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  1. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord & Michael A. Smith, Desires and Beliefs of One's Own.
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  2. Michael A. Smith & Andrew B. Scholey (2014). Nutritional Influences on Human Neurocognitive Functioning. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  3. Geoffrey Brennan, Robert E. Goodin & Michael A. Smith (eds.) (2007). Common Minds: Themes From the Philosophy of Philip Pettit. Oxford University Press.
    During a career spanning over thirty years Philip Pettit has made seminal contributions in moral philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of the social sciences, philosophy of mind and action, and metaphysics. The corpus of work Pettit has contributed and stimulated is all the more remarkable because of the way in which Pettit and his circle adapt lessons learned when thinking about problems in one area of philosophy to problems in a completely different area. -/- Common Minds presents specially written papers by (...)
     
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  4. Michael A. Smith (2001). 7. Beyond Fideism and Antirationalism: Some Reflections on Fides Et Ratio. Logos 4 (4).
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  5. Michael A. Smith (1998). Galen Strawson and the Weather Watchers. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):449-454.
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  6. Michael A. Smith (1998). The Possibility of Philosophy of Action. In Jan Bransen & Stefaan Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 17--41.
    This article was conceived as a sequel to “The Humean Theory of Motivation.” The paper addresses various challenges to the standard account of the explanation of intentional action in terms of desire and means-end belief, challenges that didn’t occur to me when I wrote “The Humean Theory of Motivation.” I begin by suggesting that the attraction of the standard account lies in the way in which it allows us to unify a vast array of otherwise diverse types of action explanation. (...)
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  7. Michael A. Smith (1997). A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility. In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. 293-317.
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  8. Michael A. Smith (1995). Common Advantage and Common Good. Laval Théologique et Philosophique 51 (1):111-125.
  9. Michael A. Smith (1995). Internalism's Wheel. Ratio 8 (3):277-302.
    If an agent judges that she morally ought to PHI in certain circumstances C then, according to internalists, absent practical irrationality, she must be motivated, to some extent, to PHI in C. Internalists thus accept what I have elsewhere called the ‘practicality requirement on moral judgement’. There are many different theories about the nature and content of moral judgement that aspire to explain and capture the truth embodied in internalism, and these theories share little in common beyond that aspiration. Worse (...)
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  10. Michael A. Smith (1993). Color, Transparency, Mind-Independence. In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford University Press.
     
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  11. Michael A. Smith (1988). Reason and Desire. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:243-58.
    My topic is the debate in moral psychology between the rationalist and the anti-rationalist over the proper relation between reason and desire. My aim is not to adjudicate this debate, but rather to clarify what is at stake, for, it seems to me, both parties are prone to misconceive the issues that divide them.
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  12. Michael A. Smith (1986). Peacocke on Red and Red. Synthese 68 (September):559-576.
    How are we to define red? We seem to face a dilemma. For it seems that we must define red in terms of looks red. But looks red is semantically complex. We must therefore define looks red in terms of red. Can we avoid this dilemma? Christopher Peacocke thinks we can. He claims that we can define the concept of being red in terms of the concept of being red; the concept of a sensational property of visual experience. Peacocke agrees (...)
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