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  1. Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise.
    In order to form a contract at least one of the parties to the bargain must give an undertaking or commitment of the appropriate kind to the other; that is, she must perform a commissive speech act of the right kind. It is widely assumed that the speech act in question is a promise. Indeed it is standard textbook fare that a contract is a promise (or an exchange of promises) that the law will enforce. This assumption underlies the venerable (...)
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  2. Christopher Michaelson, Michael G. Pratt, Adam M. Grant & Craig P. Dunn (2014). Meaningful Work: Connecting Business Ethics and Organization Studies. Journal of Business Ethics 121 (1):77-90.
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  3. Michael G. Pratt (2014). Some Features of Promises and Their Obligations. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):382-402.
    Promises raise two main philosophical problems, one moral and the other conceptual. The moral problem concerns the normative significance of promising: what is the nature and basis of the obligations and rights to which promises typically give rise? The conceptual problem is to say what a promise is: what is involved in making a promise? In this paper I defend three controversial claims about promising. One is about the moral problem of promising, one is about the conceptual problem, and the (...)
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  4. Michael G. Pratt (2007). Promises, Contracts and Voluntary Obligations. Law and Philosophy 26 (6):531 - 574.
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  5. Michael G. Pratt (2003). Promises and Perlocutions. In Matt Matravers (ed.), Scanlon and Contractualism. Frank Cass. 93-119.
    This is a critical analysis of T.M. Scanlon's contractualist account of promising and promissory obligation. After situating Scanlon's account within one of two broad schools of thought on promising (the 'perlocutionary' school) I argue that his account fails to overcome a fatal circularity that plagues all such theories of promise. I go on to argue that Scanlon's contractualist moral theory will support an alternative, non-perlocutionary theory of promise that is not susceptible to this logical difficulty.
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  6. Michael G. Pratt (1998). Nietzsche and the Capacity to Contract. Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 22:84.