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Profile: Michael Lynch (University of Connecticut)
  1. Michael P. Lynch (forthcoming). A Functionalist Theory of Truth. The Nature of Truth:723--750.
     
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  2. Michael P. Lynch (forthcoming). Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Incommensurability. Social Epistemology:262--77.
  3. Michael P. Lynch (forthcoming). Truth and Freedom: Rorty and the Problem of Priority. The European Legacy.
    What does truth have to do with freedom? That is, what is the relationship between our political and epistemic principles? In this paper, I grapple and reject Rorty's reasons for thinking that the former can't be based on the latter, but offer an alternative argument that supports his over-all conclusion that our epistemic and political values are ultimately intertwined.
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  4. Michael P. Lynch (forthcoming). The Price of Truth. In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), Pragmatism, Minimalism and Metaphysics.
    Like William James before him, Huw Price has influentially argued that truth has a normative role to play in our thought and talk. I agree. But Price also thinks that we should regard truth-conceived of as property of our beliefs-as something like a metaphysical myth. Here I disagree. In this paper, I argue that reflection on truth's values pushes us in a slightly different direction, one that opens the door to certain metaphysical possibilities that even a Pricean pragmatist can love.
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  5. Michael Lynch (2014). Matters of Fact, and the Fact of Matter. Human Studies 37 (1):139-145.
    My remarks in this brief commentary focus on Chris Calvert-Minor’s (2014) article on Karen Barad’s philosophical writings, and are only indirectly relevant to an assessment of Barad’s work. I have limited acquaintance with Barad’s writings, and even less with Nils Bohr’s. Barad explicitly borrows from Bohr’s theoretical writings when developing her version of feminist epistemology. Barad’s recruitment of Bohr to support her philosophy creates a dilemma for me and other readers who are not conversant with Bohr’s physics/philosophy. To my understanding, (...)
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  6. Michael P. Lynch (2014). In Praise of Reason: Why Rationality Matters for Democracy. The Mit Press.
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  7. Michael Patrick Lynch (2014). Neuromedia, Extended Knowledge and Understanding. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):299-313.
    Imagine you had the functions of your smartphone miniaturized to a cellular level and accessible by your neural network. Reflection on this possibility suggests that we should not just concern ourselves with whether our knowledge is extending “out” to our devices; our devices are extending in, and with them, possibly the information that they bring. If so, then the question of whether knowledge is “extended” becomes wrapped up with the question of whether knowing is something we do, or something we (...)
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  8. Léna Soler, Sjoerd Zwart, Michael Lynch & Vincent Israel-Jost (eds.) (2014). Science After the Practice Turn in the Philosophy, History, and Social Studies of Science. Routledge.
    In the 1980s, philosophical, historical and social studies of science underwent a change which later evolved into a turn to practice. Analysts of science were asked to pay attention to scientific practices in meticulous detail and along multiple dimensions, including the material, social and psychological. Following this turn, the interest in scientific practices continued to increase and had an indelible influence in the various fields of science studies. No doubt, the practice turn changed our conceptions and approaches of science, but (...)
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  9. Francesco Catania & Michael Lynch (2013). A Simple Model to Explain Evolutionary Trends of Eukaryotic Gene Architecture and Expression. Bioessays 35 (6):561-570.
  10. Michael Lynch (2013). At the Margins of Tacit Knowledge. Philosophia Scientiæ 17:55-73.
    Michael Polanyi and H.M. Collins contrast tacit knowledge with explicit knowledge. For Collins, secrets and other forms of “relational tacit knowledge” are tacit, but only in relation to specific circumstances and relationships. Collins treats such relational knowledge as less interesting theoretically than collective knowledge that is essentially difficult and perhaps impossible to convey through explicit formulations. In this paper I focus on relational tacit knowledge, despite its marginality in Collins’s typology, because it draws attention to conceptual ambiguities in the relationship (...)
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  11. Michael Lynch (2013). Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical Reasons. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):343-362.
    In this paper, I raise two questions about epistemic commitments, and thus, indirectly, about our epistemic agency. Can we rationally defend such commitments when challenged to do so? And if so, how?
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  12. Michael Lynch (2013). Science, Truth, and Forensic Cultures: The Exceptional Legal Status of DNA Evidence. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (1):60-70.
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  13. Michael P. Lynch (2013). Expressivism and Plural Truth. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):385-401.
    Contemporary expressivists typically deny that all true judgments must represent reality. Many instead adopt truth minimalism, according to which there is no substantive property of judgments in virtue of which they are true. In this article, I suggest that expressivists would be better suited to adopt truth pluralism, or the view that there is more than one substantive property of judgments in virtue of which judgments are true. My point is not that an expressivism that takes this form is true, (...)
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  14. Michael P. Lynch (2013). Truth in Ethics. In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  15. Michael Lynch (2012). Garfinkel Stories. Human Studies 35 (2):163-168.
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  16. Michael Lynch (2012). Revisiting the Cultural Dope. Human Studies 35 (2):223-233.
    This essay focuses on the "cultural dope," an ironic reference in Harold Garfinkel's Studies in Ethnomethodology to the rule-following actor in conventional sociological theories. In the nearly half-century since the publication of that book, the "cultural dope" has been incorporated into numerous criticisms of "models of man" in the human sciences. Garfinkel's account appeals to many writers because it seems to present an alternative picture of the actor: an individual who is self-aware, reflective, and skilled in the conduct of daily (...)
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  17. Michael Lynch (ed.) (2012). Science and Technology Studies: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences. Routledge.
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  18. Michael P. Lynch (2012). In Praise of Reason. MIT Press.
    Can we give objective reasons for our most basic standards of reason-- our fundamental epistemic principles? I argue, against several forms of skepticism about reason, that we can, but that the reasons we can give for epistemic principles are ultimately practical, not epistemic.
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  19. Michael Patrick Lynch (2012). The Many Faces of Truth: A Response to Some Critics. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2):255-269.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 2, Page 255-269, May 2012.
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  20. Michael J. Lynch & Paul Stretesky (eds.) (2011). Radical and Marxist Theories of Crime. Ashgate.
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  21. Michael P. Lynch (2011). After Truth Gives Way. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):400-409.
    At first glance, Mark Richard's recent book When Truth Gives Out appears, in the most commendable sense of the word, ‘old-fashioned’. Its central thesis is that truth is sometimes the wrong standard to use when assessing the judgements we make about the world. Not all correct judgements are true, and not all incorrect ones are false. They can all be measured, but they cannot all be measured in the same way. -/- Many of the heroes of old, ensconced in philosophical (...)
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  22. Michael P. Lynch (2011). Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-Aptness. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):149-158.
    In this paper, I make two points about Richard’s truth relativism. First, I argue his truth relativism is at odds with his account of truth-aptness. Second, I argue that his truth relativism commits him to a form of pluralism about truth.
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  23. Michael Lynch (2010). The Elusive Nature of Truth. Principia 4 (2):229-256.
    In this essay, I present a new argument for the imposszbility of defining truth by specifying the underlying structural property all and only true propositions have in common. The set of considerations. I use to support this claim take as their inspiration Alston's recent argument that it is impossible to define truth epistemically—in terms of justification or warrant. According to what Alston calls the "intensional argument", epistemic definitions are inconsistent with the T-schema or the principle that it is true that (...)
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  24. Michael P. Lynch (2010). Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement. In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oup Oxford.
     
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  25. David Capps, Michael P. Lynch & Daniel Massey (2009). A Coherent Moral Relativism. Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430.
    Moral relativism is an attractive position, but also one that it is difficult to formulate. In this paper, we propose an alternative way of formulating moral relativism that locates the relativity of morality in the property that makes moral claims true. Such an approach, we believe, has significant advantages over other possible ways of formulating moral relativism. We conclude by considering a few problems such a position might face.
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  26. Michael Lynch (2009). Deception and the Nature of Truth. In Clancy W. Martin (ed.), The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press. 188.
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  27. Michael Lynch (2009). Going Public: A Cautionary Tale. Spontaneous Generations 3 (1):213-219.
    A colleague who was participating in one of the many Darwin bicentennial events on university campuses this year recently asked me, “What was Fuller thinking?” In reply, I sent him a copy of Steve Fuller’s (2009) opinion piece, which had just come out in this journal. In it, Fuller attempts to explain why he decided to perform as an expert witness for the defense in Kitzmiller et al. v. Dover Area School District (US Federal Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2005). (...)
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  28. Michael Lynch (2009). The Truth of Values and the Values of Truth'. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  29. Michael P. Lynch (2009). Review of Elijah Millgram, Hard Truths. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (11).
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  30. Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth as One and Many. Clarendon Press.
    What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories of truth hold that truth has only a single uniform nature. All truths are true in the same way. More recent deflationary theories claim that truth has no nature at all; the concept of truth is of no real philosophical importance. In this concise and clearly written book, Lynch argues that we should reject both these extremes and hold that truth is a functional property. To (...)
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  31. Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
  32. Michael P. Lynch (2009). The Values of Truth and the Truth of Values. In Pritchard, Haddock & MIllar (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 225--42.
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  33. Michael Lynch & Ruth McNally, Forensic DNA Databases : The Co-Production of Law and Surveillance Technology.
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  34. Michael P. Lynch (2008). Alethic Pluralism, Logical Consequence and the Universality of Reason. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):122-140.
  35. Michael P. Lynch (2008). Three Forms of Pluralism About Truth. Philosophia Scientiae 12:109-124.
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  36. Michael Lynch (2007). Expertise, Skepticism and Cynicism: Lessons From Science & Technology Studies. Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science 1 (1):17.
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  37. Michael Lynch (2007). The Origins of Ethnomethodology. In Stephen P. Turner & Mark W. Risjord (eds.), Philosophy of Anthropology and Sociology. Elsevier. 485--516.
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  38. Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.) (2006). Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press.
    Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.
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  39. Michael Lynch (2006). From Ruse to Farce. Social Studies of Science 36 (6):819-826.
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  40. Michael P. Lynch (2006). Rewrighting Pluralism. The Monist 89 (1):63-84.
  41. Michael P. Lynch (2006). Trusting Intuitions. In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism. Oxford University Press. 227--238.
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  42. Michael P. Lynch (2006). Zombies and the Case of the Phenomenal Pickpocket. Synthese 149 (1):37-58.
    A prevailing view in contemporary philosophy of mind is that zombies are logically possible. I argue, via a thought experiment, that if this prevailing view is correct, then I could be transformed into a zombie. If I could be transformed into a zombie, then surprisingly, I am not certain that I am conscious. Regrettably, this is not just an idiosyncratic fact about my psychology; I think you are in the same position. This means that we must revise or replace some (...)
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  43. Michael Lynch & Ruth McNally, Encadenando a Un Monstruo : La Produccion de Representaciones En Un Campu Impuro.
    This paper analyses the topic of representation since the point of view of ethnomethodology and sociology of scientific knowledge. It starts out by discussing the “standard image of representation” and the constructivist proposition of that image. Then, a case of study is presented to suggest how practices for collecting and analyzing forensic evidence in criminal law, can contribute to understand representational adequacy. The aim of this paper is to think differently about representantion considering how it is produced, managed and deconstructed. (...)
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  44. Michael Lynch (2005). Précis to True to Life, and Replies to Commentators. Philosophical Books 46:289-91.
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  45. Michael P. Lynch (2005). Summary. Philosophical Books 46 (4):289-291.
  46. Michael Lynch, Stephen Hilgartner & Carin Berkowitz (2005). Voting Machinery, Counting and Public Proofs in the 2000 US Presidential Election. In Bruno Latour & Peter Weibel (eds.), Making Things Public. Mit Press. 814--25.
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  47. Michael Lynch & Ruth McNally, "Science", "Sens Commun" Et Preuve ADN: Une Controverse Judiciaire a Propos de la Comprehension Publique de la Science ["Science" "Common Sense", and DNA Evidence: A Legal Controversy About the Public Understanding of Science]:A Legal Controversy About the Public Understanding of Science.
    This paper examines the English case, Regina v Adams in which the difference between "scientific reason" and "common sense" was explicitly at stake in the use of DNA evidence. In its decision the Appellate Court reinstated a boundary between "scientific" and "common sense" evidence, arguing that this boundary was necessary to preserve the jury's role as trier of fact. The paper's discussion of the court's work of demarcation addresses the unresolved problems with the place of probability estimates in jury trials.
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  48. Michael Lynch (2004). Circumscribing Expertise: Membership Categories in Courtroom Testimony. In Sheila Jasanoff (ed.), States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order. Routledge. 161--80.
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  49. Michael Lynch (2004). True to Life: Why Truth Matters. Cambridge, Mass.: Mit Press.
  50. Michael P. Lynch (2004). Minimalism and the Value of Truth. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497 - 517.
    Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must (...)
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