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  1. Michael McDermott (2009). A Science of Intention. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):252-273.
    Quine's key argument against intentional psychology is that belief ascriptions have no determinate empirical content unless we take facts about linguistic meaning for granted, but meaning claims have no determinate empirical content unless we take belief for granted. I try to show that, on the contrary, an intentional psychology can explain behaviour without relying on any concept of meaning.
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  2. Michael McDermott (2009). Truth and Assertability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):465 - 470.
    Deflationists say that the equivalence between ‘p is true’ and p is all there is to the meaning of ‘true’. “Use” theories generally construe meaning as acceptance conditions. I argue: (i) there are certain obvious objections to a deflationary theory of truth so formulated; but (ii) they can be overcome if we employ a graded notion of use, i.e. a notion of assertability; but (iii) there appear to be certain further difficulties which cannot be overcome in this way.
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  3. Michael McDermott (2008). Are Plans Necessary? Philosophical Studies 138 (2):225 - 232.
    According to classical decision theory, an agent realises at time t the option with maximum expected utility (determined by his beliefs and desires at t), where the relevant options are possible actions performed at t. I consider an alternative according to which the relevant options are in general plans, complex courses of action extending into the future.
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  4. Michael McDermott (2007). True Antecedents. Acta Analytica 22 (4):333-335.
    In this note I discuss what seems to be a new kind of counterexample to Lewis’s account of counterfactuals. A coin is to be tossed twice. I bet on ‘Two heads’, and I win. Common sense says that (1) is false. But Lewis’s theory says that it is true. (1) If at least one head had come up, I would have won.
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  5. Michael McDermott (2004). Jonathan Bennett, a Philosophical Guide to Conditionals , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003, Pp. 402, £50 (Cloth), £17.99 (Paper). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2):341 – 350.
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  6. Michael McDermott (2003). Closeness of Worlds. Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):227-230.
    An objection is presented to Lewis’s analysis of counterfactual conditionals in terms of relative closeness of possible worlds. The objection depends on no special assumptions about the ‘closer-than’ relation. The argument also casts doubt on Lewis’s claim that Antecedent Strengthening fails for counterfactuals.
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  7. Michael McDermott (2002). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):84 - 101.
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  8. Michael McDermott (2002). Causation: Influence Versus Sufficiency. Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):84-101.
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  9. Michael Mcdermott (1999). Conditionals. Philosophical Review 108 (1):103-106.
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  10. Michael McDermott (1999). Counterfactuals and Access Points. Mind 108 (430):291-334.
    Common sense suggests that counterfactuals are capable of truth and falsity, and that their truth values depend on more than just the actual course of events. Projectivists, like Mackie, deny the first; reductivists, like Lewis, deny the second. I criticize Mackie's and Lewis's theories, thereby defending realism. There are parallel issues and positions concerning the other concepts of the natural necessity family. A realist theory may also have a positive part, consisting of an account of some of the conceptual relations (...)
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  11. Michael McDermott (1997). Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis: Lewis on Indeterministic Causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):396 – 403.
    Lewis considers (Postscript B to 'Causation') the objection that what he calls a plain case of probabilistic causation is really a probable case of plain causation. He replies that the objection rests on the false metaphysical assumption that counterfactuals whose consequents are about events (rather than chances) can be true under indeterminism. The present note argues that this is the wrong kind of reply, because metaphysics is never relevant to conceptual analysis.
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  12. Michael McDermott (1996). On the Truth Conditions of Certain 'If'-Sentences. Philosophical Review 105 (1):1-37.
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  13. Michael McDermott (1996). Reply to Ramachandran. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):330.
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  14. Michael McDermott (1995). Lewis on Causal Dependence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):129 – 139.
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  15. Michael McDermott (1995). Redundant Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):523-544.
    I propose an amendment of Lewis's counterfactual analysis of causation, designed to overcome some difficulties concerning redundant causation.
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  16. Michael McDermott (1988). A Russellian Account of Belief Sentences. Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):141-157.
  17. Michael McDermott (1988). The Narrow Semantics of Names. Mind 97 (386):224-237.
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  18. Michael McDermott (1984). Utility and Rational Self-Interest. Philosophical Studies 46 (2):199 - 214.
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  19. Michael McDermott (1983). Hare's Argument for Utilitarianism. Philosophical Quarterly 33 (133):386-391.
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  20. Michael Mcdermott (1981). Inductive Definitions. Logique Et Analyse 24 (September-December):315-330.
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  21. Michael McDermott (1978). How to Preach. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):633 - 652.
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  22. Michael McDermott (1977). Sets as Open Sentences. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (3):247 - 253.
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