Search results for 'Michael Abram Bergmann' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Michael Bergmann (2006). Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence. Or perhaps it must be reliably formed. Or perhaps there are some other "good-making" features it must have. But does a belief's justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists, who tend to focus (...)
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  2. Michael Bergmann & Michael Rea (2005). In Defence of Sceptical Theism: A Reply to Almeida and Oppy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):241 – 251.score: 240.0
    Some evidential arguments from evil rely on an inference of the following sort: 'If, after thinking hard, we can't think of any God-justifying reason for permitting some horrific evil then it is likely that there is no such reason'. Sceptical theists, us included, say that this inference is not a good one and that evidential arguments from evil that depend on it are, as a result, unsound. Michael Almeida and Graham Oppy have argued (in a previous issue of this (...)
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  3. Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.) (2014). Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press.score: 240.0
    Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting (...)
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  4. Darren Belousek Balashov, Michael Bergmann & J. B. Hud Hudson (1998). Temporal Parts Unmotivated Michael С Rea. Philosophical Review 107 (2):225-260.score: 210.0
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  5. Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey E. Brower (2007). The God of Eth and the God of Earth. Think 5 (14):33-38.score: 150.0
    Stephen Law has recently argued (Think 9), using a dialogue set on the fictional planet Eth, that traditional belief in God is . Bergmann and Brower argue that theists on Earth should not be convinced.
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  6. Michael Bergmann (2001). Skeptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument From Evil. Noûs 35 (2):278–296.score: 120.0
    Skeptical theists endorse the skeptical thesis (which is consistent with the rejection of theism) that we have no good reason for thinking the possible goods we know of are representative of the possible goods there are. In his newest formulation of the evidential arguments from evil, William Rowe tries to avoid assuming the falsity of this skeptical thesis, presumably because it seems so plausible. I argue that his new argument fails to avoid doing this. Then I defend that skeptical thesis (...)
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  7. Michael Bergmann (2009). Rational Disagreement After Full Disclosure. Episteme 6 (3):336-353.score: 120.0
    The question I consider is this: The Question: Can two people – who are, and realize they are, intellectually virtuous to about the same degree – both be rational in continuing knowingly to disagree after full disclosure (by each to the other of all the relevant evidence they can think of) while at the same time thinking that the other may well be rational too? I distinguish two kinds of rationality – internal and external – and argue in section 1 (...)
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  8. Michael Bergmann & Jeffrey E. Brower (2006). A Theistic Argument Against Platonism (and in Support of Truthmakers and Divine Simplicity). Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:357-386.score: 120.0
    Predication is an indisputable part of our linguistic behavior. By contrast, the metaphysics of predication has been a matter of dispute ever since antiquity. According to Plato—or at least Platonism, the view that goes by Plato’s name in contemporary philosophy—the truths expressed by predications such as “Socrates is wise” are true because there is a subject of predication (e.g., Socrates), there is an abstract property or universal (e.g., wisdom), and the subject exemplifies the property.1 This view is supposed to be (...)
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  9. Daniel Howard-Snyder & Michael Bergmann (2003). Grounds for Belief in God Aside, Does Evil Make Atheism More Reasonable Than Theism? In Michael Peterson & Raymond Van Arrogan (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell. 140--55.score: 120.0
    Preprinted in God and the Problem of Evil(Blackwell 2001), ed. William Rowe. Many people deny that evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. After all, they say, the grounds for belief in God are much better than the evidence for atheism, including the evidence provided by evil. We will not join their ranks on this occasion. Rather, we wish to consider the proposition that, setting aside grounds for belief in God and relying only on (...)
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  10. Michael Bergmann (2004). What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):161–165.score: 120.0
    One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially--i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing foundationalist. In this paper, I will explain why his objections to foundationalism (...)
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  11. Michael Bergmann (2007). Is Klein an Infinitist About Doxastic Justification? Philosophical Studies 134 (1):19 - 24.score: 120.0
    This paper is a response to Peter Klein's “Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning” (also in this issue of this journal). After briefly discussing what Klein says about the requirement, for doxastic justification, that a belief be formed in the right way, I'll make the following three points: Klein's solution to the regress problem isn't an infinitist solution, Klein's position on doxastic justification faces a troubling dilemma, and Klein's objection to foundationalism fails.
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  12. Michael Bergmann (1999). (Serious) Actualism and (Serious) Presentism. Noûs 33 (1):118-132.score: 120.0
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  13. Michael Bergmann (2004). Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):709–727.score: 120.0
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  14. Daniel Howard-Snyder & Michael Bergmann (2003). Reply to Rowe. In Michael Peterson (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion. Blackwell.score: 120.0
    Preprinted in God and the Problem of Evil (Blackwell 2001), ed. William Rowe. In this article, we reply to Bill Rowe's "Evil is Evidence Against Theistic Belief" in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell 2003).
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  15. Michael Bergmann (1997). Internalism, Externalism and the No-Defeater Condition. Synthese 110 (3):399-417.score: 120.0
    Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of internal here? And of which conditions of (...)
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  16. Michael Bergmann & J. A. Cover (2006). Divine Responsibility Without Divine Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 23 (4):381-408.score: 120.0
    Adherents of traditional western Theism have espoused CONJUNCTION: God is essentially perfectly good and God is thankworthy for the good acts he performs . But suppose that (i) God’s essential perfect goodness prevents his good acts from being free, and that (ii) God is not thankworthy for an act that wasn’t freely performed.
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  17. Michael Bergmann (2005). Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (220):419–436.score: 120.0
    Internalists tend to impose on justification higher-level requirements, according to which a belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief (i.e., a belief about the epistemic credentials of a belief). I offer an error theory that explains the appeal of this requirement: analytically, a belief is not justified if we have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our beliefs must satisfy a higher-level requirement. I respond to the (...)
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  18. Michael Bergmann (2000). Externalism and Skepticism. Philosophical Review 109 (2):159-194.score: 120.0
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  19. Michael Bergmann (1996). A New Argument From Actualism to Serious Actualism. Noûs 30 (3):356-359.score: 120.0
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  20. Michael Bergmann (2013). Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):163-184.score: 120.0
    It’s not implausible to think that whenever I have a justified noninferential belief that p, it is caused by a seeming that p. It’s also tempting to think that something contributes to the justification of my belief only if I hold my belief because of that thing. Thus, given that many of our noninferential beliefs are justified and that we hold them because of seemings, one might be inclined to hold a view like Phenomenal Conservatism, according to which seemings play (...)
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  21. Michael Bergmann (2008). Reidian Externalism. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan.score: 120.0
    What distinguishes Reidian externalism from other versions of epistemic externalism about justification is its proper functionalism and its commonsensism, both of which are inspired by the 18th century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid. Its proper functionalism is a particular analysis of justification; its commonsensism is a certain thesis about what we are noninferentially justified in believing.
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  22. Michael Bergmann (2006). Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):198-207.score: 120.0
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  23. Michael Bergmann (2000). Deontology and Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):87-102.score: 120.0
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  24. Michael Bergmann (2006). BonJour's Dilemma. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 131 (3):679 - 693.score: 120.0
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  25. Michael Bergmann (2003). Agent Causation and Responsibility. Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):229-235.score: 120.0
  26. Michael Bergmann (2004). Externalist Justification Without Reliability. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):35–60.score: 120.0
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  27. Hugo Bergmann & Franz Brentano (1946). Briefe Franz Brentanos an Hugo Bergmann. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 7 (1):83-158.score: 120.0
  28. Michael Bergmann (2001). Faith with Reason. Paul Helm. Mind 110 (439):771-774.score: 120.0
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  29. Michael Bergmann (2002). Molinist Frankfurt-Style Counterexamples and the Free Will Defense. Faith and Philosophy 19 (4):462-478.score: 120.0
  30. Michael Bergmann (1999). Might-Counterfactuals, Transworld Untrustworthiness and Plantinga's Free Will Defence. Faith and Philosophy 16 (3):336-351.score: 120.0
    Plantinga’s Free Will Defense (FWD) employs the following proposition as a premise:◊TD. Possibly, every essence is transworld depraved.I argue that he fails to establish his intended conclusion because the denial of ◊TD is epistemically possible. I then consider an improved version of the FWD which relies on◊TU. Possibly, every essence is transworld untrustworthy.(The notion of transworld untrustworthiness is the might-counterfactual counterpart to Plantinga’s would-counterfactual notion of transworld depravity.) I argue that the denial of ◊TU is also epistemically possible and, therefore, (...)
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  31. Michael Bergmann (2008). Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil. In Thomas P. Flint & Michael C. Rea (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press. 374--99.score: 120.0
  32. Michael Bergmann (2013). Phenomenal Conservatism and the Dilemma for Internalism. In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. Oup Usa. 154.score: 120.0
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  33. Michael Bergmann (2001). Putting Skeptics in Their Place. International Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):484-486.score: 120.0
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  34. Michael Bergmann (2006). Review: Bonjour's Dilemma. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 131 (3):679 - 693.score: 120.0
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  35. Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (2014). Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Overview and Future Directions. In Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution.score: 120.0
  36. Michael Bergmann (1996). Evil and the Evidence for God. Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):436-441.score: 120.0
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  37. Michael Bergmann (2004). Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Review 113 (3):435-437.score: 120.0
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  38. Michael Bergmann (2011). Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin Objection. In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford University Press. 123.score: 120.0
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  39. Michael Bergmann (1999). God and Inscrutable Evil. Faith and Philosophy 16 (4):562-569.score: 120.0
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  40. Michael Bergmann (2008). Externalist Responses to Skepticism. In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on Skepticism. Oxford University Press. 504--32.score: 120.0
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  41. Michael Bergmann & Brett Coppenger (eds.) (forthcoming). Traditional Epistemic Internalism. Oxford University Press.score: 120.0
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  42. Daniel Howard-Snyder, Michael Bergmann & William Rowe (2001). An Exchange on the Problem of Evil. In William L. Rowe (ed.), God and the Problem of Evil. Blackwell. 124--158.score: 120.0
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  43. Mike Michael (1991). Reviews : Michael Billig, Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989 (1987), Paper £9.95, Vi + 290 Pp. [REVIEW] History of the Human Sciences 4 (3):441-444.score: 120.0
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  44. Ali Hasan (2011). Classical Foundationalism and Bergmann's Dilemma for Internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:391-410.score: 45.0
    In Justification without Awareness (2006), Michael Bergmann presents a dilemma for internalism from which he claims there is “no escape”: The awareness allegedly required for justification is either strong awareness, which involves conceiving of some justification-contributor as relevant to the truth of a belief, or weak awareness, which does not. Bergmann argues that the former leads to an infinite regress of justifiers, while the latter conflicts with the “clearest and most compelling” motivation for endorsing internalism, namely, that (...)
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  45. Jason Rogers & Jonathan Matheson (2011). Bergmann's Dilemma: Exit Strategies for Internalists. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 152 (1):55 - 80.score: 45.0
    Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are versions of "weak awareness internalism" that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb to the "Subject's Perspective Objection" horn of the dilemma. Second, we show that there are versions of "strong awareness internalism" that do not fall prey to the dilemma's "vicious regress" horn. We note along (...)
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  46. John M. DePoe (2012). Bergmann's Dilemma and Internalism's Escape. Acta Analytica 27 (4):409-423.score: 45.0
    Michael Bergmann has argued that internalist accounts of justification face an insoluble dilemma. This paper begins with an explanation of Bergmann’s dilemma. Next, I review some recent attempts to answer the dilemma, which I argue are insufficient to overcome it. The solution I propose presents an internalist account of justification through direct acquaintance. My thesis is that direct acquaintance can provide subjective epistemic assurance without falling prey to the quagmire of difficulties that Bergmann alleges all internalist (...)
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  47. Michael Boylan, Denise Inge, Frederic Jameson, Scott Barry Kaufman, James C. Kaufman, Dominic Mciver Lopes, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Adrian Pabst, Angus Paddison & Fiona Price (2010). BENTON, MICHAEL. Literary Biography An Introduction.(London: Wiley-Blackwell). 2009. Pp. 280.£ 60.00 (Hbk). BERGMANN, SIGURD. In the Beginning is the Icon: A Liberative Theology of Images, Visual Arts and Culture.(London: Equinox Publishing Limited). 2009. Pp. 256.£ 50.00 (Hbk). [REVIEW] British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1):119.score: 39.0
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  48. Thomas M. Crisp (2010). A Dilemma for Internalism? Synthese 174 (3):355 - 366.score: 36.0
    Internalism about epistemic justification (henceforth, ‘internalism’) says that a belief B is epistemically justified for S only if S is aware of some good-making feature of B, some feature that makes for B’s having positive epistemic status: e.g., evidence for B. Externalists with respect to epistemic justification (‘externalists’) deny this awareness requirement. Michael Bergmann has recently put this dilemma against internalism: awareness admits of a strong and a weak construal; given the strong construal, internalism is subject to debilitating (...)
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  49. Richard Fumerton (2007). Review of Michael Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).score: 36.0
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  50. Peter J. Markie (2008). Justification Without Awareness – Michael Bergmann. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):550–555.score: 36.0
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