science 66 (4):534-541.
    Are thought experiments nothing but arguments? I argue that it is not possible to make sense of the historical trajectory of certain thought experiments if one takes them to be arguments. Einstein and Bohr disagreed about the outcome of the clock-in-the-box thought experiment, and so they reconstructed it using different arguments. This is to be expected whenever scientists disagree about a thought experiment's outcome. Since any such episode consists of two arguments but just one thought experiment, the thought experiment cannot (...)
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  16. Michael A. Bishop & Stephen P. Stich (1998). The Flight to Reference, or How Not to Make Progress in the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 65 (1):33-49.
    The flight to reference is a widely-used strategy for resolving philosophical issues. The three steps in a flight to reference argument are: (1) offer a substantive account of the reference relation, (2) argue that a particular expression refers (or does not refer), and (3) draw a philosophical conclusion about something other than reference, like truth or ontology. It is our contention that whenever the flight to reference strategy is invoked, there is a crucial step that is left undefended, and that (...)
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  17. Michael A. Bishop (1997). Existential Cognition. International Studies in Philosophy 29 (4):130-131.
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  18. Michael A. Bishop (1992). Theory-Ladenness of Perception Arguments. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:287 - 299.
    The first aim of this paper is to adduce a framework for understanding theory-ladenness of perception arguments. The second aim is to begin to assess an important cluster of theory-ladenness arguments-those that begin with some psychological phenomenon and conclude that scientific controversies are resolved without appeal to theory-neutral observations. Three of the arguments (from expectation effects, ambiguous figures, and inverting lenses) turn out to be either irrelevant to or subversive of theory-ladenness. And even if we grant the premises of the (...)
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  19. Michael A. Bishop (1992). The Possibility of Conceptual Clarity in Philosophy. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):267 - 277.
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  20. Michael A. Bishop (1991). Why the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis is Self-Defeating. Philosophical Studies 63 (3):343 - 356.