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Profile: Michael Lynch (University of Connecticut)
Profile: Michael Lynch
  1.  37
    Michael Lynch (1993). Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science. Cambridge University Press.
    Philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science have grown interested in the daily practices of scientists. Recent studies have drawn linkages between scientific innovations and more ordinary procedures, craft skills, and sources of sponsorship. These studies dispute the idea that science is the application of a unified method or the outgrowth of a progressive history of ideas. This book critically reviews arguments and empirical studies in two areas of sociology that have played a significant role in the 'sociological turn' in science (...)
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  2. Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth as One and Many. Clarendon Press.
    What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all; the concept of truth is of no real philosophical importance. In this concise and clearly written book, Lynch argues that we should reject both these extremes and hold that truth is a functional property. To (...)
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  3.  10
    Michael Lynch (2004). True to Life: Why Truth Matters. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  4. Michael P. Lynch (2006). Rewrighting Pluralism. The Monist 89 (1):63-84.
  5. Michael Lynch (2009). The Truth of Values and the Values of Truth'. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press
     
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  6.  38
    Michael P. Lynch (ed.) (2001). The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives. The MIT Press.
    These essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have?
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  7.  41
    Michael P. Lynch & Nathan Sheff (2016). The Knowers in Charge. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1):53-63.
    _ Source: _Page Count 11 Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. By Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xiii +279. isbn 978–0–19–993647–2.
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  8.  90
    Michael P. Lynch (2004). Truth and Multiple Realizability. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):384 – 408.
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there is more than one way for a proposition to be true. When taken to imply that there is more than one concept and property of truth, this position faces a number of troubling objections. I argue that we can overcome these objections, and yet retain pluralism's key insight, by taking truth to be a multiply realizable property of propositions.
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  9. Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
  10. Edward Hackett, Olga Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch & Judy Wajcman (eds.) (2007). The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies. MIT Press.
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  11. Ronald N. Giere, Michael Lynch & Steve Woolgar (1994). Representation in Scientific Practice. Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):113-120.
     
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  12. Michael Lynch (1995). Review Symposium on Ian Hacking : Narrative Hooks and Paper Trails: The Writing of Memory. History of the Human Sciences 8 (4):118-130.
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  13. Michael P. Lynch (2011). Truth as One and Many. Oxford University Press Uk.
    What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all; the concept of truth is of no real philosophical importance. In this concise and clearly written book, Lynch argues that we should reject both these extremes and hold that truth is a functional property. To (...)
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  14. Michael P. Lynch (forthcoming). Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Incommensurability. Social Epistemology:262--77.
  15.  33
    Michael P. Lynch (2012). In Praise of Reason. MIT Press.
    Can we give objective reasons for our most basic standards of reason-- our fundamental epistemic principles? I argue, against several forms of skepticism about reason, that we can, but that the reasons we can give for epistemic principles are ultimately practical, not epistemic.
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  16.  93
    Michael Lynch (2013). Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical Reasons. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):343-362.
    In this paper, I raise two questions about epistemic commitments, and thus, indirectly, about our epistemic agency. Can we rationally defend such commitments when challenged to do so? And if so, how?
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  17.  7
    Michael P. Lynch (2001). Truth in Context: An Essay on Pluralism and Objectivity. A Bradford Book.
    A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999 Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naïve. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch argues (...)
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  18.  9
    Michael P. Lynch & Paul Silva (forthcoming). Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity? In Advance. Journal of Philosophical Research.
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  19.  89
    Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) (2006). Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.
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  20. David Capps, Michael P. Lynch & Daniel Massey (2009). A Coherent Moral Relativism. Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430.
    Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.
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  21.  56
    Michael Lynch (1988). The Externalized Retina: Selection and Mathematization in the Visual Documentation of Objects in the Life Sciences. [REVIEW] Human Studies 11 (2-3):201 - 234.
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  22. Michael P. Lynch (forthcoming). A Functionalist Theory of Truth. The Nature of Truth:723--750.
  23. Michael Lynch (2009). Deception and the Nature of Truth. In Clancy W. Martin (ed.), The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press 188.
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  24. Michael P. Lynch (2010). Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. OUP Oxford
     
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  25.  23
    Filippo Ferrari, Michael Lynch & Douglas Edwards (2015). Truth and Naturalism. In Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Wiley Blackwell
    Is truth itself natural? This is an important question for both those working on truth and those working on naturalism. For theorists of truth, answering the question of whether truth is natural will tell us more about the nature of truth (or lack of it), and the relations between truth and other properties of interest. For those working on naturalism, answering this question is of paramount importance to those who wish to have truth as part of the natural order. In (...)
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  26.  10
    Michael P. Lynch (2004). Minimalism and the Value of Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497 - 517.
    Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must (...)
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  27. Michael P. Lynch (2006). Zombies and the Case of the Phenomenal Pickpocket. Synthese 149 (1):37-58.
    A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some (...)
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  28.  93
    Michael P. Lynch (2013). Expressivism and Plural Truth. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.
    Contemporary expressivists typically deny that all true judgments must represent reality. Many instead adopt truth minimalism, according to which there is no substantive property of judgments in virtue of which they are true. In this article, I suggest that expressivists would be better suited to adopt truth pluralism, or the view that there is more than one substantive property of judgments in virtue of which judgments are true. My point is not that an expressivism that takes this form is true, (...)
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  29. Michael P. Lynch (forthcoming). The Price of Truth. In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), Pragmatism, Minimalism and Metaphysics.
    Like William James before him, Huw Price has influentially argued that truth has a normative role to play in our thought and talk. I agree. But Price also thinks that we should regard truth-conceived of as property of our beliefs-as something like a metaphysical myth. Here I disagree. In this paper, I argue that reflection on truth's values pushes us in a slightly different direction, one that opens the door to certain metaphysical possibilities that even a Pricean pragmatist can love.
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  30.  14
    Michael Patrick Lynch (2014). Neuromedia, Extended Knowledge and Understanding. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):299-313.
    Imagine you had the functions of your smartphone miniaturized to a cellular level and accessible by your neural network. Reflection on this possibility suggests that we should not just concern ourselves with whether our knowledge is extending “out” to our devices; our devices are extending in, and with them, possibly the information that they bring. If so, then the question of whether knowledge is “extended” becomes wrapped up with the question of whether knowing is something we do, or something we (...)
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  31.  21
    Michael Lynch (2014). Matters of Fact, and the Fact of Matter. Human Studies 37 (1):139-145.
    My remarks in this brief commentary focus on Chris Calvert-Minor’s (2014) article on Karen Barad’s philosophical writings, and are only indirectly relevant to an assessment of Barad’s work. I have limited acquaintance with Barad’s writings, and even less with Nils Bohr’s. Barad explicitly borrows from Bohr’s theoretical writings when developing her version of feminist epistemology. Barad’s recruitment of Bohr to support her philosophy creates a dilemma for me and other readers who are not conversant with Bohr’s physics/philosophy. To my understanding, (...)
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  32.  18
    Michael Lynch (1992). Extending Wittgenstein: The Pivotal Move From Epistemology to the Sociology of Science. In Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture. University of Chicago Press 215--265.
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  33. Michael P. Lynch (2000). Alethic Pluralism and the Functionalist Theory of Truth. Acta Analytica 24:195--214.
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  34.  48
    Michael Lynch (1999). Silence in Context: Ethnomethodology and Social Theory. [REVIEW] Human Studies 22 (2-4):211-233.
    Ethnomethodologists (or at least many of them) have been reticent about their theoretical sources and methodological principles. It frequently falls to others to make such matters explicit. In this paper I discuss this silence about theory, but rather than entering the breach by specifying a set of implicit assumptions and principles, I suggest that the reticence is consistent with ethnomethodology's distinctive research 'program'. The main part of the paper describes the pedagogical exercises and forms of apprenticeship through which Garfinkel and (...)
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  35. Michael Lynch (1991). Pictures of Nothing? Visual Construals in Social Theory. Sociological Theory 9 (1):1-21.
    This paper builds upon ethnomethodological and social constructivist studies of representation in the natural sciences to examine sociological theory, a field that is much closer to home. An analysis of diagrams and related illustrations in theory texts shows that labels, geometric boundaries, vectors, and symmetries often are used to convey a sense of orderly flows of causal influences in a homogeneous field. These graphic elements make up what I call a "rhetorical mathematics" that conveys an impression of rationality. Although theory (...)
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  36.  64
    Michael P. Lynch & Joshua Glasgow (2003). The Impossibility of Superdupervenience. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):201-221.
    Supervenience has provided a way for nonreductive materialists to explain how the mental can be physically irreducible but still physically respectable. In recent years, doubts about this research program have emerged from a number of quarters. Consequently, Terence Horgan has argued that nonreductive materialists must appeal to an upgraded "superdupervenience," if supervenience is to do any materialist work. We argue that nonreductive materialism cannot meet this challenge. Superdupervenience is impossible.
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  37.  67
    Michael P. Lynch (2008). Alethic Pluralism, Logical Consequence and the Universality of Reason. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):122-140.
  38.  72
    Michael P. Lynch (forthcoming). Truth and Freedom: Rorty and the Problem of Priority. The European Legacy.
    What does truth have to do with freedom? That is, what is the relationship between our political and epistemic principles? In this paper, I grapple and reject Rorty's reasons for thinking that the former can't be based on the latter, but offer an alternative argument that supports his over-all conclusion that our epistemic and political values are ultimately intertwined.
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  39.  60
    Michael Lynch (1991). Science in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction: Moral and Epistemic Relations Between Diagrams and Photographs. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 6 (2):205-226.
    Sociologists, philosophers and historians of science are gradually recognizing the importance of visual representation. This is part of a more general movement away from a theory-centric view of science and towards an interest in practical aspects of observation and experimentation. Rather than treating science as a matter of demonstrating the logical connection between theoretical and empirical statements, an increasing number of investigations are examining how scientists compose and use diagrams, graphs, photographs, micrographs, maps, charts, and related visual displays. This paper (...)
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  40.  14
    Michael Lynch (2013). Science, Truth, and Forensic Cultures: The Exceptional Legal Status of DNA Evidence. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (1):60-70.
    Many epistemological terms, such as investigation, inquiry, argument, evidence, and fact were established in law well before being associated with science. However, while legal proof remained qualified by standards of ‘moral certainty’, scientific proof attained a reputation for objectivity. Although most forms of legal evidence continue to be treated as fallible ‘opinions’ rather than objective ‘facts’, forensic DNA evidence increasingly is being granted an exceptional factual status. It did not always enjoy such status. Two decades ago, the scientific status of (...)
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  41.  5
    Michael Lynch (2016). Social Constructivism in Science and Technology Studies. Human Studies 39 (1):101-112.
    Berger and Luckmann’s concept of “social construction” has been widely adopted in many fields of the humanities and social sciences in the half-century since they wrote The Social Construction of Reality. One field in which constructivism was especially provocative was in Science and Technology Studies, where it was expanded beyond the social domain to encompass the practices and contents of contemporary natural science. This essay discusses the relationship between social construction in STS and Berger and Luckmann’s original conception of it, (...)
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  42.  33
    Michael Patrick Lynch (2012). The Many Faces of Truth: A Response to Some Critics. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):255-269.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 255-269, May 2012.
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  43.  74
    Michael P. Lynch (1999). Relativity of Fact and Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):579-595.
    A common strategy amongst realists grants relativism at the level of language or thought but denies it at the level of fact. Their point is that even if our concept of an object is relative to a conceptual scheme, it doesn't follow that objects themselves are relative to conceptual schemes. This is a sensible point. But in this paper I present a simple argument for the conclusion that it is false. According to what I call the T-argument, relativism about content (...)
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  44.  99
    Michael P. Lynch (1997). Three Models of Conceptual Schemes. Inquiry 40 (4):407 – 426.
    Despite widespread confusion over its meaning, the notion of a conceptual scheme is pervasive in Anglo-American philosophy, particularly amongst those who call themselves ' conceptual relativists'. In this paper, I identify three different ways to understand conceptual schemes. I argue that the two most common models, deriving from Kant and Quine, are flawed, and, in addition, useless for the relativist. Instead, I urge adoption of a 'neo-Kantian', broadly Wittgensteinian model, which, it is ' argued, is immune from Davidsonian objections to (...)
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  45.  6
    Michael Lynch (1991). Laboratory Space and the Technological Complex: An Investigation of Topical Contextures. Science in Context 4 (1).
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  46. Cyrus Mody & Michael Lynch (2010). Test Objects and Other Epistemic Things: A History of a Nanoscale Object. British Journal for the History of Science 43 (3):423-458.
    This paper follows the history of an object. The purpose of doing so is to come to terms with a distinctive kind of research object – which we are calling a ‘test object’ – as well as to chronicle a significant line of research and technology development associated with the broader nanoscience/nanotechnology movement. A test object is one of a family of epistemic things that makes up the material culture of laboratory science. Depending upon the case, it can have variable (...)
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  47. Michael P. Lynch (2009). The Values of Truth and the Truth of Values. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press 225--42.
     
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  48.  8
    Michael Lynch (2012). Revisiting the Cultural Dope. Human Studies 35 (2):223-233.
    This essay focuses on the "cultural dope," an ironic reference in Harold Garfinkel's Studies in Ethnomethodology to the rule-following actor in conventional sociological theories. In the nearly half-century since the publication of that book, the "cultural dope" has been incorporated into numerous criticisms of "models of man" in the human sciences. Garfinkel's account appeals to many writers because it seems to present an alternative picture of the actor: an individual who is self-aware, reflective, and skilled in the conduct of daily (...)
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  49.  2
    Michael Lynch (1992). From the 'Will to Theory 'to the Discursive Collage: A Reply to Bloor's' Left and Right Wittgensteinians'. In Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture. University of Chicago Press 283--300.
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  50.  27
    Michael Lynch & Steve Woolgar (1988). Introduction: Sociological Orientations to Representational Practice in Science. [REVIEW] Human Studies 11 (2-3):99 - 116.
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