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Profile: Michael Bishop (University of Chicago)
  1. Michael Bishop, Faculty.
    J.D. Trout and I started this project in 2000. Our goal was to write a book that was interesting, opinionated, accessible, and fun to read. Here are some excerpts from the first two pages of chapter 1: Excerpts [pdf] . The cover photo is a still of the great Buster Keaton from his movie, The General.
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  2. Michael A. Bishop (forthcoming). 2. The Flat Maximum Principle. Episteme.
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  3. Joshua Shepherd & Michael Bishop (forthcoming). The Case for Naturalized Epistemology. In Stefan Tolksdorf & Dirk Koppleberg (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie: Wie und Wozu? Mentis Publishers.
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  4. Michael Bishop (2012). A Priori Knowledge of the Way the World Works. Metascience 21 (3):687-691.
    A priori knowledge of the way the world works Content Type Journal Article Category Essay Review Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9631-4 Authors Michael Bishop, Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, 156 C Dodd Hall, Tallahassee, FL 32306, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  5. Michael Bishop (2012). Editor's Introduction. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 7 (1).
    Philosophers investigate the nature of morality. And scientists study the moral judgments people make, the moral norms people enforce, and the systems of moral rules people embrace. What is the relationship between these investigations? The traditional philosophical view is that an unbreachable wall divides these activities. Philosophy and science investigate entirely separate domains. Philosophy investigates the normative realm – the true nature of morality. Science investigates the descriptive realm – how different people or groups of people think about morality and (...)
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  6. Michael Bishop (2012). The Network Theory of Well-Being: An Introduction. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 7 (1).
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  7. Chris Zarpentine, Heather Cipolletti & Michael Bishop (2012). WINO Epistemology and the Shifting-Sands Problem. The Monist 95 (2):308-328.
    By making plausible the Diversity Thesis (different people have systematically different and incompatible packages of epistemic intuitions), experimental epistemology raises the specter of the shifting-sands problem: the evidence base for epistemology contains systematic inconsistencies. In response to this problem, some philosophers deny the Diversity Thesis, while others flirt with denying the Evidence Thesis (in normal circumstances, the epistemic intuition that p is prima facie evidence that p is true). We propose to accept both theses. The trick to living with the (...)
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  8. Michael A. Bishop (2010). Why the Generality Problem is Everybody's Problem. Philosophical Studies 151 (2):285 - 298.
    The generality problem is widely considered to be a devastating objection to reliabilist theories of justification. My goal in this paper is to argue that a version of the generality problem applies to all plausible theories of justification. Assume that any plausible theory must allow for the possibility of reflective justification—S's belief, B, is justified on the basis of S's knowledge that she arrived at B as a result of a highly (but not perfectly) reliable way of reasoning, R. The (...)
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  9. Michael Bishop (2009). Reflections on Cognitive and Epistemic Diversity : Can a Stich in Time Save Quine? In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    In “Epistemology Naturalized”, Quine famously suggests that epistemology, properly understood, “simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science” (1969, 82). Since the appearance of Quine’s seminal article, virtually every epistemologist, including the later Quine (1986, 664), has repudiated the idea that a normative discipline like epistemology could be reduced to a purely descriptive discipline like psychology. Working epistemologists no longer take Quine’s vision in “Epistemology Naturalized” seriously. In this paper, I will explain why I (...)
     
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  10. Michael Bishop & Dominic Murphy (eds.) (2009). Stich and His Critics. Blackwell.
    Through a challenging collection of original new essays from leading philosophical scholars, the text explores some of philosophy's most hotly-debated contemporary topics, including mental representation, theory of mind, nativism, moral ...
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  11. Dominic Murphy & Michael Bishop (2009). Introduction. In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  12. Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.) (2009). Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Through a challenging collection of original new essays from leading philosophical scholars, the text explores some of philosophy's most hotly-debated ...
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  13. Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout (2008). Strategic Reliabilism: A Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1049-1065.
    Strategic Reliabilism is a framework that yields relative epistemic evaluations of belief-producing cognitive processes. It is a theory of cognitive excellence, or more colloquially, a theory of reasoning excellence (where 'reasoning' is understood very broadly as any sort of cognitive process for coming to judgments or beliefs). First introduced in our book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment (henceforth EPHJ), the basic idea behind SR is that epistemically excellent reasoning is efficient reasoning that leads in a robustly reliable fashion (...)
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  14. Michael Bishop (2007). Notice Critique : Reconstructing Reason and Representation — Murray Clarke. Philosophiques 34 (2):367-374.
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  15. Michael Bishop (2007). Reconstructing Reason and Representation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):492–495.
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  16. Michael Bishop & Benett Bootz (2007). Goodbye, Justification. Hello World. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):269-285.
    There are simple rules for making important judgments that are more reliable than experts, but people refuse to use them People refuse even when they are told that these rules are more reliable than they are. When we say that people “refuse” to use the rule, we do not mean that people stubbornly refuse to carry out the steps indicated by the rule. Rather, people defect from the rule (i.e., they overturn the rule’s judgment) so often that they end up (...)
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  17. Michael A. Bishop (2006). Fast and Frugal Heuristics. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):201–223.
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  18. Michael A. Bishop (2006). Which Rights Should Be Universal? Review of Metaphysics 59 (3):683-685.
  19. Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout (2006). First Page Preview. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (2).
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  20. Michael A. Bishop (2005). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. Oxford University Press.
    Bishop and Trout here present a unique and provocative new approach to epistemology (the theory of human knowledge and reasoning). Their approach aims to liberate epistemology from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science. The approach is novel in its use of cost-benefit analysis to guide people facing real reasoning problems and in its framework for resolving normative disputes in psychology. Based on empirical data, Bishop and Trout show how (...)
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  21. Michael A. Bishop (2005). The Autonomy of Social Epistemology. Episteme 2 (1):65-78.
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  22. Michael A. Bishop, J. D. Trout, L. Johannes Brandl, Marian David, Leopold Stubenberg, Herman Cappelen & Ernie Lepore (2005). Appearance in This List Neither Guarantees nor Precludes a Future Review of the Book. Agamben, Giorgio, Trans. Kevin Attell, State of Exception, London and Chicago: Univer-Sity of Chicago Press, 2005, Pp. Vii+ 95,£ 8.50, $12.00. Aiken, William and John Haldane (Eds), Philosophy and Its Public Role, Exeter, UK and Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 2004, Pp. Vi+ 272,£ 14.95, $29.90. [REVIEW] Mind 114:454.
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  23. Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout (2005). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. OUP USA.
    Bishop and Trout here present a unique and provocative new approach to epistemology (the theory of human knowledge and reasoning). Their approach aims to liberate epistemology from the scholastic debates of standard analytic epistemology, and treat it as a branch of the philosophy of science. The approach is novel in its use of cost-benefit analysis to guide people facing real reasoning problems and in its framework for resolving normative disputes in psychology. Based on empirical data, Bishop and Trout show how (...)
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  24. Michael Bishop & J. D. Trout (2005). The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology. Noûs 39 (4):696 - 714.
    Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) names a contingently clustered class of methods and theses that have dominated English-speaking epistemology for about the past half-century. The major contemporary theories of SAE include versions of foundationalism (Chisholm 1981, Pollock 1974), coherentism (Bonjour 1985, Lehrer 1974), reliabilism (Dretske 1981, Goldman 1986) and contextualism (DeRose 1995, Lewis 1996). While proponents of SAE don’t agree about how to define naturalized epistemology, most agree that a thoroughgoing naturalism in epistemology can’t work. For the purposes of this paper, (...)
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  25. J. D. Trout & Michael Bishop (2005). The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology. Noûs 39 (4):696-714.
    Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) names a contingently clustered class of methods and theses that have dominated English-speaking epistemology for about the past half-century. The major contemporary theories of SAE include versions of foundationalism (Chisholm 1981, Pollock 1974), coherentism (Bonjour 1985, Lehrer 1974), reliabilism (Dretske 1981, Goldman 1986) and contextualism (DeRose 1995, Lewis 1996). While proponents of SAE don’t agree about how to define naturalized epistemology, most agree that a thoroughgoing naturalism in epistemology can’t work. For the purposes of this paper, (...)
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  26. Michael A. Bishop (2003). The Pessimistic Induction, the Flight to Reference and the Metaphysical Zoo. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):161 – 178.
    Scientific realism says of our best scientific theories that (1) most of their important posits exist and (2) most of their central claims are approximately true. Antirealists sometimes offer the pessimistic induction in reply: since (1) and (2) are false about past successful theories, they are probably false about our own best theories too. The contemporary debate about this argument has turned (and become stuck) on the question, Do the central terms of successful scientific theories refer? For example, Larry Laudan (...)
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  27. Michael Bishop (2002). Years of Successful Predictive Modeling Should Be Enough: Lessons for Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S197-S208.
    Our aim in this paper is to bring the woefully neglected literature on predictive modeling to bear on some central questions in the philosophy of science. The lesson of this literature is straightforward: For a very wide range of prediction problems, statistical prediction rules (SPRs), often rules that are very easy to implement, make predictions than are as reliable as, and typically more reliable than, human experts. We will argue that the success of SPRs forces us to reconsider our views (...)
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  28. Michael A. Bishop (2002). The Theory Theory Thrice Over: The Child as Scientist, Superscientist, or Social Institution? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 33 (1):121-36.
    Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff have argued for a view they call the ‘theory theory’: theory change in science and children are similar. While their version of the theory theory has been criticized for depending on a number of disputed claims, we argue that there is a fundamental problem which is much more basic: the theory theory is multiply ambiguous. We show that it might be claiming that a similarity holds between theory change in children and (i) individual scientists, (ii) (...)
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  29. Richard Samuels, Stephen Stich & Michael Bishop (2002). Ending the Rationality Wars: How to Make Disputes About Human Rationality Disappear. In Renee Elio (ed.), Common Sense, Reasoning and Rationality. Oxford University Press. 236-268.
    During the last 25 years, researchers studying human reasoning and judgment in what has become known as the “heuristics and biases” tradition have produced an impressive body of experimental work which many have seen as having “bleak implications” for the rationality of ordinary people (Nisbett and Borgida 1975). According to one proponent of this view, when we reason about probability we fall victim to “inevitable illusions” (Piattelli-Palmarini 1994). Other proponents maintain that the human mind is prone to “systematic deviations from (...)
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  30. Bill Robinson & Michael Bishop (2001). Elmer Daniel Klemke, 1926-2000. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74 (5):238 - 239.
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  31. Michael A. Bishop (2000). In Praise of Epistemic Irresponsibility: How Lazy and Ignorant Can You Be? Synthese 122 (1-2):179 - 208.
    Epistemic responsibility involves at least two central ideas. (V) To be epistemically responsible is to display the virtue(s) epistemic internalists take to be central to justification (e.g., coherence, having good reasons, fitting the evidence). (C) In normal (non-skeptical)circumstances and in thelong run, epistemic responsibility is strongly positively correlated with reliability. Sections 1 and 2 review evidence showing that for a wide range of real-world problems, the most reliable, tractable reasoning strategies audaciously flout the internalist''s epistemic virtues. In Section 3, I (...)
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  32. Michael Bishop, Richard Samuels & Stephen Stich (2000). Editors' Note. Synthese 122 (1-2):1-1.
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  33. Michael Bishop (1999). Semantic Flexibility in Scientific Practice: A Study of Newton's Optics. Philosophy and Rhetoric 32 (3):210 - 232.
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  34. Michael A. Bishop (1999). Why Thought Experiments Are Not Arguments. Philosophy of Science 66 (4):534-541.
    Are thought experiments nothing but arguments? I argue that it is not possible to make sense of the historical trajectory of certain thought experiments if one takes them to be arguments. Einstein and Bohr disagreed about the outcome of the clock-in-the-box thought experiment, and so they reconstructed it using different arguments. This is to be expected whenever scientists disagree about a thought experiment's outcome. Since any such episode consists of two arguments but just one thought experiment, the thought experiment cannot (...)
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  35. Michael Bishop (1998). An Epistemological Role for Thought Experiments. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 63:19-34.
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  36. Michael A. Bishop & Stephen P. Stich (1998). The Flight to Reference, or How Not to Make Progress in the Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 65 (1):33-49.
    The flight to reference is a widely-used strategy for resolving philosophical issues. The three steps in a flight to reference argument are: (1) offer a substantive account of the reference relation, (2) argue that a particular expression refers (or does not refer), and (3) draw a philosophical conclusion about something other than reference, like truth or ontology. It is our contention that whenever the flight to reference strategy is invoked, there is a crucial step that is left undefended, and that (...)
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  37. Michael A. Bishop (1997). Existential Cognition. International Studies in Philosophy 29 (4):130-131.
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  38. Michael Bishop (1996). Biology, Ethics, and the Origins of Life. Teaching Philosophy 19 (3):302-304.
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  39. Michael Bishop (1996). What is This Thing Called Science? Teaching Philosophy 19 (2):204-206.
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  40. Michael Bishop (1996). Book Review:Rethinking Objectivity Allan Megill. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 63 (1):145-.
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  41. Michael Bishop (1992). Commentary on< Em> The Possibility of an Evolutionary Semantics: The Nature and Evolution of Human Language. Between the Species 8 (2):10.
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  42. Michael A. Bishop (1992). Theory-Ladenness of Perception Arguments. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:287 - 299.
    The first aim of this paper is to adduce a framework for understanding theory-ladenness of perception arguments. The second aim is to begin to assess an important cluster of theory-ladenness arguments-those that begin with some psychological phenomenon and conclude that scientific controversies are resolved without appeal to theory-neutral observations. Three of the arguments (from expectation effects, ambiguous figures, and inverting lenses) turn out to be either irrelevant to or subversive of theory-ladenness. And even if we grant the premises of the (...)
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  43. Michael A. Bishop (1992). The Possibility of Conceptual Clarity in Philosophy. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):267 - 277.
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  44. Michael A. Bishop (1991). Why the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis is Self-Defeating. Philosophical Studies 63 (3):343 - 356.