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  1.  12
    Michael Luntley (2003). Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement. Blackwell Pub..
    Wittgenstein's master argument -- Realism, language, and self -- This is how we play the game -- Rules and other people -- Putting your self in the picture -- Seeing things aright.
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  2.  34
    Michael Luntley (1999). Contemporary Philosophy of Thought: Truth, World, Content. Blackwell Publishers.
    This text gives voice to the idea that the study of the philosophy of thought and language is more than a specialism, but rather lies at the very heart of the ...
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  3.  21
    Michael Luntley (2011). What Do Nurses Know? Nursing Philosophy 12 (1):22-33.
    This paper defends an epistemic conservatism - propositional knowing-that suffices for capturing all the fine details of the knowledge of experienced nurses that depends on the complex ways in which they are embedded in shared fields of activity. I argue against the proliferation of different ways of knowing associated with the work of Dreyfus and Benner. I show how propositional knowledge can capture the detail of the phenomenology that motivates the Dreyfus/Benner proliferation.
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  4.  13
    Michael Luntley (2012). Training, Training, Training: The Making of Second Nature and the Root's of Wittgenstein's Pragmatism. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 4 (2):88-104.
    Both Wittgenstein and Dewey have a role for the concept of skills and tech-niques in their understanding of practices and thereby the possession of concepts. Skills are typically acquired through training. It can seem, however, that their respective appeals to practice are dissimilar: Dewey’s appeal is, like Peirce’s, programmatic. It is meant to do philosophical work. In contrast, for Wittgenstein, the appeal to practice can seem a primitive, something that is meant to put an end to philosophical work. I argue (...)
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  5.  14
    Michael Luntley (2008). Training and Learning. Educational Philosophy and Theory 40 (5):695-711.
    Some philosophers of education think that there is a pedagogically informative concept of training that can be gleaned from Wittgenstein's later writings: training as initiation into a form of life. Stickney, in 'Training and Mastery of Techniques in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy: A response to Michael Luntley'takes me to task for ignoring this concept. In this essay I argue that there is no such concept to be ignored. I start by noting recent developments in Wittgenstein scholarship that raise serious issues about (...)
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  6.  34
    Michael Luntley (2008). Conceptual Development and the Paradox of Learning. Journal of Philosophy of Education 42 (1):1-14.
    Conceptual development requires learning. It requires learning to make discriminations that were previously unavailable to the subject. Notwithstanding the descriptions of learning available in the psychological and educational literature, there is no account available that shows that it is so much as possible. There can be no such account unless there is an answer to Jerry Fodor's paradox of learning. On our current understanding of concept acquisition, there is no such thing as learning. In this paper I explore a way (...)
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  7.  49
    Michael Luntley (2009). Understanding Expertise. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (4):356-370.
    It is sometimes said that experts know and decide 'in the moment', not by theoretical or propositionally articulated reflection. What differentiates expert from novice is not that the former know a lot more than the latter, but that their knowledge and the way they use it is qualitatively different. Although this idea is common in the education literature, especially the literature on professional education, it has received little sustained philosophical treatment. I shall argue that the idea of a distinct expert (...)
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  8.  9
    Michael Luntley (2003). Ethics in the Face of Uncertainty: Judgement Not Rules. Business Ethics 12 (4):325–333.
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  9.  62
    Michael Luntley (2003). Nonconceptual Content and the Sound of Music. Mind and Language 18 (4):402-426.
    : I present an argument for the existence of nonconceptual representational content. The argument is compatible with McDowell's defence of conceptualism against those arguments for nonconceptual content that draw upon claims about the fine‐grainedness of experience. I present a case for nonconceptual content that concentrates on the idea that experience can possess representational content that cannot perform the function of conceptual content, namely figure in the subject's reasons for belief and action. This sort of argument for nonconceptual content is best (...)
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  10.  23
    Michael Luntley (2009). On Education and Initiation. Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (s1):41-56.
    In this paper I take up Peters' invitation to think of education in terms of initiation. I argue that the concept of initiation demands much closer scrutiny and analysis in order to provide a substantive thesis about education. A key challenge concerns how we conceive of the initiate. The very idea of initiation suggests that, in some interesting sense, the pupil qua initiate joins in learning activities; their role is more than that of passive recipient of values and belief. But (...)
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  11.  46
    Michael Luntley (2010). Expectations Without Content. Mind and Language 25 (2):217-236.
    In this paper I show how the way experience presents things to us can be treated without attributing a representational content to experience. The basic claim that experience can present us with more things than the range of things available to us in thought is neutral with respect to the choice between a content account of experience and a naïve content-free account. I show how Meyer's theory of expectations in accounting for our experience of music supports the naïve account. Expectations (...)
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  12.  22
    Michael Luntley (2002). Patterns, Particularism and Seeing the Similarity. Philosophical Papers 31 (3):271-291.
    Abstract I argue for a form of particularism from a reading of Wittgenstein's critique of the idea that word use is governed by rules. In place of the idea that word use is driven by rules, I show how the patterns of word use, in virtue of which we express our reasons, emerge from our ongoing practice, including our practice of seeing things as similar. I argue that the notion of seeing the similarities is primitive for Wittgenstein. The remark, ?this (...)
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  13.  1
    Michael Luntley (2008). On the Teaching and Learning of Words. In David K. Levy & Edoardo Zamuner (eds.), Wittgenstein's Enduring Arguments. Routledge
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  14.  15
    Michael Luntley (2010). What's Doing? Activity, Naming and Wittgenstein's Response to Augustine. In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press
  15.  12
    Michael Luntley (2007). Learning, Empowerment and Judgement. Educational Philosophy and Theory 39 (4):418–431.
    Here is a distinction that appears very simple, looks compelling and seems to be deeply rooted in our reflections on learning. 1 The distinction is between activities of learning that involve training and those that involve reasoning. In the former, the pupil is a passive recipient of habits of mind and action. The mechanism by which they acquire these habits is mimesis, not reasoning. In contrast, learning by reasoning involves considerable mental activity by the pupil who has to work out (...)
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  16.  9
    Michael Luntley (2004). Growing Awareness. Journal of Philosophy of Education 38 (1):1–20.
  17. Michael Luntley (1988). Language, Logic & Experience the Case for Anti-Realism.
     
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  18.  1
    Bernhard Weiss & Michael Luntley (1990). Language, Logic and Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 40 (161):534.
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  19.  15
    Seyed Ali Kalantari & Michael Luntley (2013). On the Logic of Aiming at Truth. Analysis 73 (3):419-422.
    We argue that the debate about the normativity of belief thesis has been hampered by the slogan, ‘belief aims at truth’. We show that the slogan provides no content to the normativity of belief. The slogan encourages formulations of the norm as a prescriptive norm. There are well-known problems with such formulations. We provide a new formulation of the thesis as a prohibitive norm. This captures the key intuition most normativists about belief want to endorse.
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  20. Michael Luntley (2003). Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement. Wiley-Blackwell.
    In this important study, Michael Luntley offers a compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning and intentionality, based upon a unifying theme in the early and later philosophies. A compelling reading of Wittgenstein’s account of meaning and intentionality. Offers an important and original reading of Wittgenstein’s key texts. Based upon a unifying theme in Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophies.
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  21.  48
    Michael Luntley (1984). The Sense of a Name. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):265-282.
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  22.  21
    Michael Luntley (2013). Saul Kripke, Philosophical Troubles, Collected Papers: Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Xiii + 388, Price £27.50 Hb. [REVIEW] Philosophical Investigations 36 (1):87-90.
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  23. Michael Luntley (1997). Dynamic Thoughts and Empty Minds. European Review of Philosophy 2:77-103.
     
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  24.  4
    Michael Luntley (2005). The Character of Learning. Educational Philosophy and Theory 37 (5):689–704.
    In this paper I propose a contrast between learning as the acquisition of theories and learning as the development of insight. I then suggest that, in a great many cases, the cognitive achievement by which we come to organise behaviour rationally is the development of insight, where this is independent of the acquisition of knowledge regimented in theories. The distinction is between a model in which a subject rationalises behaviour by appeal to knowledge of particulars rather than general theoretical knowledge. (...)
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  25.  27
    Annette C. Baier & Michael Luntley (1995). Moral Sentiments, and the Difference They Make. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69:15 - 45.
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  26. Michael Luntley (1999). Contemporary Philosophy of Thought: Truth, World, Content. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  27.  16
    Michael Luntley (1998). The 'Practical Turn' and the Convergence of Traditions. Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):10 – 27.
    This paper explores the idea that the structure of intentionality is fundamentally the structure of a practice, not the structure of a language, or some quasi-linguistic system of representational entities. I show how and why neo-Fregean theory of content is committed to this practical turn. Mis-representation is often thought to be problematic for the neo-Fregean, but I show not only that it accommodates the phenomena better than the representationalist position, but also that the idea of error that the representationalist wants (...)
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  28.  2
    Michael Luntley (2008). Il momento ermeneutico: la verità nel costruttivismo. Iride 21 (2):337-346.
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  29. Michael Luntley (1995). The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson. New Delhi: Indian Coun Phil Res.
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  30. Michael Luntley (2003). Ethics in the Face of Uncertainty: Judgement Not Rules. Business Ethics: A European Review 12 (4):325-333.
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  31.  9
    Michael Luntley (1997). An Engaging Practice? Inquiry 40 (3):357 – 373.
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  32.  28
    Michael Luntley (2005). The Role of Judgement. Philosophical Explorations 8 (3):281 – 295.
    In this essay I explore one way of making sense of the idea that 'judgement' picks out a singular cognitive operation that cannot be modelled in terms of rule application. I argue that there is a place for noting a distinctive capacity for coming to a view about what to think and what to do and that this capacity is best understood in terms of singular attentional states. On the account that I sketch, the role of judgement contributes to the (...)
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  33.  8
    Michael Luntley (1982). Understanding Anthropologists. Inquiry 25 (2):199 – 216.
    In this paper I show how to treat problems in the philosophy of the social sciences, in particular anthropology, without the need to settle questions in the theory of meaning about realism and anti?realism. In doing this, I show how it is possible, contrary to received opinion, to ward off conceptual relativism without adoption of realist semantics. The argument involves sketching the feasibility of a viable non?realist concept of objectivity. Having distinguished the required notion of objectivity, I then bring this (...)
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  34. Michael Luntley (1995). Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald, Eds., Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 15 (5):340-343.
     
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  35.  5
    Michael Luntley (2002). Knowing How to Manage. Philosophy of Management 2 (3):3-14.
    The expertise of managers, as with other professionals, consists in what they know and their particular knowledge base is knowledge that is embedded in practice. In spite of what some practice assumes, management expertise is situated, experiential and cannot be codified. We lack, however, a clear philosophical model of what it means to say of knowledge that it is embedded in practice. This paper seeks to address this need, presents a theory of expertise and explores a key element of the (...)
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  36.  19
    Michael Luntley (1991). Aberrations of a Sledgehammer: Reply to Devitt. Philosophical Studies 62 (3):315 - 323.
  37.  11
    Michael Luntley (1992). Practice Makes Knowledge? Inquiry 35 (3 & 4):447 – 461.
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  38.  15
    Michael Luntley (1985). The Real Anti-Realism and Other Bare Truths. Erkenntnis 23 (3):295 - 317.
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  39.  7
    Michael Luntley, Expertise - Initiation Into Learning, Not Knowing.
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  40.  1
    Michael Luntley (2015). Lynne Rudder Baker, Naturalism and the First‐Person Perspective . Xxiv + 248, Price £64.00 Hb. [REVIEW] Philosophical Investigations 38 (4):382-385.
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  41.  12
    Michael Luntley (1982). Verification, Perception, and Theoretical Entities. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (128):245-261.
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  42.  8
    Michael Luntley (2011). The Hermeneutic Moment. The Truth in Constructivism. Iris. European Journal of Philosophy and Public Debate 2 (3):123-131.
    In this paper I examine the intuition that underpins Vattimo's thesis that thought is weak. It is the intuition that our ways of thinking depend not just on what there is, but on our activities, including the activity of interpretation. The following then seems to follow naturally from this: If we cannot factor out the contribution that the activity of interpretation plays in delimiting the very structure of thought, the idea that thought can sometimes operate as a transparent window on (...)
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  43.  6
    Michael Luntley (1989). On the Critique of Values. Inquiry 32 (4):399 – 417.
    On a familiar conception of the business of ethics, we are set to produce theories which codify our intuitive conception of values. And on this conception, the notion of a theory is that of an account which, in providing the epistemological backing to our intuitive evaluations, overrules our intuitive grasp of our moral lives. An intuitionist faces a dilemma: Without an epistemological backing intuitions of value seem unsuited to deliver moral truth, and yet if a theoretical backing is provided this (...)
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  44.  7
    Michael Luntley (1989). On the Way the World is Independently of the Way We Take It to Be. Inquiry 32 (2):177 – 194.
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  45.  9
    Michael Luntley (2003). Attention, Time & Purpose. Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):2 – 17.
    Action explanations that cite dynamic beliefs and desires cannot be modelled as causal explanations. The contents of dynamic psychological states cannot be treated as the causal antecendents to behaviour. Behavioural patterns cannot be explained in virtue of the patterns of operations performed upon the intentional antecedents to behaviour. Dynamic intentional states are persisting regulatory devices for behaviour that provide couplings with the environment. Behavioural patterns emerge from choice couplings rather than being produced by patterns for operating upon intentional antecendents to (...)
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  46. Michael Luntley (2000). John McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 20 (3):203-206.
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  47.  2
    Michael Luntley & Neil Tennant (1989). Anti-Realism and Logic. Philosophical Quarterly 39 (156):361.
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  48.  2
    Michael Luntley (1996). Commentary on "Epistemic Value Commitments&Quot. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (3):227-229.
  49.  1
    Michael Luntley (1985). Social Science or Dialogues of the Deaf? Inquiry 28 (1-4):123-148.
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  50. Michael Luntley (2000). John McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality. [REVIEW] Philosophy in Review 20:203-206.
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