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Michael E. Bratman [39]Michael Bratman [25]
  1. Michael Bratman, Normative Thinking and Planning, Individual and Shared: Reflections on Allan Gibbard's Tanner Lectures.
    There is thinking, conducted by a single person, about how to live. And there is thinking together– a kind of “language infused”(5) shared activity – about how to live together. In the first of these fascinating and deeply probing Tanner Lectures Allan Gibbard is concerned with both of these phenomena and with how they interact.
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  2. Michael Bratman (forthcoming). Reflections on the Philosophy of Action. In Jesus Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. Automatic Press/VIP.
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  3. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Temptation and the Agent's Standpoint. Inquiry 57 (3):293-310.
  4. Michael E. Bratman (2013). The Interplay of Intention and Reason. Ethics 123 (4):657-672.
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  5. Michael E. Bratman (2013). Yaffe on Criminal Attempts. Legal Theory 19 (2):101-113.
    Central to Gideon Yaffe's powerful theory of the legitimate criminalization of unsuccessful attempts is his according to which, I argue that this principle, taken together with Yaffe's theory of the nature of attempts, threatens to lead to a normatively problematic conclusion in support of the legitimate criminalization of attempts that are merely a matter of thinking and do not involve action in the public space. And I argue that Yaffe's efforts to block this conclusion are themselves problematic. This leads to (...)
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  6. Michael E. Bratman (2012). Constructivism, Agency, and the Problem of Alignment. In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 81.
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  7. Michael E. Bratman (2012). Time, Rationality, and Self-Governance. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):73-88.
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  8. John Perry, Michael Bratman & John Martin Fischer (eds.) (2012). Introduction to Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Sixth Edition, is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. The sixth edition includes five new readings--by renowned contemporary philosophers Anthony Brueckner, John Martin Fischer, Alan Goldman, Rosalind Hursthouse, and Thomas Nagel--and additional descriptive material on the authors throughout the book.
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  9. Michael E. Bratman (2011). Intention Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.
    The practical thought of planning agents is subject to distinctive rationality norms. In particular, there are norms of intention consistency and of means-end coherence. I discuss the normative significance of these norms and their relation to practical reasons. I seek a path between views that see these norms as, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality, and views that see the idea that these norms have distinctive normative significance as a 'myth'. And I seek to distinguish these norms from principles about (...)
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  10. Michael Bratman (2009). Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. 13--36.
    Two approaches to instrumental rationality Suppose I intend end E, believe that a necessary means to E is M, and believe that M requires that I intend M. My attitudes concerning E and M engage a basic requirement of practical rationality, a requirement that, barring a change in my cited beliefs, I either intend M or give up intending E.2 Call this the Instrumental Rationality requirement – for short, the IR requirement.
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  11. Michael Bratman (2009). Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149 - 165.
    Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these (...)
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  12. Michael Bratman (2009). Shared Agency. In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press. 41--59.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways. Forms of shared activity matter to us a great deal, both intrinsically – think of friendship and love, singing duets, and the joys of conversation -- and instrumentally – think of how we frequently manage to work together to achieve complex goals. My focus will be on activities of small, adult groups in the absence of asymmetric authority relations within those groups. My approach begins with an underlying model of individual planning agency, and (...)
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  13. Michael E. Bratman (2009). Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Oup Oxford.
  14. Michael E. Bratman (2009). Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self‐Governance. Ethics 119 (3):411-443.
  15. Michael E. Bratman (2009). I Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality. In David Sobel Steven Wall (ed.), Reasons for Action. 13.
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  16. Michael E. Bratman (2009). Setiya on Intention, Rationality and Reasons. Analysis 69 (3):510-521.
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  17. John Perry, Michael Bratman & John Martin Fischer (2009). Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Fourth Edition, International Edition. Oup Usa.
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  18. Michael Bratman (2007). Anchors for Deliberation. In Christoph Lumer & Sandro Nannini (eds.), Intentionality, deliberation and autonomy: the action-theoretic basis of practical philosophy. Ashgate Publishing.
    This chapter sketches a model of deliberation that is anchored in plan-like commitments of the agent, commitments that constitute a form of valuing. These anchors need not be inescapable, they can sensibly vary from person to person, they can stand in complex relations to judgments about the good, and they play basic roles in the coss-temporal organization of practical thought and action. And deliberation so understood is, I conjecture, central to autonomy and self-government. The model sketched here is located in (...)
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  19. Michael Bratman (2007). Structures of Agency: Essays. Oxford University Press.
    This is a collection of published and unpublished essays by distinguished philosopher Michael E. Bratman of Stanford University. They revolve around his influential theory, know as the "planning theory of intention and agency." Bratman's primary concern is with what he calls "strong" forms of human agency--including forms of human agency that are the target of our talk about self-determination, self-government, and autonomy. These essays are unified and cohesive in theme, and will be of interest to philosophers in ethics and metaphysics.
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  20. Michael Bratman (2007). Temptation Revisited. In Bruno Verbeek (ed.), Reasons and Intentions. Ashgate Pub. Ltd..
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  21. Michael E. Bratman (2007). Geteilte Absichten. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 55 (3):409-424.
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  22. John Perry, Michael Bratman & John Martin Fischer (eds.) (2007). Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
    Introduction to Philosophy, Fourth Edition, is the most comprehensive topically organized collection of classical and contemporary philosophy available. Building on the exceptionally successful tradition of previous editions, this edition for the first time incorporates the insights of a new coeditor, John Martin Fischer, and has been updated and revised to make it more accessible. Ideal for introductory philosophy courses, the text includes sections on the meaning of life, God and evil, knowledge and reality, the philosophy of science, the mind/body problem, (...)
     
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  23. Michael E. Bratman (2006). Dynamics of Sociality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):1–15.
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  24. Michael E. Bratman (2006). What is the Accordion Effect? Journal of Ethics 10 (1-2):5 - 19.
    In "Action and Responsibility,'' Joel Feinberg pointed to an important idea to which he gave the label "the accordion effect.'' Feinberg's discussion of this idea is of interest on its own, but it is also of interest because of its interaction with his critique, in his "Causing Voluntary Actions,'' of a much discussed view of H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré that Feinberg labels the "voluntary intervention principle.'' In this essay I reflect on what the accordion effect is (...)
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  25. Michael E. Bratman (2006). "Thinking How to Live" and the Restriction Problem. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):707 - 713.
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  26. Michael Bratman (2004). Shared Valuing and Frameworks for Practical Reasoning. In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press. 1--27.
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  27. Michael E. Bratman (2004). Three Forms of Agential Commitment: Reply to Cullity and Gerrans. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):327–335.
  28. Michael E. Bratman (2004). Three Theories of Self-Governance. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):21-46.
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  29. Michael E. Bratman (2003). Autonomy and Hierarchy. Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2):156-176.
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  30. Michael E. Bratman (2003). A Desire of One's Own. Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):221-42.
    You can sometimes have and be moved by desires which you in some sense disown. The problem is whether we can make sense of these ideas of---as I will say---ownership and rejection of a desire, without appeal to a little person in the head who is looking on at the workings of her desires and giving the nod to some but not to others. Frankfurt's proposed solution to this problem, sketched in his 1971 article, has come to be called the (...)
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  31. Michael Bratman (2002). Nozick on Free Will. In David Schmidtz (ed.), Robert Nozick. Cambridge University Press. 155--174.
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  32. Michael E. Bratman (2002). Shapiro on Legal Positivism and Jointly Intentional Activity. Legal Theory 8 (4):511-517.
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  33. Michael E. Bratman (2001). Two Problems About Human Agency. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326.
    I consider two inter-related problems in the philosophy of action. One concerns the role of the agent in the determination of action, and I call it the problem of agential authority. The other concerns the relation between motivating desire and the agent's normative deliberation, and I call it the problem of subjective normative authority. In part by way of discussion of work of Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard, I argue that we make progress with these problems by appeal to certain (...)
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  34. Michael E. Bratman (2000). Review: Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility and History. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):453 - 458.
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  35. Michael E. Bratman (2000). Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency. Philosophical Review 109 (1):35-61.
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  36. Michael E. Bratman (2000). Valuing and the Will. Noûs 34 (s14):249 - 265.
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  37. Michael Bratman (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for (...)
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  38. Michael Bratman (1999). I Intend That We J. In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press. 142–161.
  39. Michael Bratman (1998). Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention. In Jules L. Coleman, Christopher W. Morris & Gregory S. Kavka (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge University Press. 59--83.
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  40. Michael E. Bratman (1998). Morality, Normativity, and Society. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):986-989.
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  41. Michael E. Bratman (1998). The Sources of Normativity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):699 - 709.
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  42. Michael E. Bratman (1998). Review of Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):699-709.
  43. Michael E. Bratman (1997). Responsibility and Planning. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):27-43.
    We are planning agents and we are, or so we suppose, responsible agents. How are these two distinctive aspects of our agency related? In his "Freedom and Resentment" Peter Strawson understands responsible agency in terms of "reactive attitudes" like resentment and gratitude, attitudes which are normally embedded in "ordinary inter-personal relationships." I draw on Strawson''s account to sketch an answer to my question about responsibility and planning. First, the fact that an action is plan-embedded can influence the agent''s degree of (...)
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  44. Michael E. Bratman (1996). Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):1-18.
    I [try] to understand identification by appeal to phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, a desire of one's as reason-giving in one's practical reasoning, planning, and action. Is identification, so understood, "fundamental," as Frankfurt says, "to any philosophy of mind and of action"? Well, we have seen reason to include in our model of intentional agency such phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, certain of one's desires as reason-giving. Identification, at bottom, consists in such phenomena — (...)
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  45. Michael E. Bratman (1995). Review of Action, Intention, and Reason by Robert Audi. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (4):927-.
  46. Michael E. Bratman (1994). Kagan on "the Appeal to Cost". Ethics 104 (2):325-332.
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  47. Michael E. Bratman (1993). Shared Intention. Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
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  48. Michael E. Bratman (1992). Planning and the Stability of Intention. Minds and Machines 2 (1):1-16.
    I sketch my general model of the roles of intentions in the planning of agents like us-agents with substantial resource limitations and with important needs for coordination. I then focus on the stability of prior intentions: their rational resistance to reconsideration. I emphasize the importance of cases in which one's nonreconsideration of a prior intention is nondeliberative and is grounded in relevant habits of reconsideration. Concerning such cases I argue for a limited form of two-tier consequentialism, one that is restricted (...)
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  49. Michael E. Bratman (1992). Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context. Mind 101 (401):1-16.
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  50. Michael E. Bratman (1992). Shared Cooperative Activity. Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
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