When summarizing the findings of his 1896 Matter and Memory, Bergson claims: “That every reality has . . . a relation with consciousness—this is what we concede to idealism.” Yet Bergson’s 1896 text presents the theory of “pure perception,” which, since it accounts for perception according to the brain’s mechanical transmissions, apparently leaves no room for subjective consciousness. Bergson’s theory of pure perception would appear to render his idealistic concession absurd. In this paper, I attempt to defend Bergson’s idealistic concession. (...) I argue that Bergson’s account of cerebral transmissions at the level of pure perception necessarily entails a theory of temporality, an appeal to a theory of time-consciousness that justifies his idealistic concession. (shrink)
Cet essai met en cause la comparaison historique courante qui relie le traitement husserlien de la conscience du temps à la tradition philosophique occidentale par le biais du livre IX des Confessions d’Augustin. Je soutiens notamment que cette comparaison n’est valable qu’à l’égard des leçons sur le temps de 1905 (qui expliquent l’appréhension du temps par le recours à l’étirement de la conscience opéré par la mémoire) et non pour la théorie husserlienne ultérieure, que l’on peut dater autour de 1908 (...) (qui critique ouvertement les premières leçons à cause la position défectueuse et contre-intuitive qu’y était défendue selon laquelle la mémoire étend la perception). Après avoir pointé les défauts de la théorie du temps partagée par Augustin et par le Husserl de 1905, j’approfondis la distinction, élaborée plus tard par Husserl à partir de 1911, entre mémoire et rétention, et j’examine l’hypothèse selon laquelle la théorie aristotélicienne du temps telle qu’elle est présentée dans le IVème livre de la Physique pourrait représenter une meilleur terme de comparaison historique pour la théorie husserlienne de la maturité, notamment dans la mesure où elle s’appuie sur l’idée que c’est « l’esprit qui dit les “maintenant” comme deux ». (shrink)
For all its subtle differences, Husserl scholarship on time-consciousness has reached a consensus that Husserl’s theory underwent a significant interpretiveimprovement starting around 1908 / 1909. On this advance, which concerned the intentional structure and directedness of absolute consciousness, I have cautioned against reading Augustine’s theory of time as a philosophical predecessor to Husserl’s. In a recent “confrontation” with my efforts, Roger Wasserman tried to defend a reading of Augustine’s influence on Husserl’s theory of time by criticizing my reading of Augustine (...) and Husserl. This reply to Wasserman’s challenge (i) reestablishes my reservations about attempts to claim a relation between Augustine and Husserl on time-consciousness, (ii) defends the standard interpretation of the development of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness, and (iii) raises several critical questions about Wasserman’s Neoplatonic or Augustinian reading of Husserl on time-consciousness. (shrink)
Those familiar with contemporary continental philosophy know well the defenses Husserlians have offered of Husserl’s theory of inner time-consciousness against post-modernism’s deconstructive criticisms. As post-modernism gives way to Deleuzean post-structuralism, Deleuze’s Le bergsonisme has grown into the movement of Bergsonism. This movement, designed to present an alternative to phenomenology, challenges Husserlian phenomenology by criticizing the most “important… of all phenomenological problems.” Arguing that Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness detailed a linear succession of iterable instants in which the now internal to consciousness (...) receives prejudicial favor, Bergsonism concludes that Husserl derived the past from the present and cannot account for the sense of the past, which differs in kind from the present. Consequently, everything on Husserl’s account remains present and his theory cannot accommodate for time’s passage. In this paper, I renew the Husserlian defense of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness in response to the recent movement of Deleuzean Bergsonism. Section one presents Bergsonism’s notion of the past in general and its critique of Husserl’s theory of time-consciousness. Section two presents a rejoinder to Bergsonism’s critique of Husserl, questioning (1) its understanding of the living-present as linearly extended, (2) its conflation of the living-present with Husserl’s early schema-apprehension interpretation, and (3) its failure to grasp Husserl’s revised understanding of primary memory as a result of (2). In conclusion, I suggest that Husserl’s theory of retention might articulate a notion of the past more consistent with Bergson than Bergsonism itself. (shrink)
This essay contests the standard historical comparison that links Husserl’s account of time-consciousness to the tradition by way of Book XI of Augustine’sConfessions. This comparison rests on the mistaken assumption that both thinkers attribute the soul’s distention and corresponding apprehension of time to memory. While true for Augustine and Husserl’s 1905 lectures on time, Husserl concluded after 1907 that these lectures advanced the flawed and counter-intuitive position that memory extends perception. I will trace the shortcomings of Augustine’s and Husserl’s conflation (...) of memory with perception. After developing Husserl’s maturely articulated distinction between memory and retention from 1911, I suggest chapters 10–14 of Aristotle’s Physics IV as a more apt anticipation of this second, more adequate half of the Husserlian story. A reconstruction of Aristotle’s definition of time as “the number of movement,” one that privileges the activity of “the mind pronouncing that the ‘nows’ are two,” intimates Husserl’s distinction between memory and retention. For Aristotle, the soul’s recognition of the ‘nows’ as two depends not on memory, but on the soul’s intentional activity of counting, itself dependent on the ability to, as Aristotle writes in his Metaphysics, “grasp mentally and [have] already grasped” at the same time. (shrink)
Although philosophers have characteristically taken the view that art is a vehicle of some universal meaning or truth, art historians emphasize the concrete, historical location of the individual work of art. Is aesthetics capable of sustaining these two approaches? Or, as Michael Kelly argues: Is art actually determined by its historical particularity? His book covers the views of four philosophers--Heidegger, Adorno, Derrida, and Danto--ultimately iconoclasts, despite their significant philosophical engagement with the arts.
Any convincing theory of self-awareness must do the following: (a) avoid what Henry terms “ontological monism” (OM), the belief that there is only one kind of awareness, namely, object-awareness; for as long as we stick to OM, we remain wedded to the reflection theory of self-awareness and its well-known difficulties (the infinite regress being the worst). And, (b) account for the concrete personal facts about self-awareness: familiarity, unity, identity, etc. First, I go through the tradition, starting with Descartes, of accounts (...) of self-awareness which fail to satisfy constraint (a). Second, I discuss the standard solution to the problem of self-awareness found in Sartre’s pre-reflective self. I argue that Sartre’s pre-reflective self contains a residue of the bias of “ontological monism,” therefore satisfying neither (a) nor (b). Third, I suggest an alternative in Kant’s transcendental subject, which possesses self-awareness independently of a cognitive attitude in the traditional sense of object-intentionality, and thereby intimates the beginnings of a phenomenology of the invisible. (shrink)
Lexemes supposedly represent phonological but not grammatical information. Phonological word substitutions pose problems for this account because the target and error almost always come from the same grammatical class. This grammatical congruency effect can be explained within the Levelt et al. lexicon given that (1) lexemes are organized according to phonological similarity and (2) lexemes from the same grammatical category share phonological properties.
The first reference of its kind surveys the full breadth of critical thought on art, culture, and society--from classical philosophy to contemporary critical theory. Featuring 600 original articles by distinguished scholars from many fields and countries, it is a comprehensive survey of major concepts, thinkers, and debates about the meaning, uses, and value of all the arts--from painting and sculpture to literature, music, theater, dance, television, film, and popular culture. Of special interest are in-depth surveys of Western aesthetics and broad (...) coverage of non-Western traditions and theories of art. The work includes cross references, bibliographies, and an index. (shrink)
Managerial reasoning is characteristic of a care-relationship ethics:1. If a corporation provides certain community values to corporate members not reducible to their self-interested economic or professional objectives; 2. If such values are generated by a division of labor based on interdependence, reciprocity and concern for another's self-realization; 3. If it's based on promoting an ethical corporate self independent of its economic value. Such an ethic is appropriate, given employees' tremendous personal contributions, the unique position of private industry to provide distinctive (...) resources without committing extensive social resources, and due to its potential for reducing managerial moral fragmentation and hypocrisy. (shrink)