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Profile: Michael Pendlebury (North Carolina State University)
  1.  12
    Michael J. Pendlebury (1982). Indexical Reference and the Ontology of Belief. South African Journal of Philosophy 1:65-74.
  2.  10
    Michael J. Pendlebury (1996). The Role of Imagination in Perception. South African Journal of Philosophy 15 (4):133-138.
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  3.  4
    Michael J. Pendlebury (1998). Intentionality and Normativity. South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):142-151.
  4.  16
    Michael J. Pendlebury (2002). Thought and Language. South African Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):200-218.
    This article defends the view that nonlinguistic animals could be capable of thought (in the sense in which the mere possession of beliefs and desires is sufficient for thought). It is easy to identify flaws in Davidson's arguments for the thesis that thought depends upon language if one is open to the idea that some nonlinguistic animals have beliefs. It is, however, necessary to do more than this if one wishes to engage with the deeper challenge underlying Davidson's reasoning, viz., (...)
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  5.  42
    Michael J. Pendlebury (1994). Content and Causation in Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):767-785.
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  6.  19
    Michael J. Pendlebury (1999). Sensibility and Understanding in Perceptual Judgments. South African Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):356-369.
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  7.  22
    Michael J. Pendlebury (1990). Sense Experiences and Their Contents: A Defense of the Propositional Account. Inquiry 33 (2):215-30.
    A number of philosophers are committed to the view that sense experiences, in so far as they have contents, have propositional contents, but this is more often tacitly accepted than argued for in the literature. This paper explains the propositional account and presents a basic case in support of it in a simple and straightforward way which does not involve commitment to any specific philosophical theory of perception.
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  8.  37
    Michael J. Pendlebury (2002). Opacity and Self-Consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):243-251.
  9.  7
    Michael J. Pendlebury (1987). Perceptual Representation. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87:91-106.
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  10.  16
    Michael J. Pendlebury (2000). Perception and Objective Knowledge. In The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center 29-38.
    McDowell and Putnam are right to insist that objective knowledge is possible only because we are open to the world in perception, but neither of them offers an adequate account of the relationship between perception and perceptual judgments (which are at the core of our most fundamental knowledge of the world). This paper, intended as a contribution to the development of a sophisticated commonsense realism, proposes an account in terms of which perceptions acquire the status of perceptual judgments to the (...)
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  11. Michael J. Pendlebury (2000). The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 5: Epistemology. Charlottesville: Philosophy Documentation Center.
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