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Profile: Mike Almeida (University of Texas at San Antonio)
  1. Michael Almeida & Graham Oppy (2005). Reply to Trakakis and Nagasawa. Ars Disputandi 5:5-11.
    Nick Trakakis and Yujin Nagasawa criticise the argument in Almeida and Oppy . According to Trakakis and Nagasawa, we are mistaken in our claim that the sceptical theist response to evidential arguments from evil is unacceptable because it would undermine ordinary moral reasoning. In their view, there is no good reason to think that sceptical theism leads to an objectionable form of moral scepticism. We disagree. In this paper, we explain why we think that the argument of Nagasawa and Trakakis (...)
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  2. Michael J. Almeida & Graham Oppy (2003). Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments From Evil. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):496 – 516.
    Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.
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  3. Michael Almeida (2011). Theistic Modal Realism. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3:1-15.
     
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  4. Michael J. Almeida (2012). The Logical Problem of Evil Regained. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):163-176.
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  5. Michael J. Almeida & Neal D. Judisch (2002). A New Cosmological Argument Undone. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 51 (1):55-64.
    There is an intriguing recent effort to develop a valid cosmological argument on the basis of quite minimal assumptions.1 Indeed, the basis of the new cosmological argument is so slight that it is likely to make even a conscientious theist suspicious – to say nothing of our vigilant atheists. In Section 1 we present the background assumptions and central premises of the new cosmological argument. We are sympathetic to the conclusion that there necessarily exists an intelligent and powerful creator of (...)
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  6.  15
    Michael J. Almeida (forthcoming). A Posteriori Anselmianism. Topoi:1-9.
    I argue that Anselmians ought to abandon traditional Anselmianism in favor of Moderate Anselmianism. Moderate Anselmianism advances the view that a being x = God iff for every essential property P of x, it is secondarily necessary that x has P, for most essential properties of x, it is not primarily necessary that x has P and the essential properties of x include omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness and necessary existence. Traditional Anselmians have no cogent response to most a priori atheological (...)
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  7.  34
    Michael J. Almeida (2008). The Metaphysics of Perfect Beings. Routledge.
    Atheistic arguments from improvability -- Rational choice and no best world -- On evil's vague necessity -- The problem of no maximum evil -- On the logic of imperfection -- Supervenience, divine freedom, and absolute orderings -- Vague eschatology -- Theistic modal realism, multiverses, and hyperspace.
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  8. Michael J. Almeida (2004). Supervenience and Property-Identical Divine-Command Theory. Religious Studies 40 (3):323-333.
    Property-identical divine-command theory (PDCT) is the view that being obligatory is identical to being commanded by God in just the way that being water is identical to being H2O. If these identity statements are true, then they express necessary a posteriori truths. PDCT has been defended in Robert M. Adams (1987) and William Alston (1990). More recently Mark C. Murphy (2002) has argued that property-identical divine-command theory is inconsistent with two well-known and well-received theses: the free-command thesis and the supervenience (...)
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  9.  83
    Michael J. Almeida & Mark H. Bernstein (2000). Opportunistic Carnivorism. Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2):205–211.
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  10.  83
    Michael Almeida (2010). Two Challenges to Moral Nihilism. The Monist 93 (1):96-105.
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  11.  67
    Michael J. Almeida (2006). On Stone's Evidential Atheism. Theoria 72 (1):5-22.
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  12.  61
    Michael Almeida (1997). Alice G. B. Ter Meulen, Representing Time in Natural Language: The Dynamic inTerpretation of Tense and Aspect. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 7 (3):438-442.
  13.  25
    Michael Almeida (2015). T. Ryan Byerly: The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):255-259.
    One major aim of the book is to articulate a view of the mechanics of infallible divine foreknowledge that avoids commitment to causal determinism, explains how infallible foreknowledge is compatible with human freedom, and explains how God’s divine providence is compatible with human freedom and indeterministic events. The modest epistemic goal is to articulate a view that enjoys a not very low epistemic status. But even with such modest goals, I think the view cannot credibly be said to offer or (...)
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  14. Michael J. Almeida (2009). On Evil's Vague Necessity. In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2. OUP Oxford
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  15.  28
    Michael J. Almeida (2004). "Review of" Intuitions as Evidence". [REVIEW] Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):3.
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  16.  45
    Michael Almeida (2012). Theism and Explanation. Faith and Philosophy 29 (2):229-232.
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  17.  80
    Michael J. Almeida (2000). Why We Ought to Be a Little Less Beneficent. Analysis 60 (265):97–106.
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  18.  80
    Michael J. Almeida (1998). Refuting Van Inwagen's 'Refutation': Evidentialism Again. [REVIEW] International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1):23 - 29.
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  19.  47
    Michael Almeida (2006). The Unreal Problem of No Best World. Philo 9 (2):103-112.
    Suppose it is a reasonable assumption that there is no possible world that is overall highest in value. Some theists have found in thatassumption a basis for actualizing a less-than-best world. Some atheists have found in that assumption a basis for actualizing no world at all. I present a dynamic choice model for the problem and describe the rationality assumptions necessary to generate a rational choice problem for an ideally rational agent. I show that at least one of the rationality (...)
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  20.  69
    Michael J. Almeida (2005). Is It Impossible to Be Moral? Dialogue 44 (1):3-13.
    Recent work in moral theory includes an intriguing new argument that the vagueness of moral properties, together with two well-known and well-received metaethical principles, entails the incredible conclusion that it is impossible to be moral. I show that the argument equivocates between “it is true that A and B are morally indistinguishable” and “it is not false that A and B are morally indistinguishable.” As expected the argument is interesting but unsound. It is therefore not impossible to be moral.Les travaux (...)
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  21.  43
    Michael Almeida (2004). The New Evidential Argument Defeated. Philo 7 (1):22-35.
    In his most recent version of the evidential argument from evil, William Rowe argues that the observation of no outweighing goods for certain evils constitutes significant evidence against theism. I show that the new evidential argument cannot challenge theism unless it is also reasonable to believe that no good we know of justifies God in permitting any evil at all. Since the new evidential argument provides no reason at all to believe that God is not justified in permitting any existing (...)
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  22.  19
    Michael J. Almeida (1996). Ethics and the Good Life. Teaching Philosophy 19 (1):87-90.
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  23.  22
    Michael Almeida (2014). God and Necessity. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):152-154.
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  24.  18
    Michael J. Almeida (1995). Moral Questions. [REVIEW] Teaching Philosophy 18 (1):83-85.
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  25.  58
    Michael J. Almeida (1990). Deontic Logic and the Possibility of Moral Conflict. Erkenntnis 33 (1):57 - 71.
    Standard dyadic deontic logic (as well as standard deontic logic) has recently come under attack by moral philosophers who maintain that the axioms of standard dyadic deontic logic are biased against moral theories which generate moral conflicts. Since moral theories which generate conflicts are at least logically tenable, it is argued, standard dyadic deontic logic should be modified so that the set of logically possible moral theories includes those which generate such conflicts. I argue that (1) there are only certain (...)
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  26.  20
    Michael J. Almeida (2013). A Frightening Love: Recasting the Problem of Evil by Gleeson Andrew. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):607 - 610.
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  27.  22
    Michael Almeida (2012). Fales, Evan. Divine Intervention: Metaphysical and Epistemological Puzzles. Review of Metaphysics 65 (4):868-870.
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  28.  30
    Michael Almeida (2008). Critically Muddled. Philo 11 (1):120-129.
    In a recent article in Philo I critique William Rowe’s new evidential argument from evil. Richard Carrier claims I advance an argument for theism in that article and proposes a counterexample to that argument. I show that Carrier’s counterexample fails for reasons that are fairly obvious. I then offer help. The best chance for a counterexample to the argument I offer comes from the possibility of cryptid creatures. But it is not difficult to show that counterexamples from cryptic creatures also (...)
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  29.  28
    Michael J. Almeida (2008). On Vague Eschatology. Faith and Philosophy 25 (4):359-375.
    Ted Sider’s Proportionality of Justice condition requires that any two moral agents instantiating nearly the same moral state be treated in nearly the same way. I provide a countermodel in supervaluation semantics to the proportionality of justice condition. It is possible that moral agents S and S' are in nearly the same moral state, S' is beyond all redemption and S is not. It is consistent with perfect justice then that moral agents that are not beyond redemption go determinately to (...)
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  30.  42
    Michael J. Almeida (1992). The Paradoxes of Feldman's Neo-Utilitarianism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4):455 – 468.
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  31.  25
    Michael Almeida (2006). Can God Be Free? [REVIEW] Faith and Philosophy 23 (3):345-350.
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  32.  40
    Michael J. Almeida (2008). The Enlargement of Life: Moral Imagination at Work – John Kekes. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):374–377.
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  33.  38
    Michael J. Almeida (2004). Ideal Worlds and the Transworld Untrustworthy. Religious Studies 40 (1):113-123.
    The celebrated free-will defence was designed to show that the ideal-world thesis presents no challenge to theism. The ideal-world thesis states that, in any world in which God exists, He can actualize a world containing moral good and no moral evil. I consider an intriguing two-stage argument that Michael Bergmann advances for the free-will defence, and show that the argument provides atheologians with no reason to abandon the ideal-world thesis. I show next that the existence of worlds in which every (...)
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  34.  36
    Michael J. Almeida (2003). Rowe's Argument From Freedom. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2):83-91.
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  35.  22
    Michael Almeida (2007). Martin on Miracles. Philo 10 (1):27-34.
    Michael Martin introduces a non-Humean conception of miracles according to which miracles are events that need not violate a law of nature and are brought about by the exercise of a possibly non-theistic, supernatural power. Call those m-miracles. I consider Martin’s argument that the occurrence of an m-miracle would not confirm the existence of God. Martin presents an interesting argument, but it does not establish that m-miracles would not confirm the existence God. I argue that, on the contrary, it is (...)
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  36.  31
    Michael Almeida & Mark Bernstein (2005). Is It Impossible to Relieve Suffering? Philosophia 32 (1-4):313-324.
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  37.  26
    Michael Almeida (2003). A Paradox for Significant Freedom. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 54 (3):175-184.
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  38.  15
    Michael Almeida (2005). On Infinitely Improving Worlds. Philo 8 (1):38-46.
    William Rowe argues that an essentially perfectly good being could not actualize a world unless there is no better world it could actualize instead. According to Rowe’s Argument from Improvability, if there is an infinite series of ever-improving and actualizable worlds then a perfect being could actualize exactly none of them. I argue that there is no reason to believe Rowe’s argument is sound. It therefore presents no important objection to theism.
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  39.  18
    Michael Almeida (2006). Rowe's Argument From Improvability. Philosophical Papers 35 (1):1-25.
    William Rowe has argued that if there is an infinite sequence of improving worlds then an essentially perfectly good being must actualize some world in the sequence and must not actualize any world in the sequence. Since that is impossible, there exist no perfectly good beings. I show that Rowe's argument assumes that the concept of a maximally great being is incoherent. Since we are given no reason to believe that the concept of a maximally great being is incoherent we (...)
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  40.  13
    Michael J. Almeida (1994). Collective Rationality and Simple Utilitarian Theories. Dialogue 33 (03):363-.
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  41.  5
    Michael J. Almeida, Maria Rosa Antognazza, Kim Atkins, Catriona Mac-Kenzie, Randall E. Auxier, Phillip S. Seng, Desmond Avery & H. E. Baber (2009). Books for Review and for Listing Here Should Be Addressed to David Boersema, Review Editor, Department of Philosophy, Pacific University, Forest Grove, Oregon 97116. Teaching Philosophy 32 (4):427.
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  42.  15
    Michael J. Almeida (1999). Too Much (and Not Enough) of a Good Thing: How Agent Neutral Principles Fail in Prisoner's Dilemmas. Philosophical Studies 94 (3):309-328.
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  43.  4
    Michael J. Almeida (2013). A Frightening Love: Recasting the Problem of Evil, by Andrew Gleeson: New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, Pp. Ix+ 172, US $85.00 (Hardcover). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  44.  9
    Michael J. Almeida, Robert D. Valin, Marc Moens, Johan M. Lammens, William A. Foley & Colin Renfrew (1994). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 4 (1):103-128.
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  45.  6
    Mark Bernstein, Wayne Owens & Michael Almeida (2006). Arthur Ron Miller, 1949-2006. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 80 (2):111 -.
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  46. C. Fred Alford, Michael J. Almeida, Chrisoula Andreou, Maria Antonaccio, Christopher Bennett, Ben Bradley, Elizabeth Brake, Sarah Broadie, Baruch Brody & Nicholas Buccola (2008). Referees for Volume 5. Journal of Moral Philosophy 5:465-466.
     
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  47. Michael J. Almeida (2013). A Frightening Love: Recasting the Problem of Evil. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):607-610.
     
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  48. Michael J. Almeida (2010). Discussion Note: Chance, Epistemic Probability and Saving Lives: Reply to Bradley. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2010:1-1.
     
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  49. Michael J. Almeida (1989). Deontic Problems with Prohibition Dilemmas. Logique Et Analyse 32 (128):163-175.
     
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  50.  8
    Michael J. Almeida (2012). Freedom, God, and Worlds. Oxford University Press.
    A Moderate Anselmian Plea -- Metaphysical Atheological Arguments and the Free Will Defense -- Three Important Objections -- Unrestricted Actualization, Freedom and Morally Perfect Worlds -- The Logical Problem of Evil Redux -- Four Important Objections -- Four More Objections -- Redeeming Worlds -- Conclusions.
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