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Michael D. Resnik [76]Michael David Resnik [21]
  1. Michael D. Resnik (1997). Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. New York ;Oxford University Press.
    This book expounds a system of ideas about the nature of mathematics which Michael Resnik has been elaborating for a number of years. In calling mathematics a science he implies that it has a factual subject-matter and that mathematical knowledge is on a par with other scientific knowledge; in calling it a science of patterns he expresses his commitment to a structuralist philosophy of mathematics. He links this to a defense of realism about the metaphysics of mathematics--the view that mathematics (...)
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  2. C. Ward Henson, Bjarni Jónsson, E. G. K. Lopez-Escobar & Michael D. Resnik (1974). Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic: Atlanta 1973. Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (2):390-405.
  3.  71
    Michael D. Resnik (1981). Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Ontology and Reference. Noûs 15 (4):529-550.
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  4.  93
    Michael D. Resnik (1988). Second-Order Logic Still Wild. Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):75-87.
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  5. Michael D. Resnik (1997). Mathematics as a Science of Patterns. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Mathematics as a Science of Patterns is the definitive exposition of a system of ideas about the nature of mathematics which Michael Resnik has been elaborating for a number of years. In calling mathematics a science he implies that it has a factual subject-matter and that mathematical knowledge is on a par with other scientific knowledge; in calling it a science of patterns he expresses his commitment to a structuralist philosophy of mathematics. He links this to a defence of realism (...)
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  6. Michael D. Resnik & Nicoletta Orlandi (2003). Holistic Realism: A Response to Katz on Holism and Intuition. Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4):301-315.
  7. Michael D. Resnik (1990). Immanent Truth. Mind 99 (395):405-424.
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  8. Michael D. Resnik & David Kushner (1987). Explanation, Independence and Realism in Mathematics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):141-158.
  9.  44
    Michael D. Resnik (1980). Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics. Cornell University Press.
  10.  49
    Michael D. Resnik (1982). Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Epistemology. Noûs 16 (1):95-105.
  11.  77
    Michael D. Resnik (1985). How Nominalist is Hartry Field's Nominalism? Philosophical Studies 47 (2):163 - 181.
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  12.  87
    Michael D. Resnik (1985). Logic: Normative or Descriptive? The Ethics of Belief or a Branch of Psychology? Philosophy of Science 52 (2):221-238.
    By a logical theory I mean a formal system together with its semantics, meta-theory, and rules for translating ordinary language into its notation. Logical theories can be used descriptively (for example, to represent particular arguments or to depict the logical form of certain sentences). Here the logician uses the usual methods of empirical science to assess the correctness of his descriptions. However, the most important applications of logical theories are normative, and here, I argue, the epistemology is that of wide (...)
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  13.  39
    Michael David Resnik (1974). The Frege-Hilbert Controversy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (3):386-403.
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  14. Daniel A. Albert, Ronald Munson & Michael D. Resnik (1988). Reasoning in Medicine an Introduction to Clinical Inference. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
     
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  15.  5
    Michael D. Resnik (1995). Review of J. Azzouni, Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice: The Ontology and Epistemology of the Exact Sciences. [REVIEW] Philosophia Mathematica 3 (3).
  16.  52
    Michael D. Resnik (2004). Structuralism and the Independence of Mathematics. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):39-51.
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  17.  22
    Michael D. Resnik (1975). Mathematical Knowledge and Pattern Cognition. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):25 - 39.
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  18.  60
    Michael D. Resnik (1999). Review of G. Boolos, Logic, Logic, and Logic. Philosophia Mathematica 7 (3):328-335.
  19.  43
    Michael D. Resnik (1985). Ontology and Logic: Remarks on Hartry Field's Anti-Platonist Philosophy of Mathematics. History and Philosophy of Logic 6 (1):191-209.
    In Science without numbers Hartry Field attempted to formulate a nominalist version of Newtonian physics?one free of ontic commitment to numbers, functions or sets?sufficiently strong to have the standard platonist version as a conservative extension. However, when uses for abstract entities kept popping up like hydra heads, Field enriched his logic to avoid them. This paper reviews some of Field's attempts to deflate his ontology by inflating his logic.
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  20.  27
    Michael D. Resnik (1974). On the Philosophical Significance of Consistency Proofs. Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1/2):133 - 147.
    We have seen that despite Feferman's results Gödel's second theorem vitiates the use of Hilbert-type epistemological programs and consistency proofs as a response to mathematical skepticism. Thus consistency proofs fail to have the philosophical significance often attributed to them.This does not mean that consistency proofs are of no interest to philosophers. We know that a ‘non-pathological’ consistency proof for a system S will use methods which are not available in S. When S is as strong a system as we are (...)
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  21.  28
    Michael D. Resnik (1989). A Naturalized Epistemology for a Platonist Mathematical Ontology. Philosophica 43.
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  22.  55
    Michael D. Resnik (1999). Against Logical Realism. History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (3-4):181-194.
    This paper argues against Logical Realism, in particular against the view that there are facts of matters of logic that obtain independently of us, our linguistic conventions and inferential practices. The paper challenges logical realists to provide a non-intuition based epistemology, one which would be compatible with the empiricist and naturalist convictions motivating much recent anti-realist philosophy of mathematics.
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  23.  61
    Michael D. Resnik (1992). A Structuralist's Involvement with Modality. Mind 101 (401):107-122.
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  24.  13
    Michael D. Resnik (1989). Computation and Mathematical Empiricism. Philosophical Topics 17 (2):129-144.
  25.  24
    Michael D. Resnik (1979). II. Frege as Idealist and Then Realist. Inquiry 22 (1-4):350-357.
    Michael Dummett argued that Frege was a realist while Hans Sluga countered that he was an objective idealist in the rationalist tradition of Kant and Lotze. Sluga ties Frege's idealism to the context principle which he argues Frege never gave up. It is argued that Sluga has correctly interpreted the pre?1891 Frege while Dummett is correct concerning the later period. It is also claimed that the context principle was dropped prior to 1891 to be replaced by the doctrine of unsaturated (...)
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  26.  9
    Michael D. Resnik (1984). Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects by Crispin Wright. Journal of Philosophy 81 (12):778-783.
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  27.  19
    Michael D. Resnik (1999). Realistic Rationalism. Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):207-211.
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  28. Michael D. Resnik (2000). Parsons on Mathematical Intuition and Obviousness. In Gila Sher & Richard L. Tieszen (eds.), Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons. Cambridge University Press 219--231.
     
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  29.  35
    Michael David Resnik (1966). On Skolem's Paradox. Journal of Philosophy 63 (15):425-438.
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  30.  21
    Michael David Resnik (1967). The Context Principle in Frege's Philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (3):356-365.
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  31.  8
    Michael D. Resnik (1983). A Restriction on a Theorem of Harsanyi. Theory and Decision 15 (4):309-320.
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  32. Michael D. Resnik (1988). Mathematics From the Structural Point of View in Philosophie des Mathématiques. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 42 (167):400-424.
     
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  33.  26
    Michael D. Resnik (1996). Quine, the Argument From Proxy Functions, and Structuralism. Philosophical Topics 24 (1):129-148.
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  34.  18
    Michael D. Resnik (1990). Between Mathematics and Physics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:369 - 378.
    Nothing has been more central to philosophy of mathematics than the distinction between mathematical and physical objects. Yet consideration of quantum particles shows the inadequacy of the popular spacetime and causal characterizations of the distinction. It also raises problems for an assumption used recently by Field, Hellman and Horgan, namely, that the mathematical realm is metaphysically independent of the physical one.
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  35.  10
    Michael D. Resnik (1988). Mathematics From the Structural Point of View. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 42 (4):400-424.
    This paper is a nontechnical exposition of the author's view that mathematics is a science of patterns and that mathematical objects are positions in patterns. the new elements in this paper are epistemological, i.e., first steps towards a postulational theory of the genesis of our knowledge of patterns.
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  36.  40
    Michael D. Resnik (1987). You Can't Trust an Ideal Theory to Tell the Truth. Philosophical Studies 52 (2):151--60.
  37.  12
    Michael D. Resnik (1994). What is Structuralism? In Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala. Kluwer 355--364.
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  38.  25
    Michael David Resnik (1965). Frege's Theory of Incomplete Entities. Philosophy of Science 32 (3/4):329-341.
    This paper examines four arguments in support of Frege's theory of incomplete entities, the heart of his semantics and ontology. Two of these arguments are based upon Frege's contributions to the foundations of mathematics. These are shown to be question-begging. Two are based upon Frege's solution to the problem of the relation of language to thought and reality. They are metaphysical in nature and they force Frege to maintain a theory of types. The latter puts his theory of incomplete entities (...)
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  39.  19
    Michael D. Resnik (1990). Mathematical Intuition. Review of Metaphysics 44 (2):442-444.
  40.  5
    Michael D. Resnik (1992). Constructibility and Mathematical Existence by Charles S. Chihara. Journal of Philosophy 89 (12):648-651.
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  41.  16
    Michael David Resnik (1969). More on Skolem's Paradox. Noûs 3 (2):185-196.
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  42.  25
    Chung-Ying Cheng & Michael David Resnik (1965). Ontic Commitment and the Empty Universe. Journal of Philosophy 62 (14):359-364.
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  43.  9
    Susan C. Hale & Michael D. Resnik (1987). Science Nominalized? Philosophy of Science 54 (2):277-280.
    We argue that Horgan's program for nominalizing science fails, because its translation of quantitative statements destroys the inferential structures of explanations, predictions and retrodictions of nonquantitative scientific facts.
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  44.  18
    Michael D. Resnik (1986). Impartial Welfarism and the Concept of a Person. Erkenntnis 25 (1):47 - 60.
    This paper examines some work in welfare economics based upon generalized social welfare function (GSWFs). Impartial welfarism consists in a set of apparently quite weak moral axioms concerning GSWFs. Using that framework, welfare economists have derived both utilitarian and Rawlsian doctrines. These results would seem to be of great importance to moral philosophy. I argue, however, that applying them presupposes a view of persons as mere place holders for preferences, thereby limiting the theorems' appeal for moral philosophers. I propose a (...)
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  45.  20
    Michael D. Resnik (1999). Review of J. P. Burgess and G. A. Rosen, A Subject With No Object. Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics. [REVIEW] Noûs 33 (3):505–516.
  46.  2
    Michael David Resnik (1968). Logic and Scientific Methodology in the Writings of Mencius. International Philosophical Quarterly 8 (2):212-230.
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  47.  9
    Michael D. Resnik (1969). A Set Theoretic Approach to the Simple Theory of Types. Theoria 35 (3):239-258.
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  48.  11
    Michael D. Resnik (1993). Frege. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):961-963.
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  49.  3
    Michael D. Resnik (1986). Frege's Proof of Referentiality. In L. Haaparanta & J. Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized. D. Reidel Publishing Co. 177--195.
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  50.  4
    Alex C. Michalos, Robert E. Butts & Michael David Resnik (1971). Book Review:The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Paul Edwards. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 38 (4):612-.
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