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Michael E. Bratman [56]Michael Edward Bratman [1]
  1. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. OUP Usa.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways that matter to us a great deal. This book explores the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of such sociality. It argues that appeal to the planning structures involved in our individual, temporally extended agency provides substantial resources for understanding these foundations of our sociality.
     
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  2.  45
    Michael E. Bratman (2012). Time, Rationality, and Self-Governance. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):73-88.
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  3. Michael E. Bratman (1993). Shared Intention. Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
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  4. Michael E. Bratman (1992). Shared Cooperative Activity. Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
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  5. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways, and these forms of shared activity matter to us a great deal. Think of friendship and love, singing duets, dancing together, and the joys of conversation. And think about the usefulness of conversation and how we frequently manage to work together to achieve complex goals, from building buildings to putting on plays to establishing important results in the sciences.With Shared Agency, Michael E. Bratman seeks to answer questions about the conceptual, metaphysical and normative (...)
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  6. Michael E. Bratman (2009). Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self‐Governance. Ethics 119 (3):411-443.
  7. Michael E. Bratman (1992). Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context. Mind 101 (401):1-16.
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  8. Michael E. Bratman (2000). Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency. Philosophical Review 109 (1):35-61.
  9. Michael E. Bratman (2009). Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. OUP Oxford
  10. Michael E. Bratman (2003). A Desire of One's Own. Journal of Philosophy 100 (5):221-42.
    You can sometimes have and be moved by desires which you in some sense disown. The problem is whether we can make sense of these ideas of---as I will say---ownership and rejection of a desire, without appeal to a little person in the head who is looking on at the workings of her desires and giving the nod to some but not to others. Frankfurt's proposed solution to this problem, sketched in his 1971 article, has come to be called the (...)
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  11. Michael E. Bratman (1996). Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason. Philosophical Topics 24 (2):1-18.
    I [try] to understand identification by appeal to phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, a desire of one's as reason-giving in one's practical reasoning, planning, and action. Is identification, so understood, "fundamental," as Frankfurt says, "to any philosophy of mind and of action"? Well, we have seen reason to include in our model of intentional agency such phenomena of deciding to treat, and of treating, certain of one's desires as reason-giving. Identification, at bottom, consists in such phenomena — (...)
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  12.  13
    Michael E. Bratman (2015). Shared Agency: Replies to Ludwig, Pacherie, Petersson, Roth, and Smith. Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1).
    These are replies to the discussions by Kirk Ludwig, Elizabeth Pacherie, Björn Petersson, Abraham Roth, and Thomas Smith of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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  13. Michael E. Bratman (2013). The Interplay of Intention and Reason. Ethics 123 (4):657-672.
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  14. Michael E. Bratman (2001). Two Problems About Human Agency. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309–326.
    I consider two inter-related problems in the philosophy of action. One concerns the role of the agent in the determination of action, and I call it the problem of agential authority. The other concerns the relation between motivating desire and the agent's normative deliberation, and I call it the problem of subjective normative authority. In part by way of discussion of work of Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard, I argue that we make progress with these problems by appeal to certain (...)
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  15. Michael E. Bratman (2011). Intention Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.
    The practical thought of planning agents is subject to distinctive rationality norms. In particular, there are norms of intention consistency and of means-end coherence. I discuss the normative significance of these norms and their relation to practical reasons. I seek a path between views that see these norms as, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality, and views that see the idea that these norms have distinctive normative significance as a 'myth'. And I seek to distinguish these norms from principles about (...)
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  16.  70
    Michael E. Bratman (2014). Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint. Inquiry 57 (3):293-310.
    Suppose you resolve now to resist an expected temptation later while knowing that once the temptation arrives your preference or evaluative assessment will shift in favor of that temptation. Are there defensible norms of rational planning agency that support sticking with your prior intention in the face of such a shift at the time of temptation and in the absence of relevant new information? This article defends the idea that it might be rational to stick with your prior intention in (...)
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  17.  90
    Michael E. Bratman (2003). Autonomy and Hierarchy. Social Philosophy and Policy 20 (2):156-176.
    In autonomous action the agent herself directs and governs the action. But what is it for the agent herself to direct and to govern? One theme in a series of articles by Harry G. Frankfurt is that we can make progress in answering this question by appeal to higher-order conative attitudes. Frankfurt's original version of this idea is that in acting of one's own free will, one is not acting simply because one desires so to act. Rather, it is also (...)
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  18.  8
    Michael E. Bratman (2015). Précis of Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):1-5.
    A précis of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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  19.  87
    Michael E. Bratman (2006). Dynamics of Sociality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):1–15.
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  20.  74
    Michael E. Bratman (2000). Valuing and the Will. Noûs 34 (s14):249 - 265.
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  21.  19
    Michael E. Bratman (2015). Shared Agency: Replies to Tenenbaum, Copp, and Schapiro. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3409-3420.
    This is a reply to discussions by David Copp, Tamar Schapiro, and Sergio Tenenbaum of Michael E. Bratman, Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together.
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  22.  88
    Michael E. Bratman (2004). Three Theories of Self-Governance. Philosophical Topics 32 (1/2):21-46.
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  23. Michael E. Bratman (2009). Setiya on Intention, Rationality and Reasons. Analysis 69 (3):510-521.
    ‘The idea that there are standards of practical reason apart from or independent of good character,’ Kieran Setiya trenchantly argues, ‘is a philosophical mirage’. 1 Setiya's argument in this fine book is a striking blend of philosophy of action and normative philosophy. A central claim is that the intention is a special kind of belief. I want both to challenge that claim and to reflect on a subtle argument in its favour that is in the background.1.Practical thinking, as understood by (...)
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  24.  49
    Michael E. Bratman (2013). Yaffe on Criminal Attempts. Legal Theory 19 (2):101-113.
    Central to Gideon Yaffe's powerful theory of the legitimate criminalization of unsuccessful attempts is his according to which, I argue that this principle, taken together with Yaffe's theory of the nature of attempts, threatens to lead to a normatively problematic conclusion in support of the legitimate criminalization of attempts that are merely a matter of thinking and do not involve action in the public space. And I argue that Yaffe's efforts to block this conclusion are themselves problematic. This leads to (...)
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  25. Michael E. Bratman (2006). What is the Accordion Effect? Journal of Ethics 10 (1-2):5 - 19.
    In "Action and Responsibility,'' Joel Feinberg pointed to an important idea to which he gave the label "the accordion effect.'' Feinberg's discussion of this idea is of interest on its own, but it is also of interest because of its interaction with his critique, in his "Causing Voluntary Actions,'' of a much discussed view of H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honoré that Feinberg labels the "voluntary intervention principle.'' In this essay I reflect on what the accordion effect is (...)
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  26. Michael E. Bratman (1998). Review of Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):699-709.
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  27. Michael E. Bratman (1992). Planning and the Stability of Intention. Minds and Machines 2 (1):1-16.
    I sketch my general model of the roles of intentions in the planning of agents like us-agents with substantial resource limitations and with important needs for coordination. I then focus on the stability of prior intentions: their rational resistance to reconsideration. I emphasize the importance of cases in which one's nonreconsideration of a prior intention is nondeliberative and is grounded in relevant habits of reconsideration. Concerning such cases I argue for a limited form of two-tier consequentialism, one that is restricted (...)
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  28. Michael E. Bratman (2007). Structures of Agency: Essays. Oxford University Press Usa.
    This is a collection of published and unpublished essays by distinguished philosopher Michael E. Bratman of Stanford University. They revolve around his influential theory, known as the 'planning theory of intention and agency'.
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  29. Michael E. Bratman (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for (...)
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  30. Michael E. Bratman (1997). Responsibility and Planning. Journal of Ethics 1 (1):27-43.
    We are planning agents and we are, or so we suppose, responsible agents. How are these two distinctive aspects of our agency related? In his "Freedom and Resentment" Peter Strawson understands responsible agency in terms of "reactive attitudes" like resentment and gratitude, attitudes which are normally embedded in "ordinary inter-personal relationships." I draw on Strawson''s account to sketch an answer to my question about responsibility and planning. First, the fact that an action is plan-embedded can influence the agent''s degree of (...)
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  31.  63
    Michael E. Bratman (1994). Kagan on "the Appeal to Cost". Ethics 104 (2):325-332.
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  32.  85
    Michael E. Bratman (1991). Cognitivism About Practical Reason (Review of Practical Reflection, by J. David Velleman). [REVIEW] Ethics 102 (1):117-.
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  33.  11
    Michael E. Bratman (2002). Shapiro on Legal Positivism and Jointly Intentional Activity. Legal Theory 8 (4):511-517.
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  34.  7
    Michael E. Bratman (2015). Précis of Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3375-3378.
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  35.  63
    Michael E. Bratman (2004). Three Forms of Agential Commitment: Reply to Cullity and Gerrans. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):327–335.
  36.  49
    Michael E. Bratman (1989). Intention and Personal Policies. Philosophical Perspectives 3:443-469.
  37.  3
    Michael E. Bratman (2009). Modest Sociality and the Distinctiveness of Intention. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):149-165.
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  38.  39
    Michael E. Bratman (2006). "Thinking How to Live" and the Restriction Problem. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):707 - 713.
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  39.  71
    Michael E. Bratman (1990). Dretske's Desires. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):795-800.
  40.  1
    Michael E. Bratman (2001). XV*-Two Problems About Human Agency. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):309-326.
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  41.  42
    Michael E. Bratman (1998). The Sources of Normativity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):699 - 709.
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  42.  15
    Michael E. Bratman (2012). Constructivism, Agency, and the Problem of Alignment. In Jimmy Lenman & Yonatan Shemmer (eds.), Constructivism in Practical Philosophy. Oxford University Press 81.
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  43.  38
    Michael E. Bratman (1995). Review of Action, Intention, and Reason by Robert Audi. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (4):927-.
  44.  1
    Michael E. Bratman (2004). Three Forms of Agential Commitment: Reply to Cullity and Gerrans. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):327-335.
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  45.  33
    Michael E. Bratman (2007). Geteilte Absichten. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 55 (3):409-424.
    Michael Bratmans individualistischer Ansatz geteilter Absichten im Kontext gemeinsamen absichtlichen Handelns ist in seiner Betonung des Teilens von intentionalen Zuständen klar nicht-atomistisch: Wenn zwei Akteure eine Absicht teilen, greifen nicht bloß ihre Subpläne ineinander, sondern ihre individuellen Einstellungen müssen so zueinander in Wechselbeziehung stehen, dass die Bindung nicht bloß kognitiver Natur ist. Jede der Beteiligten muss auch die Wirksamkeit der Absicht der anderen wollen.
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  46.  24
    Michael E. Bratman (1998). Morality, Normativity, and Society. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):986-989.
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  47.  11
    Michael E. Bratman (2000). Review: Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility and History. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):453 - 458.
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  48.  14
    Michael E. Bratman (1991). Review: Cognitivism About Practical Reason. [REVIEW] Ethics 102 (1):117 - 128.
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  49. Michael E. Bratman (2009). I Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality. In David Sobel Steven Wall (ed.), Reasons for Action. 13.
     
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  50.  1
    Michael E. Bratman (2006). What is the Accordion Effect? Journal of Ethics 10 (1-2):5-19.
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