This essay reflects on the declining fortunes of C.B. Macpherson's thesis regarding the 'bourgeois' character of Hobbes's political thought. Through a detailed engagement with Macpherson's critics, I argue that determinate transformations of society in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England provide a compelling basis for a revised version of his thesis, if common misinterpretations are corrected and the transition to capitalism is located in the rise of a capitalist aristocracy, as in recent Marxist historiography. Locating Hobbes within this historical frame, allows an (...) account of 'social origins' that penetrates more deeply into the core of his thought than Macpherson's own reading allows: tracing the impact of market imperatives to a specific model of rationalized desire and its fraught relationship with an indeterminate future it perpetually summons up and seeks to master. (shrink)

"The fundamental ambiguity of the scholastic universes and all of their productions … lies in the fact that their apartness from the world of production is both a liberatory break and a disconnection, a potentially crippling separation." "Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations1" "The public sphere is in this scene what one might call the factory of politics—its site of production." "Alexander Kluge, “On Film and the Public Sphere”2"In political and cultural theory today, all roads seem to lead through the public sphere. (...) In an era of apparent political regression and economic decline, grand pronouncements of radical…. (shrink)

Oriented, descriptively, by recent liberal definitions of populism, this essay pursues a historical-materialist definition that grounds populist antagonisms in class struggles as ‘crystallised’ in the capitalist state. A critical assessment of Laclau’s early equation of populism and socialism inaugurates the reading of Poulantzas’s relational account of class and state as a nascent framework for a theory of populism, centred on the state and its ideological crystallisation of individualisation, the mental/manual-labour division and the ‘people-nation’. This framework is then expanded to articulate (...) the political-economic core of populist antagonisms, the specific character of ‘neoliberal populism’ today, and the potential, in relation to theories of ‘popular politics’ and a ‘communist people’, that left-wing populism might hold as a process of new political productions of class. This reading provides for a more expansive account of such movements’ potentials, beyond a threat to or correction of pre-determined democratic or Marxist schemas. (shrink)

This essay traces out, in the works of Thomas Hobbes, the theoretical development of what I argue is the essential temporal element of modern thought: anxiety regarding the future. What finds systematic expression in Hobbes’s psychology and politics is the dilemma that modern thinking inherits: the project of social rationalization perpetuates an image of an indeterminate future, to which the only possible response is rational submission to a project of administration over men akin to that which science practices on nature.

In addressing the immensity of Hegel’s system, books of brief essays by different authors often seem at once helpful and hopeless. Helpful because that immensity is often daunting and we must find ourselves inclined to localize, to seek particular points of contact from which we might begin fruitfully to engage with the system and find our way into it. Hopeless because Hegel himself seems to warn us against such an endeavor; for there is, he tells us, no “royal road to (...) science.” To grasp Spirit we must grasp its entire movement, and to know any part we must know the whole which is the immanent movement of those parts. The only place to begin is at the beginning and it is a long road. (shrink)

Breckman’s intention, as his title suggests, is to trace the development—or, more tendentiously, the origin—of Marx’s thought through his relation to the Young Hegelians, the principle figures of the Prussian left just prior to Marx. Though Marx engaged in frequent acts of polemical distinction between himself and these earlier thinkers, Breckman suggests we have been too quick to take Marx at his own word and to locate the source of his theory in “his opposition to the private property regime of (...) capitalism and the doctrine that underpins classical political economy and liberal bourgeoisie society”. This source, Breckman suggests, would be better sought in Marx’s appropriation and development of the Young Hegelian’s religious debates with conservative critics of Hegel who defended a personalist conception of God. It is one of Breckman’s central and most convincing contentions that these religious debates over the nature of God must be read equally as political debates between a defense of monarchal sovereignty modeled on the personalist God and a leftist critique of this conception, which struggles to construct out of Hegel’s “World Spirit” a secularized conception of social unity that might establish the grounds for a noncoercive political form. (shrink)

The story Heidegger tells of the inauguration of western metaphysics in the teleological impulse of Aristotle’s formal cause is by now a familiar one, and the story of how this metaphysics is also one which privileges the modality of vision is equally well known. Yet what is often forgotten is that Aristotle himself, in de Anima, does not privilege vision in the orders of the soul but, to the contrary, identifies touch as the primary, and in fact the only necessary, (...) sense in animals—essential to their being—while the other senses, including sight, contribute only to their “well-being.” While the telos of Plato’s cave is the ascent into the pure light of the Good, the biological vision of Aristotelian animals, including man, is something they only have because they live in air, and must find their food. Thus, the paradoxical nature of the rational animal: the eye that tries to see from outside its skin. (shrink)